觀音玄義記 4.25

4.25

Third, the three examinations in mutual contrast, in three parts: first, clarifying that stimulus and response are neither identical nor distinct, in two: first, question; second, answer. Because they are not identical, there is stimulus and response; because they are not distinct, they are interconnected. Second, clarifying that stimulus and response are neither false nor real, in two: first, question; second, answer. "Et cetera" means that its sense should be modeled on the above: they are neither identical nor distinct, and neither false nor real. However, with regard to being neither false nor real and neither identical nor distinct, one must grasp their meaning. The mind, the Buddha, and sentient beings—these three are without difference; principle originally has no differentiation, and differentiation is according to phenomenal functioning. Because the principle of the three thousand [realms] is identical, they are not distinct; because the phenomena of delusion and awakening differ, they are not identical. Because of awakening, the Buddha-dharma constitutes the response; because of delusion, the arising of the mind constitutes the stimulus. Because principle is originally one, it is not real; because phenomena are temporarily differentiated, it is not false. Therefore the *Gate of Nonduality* says: "Illusory capacity, illusory stimulus; illusory response, illusory meeting." Thus, prior to the bhūmis and abodes, distinctive marks still persist; in the true stages, portion by portion, they are identical with the Buddha's substance and function. When reaching the ultimate, stimulus and response are both extinguished, so how could one still discourse upon identity and difference, or falsity and reality? Third, from "Taking others' [explanations]" onward, clarifying that stimulus and response are difficult to conceive, in two: first, recounting others' questions and answers, in two: first, doubting that the estrangement between ordinary beings and sages is not stimulus and response. If one strictly examines stimulus and response, their substances are distinct. Although subject and object are mutually posited, ordinary beings and sages are definitively demarcated: that which is stimulated is a sage, definitely not the one capable of stimulating; that which is responded to is an ordinary being, definitively not the one capable of responding. If stimulus and response are separated, how can this be called the communion of the Way? Second, answering that through the preservation and subsumption of subject and object, there is communion of the Way, in two: first, mutually discussing subject and object. First, positing that the stimulated and the responded to are not real. Why? The stimulated is not an ordinary being, hence it is not real; the responded to is not a sage, hence it is not real. Next, positing that the capable response and the capable stimulus are not real. Why? Truly because one again takes the stimulated as the capable response; since the stimulated is already not real, the capable response is not real. Furthermore, one takes the responded to as the capable stimulus; since the responded to is already not real, the capable stimulus is not real. Since the two are already not real, the two are also not distinct. Second, from "Not distinct" onward, separately discussing preservation and subsumption. Since there is neither reality nor distinctness, how is it called the communion of the Way through stimulus and response? Therefore, by mutually preserving and mutually subsuming, one establishes being distinct while not distinct. Because it is by means of the stimulated that it becomes the capable response, and by means of the responded to that it becomes the capable stimulus, stimulus and response are not distinct. Yet now, on the side of the sage, the stimulated is subsumed and designated as the capable response; on the side of ordinary beings, the responded to is subsumed and designated as the capable stimulus; thus it becomes distinct. It is with respect to being distinct that there is stimulus and response; it is with respect to not being distinct that there is communion of the Way. These are the ancient masters' subjective conceptualizations of the meanings of stimulus, response, and communion of the Way. Second, from "Personal objection" onward, Zhang'an refutes and establishes, in two: first, objecting that the other's meaning fails to stand, in two: first, objecting that the established proposition fails to stand, in two: first, clarifying that preservation and subsumption fail to stand. Although they mutually discourse on preservation and subsumption through subject and object, when investigating their actual state, they merely subsume the ordinary stimulus on the side of the sage, and again subsume the sagely response on the side of the ordinary being; because the sage is subsumed, the capable response cannot be obtained, and because the ordinary being is subsumed, the capable stimulus cannot be obtained. If so, stimulus and response are eternally disparate; how can one say they are not distinct? Second, from "Furthermore, stimulus" onward, clarifying that not being distinct fails to stand, the general meaning being the same as before. Second, from "Furthermore, objecting" onward, concluding the errors via the four natures. That the stimulus is capable and the response is object belongs inherently to capacity; that the stimulus is object and the response is capable belongs inherently to response; thus this is self-nature. The next two phrases, although involving stimulus and response, their meanings do not derive from each other, and still belong to self-nature. The next four phrases all arise from the other, thus they belong to other-nature. The third does not arise solely from self, nor solely from other, but requires the two to arise together, thus belonging to shared nature. If divorced from self and other, it belongs to causeless nature. Second, from "Question: If so" onward, clarifying that our [tradition] now skillfully tallies, in two: first, questioning on the grounds that apart from the four phrases there is no stimulus and response. Second, from "Answer: The sage" onward, answering by using the four siddhāntas to establish conditioned arising. The Great Sage has fully realized that the principle and phenomena of the three thousand [realms] are together in one single mind; therefore his mind is impartial. Completely understanding that each and every one is at once empty, conventional, and middle, his mind is without abiding. Since the sage uses this impartiality and non-abiding as the dharma of capable response, he does not abide in or cling to the capacities and stimuli responded to, but merely, following the four capacities of the ten realms—aspirations, suitability, destroying evil, and entering principle—knocks upon them, then spontaneously responds by means of the four dharmas of mundane, individual, therapeutic, and ultimate truth. How could this stimulus and response be conceived in terms of self, other, both, or neither? Furthermore, when sentient beings obtain the four benefits through what arises from self as stimulus and response, it can also be said to be self-stimulus and self-response. If they obtain the four benefits through the [other] three kinds, it can also be said that response arises from stimulus, that stimulus arises from response, that both together can produce stimulus, that both together can produce response, that stimulus exists apart from the two, and that response exists apart from the two—all can be stated. Since there are no four attachments, and the four are spoken in accordance with capacity, the discussions of stimulus and response in the various sūtras and treatises do not go beyond these four.