華嚴經探玄記 3.58
華嚴經探玄記 3.58
- Language
- Classical Chinese
3.58
第六共不共者,於中有二:先明分齊、後顯義相。初中隨一世界皆是有情,謂異熟識由共相種成熟力故,變似色等器世間相。問:凡一世界有幾有情異熟識變?答:《唯識論》中有三師說。初師說云:一切有情,以契經說「一切有情業增上力所共起故。」次師破云:若爾,諸佛菩薩應實變為此雜穢土;諸異生等應實變為他方此界諸淨妙土;又聖者厭離有色生無色界,必不下生,變為此土復何所用?有此三種大過失故,明不得通一切有情。應說現居及當生者,彼異熟識變為此界,經依少分說一切言,諸同業者皆共變故。後師轉破第二云:若爾,器世界將壞時,既無現居及當生者,誰異熟識變為此界?又諸異生厭離有色,生無色界現無色身,預變為土此復何用?設有色身與異地器,麁細懸隔不相依持,此變為彼亦何所益?亦由如此三種大過,是故現居及當生者皆不成變。謂初器將壞,當生現居俱無受用;二若現受無色界身,而於此土無受用義;三設有色界身與此麁細異,亦無依持受用。是故此三俱無變義。若爾,誰識變耶?正義應云:凡所變土,本為色身依持受用故。若於身可有持用,設令生在他方,自地彼識亦得變為此土。故器世界將壞初成,雖無有情而現有土。此土竝依《唯識論》辨。第二顯共不共義相者,若小乘中既是極微所共合成,故唯是共。若三乘中,有四句:初或亦唯共,謂彼依報雖不離識,而識是別、土相是一,由彼彼識中共相種子共所現故。如攬四塵共成一柱,一柱之相不離四塵,非隨四塵而有四柱,當知此中道理亦爾。若自受用土佛與諸佛共有一土,猶如法身諸佛共依故,以是同法性土故。若他受用土,亦佛與菩薩之所共有,如王與臣共有一國。諸雜染土,亦是有情共業所現,故無別也。二如是依果實皆不共,以各於自本識中現故。論云「俱是有情異熟識各變,同處相似不相障礙,如眾燈明、如多所夢,因類是別、果相相似、處所無別,假名為共,實各有異。諸佛淨土亦復如是,各別識變皆遍法界,同處相似說名為共。」解云:若有一土不隨識別,則心外有法,不成唯識。論云「我說識所緣,唯識所現故。」由是當知皆自識變,故各不同。三亦共亦不共者,由前二說不相離故。《瑜伽》云「外等諸物,或由不共分別為因、或復由共分別為因。若共分別之所起者,分別雖無,由他分別所任持故,而不永滅。若不爾者,他之分別應無其果。彼雖不滅得清淨者,於彼事中正見清淨。譬如眾多修觀行者,於一事中由定心智種種無量,異見可得。彼亦如是。」解云:此說依報隨共分別,其不共分別同前第二,是故隨外器世界皆具如是二義而成,故雙存也。四非共非不共者,有二義:一由前二說互形奪故、隨定取一不可得故,是故俱非。二由土依識土相盡故、識從緣起無自性故,是故共與不共性相皆離不可說也。此上若約果報賴耶識所變等,即是初教。若如來藏賴耶所現,即屬終教。若一切相盡,唯一淨心平等平等,離言絕慮,即屬頓教。若依圓教,有二義:一如前諸教所說,即同無盡法界帝網重重,即入無礙具足主伴,即屬此攝。二以義求,亦有四句:一或唯共,以同一法界故、相即故;二或唯不共,以緣起各別故、相不雜故;三或俱,以上二義不相離故、以全體相即而不壞故;四或俱非,以二相泯故、形奪盡故。
Sixth, regarding shared and unshared, herein there are two parts: first, clarifying the boundaries; second, revealing the doctrinal characteristics.
In the first, each single world is entirely sentient beings; that is, the vipākavijñāna, through the maturation power of the seeds of shared characteristics, transforms into the semblance of the container world of matter and so forth.
Question: For an ordinary single world, how many sentient beings' vipākavijñāna transforms it?
Answer: In the Cheng weishi lun there are explanations by three masters. The first master says: All sentient beings [transform it], because the sūtras say: 'It is co-arisen by the sovereign power of the karma of all sentient beings.'
The second master refutes this, saying: If that were so, the Buddhas and bodhisattvas would actually have to transform into this defiled and impure land; ordinary beings and the like would actually have to transform into the various pure and wondrous lands of other directions and of this realm; furthermore, when noble ones develop aversion to having form and are born in the formless realm, they will definitely not be born below, so what purpose would it serve to transform into this land? Because of these three great faults, it is clear that it cannot extend to all sentient beings. One should say that it is those currently residing and those who are to be born whose vipākavijñāna transforms into this realm; the sūtra uses the word 'all' on the basis of a portion, because all those with shared karma transform it together.
The third master in turn refutes the second, saying: If that were so, when the container world is about to be destroyed, since there are neither current residents nor those to be born, whose vipākavijñāna transforms into this realm? Furthermore, when various ordinary beings develop aversion to having form and are born in the formless realm, presently possessing formless bodies, what purpose would it serve to pre-emptively transform into a land? Supposing they had form-realm bodies, and the receptacle of a different plane is far removed in terms of coarseness and fineness and does not support or sustain them, what benefit would there also be in this transforming into that? Because of these three great faults, neither current residents nor those to be born succeed in transforming it. That is to say: first, when the receptacle is about to be destroyed, neither those to be born nor current residents have any enjoyment of it; second, if one currently receives a formless-realm body, then in this land there is no sense of enjoyment; third, even supposing there is a form-realm body, its difference from this in coarseness and fineness means there is also no supportive enjoyment. Therefore, in these three cases there is no sense of transformation.
If so, whose consciousness transforms it? The orthodox meaning should be: whatever land is transformed is fundamentally for the sake of the material body's support and enjoyment. If it can be used to support the body, then even if one is born in another direction, that consciousness of one's own plane can also transform into this land. Therefore, when the container world is about to be destroyed or newly formed, although there are no sentient beings, there is presently a land. All of this regarding the land is distinguished according to the Cheng weishi lun.
Second, revealing the characteristics of the meaning of shared and unshared: in the Hīnayāna, since it is co-produced through the assembly of paramāṇus, it is exclusively shared.
In the Three Vehicles, there are four propositions:
First, either it is also exclusively shared; that is, although that circumstantial retribution is not separate from consciousness, yet the consciousnesses are distinct while the characteristics of the land are one, because it is commonly manifested by the seeds of shared characteristics within those various consciousnesses. Just as gathering the four dusts together forms one pillar, and the characteristic of the single pillar is not separate from the four dusts, yet there are not four pillars corresponding to the four dusts, one should know that the principle here is likewise. As for the land of personal enjoyment, a Buddha shares a single land with all Buddhas, just as all Buddhas jointly rely on the dharmakāya, because it is a land of identical dharmatā. As for the land of enjoyment for others, it is also shared between Buddhas and bodhisattvas, just as a king and his ministers share a single country. Various defiled lands are also manifested by the shared karma of sentient beings, so they are not distinct.
Second, such retributive circumstantial results are actually all unshared, because each is manifested within one's own fundamental consciousness. The treatise says: 'All are transformed individually by the vipākavijñāna of sentient beings, occupying the same place with similar characteristics without obstructing one another, like the lights of many lamps, or like many dreaming; because the types of causes are distinct, the characteristics of the results are similar, and the locations are identical, it is metaphorically named shared, but in reality each is distinct. The pure lands of the Buddhas are also like this: transformed by distinct consciousnesses, each pervades the dharmadhātu, and occupying the same place with similar characteristics, they are described as shared.' It is explained: if there were a single land that did not vary with consciousness, then there would be dharmas outside the mind, and Consciousness-Only would not be established. The treatise says: 'I teach that the object of consciousness is only manifested by consciousness.' From this, one should know that all are transformed by one's own consciousness, and thus each is distinct.
Third, both shared and unshared: because the preceding two explanations are not separated from each other. The Yogācārabhūmi says: 'External objects and so forth either have unshared conceptualization as their cause, or they also have shared conceptualization as their cause. If they are arisen from shared conceptualization, then although [one's own] conceptualization is absent, because they are sustained by others' conceptualization, they are not permanently destroyed. If it were not so, others' conceptualization would lack its fruit. Even though it is not destroyed, one who attains purity perceives purity precisely in that object. For example, in the case of many practitioners of contemplation, in one single object, through the wisdom of a concentrated mind, varied and boundless different perceptions can be obtained. This is also like that.' It is explained: this states that circumstantial retribution follows shared conceptualization; its unshared conceptualization is the same as the second [proposition] above. Therefore, every external container world is established by possessing both of these two meanings, and thus both are preserved.
Fourth, neither shared nor unshared: there are two meanings. (1) Because the preceding two explanations mutually exclude each other, and grasping either one definitively is unattainable, it is therefore neither. (2) Because the land relies on consciousness and the characteristics of the land are exhausted, and consciousness arises from conditions and lacks self-nature, the nature and characteristics of both shared and unshared are transcended and ineffable.
The above, if in terms of what is transformed by the retributive vipākavijñāna, etc., belongs to the Initial Teaching. If manifested by the tathāgatagarbha-ālayavijñāna, it belongs to the Final Teaching. If all characteristics are exhausted and there is only a single pure mind that is equal of equals, transcending words and cutting off thought, it belongs to the Sudden Teaching.
According to the Perfect Teaching, there are two meanings: (1) As expounded in the preceding teachings, it is identical with the boundless dharmadhātu, Indra's net layer upon layer, entering into each other without obstruction, fully endowed with master and companions; it is subsumed under this. (2) Investigated through its principle, there are also four propositions: (a) or exclusively shared, because it is of the same dharmadhātu and because of mutual identity; (b) or exclusively unshared, because dependent origination is distinct in each case and because characteristics are unmixed; (c) or both, because the above two meanings are not separated from each other, and because the entire essence is mutually identical without being destroyed; (d) or neither, because both characteristics are obliterated, and mutual exclusion is exhausted.
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- 成唯識論 — Classical Chinese