華嚴經探玄記 2.8

2.8

第四釋文。依《智論》，如，順也。是，信也，又是印也。即印順信受，故言如是。如是總舉一部文義，謂指己所聞之法，故云如是。依長耳三藏，約三寶釋：一約佛云，謂如佛所說是我所聞，如我所聞是佛所說。二約法云，如我所聞是稱理之說，如稱理之教是我所傳。三約僧云，如我所聞是諸菩薩之所同聞，如諸菩薩之所同聞是我所傳故也。依《佛地論》，云傳佛教者，言如是之事我昔曾聞。如是總言依四義轉：一依譬喻、二依教誨、三依問答、四依許可，廣釋如彼論。中我者，謂五蘊假者。汎論我有四種：一真我，謂真如中常樂我淨等，真如為性；二自在我，謂八自在我等，以智為性；三假我，謂五蘊假者，以唯識所現，似有主宰等以其為性；四執我，謂分別俱生所執為性。又緣我之心亦有四種：一見，謂諸凡夫等；二慢，謂諸學人；三習，謂無學人；四隨世流布，謂諸佛。此中我者，於前四中通有初三。約教准之，後四中唯一，亦可通後三，思准之。何故不說無我而說我耶？謂顯親聞故、語便故、隨世間故、顯無我故，竝如《智論》說也。問：傳法者何故不自稱名而言我耶？答：有濫同名失故。問：我豈不通耶？答：已稱我，定屬自故、簡別他故。問：何不言耳聞？答：以總收別故。問：耳但聞聲，豈能解耶？答：耳聞其聲，意解文等，和合無二，從親說聞。薩婆多根聞，《成實》識聞，《智論》和合聞，即空無作也。《涅槃》云「四因緣和合故聞：一耳根不壞、二聲在可聞境、三中間無障礙、四有欲聞故得聞。」是故此聞則不聞聞也。又具十緣：一本識為根本依、二耳識種子為因緣依、三末那為染污依、四意識為分別依、五自類耳識為等無間依、六耳根不壞為同境根、七作意欲聞、八有境為所緣緣、九中間無障礙、十境近在可聞亦通餘法不礙等。是故此聞，無自性故不聞聞也。約教，准辨之。「一時」以下通二序，即是六句之內後四句。於中初三同辨，謂時、主及處；後一別辨，謂同聞眾。此亦即是三世間相應知。前中亦二：先通標三相、後「始成正覺」下別釋三義。何故有此二門者？謂約處，前則通舉染淨，後則別顯淨相。又前寄染、後別辨淨。又以時有始終、處有染淨、佛有淺深，故須重料簡也。

Fourth, explaining the text. According to the Dà zhìdù lùn, 'thus' (ru) means conformity; 'this' (shi) means faith, and also endorsement. That is, by endorsing, conforming to, and faithfully accepting it, one says 'thus.' 'Thus' collectively brings up the text and meaning of the entire work, indicating the Dharma that one has heard oneself; therefore it says 'thus.' According to Tripiṭaka Master Chang'er, it is explained in terms of the Triratna: first, in terms of the Buddha, it means 'as what the Buddha taught is what I heard, so what I heard is what the Buddha taught'; second, in terms of the Dharma, 'as what I heard is teaching that conforms to principle, so the teaching that conforms to principle is what I transmit'; third, in terms of the Saṅgha, 'as what I heard is what the bodhisattvas jointly heard, so what the bodhisattvas jointly heard is what I transmit.' According to the Buddhabhūmi-vyākhyāna, the transmitter of the Buddha's teaching says, 'Things such as this, I once heard in the past.' 'Thus' is a collective term applied according to four senses: first, based on analogy; second, based on instruction; third, based on question and answer; fourth, based on assent; as explained extensively in that treatise. As for 'I' therein, it refers to the provisional person of the five aggregates. Broadly speaking, there are four kinds of 'I': first, the true I, meaning the eternity, bliss, self, and purity in tathatā, having tathatā as its nature; second, the autonomous I, meaning the eight autonomous selves and so forth, having wisdom as its nature; third, the provisional I, meaning the provisional person of the five aggregates, taking what appears in vijñapti-mātra as seemingly possessing an overlord as its nature; fourth, the grasped I, taking what is grasped by conceptual discrimination and innately co-arising as its nature. Furthermore, the minds that take an 'I' as their object also have four kinds: first, view, meaning ordinary beings and the like; second, conceit, meaning those in training (śaikṣa); third, residual habit, meaning those beyond training (aśaikṣa); fourth, following worldly convention, meaning the Buddhas. As for the 'I' here, among the former four it generally possesses the first three. In reference to the teachings, among the latter four it is only the one [fourth], or it may also encompass the latter three; this should be considered accordingly. Why not state non-self and instead state 'I'? It is to show direct hearing, for convenience of speech, to conform to worldly convention, and to reveal non-self, all as explained in the Dà zhìdù lùn. Question: Why does the transmitter of the Dharma not state his own name instead of saying 'I'? Answer: Because there is the fault of confusion with identical names. Question: Is 'I' not also general? Answer: Having already stated 'I', it definitely belongs to oneself and distinguishes one from others. Question: Why not say 'heard with the ear'? Answer: Because the whole encompasses the parts. Question: The ear only hears sound; how could it understand? Answer: The ear hears its sound, and the mind understands the text, harmoniously united without duality; thus 'hearing' is spoken of from what is immediate. In the Sarvāstivāda, the sense organ hears; in the Tattvasiddhi, consciousness hears; in the Dà zhìdù lùn, the harmony hears, which is empty and uncreated. The Nirvāṇa Sūtra says: 'Hearing occurs through the harmony of four causes and conditions: first, the ear faculty is undamaged; second, sound is in the perceptible range; third, there is no obstruction in between; fourth, having the desire to hear, one thereby hears.' Therefore, this hearing is hearing without hearing. Furthermore, it possesses ten conditions: first, the fundamental consciousness as the fundamental support; second, the seed of ear-consciousness as the causal condition support; third, the manas as the defiled support; fourth, the mental consciousness as the discriminative support; fifth, ear-consciousness of its own class as the immediately preceding support; sixth, the undamaged ear faculty as the shared-object faculty; seventh, attention desiring to hear; eighth, the presence of an object as the objective condition; ninth, no obstruction in between; tenth, the object being near in a hearable range and unobstructed by other phenomena. Therefore, this hearing, being without intrinsic nature, is hearing without hearing. This should be determined in reference to the teachings. From 'At one time' onwards applies to both prefaces, which are the latter four clauses of the six clauses. Among them, the first three are determined together, namely time, host, and place; the last one is determined separately, namely the assembly of joint hearers. This should also be known as corresponding to the three realms. The former part also has two aspects: first, generally indicating the three characteristics; later, from 'when first realizing perfect enlightenment' onwards, separately explaining the three meanings. Why are there these two approaches? In terms of place, the former generally brings up the defiled and pure, while the latter separately reveals the pure aspect. Moreover, the former resorts to the defiled, and the latter separately determines the pure. Furthermore, because time has beginning and end, place has defilement and purity, and Buddha has shallow and profound, they must be examined again.