金剛三昧經論 2.135

2.135

論曰：此下第四明真不有如而無不如義。於中有二：先問、後答。問中亦二：先立道理、後問所疑。言如是名義者，如前所說不可思議之名義相。名義相稱無倒無變，故名真實。如是名義遠離能所一味平等，故名如相。如是名義平等如相，諸佛如來所體，故言如來如相。如不住如者，是明無名之如名當於無如之如義。如無如相相無如故者，無如相之如相，稱於無名之如名。如是稱當能所平等故，若名若義非不如來也。相無如者，如相無如，如相正是無相為相。當知如無如相是明不有如之無相。相無如者，是明不有無相之如。如之體相雖是不有，而亦不無如之體相。如是無如相之如相，方稱無名之如名也。眾生心相相亦如來者，謂諸眾生分別心相，相即非相無不平等，是故彼相亦是如來。上來正立平等道理。次言眾生之心應無別境者，是問所疑。眾生心相既是如來，則眾生心應無別境，無別境者即無分別，無分別故應無染污，無染污故即無三界。有作是疑，故作是問。

The commentary says: From here on, the fourth [section] explains the meaning that the true is not being as thusness, yet there is nothing that is not thusness. Herein there are two parts: first the question, and later the answer. The question also has two parts: first setting forth the principle, and later asking about what is doubted. As for 'such names and meanings,' this refers to the previously explained inconceivable characters of names and meanings. The names and meanings correspond to each other without inversion and without alteration, and therefore are termed 'real.' Such names and meanings are far removed from grasped and grasper, of single taste and equal, and therefore are termed the 'character of thusness.' Such names and meanings, the equal character of thusness, are realized by the buddhas, the tathāgatas; hence it says 'the tathāgata's character of thusness.' 'Thusness does not abide in thusness' explains that the name 'thusness,' which has no name, corresponds to the meaning 'thusness,' which has no thusness. 'Thusness lacks the character of thusness because characters lack thusness' means that the character of thusness that lacks the character of thusness matches the name 'thusness' that is without name. Because they match and correspond in this way, grasper and grasped being equal, both name and meaning are not other than the Tathāgata. 'Characters lack thusness' means that the character of thusness lacks thusness; the character of thusness is precisely taking signlessness as character. One should know that 'thusness lacks the character of thusness' explains the signlessness that is not being as thusness. 'Characters lack thusness' explains the thusness that is not being signless. Although the substance and character of thusness are not being, neither are they without the substance and character of thusness. Only such a character of thusness, which lacks the character of thusness, matches the name 'thusness' that has no name. 'The characters of sentient beings' minds are also the Tathāgata' means that the characters of the discriminative minds of sentient beings, their characters being precisely non-characters, are in all cases equal; therefore, those characters are also the Tathāgata. The above properly establishes the principle of equality. Next, 'the minds of sentient beings ought to have no distinct objective realm' asks about what is doubted: since the characters of sentient beings' minds are already the Tathāgata, then sentient beings' minds ought to have no distinct objective realm. Having no distinct objective realm entails having no discrimination; having no discrimination, there should be no defilement; having no defilement, there would be no three realms. Having this doubt, [the Bodhisattva] therefore poses this question.