華嚴經探玄記 12.14.2

12.14.2

Fifth, regarding [their distribution among] the limbs: Question: Since all equally have the meaning of compliance, which is the meaning of a limb, why does the first dhyāna take vitarka and vicāra as antidotes and not establish internal confidence, and so forth? Answer: Because this is the first dhyāna, one searches out and examines the faults of the desire realm, and is able to counter those coarse searchings and examinings of desire and the like; therefore, these limbs are established. Internal confidence is concealed by these coarse marks of vitarka and vicāra, and its essence is not manifested; therefore, it is not established. Question: Why are equanimity, mindfulness, and correct knowledge combined into internal confidence in the second dhyāna, and only distinguished in the third and fourth dhyānas? Answer: In the second dhyāna, equanimity and the others are concealed by the coarse mark of joy; therefore, they are not differentiated. It is merely designated as internal confidence in terms of departing from external vitarka and vicāra. Question: If the three dharmas are equally differentiated [later], why does the fourth dhyāna not establish correct knowledge? Answer: Correct knowledge is distinct and evident, whereas in the fourth dhyāna the mark of equanimity toward activities (saṃskāropekṣā) is subtle and concealed; since their marks are contrary, it is not established. Furthermore, because it is covered and obscured by superior equanimity—since the feeling of superior equanimity belongs to the portion of non-knowledge (avidyā), whereas correct knowledge is clarity, they oppose and obstruct each other—therefore, it is not established. Question: Pliancy (praśrabdhi) exists in concentration across all stages; why is a limb of pliancy not established? Answer: Pliancy is fluttering and light; in the first and second dhyānas, it is covered by its conformity with the fluctuating nature of the feeling of joy, while in the third and fourth dhyānas, it is covered by its opposition to the deep tranquility of equanimity toward activities; thus, it is not established as a limb at all. Question: If so, why does the Hīnayāna establish the limb of pliancy in the first and second dhyānas? Answer: They establish pliancy on the basis of eliminating the five-consciousness-bodies of the desire realm and the three-consciousness-bodies of the first dhyāna, each eliminating the bodily heaviness induced thereby; later, because in the second and third dhyānas there are no coarse consciousness-bodies or induced bodily heaviness to be countered, pliancy is not established in the third and fourth dhyānas. Now, according to the Mahāyāna, it is subsumed under the feeling of pleasure, and thus is not separately established. Sixth, regarding their constitution: Question: Since there are four dhyānas, the number of limbs should be identical; why do the first and third each have five, while the second and fourth each have only four? Answer: Because the desires and evils of the desire realm are difficult to eliminate, and the joy of the second dhyāna is profound and difficult to depart from, one wishes to provide strong antidotes; therefore, the first dhyāna and the third each establish five limbs. Since the first dhyāna and the third [as antidotes to those difficulties] leave the second and fourth without such intractable faults to discard, the second and fourth only establish four limbs. Seventh, regarding discrimination: Question: If it is a limb of the first dhyāna, is it also of the second dhyāna? Answer: One should form four propositions: (1) There are those that are limbs of the first and not of the second, namely vitarka and vicāra; (2) there are those that are of the second and not of the first, namely internal purity [and confidence]; (3) there are those common to both the first and second, namely joy, pleasure, and concentration; (4) there are those belonging to neither the first nor the second, namely those other than the above. Again, Question: If it is a limb of the first, is it also of the third? Answer: One likewise forms four propositions: (1) There are those of the first dhyāna and not of the third, namely vitarka, vicāra, and joy; (2) there are those of the third and not of the first, namely equanimity, mindfulness, and wisdom; (3) there are those of both the first dhyāna and the third, namely pleasure and one-pointedness of mind; (4) there are those that are neither, namely those other than the above. Furthermore, vitarka, vicāra, joy, and pleasure belong to the first and not the fourth; the feeling of equanimity and equanimous mindfulness belong to the fourth and not the first; one-pointedness of mind belongs to both the first and the fourth; those contrary to the above belong to neither the first nor the fourth. Comparing the second and the rest, each likewise has four propositions, which can be understood accordingly. Eighth, regarding the factors of awakening: Question: If it is a dhyāna limb, is it also a limb of the path (mārgāṅga)? Answer: One should form four propositions: (1) It may be a dhyāna limb and not a path limb, namely vitarka, vicāra, pleasure, and neither-pain-nor-pleasure; (2) or a path limb and not a dhyāna limb, namely vigor, faith, pliancy, correct thought, [correct] speech, [correct] action, and [correct] livelihood; (3) or both, namely joy, equanimity toward activities, mindfulness, concentration, and wisdom; (4) or neither, those other than the above. Fourth, karmic function has four aspects: (1) regarding generating wisdom and cutting off defilements; (2) regarding generating supernormal powers and producing activities; (3) regarding leaping over and intervening among various concentrations; (4) regarding sovereignty in the function of concentration. First, if non-Buddhists cultivate and attain the four dhyānas, they give rise to defiled wisdom, subdue the defilements of the desire realm, and obtain rebirth in higher realms, or take the non-ideation [state] to be nirvāṇa. If Hīnayāna practitioners, relying on this, they can generate uncontaminated noble wisdom, cut off the defilement of self-grasping, and attain arhatship. If bodhisattvas, they may, for the sake of sentient beings, manifest entering mundane concentrations without being reborn accordingly, or relying on this, fulfill contemplations of signlessness, non-arising, and the like, generate true noble wisdom, sever the two obscurations, and attain the fruit of Buddhahood. If Samantabhadra and others, as well as the Tathāgatas, relying on this, they manifest entering hundreds of thousands of samādhis. Second, regarding generating supernormal powers: non-Buddhists, relying on this, generate the five supernormal powers, seeing past and future, and so forth, yet giving rise to various wrong views. The two vehicles, relying on this, give rise to the six supernormal powers, yet these have finite limits. Bodhisattvas, relying on this, generate five or six; their scope surpasses the Hīnayāna, and should be known according to their bhūmis. Samantabhadra and the Buddhas, relying on this, generate six or ten, all without limitation. Third, regarding leaping over various concentrations: non-Buddhists do not attain sovereignty over concentration. The two vehicles may enter and emerge sequentially, or leap through the nine concentrations in sequence, or leap in pairs, or leap from start to finish. Bodhisattvas can, relying on a single concentration, manifest hundreds of thousands of concentrations, and so forth. Samantabhadra and the Buddhas can enter concentrations as numerous as dust particles, and within each one, further produce dust-particle-like [concentrations] and the like; such sovereignty has no limit. Fourth, regarding the function of concentration: non-Buddhists have none at all. The two vehicles only produce functions by relying on concentration; they cannot take concentration itself as function. If it is a bodhisattva of the Initial Teaching, while in concentration, although devoid of the karmic function of the five consciousnesses, due to the power of prior vows they stimulate the remaining consciousnesses to manifest having function, which is described as arising simultaneously. If it is a bodhisattva of the Final Teaching, they are able to be simultaneously in concentration and in function, acting doubly with sovereignty, because principle and phenomena are unhindered. If it is a bodhisattva of the Sudden Teaching, concentration and function are one, because both designations are obliterated. If it is Samantabhadra of the Perfect Teaching, entering concentration is itself producing function without altering the characteristics of concentration, because the two phenomena are mutually identical. Seventh, distinguishing the characteristics: the four dhyānas constitute four, and within each there are four meanings: (1) departing from hindrances; (2) cultivating the antidotes; (3) cultivating benefits; (4) the samādhi that is the basis of both. In the first dhyāna, 'departing from desires' and so forth elucidate departing from hindrances; various explanations differ. According to the Abhidharma, departing from the five desires is called 'departing from desires,' cutting off the ten evils is called 'departing from evils,' and eliminating the five hindrances is called 'departing from unwholesome dharmas.' According to the Tattvasiddhi, severing the mind of greedy desire is called 'departing from desires,' and because one departs from desires, one also abandons killing and the rest, which is called 'departing from evil and unwholesome dharmas.' According to the Dà zhìdù lùn, departing from the five desires is called 'departing from desires,' and eliminating the five hindrances is called 'departing from evil and unwholesome [dharmas].' Furthermore, desires that give rise to evil actions and cause one to fall into the lowest evil destinies are called 'desire-evils'; those that conflict with the generation of wholesome factors are called 'unwholesome'; or all evils and unwholesome states of the desire realm are collectively abandoned. According to fascicle eight of the Samuccaya: 'It can cut off the desire, ill will, harmfulness, and the like of the desire realm.' Second, 'having vitarka and vicāra' constitutes cultivating the antidotes. The Dà zhìdù lùn states: 'For example, like shaking a bell, the coarse sound is an analogy for vitarka, and the subtle sound is an analogy for vicāra.'