華嚴經探玄記 12.14.2

12.14.2

五約支分者，問：等是隨順義是支義，何故初定以尋伺為對治，不立內淨等？ 答：為此定初故，尋求伺察欲界過患，而能治彼欲等尋伺，故立此支。 內淨為此尋伺麁相之所覆故，體不顯現，是故不立。 問：捨念正知何故二禪合為內淨，三禪四禪方乃分之？ 答：二禪捨等為喜麁相之所覆故，是故不分； 但約離外尋伺，名為內淨。 問：等分三法，何故第四不立正知，答：正知明顯，四定行捨其相微隱，相違不立。 又為勝捨所覆障故，以勝捨受是無明分，正知是明，相違害故，是故不立。 問：輕安在定一切地有，何故不立輕安支？ 答：輕安浮動，初二靜慮喜受浮動相順所覆，三四靜慮行捨沈靜相違所覆，總不立支。 問：若爾，小乘何故初二立輕安支？ 答：彼據除欲界五識身及初定三識身，各除所引身麁重，故立輕安； 後以二三定中無麁識身及所引身麁重可對治故，三四定不立輕安。 今依大乘，是樂受攝，故不別立。 六約建立者，問：禪既有四，支數應同，何故初三各有五、二四各唯四？ 答：為欲界欲惡難除，二定喜深難離，欲為牢強對治，是故初禪及三各立五支。 以初定及三無此難遣，是故二四唯立四支。 七約決擇者，問：若初定支，亦二禪耶？ 答：應作四句。 有是初支非第二，謂尋、伺； 有是第二非初禪，謂內等淨； 有通初二，謂喜、樂、定； 有非初二，謂除上說。 又問：若是初支，亦第三耶？ 答：亦作四句。 有是初禪非第三，謂尋、伺、喜； 有是第三非初禪，謂捨、念、慧； 有亦初禪亦第三，謂樂及心一境性； 有是俱非，謂除上說。 又尋伺喜樂是初非四、捨受捨念是四非初、心一境性亦初亦四，與上相違非初非四。 以第二等望，餘各四句，準之可見。 八約道品者，問：若是禪支，亦道支耶？ 答：應作四句。 或是禪支非道支，謂尋、伺、樂及不苦不樂； 或道支非禪支，謂精進、信、輕安、正思、語、業、命； 或俱，謂喜、行捨、念、定、慧； 或俱非，除上所說。 第四業用者，有四：一約發智斷惑、二約發通起用、三約諸定超間、四約定用自在。 初中，若諸外道修得四禪起有流智，伏欲界惑得生上界，或取無想以為涅槃。 若諸小乘，依此能發無漏聖智，斷人我惑得阿羅漢。 若菩薩人，或為眾生示入世定而不隨生，或復依此成於無相無生等觀發真聖智，斷除二障得成佛果。 若普賢等及諸如來，依此示入百千三昧。 第二發通者，外道依此發起五通，見過未等起諸邪見。 二乘依此所起六通，然有限分。 菩薩依此發五或六，分齊過小，隨位應知。 普賢及佛依此所發或六或十，皆無限分。 第三諸定超間者，外道於定不得自在。 二乘或有次第出入，或於九定次第超入，或雙雙超或首尾超。 菩薩能依一定出百千定等。 普賢及佛能入塵數定，一一復各生於塵等，如是自在無有限量。 第四定用者，外道總無。 二乘只有依定發用，不得即定為用。 若初教菩薩在於定中，雖無五識業用，由前願力擊發餘識示有作用，說為俱起。 若終教菩薩，能即定即用，雙行自在，以理事無礙故。 若頓教菩薩，定用為一，雙絕兩名故。 若圓教普賢，即在定為起用，而不改定相，以二事相即故。 七辨相者，四禪即為四，一一中各有四義：一離障、二修行對治、三修利益、四彼二依止三昧。 初禪離欲，等明離障，諸說不同。 依《毘曇》，離五欲故名離欲，斷十惡故名離惡，除五蓋故名離不善法。 依《成實》，斷貪欲心名為離欲，以離欲故亦捨殺等名離惡不善法。 依《智論》，離五欲名離欲，除五蓋名離惡不善。 又諸欲發惡行墮極下惡處名欲惡，違生善品名不善，或總欲界諸惡不善俱皆捨離。 依《雜集論》第八云「能斷欲界欲恚害等。 」二有覺有觀者，是修對治。 《智論》云「譬如振鈴，麁聲喻覺、細聲喻觀。

Fifth, regarding [their distribution among] the limbs: Question: Since all equally have the meaning of compliance, which is the meaning of a limb, why does the first dhyāna take vitarka and vicāra as antidotes and not establish internal confidence, and so forth? Answer: Because this is the first dhyāna, one searches out and examines the faults of the desire realm, and is able to counter those coarse searchings and examinings of desire and the like; therefore, these limbs are established. Internal confidence is concealed by these coarse marks of vitarka and vicāra, and its essence is not manifested; therefore, it is not established. Question: Why are equanimity, mindfulness, and correct knowledge combined into internal confidence in the second dhyāna, and only distinguished in the third and fourth dhyānas? Answer: In the second dhyāna, equanimity and the others are concealed by the coarse mark of joy; therefore, they are not differentiated. It is merely designated as internal confidence in terms of departing from external vitarka and vicāra. Question: If the three dharmas are equally differentiated [later], why does the fourth dhyāna not establish correct knowledge? Answer: Correct knowledge is distinct and evident, whereas in the fourth dhyāna the mark of equanimity toward activities (saṃskāropekṣā) is subtle and concealed; since their marks are contrary, it is not established. Furthermore, because it is covered and obscured by superior equanimity—since the feeling of superior equanimity belongs to the portion of non-knowledge (avidyā), whereas correct knowledge is clarity, they oppose and obstruct each other—therefore, it is not established. Question: Pliancy (praśrabdhi) exists in concentration across all stages; why is a limb of pliancy not established? Answer: Pliancy is fluttering and light; in the first and second dhyānas, it is covered by its conformity with the fluctuating nature of the feeling of joy, while in the third and fourth dhyānas, it is covered by its opposition to the deep tranquility of equanimity toward activities; thus, it is not established as a limb at all. Question: If so, why does the Hīnayāna establish the limb of pliancy in the first and second dhyānas? Answer: They establish pliancy on the basis of eliminating the five-consciousness-bodies of the desire realm and the three-consciousness-bodies of the first dhyāna, each eliminating the bodily heaviness induced thereby; later, because in the second and third dhyānas there are no coarse consciousness-bodies or induced bodily heaviness to be countered, pliancy is not established in the third and fourth dhyānas. Now, according to the Mahāyāna, it is subsumed under the feeling of pleasure, and thus is not separately established. Sixth, regarding their constitution: Question: Since there are four dhyānas, the number of limbs should be identical; why do the first and third each have five, while the second and fourth each have only four? Answer: Because the desires and evils of the desire realm are difficult to eliminate, and the joy of the second dhyāna is profound and difficult to depart from, one wishes to provide strong antidotes; therefore, the first dhyāna and the third each establish five limbs. Since the first dhyāna and the third [as antidotes to those difficulties] leave the second and fourth without such intractable faults to discard, the second and fourth only establish four limbs. Seventh, regarding discrimination: Question: If it is a limb of the first dhyāna, is it also of the second dhyāna? Answer: One should form four propositions: (1) There are those that are limbs of the first and not of the second, namely vitarka and vicāra; (2) there are those that are of the second and not of the first, namely internal purity [and confidence]; (3) there are those common to both the first and second, namely joy, pleasure, and concentration; (4) there are those belonging to neither the first nor the second, namely those other than the above. Again, Question: If it is a limb of the first, is it also of the third? Answer: One likewise forms four propositions: (1) There are those of the first dhyāna and not of the third, namely vitarka, vicāra, and joy; (2) there are those of the third and not of the first, namely equanimity, mindfulness, and wisdom; (3) there are those of both the first dhyāna and the third, namely pleasure and one-pointedness of mind; (4) there are those that are neither, namely those other than the above. Furthermore, vitarka, vicāra, joy, and pleasure belong to the first and not the fourth; the feeling of equanimity and equanimous mindfulness belong to the fourth and not the first; one-pointedness of mind belongs to both the first and the fourth; those contrary to the above belong to neither the first nor the fourth. Comparing the second and the rest, each likewise has four propositions, which can be understood accordingly. Eighth, regarding the factors of awakening: Question: If it is a dhyāna limb, is it also a limb of the path (mārgāṅga)? Answer: One should form four propositions: (1) It may be a dhyāna limb and not a path limb, namely vitarka, vicāra, pleasure, and neither-pain-nor-pleasure; (2) or a path limb and not a dhyāna limb, namely vigor, faith, pliancy, correct thought, [correct] speech, [correct] action, and [correct] livelihood; (3) or both, namely joy, equanimity toward activities, mindfulness, concentration, and wisdom; (4) or neither, those other than the above. Fourth, karmic function has four aspects: (1) regarding generating wisdom and cutting off defilements; (2) regarding generating supernormal powers and producing activities; (3) regarding leaping over and intervening among various concentrations; (4) regarding sovereignty in the function of concentration. First, if non-Buddhists cultivate and attain the four dhyānas, they give rise to defiled wisdom, subdue the defilements of the desire realm, and obtain rebirth in higher realms, or take the non-ideation [state] to be nirvāṇa. If Hīnayāna practitioners, relying on this, they can generate uncontaminated noble wisdom, cut off the defilement of self-grasping, and attain arhatship. If bodhisattvas, they may, for the sake of sentient beings, manifest entering mundane concentrations without being reborn accordingly, or relying on this, fulfill contemplations of signlessness, non-arising, and the like, generate true noble wisdom, sever the two obscurations, and attain the fruit of Buddhahood. If Samantabhadra and others, as well as the Tathāgatas, relying on this, they manifest entering hundreds of thousands of samādhis. Second, regarding generating supernormal powers: non-Buddhists, relying on this, generate the five supernormal powers, seeing past and future, and so forth, yet giving rise to various wrong views. The two vehicles, relying on this, give rise to the six supernormal powers, yet these have finite limits. Bodhisattvas, relying on this, generate five or six; their scope surpasses the Hīnayāna, and should be known according to their bhūmis. Samantabhadra and the Buddhas, relying on this, generate six or ten, all without limitation. Third, regarding leaping over various concentrations: non-Buddhists do not attain sovereignty over concentration. The two vehicles may enter and emerge sequentially, or leap through the nine concentrations in sequence, or leap in pairs, or leap from start to finish. Bodhisattvas can, relying on a single concentration, manifest hundreds of thousands of concentrations, and so forth. Samantabhadra and the Buddhas can enter concentrations as numerous as dust particles, and within each one, further produce dust-particle-like [concentrations] and the like; such sovereignty has no limit. Fourth, regarding the function of concentration: non-Buddhists have none at all. The two vehicles only produce functions by relying on concentration; they cannot take concentration itself as function. If it is a bodhisattva of the Initial Teaching, while in concentration, although devoid of the karmic function of the five consciousnesses, due to the power of prior vows they stimulate the remaining consciousnesses to manifest having function, which is described as arising simultaneously. If it is a bodhisattva of the Final Teaching, they are able to be simultaneously in concentration and in function, acting doubly with sovereignty, because principle and phenomena are unhindered. If it is a bodhisattva of the Sudden Teaching, concentration and function are one, because both designations are obliterated. If it is Samantabhadra of the Perfect Teaching, entering concentration is itself producing function without altering the characteristics of concentration, because the two phenomena are mutually identical. Seventh, distinguishing the characteristics: the four dhyānas constitute four, and within each there are four meanings: (1) departing from hindrances; (2) cultivating the antidotes; (3) cultivating benefits; (4) the samādhi that is the basis of both. In the first dhyāna, 'departing from desires' and so forth elucidate departing from hindrances; various explanations differ. According to the Abhidharma, departing from the five desires is called 'departing from desires,' cutting off the ten evils is called 'departing from evils,' and eliminating the five hindrances is called 'departing from unwholesome dharmas.' According to the Tattvasiddhi, severing the mind of greedy desire is called 'departing from desires,' and because one departs from desires, one also abandons killing and the rest, which is called 'departing from evil and unwholesome dharmas.' According to the Dà zhìdù lùn, departing from the five desires is called 'departing from desires,' and eliminating the five hindrances is called 'departing from evil and unwholesome [dharmas].' Furthermore, desires that give rise to evil actions and cause one to fall into the lowest evil destinies are called 'desire-evils'; those that conflict with the generation of wholesome factors are called 'unwholesome'; or all evils and unwholesome states of the desire realm are collectively abandoned. According to fascicle eight of the Samuccaya: 'It can cut off the desire, ill will, harmfulness, and the like of the desire realm.' Second, 'having vitarka and vicāra' constitutes cultivating the antidotes. The Dà zhìdù lùn states: 'For example, like shaking a bell, the coarse sound is an analogy for vitarka, and the subtle sound is an analogy for vicāra.'