觀音玄義記 4.25

4.25

三、三番相對簡，三：初、明感應非一異，二：初、問；二、答。不一故感應，不異故相關。二、明感應非虛實，二：初、問；二、答。「云云」者，義應例上，既非一異亦非虛實。然雙非虛實及非一異，須得其意。心佛眾生三無差別，理本無差差約事用。三千理同故不異，迷悟事異故不一。悟故佛法為應，迷故心生是感。理本一故非實，事暫異故非虛。故不二門云「幻機幻感、幻應幻赴。」故地住前異相仍存，真位分分同佛體用。至于究竟感應既亡，復何論於一異虛實？三、「以他」下，明感應難思議，二：初、敘他問答，二：初、疑凡聖隔異非感應。剋論感應，其體各別。雖互立能所，而凡聖定分，所感是聖必非能感、所應是凡定非能應，感應分隔何名道交？二、答能所存沒故道交，二：初、互論能所。先立所感，所應不實。何者？所感非凡故不實，所應非聖故不實。次立能應，能感不實。何者？良以還將所感為能應，所感既不實，故能應不實。又將所應為能感，所應既不實，故能感不實。二既不實，二亦非異。二、「不異」下，各論存沒。既無實無異，何名感應道交？故以互存互沒而立不異而異，以由所感而為能應、所應為能感，故感應不異。而今聖邊沒於所感，目為能應；凡邊沒於所應，目為能感，故成而異。就於而異，故有感應。就其不異，故得道交。斯是古師情解感應及道交義。二、「私難」下，章安破立，二：初、難他義不成，二：初、難立義不成，二：初、明存沒不成。雖以能所互論存沒，究其體狀只於聖邊沒其凡感，復於凡邊沒於聖應，以其聖沒能應不得、凡沒能感不得。若爾，感應永殊，那言不異？二、「又感」下，明不異不成，大意同前。二、「又難」下，以四性結過。感能應所自屬於機，感所應能自屬於應，故是自性。次之二句雖涉感應，義不相由，還屬自性。次有四句皆從彼生，故屬他性。第三不獨由自、不獨由他，須二合生，乃屬共性。若離自他，屬無因性。二、「問若」下，明今能妙契，二：初、離四句無感應以問。二、「答聖」下，用四悉立因緣而答。大聖圓證，三千理事同在一心，故心平等。一一皆了即空假中，故心無住。聖既用此平等無住為能應法，故不住著所應機感，但隨十界樂欲便宜破惡入理四機扣之，即以世界、為人、對治、第一義四種之法任運而應。此之感應豈可以其自他共離而思議邪？又復眾生於自生感應有四益者，亦可說言自感自應。若於三種有四益者，亦可說言由感生應、由應生感，共能生感、共能生應，離二有感、離二有應，皆可得說。既無四執，隨機說四，故諸經論談於感應不出此四也。

Third, the three examinations in mutual contrast, in three parts: first, clarifying that stimulus and response are neither identical nor distinct, in two: first, question; second, answer. Because they are not identical, there is stimulus and response; because they are not distinct, they are interconnected. Second, clarifying that stimulus and response are neither false nor real, in two: first, question; second, answer. "Et cetera" means that its sense should be modeled on the above: they are neither identical nor distinct, and neither false nor real. However, with regard to being neither false nor real and neither identical nor distinct, one must grasp their meaning. The mind, the Buddha, and sentient beings—these three are without difference; principle originally has no differentiation, and differentiation is according to phenomenal functioning. Because the principle of the three thousand [realms] is identical, they are not distinct; because the phenomena of delusion and awakening differ, they are not identical. Because of awakening, the Buddha-dharma constitutes the response; because of delusion, the arising of the mind constitutes the stimulus. Because principle is originally one, it is not real; because phenomena are temporarily differentiated, it is not false. Therefore the *Gate of Nonduality* says: "Illusory capacity, illusory stimulus; illusory response, illusory meeting." Thus, prior to the bhūmis and abodes, distinctive marks still persist; in the true stages, portion by portion, they are identical with the Buddha's substance and function. When reaching the ultimate, stimulus and response are both extinguished, so how could one still discourse upon identity and difference, or falsity and reality? Third, from "Taking others' [explanations]" onward, clarifying that stimulus and response are difficult to conceive, in two: first, recounting others' questions and answers, in two: first, doubting that the estrangement between ordinary beings and sages is not stimulus and response. If one strictly examines stimulus and response, their substances are distinct. Although subject and object are mutually posited, ordinary beings and sages are definitively demarcated: that which is stimulated is a sage, definitely not the one capable of stimulating; that which is responded to is an ordinary being, definitively not the one capable of responding. If stimulus and response are separated, how can this be called the communion of the Way? Second, answering that through the preservation and subsumption of subject and object, there is communion of the Way, in two: first, mutually discussing subject and object. First, positing that the stimulated and the responded to are not real. Why? The stimulated is not an ordinary being, hence it is not real; the responded to is not a sage, hence it is not real. Next, positing that the capable response and the capable stimulus are not real. Why? Truly because one again takes the stimulated as the capable response; since the stimulated is already not real, the capable response is not real. Furthermore, one takes the responded to as the capable stimulus; since the responded to is already not real, the capable stimulus is not real. Since the two are already not real, the two are also not distinct. Second, from "Not distinct" onward, separately discussing preservation and subsumption. Since there is neither reality nor distinctness, how is it called the communion of the Way through stimulus and response? Therefore, by mutually preserving and mutually subsuming, one establishes being distinct while not distinct. Because it is by means of the stimulated that it becomes the capable response, and by means of the responded to that it becomes the capable stimulus, stimulus and response are not distinct. Yet now, on the side of the sage, the stimulated is subsumed and designated as the capable response; on the side of ordinary beings, the responded to is subsumed and designated as the capable stimulus; thus it becomes distinct. It is with respect to being distinct that there is stimulus and response; it is with respect to not being distinct that there is communion of the Way. These are the ancient masters' subjective conceptualizations of the meanings of stimulus, response, and communion of the Way. Second, from "Personal objection" onward, Zhang'an refutes and establishes, in two: first, objecting that the other's meaning fails to stand, in two: first, objecting that the established proposition fails to stand, in two: first, clarifying that preservation and subsumption fail to stand. Although they mutually discourse on preservation and subsumption through subject and object, when investigating their actual state, they merely subsume the ordinary stimulus on the side of the sage, and again subsume the sagely response on the side of the ordinary being; because the sage is subsumed, the capable response cannot be obtained, and because the ordinary being is subsumed, the capable stimulus cannot be obtained. If so, stimulus and response are eternally disparate; how can one say they are not distinct? Second, from "Furthermore, stimulus" onward, clarifying that not being distinct fails to stand, the general meaning being the same as before. Second, from "Furthermore, objecting" onward, concluding the errors via the four natures. That the stimulus is capable and the response is object belongs inherently to capacity; that the stimulus is object and the response is capable belongs inherently to response; thus this is self-nature. The next two phrases, although involving stimulus and response, their meanings do not derive from each other, and still belong to self-nature. The next four phrases all arise from the other, thus they belong to other-nature. The third does not arise solely from self, nor solely from other, but requires the two to arise together, thus belonging to shared nature. If divorced from self and other, it belongs to causeless nature. Second, from "Question: If so" onward, clarifying that our [tradition] now skillfully tallies, in two: first, questioning on the grounds that apart from the four phrases there is no stimulus and response. Second, from "Answer: The sage" onward, answering by using the four siddhāntas to establish conditioned arising. The Great Sage has fully realized that the principle and phenomena of the three thousand [realms] are together in one single mind; therefore his mind is impartial. Completely understanding that each and every one is at once empty, conventional, and middle, his mind is without abiding. Since the sage uses this impartiality and non-abiding as the dharma of capable response, he does not abide in or cling to the capacities and stimuli responded to, but merely, following the four capacities of the ten realms—aspirations, suitability, destroying evil, and entering principle—knocks upon them, then spontaneously responds by means of the four dharmas of mundane, individual, therapeutic, and ultimate truth. How could this stimulus and response be conceived in terms of self, other, both, or neither? Furthermore, when sentient beings obtain the four benefits through what arises from self as stimulus and response, it can also be said to be self-stimulus and self-response. If they obtain the four benefits through the [other] three kinds, it can also be said that response arises from stimulus, that stimulus arises from response, that both together can produce stimulus, that both together can produce response, that stimulus exists apart from the two, and that response exists apart from the two—all can be stated. Since there are no four attachments, and the four are spoken in accordance with capacity, the discussions of stimulus and response in the various sūtras and treatises do not go beyond these four.