金剛三昧經論 1.59

1.59

論曰：此是別治。別治有二：一者況治、二者逐治。況治中言本從因果者，從總出別。總而言之唯因與果。從因出二三，從果出五二；又從因出十支，從果說二支，故所從本但是因果。因果所起興於心行者，因果之起心行為本，心能作因心受果故，心尚不有何況有身者。依上所說觀察道理心不可得。況心所作色身是有乎。身心尚無況有我耶，又心不有故因果亦空，因果尚空況有我乎？又因果空故十二支空，況有作者受者等耶？如經言「菩薩觀十二因緣如虛空不可盡」，此之謂也。已說況破。云何逐治？謂若有我者令滅有見者，牒前況破滅存我執。若無我者令滅無見者，此正逐破無我之病。所以然者？先破我執離外道病，而取無我墮二乘病故。今逐破著無之見，我本非有，況有我無故。總別二觀破我執竟。

The commentary says: This is the specific treatment. The specific treatment has two parts: first, treatment by analogy (a fortiori); second, treatment by direct pursuit. In the treatment by analogy, the statement "fundamentally originate from cause and fruition" brings out the specific from the general. Speaking generally, there are only cause and fruition. From cause emerge two and three; from fruition emerge five and two. Furthermore, from cause ten links are brought forth, and from fruition two links are explained; therefore, that which they fundamentally originate from is merely cause and fruition. In "That which cause and fruition produce arises from mental activities," mental activities are the root of the arising of cause and fruition, because the mind can create causes and the mind receives fruition. In "If the mind does not even exist, how could there be a body?" based on the principle of contemplation explained above, the mind cannot be apprehended. How much less could the physical body created by the mind exist? If body and mind do not even exist, how could there be a self? Moreover, because the mind does not exist, cause and fruition are also empty; if cause and fruition are empty, how could there be a self? Furthermore, because cause and fruition are empty, the twelve links are empty; how could there be an agent, an experiencer, and so forth? As a sūtra says: "The bodhisattva contemplates the twelve links of dependent origination as being like empty space, inexhaustible"—this is what it means. Shattering by analogy has been explained. How is there treatment by direct pursuit? "If there is a self, have them extinguish the view of existence" repeats the previous analogy-shattering to extinguish the clinging to positing a self. "If there is no self, have them extinguish the view of non-existence" directly pursues and shatters the ailment of [clinging to] selflessness. Why is this? First shattering clinging to a self departs from the ailment of non-Buddhists, yet apprehending selflessness falls into the ailment of the two vehicles. Now, directly pursuing and shattering the view of attachment to non-existence, the self fundamentally does not exist; how much less could there be the non-existence of a self? The general and specific contemplations shattering the clinging to a self are concluded.