大方廣佛華嚴經搜玄分齊通智方軌 3.29.1

3.29.1

六釋文者，此文有三：初偈頌生後、二辨地體、三偈頌結前。 初有十八偈，前有二偈菩薩讚歎、次二諸天三業供養、次二天王及以眷屬讚歎地義、次有十一天女讚地體及諸別行、次一解脫請入後證。 女文分三：初一伎樂供養、次九正歎果德及因、後一默然觀佛。 就前九文中，初四歎果、次五歎因。 因文有三：初一大悲行、次三六度行、次一結成德用。 地體文中，大判有三：一勝慢對治、二不住道行勝、三明彼果勝。 初文有三：一牒前生後，勸修趣入； 二辨相； 三結行成。 初明勝慢對治者，明十平等法，有二種意：一解境、二行境。 言解境者，即此十門為所軌法，「不住道」下明所依行觀門方便。 言行境者，即十平等是觀解初，「不住道」下明觀成相。 又依論別定其文，亦好也。 就十平等，釋相有二：初一總、次九別。 九內有三：初七以無破有、次一以有破無、次一有無雙破。 初文有三：初一空解脫門即無相觀、次五無相解脫門即無生觀、次一無願解脫門即無性觀。 行次第者，此舉解成行外。 疑云：若諸法無，云何住持久立決定？ 為答此疑故，經云「無性故。 」言無性者，無實性也。 又云若諸法無，云何現見實有？ 為破此疑故，經云「一切法無相平等。 」又疑云：若法無相者，有處法生、有處法滅，取心隨見不由自意，云何無相？ 為破此疑故，經云「一切諸法無生平等。 」此下自體空，不如無相等，故異前也。 言無生者，一切諸法並從念生，無有自立，云何云有？ 如論念展轉故。 又云：若法從念生，即因緣非一。 念等諸緣我盡不見，唯見所成安立之法，念等不見自可是無，所成之法應說是有。 為破此疑故，經言「無成故。 」言無成者，既法從他生，汝不見彼從緣而發。 既許法從他生，汝不見此相，當知所見即是。 自謂不得實境、妄見所成，故論云「無成平等。 」此二迷苦諦。 又云：若諸法從他生，無自生性，我許非有； 能成之因既得成他，此有力能，應說是有。 為答此疑故，經云「一切離故一切法平等。 」依經在第八句。 言離者，但所執境情謂是實，論彼所見即無所從：一非先有、二無實理。 所以知？ 若從緣生，即似非實，故知所見即相非有，故論云「染相故。 」此即計集諦。 問：若是集諦，即心聚攝。 解既在境，云何應集？ 答：論能取體，乃應緣似。 煩惱業用計謂境中，境即是無，義歸取相，故說是集。 又云「諸法因緣，尋彼本末俱不可取。 」究其此意，染法依實，迷真而生，染可說無； 所迷真俗滅道二諦，順理應有。 答：汝謂真俗順理是實。 此義不然。 滅道真俗乃是梵行正智境界，云何乃云如謂是實？ 為破此疑故，經云「本淨平等。 」若如謂是實，即雜染心生，不可言本淨，故論云「淨相故。 」此迷滅道二諦。 又云：若法不如所見是實有者，即不應起世間言說； 現見有名種種不同，即驗所目之義非無。 答：如言所執名非一者，是世謂施設，非先實有。 所以知？ 但見世間得義不得名、得名不得義，故知諸名不定從義。 汝謂義實起名等，此即戲論，非實有也。 為破此疑故，經云「無戲論故。 」名不實有，賴義而生； 義不自彰，依名而顯。 此即驗是戲論因緣。 又觀義因，不見名果。 又觀名果，不見義因。 此似戲論亦無，故論云「分別相故。 」所以唯說分別者，為顯即相空也。 此迷四諦名，上已無生觀說。 又云：我已知相是無，了生非有，即驗如實決定可趣。 答：汝謂自見為妄非有，別見離念為可取者，還是分別，故經云「無取捨故。 」無取捨者，本為情謂，是取所見，並皆不真。 今還見離念為所趣，即同前妄，故論云「出沒相故。 」所以唯言出沒，為出沒即空。 上來以無遣有。 又云：我尋相生是無，又知離念非有，當知染淨真俗等法並無其體不可進趣。

Sixth, in explaining the text, this text has three parts: first, the verses giving rise to what follows; second, identifying the essence of the bhūmi; third, the verses concluding what precedes.
First, there are eighteen verses: the first two verses are praises by the bodhisattvas; the next two are offerings made with the three karmas by the devas; the next two are praises of the meaning of the bhūmi by the deva kings and their retinues; the next eleven are praises of the essence of the bhūmi and various particular practices by deva maidens; the next one is the request by Vimukticandra to reveal the entry into the subsequent realization.
The text concerning the maidens is divided into three: the first one is an offering of instrumental music; the next nine directly praise the virtues of the fruit and the cause; the last one is silently gazing upon the Buddha.
Within the preceding nine passages: the first four praise the fruit; the next five praise the cause.
The text on the cause has three parts: the first is the practice of great compassion; the next three are the practices of the six pāramitās; the last one concludes the function of merits.
Within the text on the essence of the bhūmi, there are three general divisions: first, the antidote to superior arrogance; second, the superiority of practice on the path of non-abiding; third, explaining the superiority of that fruit.
The first text has three parts: first, restating what precedes to give rise to what follows, encouraging cultivation to enter; second, identifying the characteristics; third, concluding the accomplishment of practice.
First, in explaining the antidote to superior arrogance, it explains the ten equal dharmas, which has two senses: first, the object of understanding; second, the object of practice.
As for 'the object of understanding': these ten headings are the model teachings, and below 'the path of non-abiding' it clarifies the upāya of the gateway of contemplative practice on which it relies.
As for 'the object of practice': the ten equalities are the beginning of contemplative understanding, and below 'the path of non-abiding' it clarifies the characteristics of the accomplishment of contemplation.
Furthermore, determining the text according to the commentary (Daśabhūmivyākhyāna) is also fine.
Regarding the ten equalities, the explanation of their characteristics has two parts: the first is general, and the next nine are particular.
Within the nine, there are three parts: the first seven refute existence by means of non-existence; the next one refutes non-existence by means of existence; the next one refutes both existence and non-existence.
The first text has three parts: the first one is the emptiness liberation gateway, which is contemplation of signlessness; the next five are the signless liberation gateway, which is contemplation of non-arising; the next one is the wishless liberation gateway, which is contemplation of naturelessness.
Regarding the order of practice: this raises the realization of understanding outside of practice.
A doubt is raised: 'If all phenomena are non-existent, how can they abide and endure, standing definitively for a long time?'
In order to answer this doubt, the sūtra says: 'Because they are without nature.' Saying 'without nature' means without real nature.
It is further asked: 'If all phenomena are non-existent, how is it that they are visibly perceived as real existents?'
In order to refute this doubt, the sūtra says: 'All phenomena are equal in being signless.'
Again, a doubt is raised: 'If phenomena are signless, phenomena arise in one place and cease in another place; the grasping mind follows what is perceived without depending on its own intention—how can they be signless?'
In order to refute this doubt, the sūtra says: 'All phenomena are equal in being unarisen.' From here down, this is the emptiness of own-essence; it is not like signlessness, and therefore differs from what precedes.
Saying 'unarisen' means that all phenomena arise from thought and have no independent existence; how could one say they exist? As the commentary says: because thoughts turn upon one another.
It is further said: 'If phenomena arise from thought, then their causes and conditions are not single. I do not see thoughts and all such conditions at all; I only see the established phenomena that are produced. Since thoughts and so on are not seen, they may well be non-existent, but the phenomena produced should be said to exist.'
In order to refute this doubt, the sūtra says: 'Because there is no accomplishment.' Saying 'no accomplishment' means that since phenomena arise from others, you do not see them as generated from conditions. Since you concede that phenomena arise from others, yet you do not see this characteristic, you should know that what is seen is merely [an illusion]. Presuming of oneself that one has not attained the real object, what is accomplished is falsely seen; therefore the commentary says: 'Equality in non-accomplishment.' These two [clauses] concern delusion regarding the truth of suffering.
It is further said: 'If all phenomena arise from others and have no nature of self-arising, I concede they do not exist; but since the cause that is able to accomplish can accomplish the other, it has efficacy and power, and should be said to exist.'
In order to answer this doubt, the sūtra says: 'Because of separation from all, all phenomena are equal.' According to the sūtra, this is in the eighth phrase. Saying 'separated' means that what is grasped as the object is merely an emotional presumption of reality; examining what they perceive, it has no origin: first, it did not exist previously; second, it has no real principle. How is this known? If it arises from conditions, then it appears [to exist] but is not real; therefore one knows that what is perceived is a mark that does not exist; hence the commentary says: 'Because of the mark of defilement.' This refers to conceiving the truth of origination.
Question: 'If it is the truth of origination, then it is subsumed under the aggregate of the mind. Since the understanding lies in the object, how can it correspond to origination?'
Answer: Examining the essence of the grasper, it merely corresponds to the semblance of conditions. Defilement and karma are falsely conceived within the object; the object is in fact non-existent, and the meaning comes down to grasping marks; hence it is called origination.
It is further said: 'Investigating the root and branch of the causes and conditions of all phenomena, neither can be apprehended.' Examining this intention: defiled phenomena rely on the real, arising from delusion regarding the true, and defilement can be said to be non-existent; but the two truths of cessation and the path, the true and conventional regarding which one is deluded, accord with principle and should exist.
Answer: You claim that the true and conventional accord with principle and are real. This meaning is not correct. Cessation, the path, the true, and the conventional are the realm of the pure conduct of correct wisdom; how can you claim that as conceived they are real?
In order to refute this doubt, the sūtra says: 'Equal in fundamental purity.' If it were real as conceived, then defiled minds would arise, and it could not be called fundamentally pure; hence the commentary says: 'Because of the mark of purity.' This refers to delusion regarding the two truths of cessation and the path.
It is further said: 'If phenomena are not truly existent as perceived, then worldly linguistic expressions should not arise; but we visibly see that names are varied and distinct, which proves that the referents they designate are not non-existent.'
Answer: If one claims that the names grasped are not single, these are worldly conceptual designations, not previously real existents. How is this known? One merely sees in the world that one attains the referent without attaining the name, or attains the name without attaining the referent; therefore one knows that names do not invariably follow from referents. When you claim that referents are real and give rise to names, this is conceptual proliferation and not real existence.
In order to refute this doubt, the sūtra says: 'Because they are without conceptual proliferation.' Names do not truly exist; they arise depending on referents. Referents do not manifest themselves; they become evident relying on names. This proves that they are dependent arisings of conceptual proliferation. Furthermore, observing the cause of the referent, one does not see the fruit of the name. Furthermore, observing the fruit of the name, one does not see the cause of the referent. This semblance of conceptual proliferation is also non-existent; hence the commentary says: 'Because of the mark of discrimination.' The reason it speaks only of discrimination is to reveal that they are empty in their very marks. This refers to delusion regarding the names of the four truths; above, it has already been explained under the contemplation of non-arising.
It is further said: 'I already know that marks are non-existent and understand that arising does not exist; this proves that the as-it-is can definitively be approached.'
Answer: When you claim that your own perception is false and non-existent, and separately see freedom from thought as something to be grasped, this is still discrimination; hence the sūtra says: 'Because of neither grasping nor rejecting.' 'Neither grasping nor rejecting' means that originally, due to emotional presumptions, whatever was perceived was grasped, and all of it was untrue. Now, seeing freedom from thought as that which is to be approached is identical to the previous delusion; hence the commentary says: 'Because of the marks of arising and vanishing.' The reason it only speaks of arising and vanishing is that arising and vanishing are themselves empty.
The above refutes existence by means of non-existence.
It is further said: 'I investigate and find that the arising of marks is non-existent, and also know that freedom from thought does not exist; one must know that phenomena such as defiled, pure, true, and conventional all lack essence and cannot be advanced toward.'