大方廣佛華嚴經搜玄分齊通智方軌 3.29.1

3.29.1

Sixth, in explaining the text, this text has three parts: first, the verses giving rise to what follows; second, identifying the essence of the bhūmi; third, the verses concluding what precedes.
First, there are eighteen verses: the first two verses are praises by the bodhisattvas; the next two are offerings made with the three karmas by the devas; the next two are praises of the meaning of the bhūmi by the deva kings and their retinues; the next eleven are praises of the essence of the bhūmi and various particular practices by deva maidens; the next one is the request by Vimukticandra to reveal the entry into the subsequent realization.
The text concerning the maidens is divided into three: the first one is an offering of instrumental music; the next nine directly praise the virtues of the fruit and the cause; the last one is silently gazing upon the Buddha.
Within the preceding nine passages: the first four praise the fruit; the next five praise the cause.
The text on the cause has three parts: the first is the practice of great compassion; the next three are the practices of the six pāramitās; the last one concludes the function of merits.
Within the text on the essence of the bhūmi, there are three general divisions: first, the antidote to superior arrogance; second, the superiority of practice on the path of non-abiding; third, explaining the superiority of that fruit.
The first text has three parts: first, restating what precedes to give rise to what follows, encouraging cultivation to enter; second, identifying the characteristics; third, concluding the accomplishment of practice.
First, in explaining the antidote to superior arrogance, it explains the ten equal dharmas, which has two senses: first, the object of understanding; second, the object of practice.
As for 'the object of understanding': these ten headings are the model teachings, and below 'the path of non-abiding' it clarifies the upāya of the gateway of contemplative practice on which it relies.
As for 'the object of practice': the ten equalities are the beginning of contemplative understanding, and below 'the path of non-abiding' it clarifies the characteristics of the accomplishment of contemplation.
Furthermore, determining the text according to the commentary (Daśabhūmivyākhyāna) is also fine.
Regarding the ten equalities, the explanation of their characteristics has two parts: the first is general, and the next nine are particular.
Within the nine, there are three parts: the first seven refute existence by means of non-existence; the next one refutes non-existence by means of existence; the next one refutes both existence and non-existence.
The first text has three parts: the first one is the emptiness liberation gateway, which is contemplation of signlessness; the next five are the signless liberation gateway, which is contemplation of non-arising; the next one is the wishless liberation gateway, which is contemplation of naturelessness.
Regarding the order of practice: this raises the realization of understanding outside of practice.
A doubt is raised: 'If all phenomena are non-existent, how can they abide and endure, standing definitively for a long time?'
In order to answer this doubt, the sūtra says: 'Because they are without nature.' Saying 'without nature' means without real nature.
It is further asked: 'If all phenomena are non-existent, how is it that they are visibly perceived as real existents?'
In order to refute this doubt, the sūtra says: 'All phenomena are equal in being signless.'
Again, a doubt is raised: 'If phenomena are signless, phenomena arise in one place and cease in another place; the grasping mind follows what is perceived without depending on its own intention—how can they be signless?'
In order to refute this doubt, the sūtra says: 'All phenomena are equal in being unarisen.' From here down, this is the emptiness of own-essence; it is not like signlessness, and therefore differs from what precedes.
Saying 'unarisen' means that all phenomena arise from thought and have no independent existence; how could one say they exist? As the commentary says: because thoughts turn upon one another.
It is further said: 'If phenomena arise from thought, then their causes and conditions are not single. I do not see thoughts and all such conditions at all; I only see the established phenomena that are produced. Since thoughts and so on are not seen, they may well be non-existent, but the phenomena produced should be said to exist.'
In order to refute this doubt, the sūtra says: 'Because there is no accomplishment.' Saying 'no accomplishment' means that since phenomena arise from others, you do not see them as generated from conditions. Since you concede that phenomena arise from others, yet you do not see this characteristic, you should know that what is seen is merely [an illusion]. Presuming of oneself that one has not attained the real object, what is accomplished is falsely seen; therefore the commentary says: 'Equality in non-accomplishment.' These two [clauses] concern delusion regarding the truth of suffering.
It is further said: 'If all phenomena arise from others and have no nature of self-arising, I concede they do not exist; but since the cause that is able to accomplish can accomplish the other, it has efficacy and power, and should be said to exist.'
In order to answer this doubt, the sūtra says: 'Because of separation from all, all phenomena are equal.' According to the sūtra, this is in the eighth phrase. Saying 'separated' means that what is grasped as the object is merely an emotional presumption of reality; examining what they perceive, it has no origin: first, it did not exist previously; second, it has no real principle. How is this known? If it arises from conditions, then it appears [to exist] but is not real; therefore one knows that what is perceived is a mark that does not exist; hence the commentary says: 'Because of the mark of defilement.' This refers to conceiving the truth of origination.
Question: 'If it is the truth of origination, then it is subsumed under the aggregate of the mind. Since the understanding lies in the object, how can it correspond to origination?'
Answer: Examining the essence of the grasper, it merely corresponds to the semblance of conditions. Defilement and karma are falsely conceived within the object; the object is in fact non-existent, and the meaning comes down to grasping marks; hence it is called origination.
It is further said: 'Investigating the root and branch of the causes and conditions of all phenomena, neither can be apprehended.' Examining this intention: defiled phenomena rely on the real, arising from delusion regarding the true, and defilement can be said to be non-existent; but the two truths of cessation and the path, the true and conventional regarding which one is deluded, accord with principle and should exist.
Answer: You claim that the true and conventional accord with principle and are real. This meaning is not correct. Cessation, the path, the true, and the conventional are the realm of the pure conduct of correct wisdom; how can you claim that as conceived they are real?
In order to refute this doubt, the sūtra says: 'Equal in fundamental purity.' If it were real as conceived, then defiled minds would arise, and it could not be called fundamentally pure; hence the commentary says: 'Because of the mark of purity.' This refers to delusion regarding the two truths of cessation and the path.
It is further said: 'If phenomena are not truly existent as perceived, then worldly linguistic expressions should not arise; but we visibly see that names are varied and distinct, which proves that the referents they designate are not non-existent.'
Answer: If one claims that the names grasped are not single, these are worldly conceptual designations, not previously real existents. How is this known? One merely sees in the world that one attains the referent without attaining the name, or attains the name without attaining the referent; therefore one knows that names do not invariably follow from referents. When you claim that referents are real and give rise to names, this is conceptual proliferation and not real existence.
In order to refute this doubt, the sūtra says: 'Because they are without conceptual proliferation.' Names do not truly exist; they arise depending on referents. Referents do not manifest themselves; they become evident relying on names. This proves that they are dependent arisings of conceptual proliferation. Furthermore, observing the cause of the referent, one does not see the fruit of the name. Furthermore, observing the fruit of the name, one does not see the cause of the referent. This semblance of conceptual proliferation is also non-existent; hence the commentary says: 'Because of the mark of discrimination.' The reason it speaks only of discrimination is to reveal that they are empty in their very marks. This refers to delusion regarding the names of the four truths; above, it has already been explained under the contemplation of non-arising.
It is further said: 'I already know that marks are non-existent and understand that arising does not exist; this proves that the as-it-is can definitively be approached.'
Answer: When you claim that your own perception is false and non-existent, and separately see freedom from thought as something to be grasped, this is still discrimination; hence the sūtra says: 'Because of neither grasping nor rejecting.' 'Neither grasping nor rejecting' means that originally, due to emotional presumptions, whatever was perceived was grasped, and all of it was untrue. Now, seeing freedom from thought as that which is to be approached is identical to the previous delusion; hence the commentary says: 'Because of the marks of arising and vanishing.' The reason it only speaks of arising and vanishing is that arising and vanishing are themselves empty.
The above refutes existence by means of non-existence.
It is further said: 'I investigate and find that the arising of marks is non-existent, and also know that freedom from thought does not exist; one must know that phenomena such as defiled, pure, true, and conventional all lack essence and cannot be advanced toward.'