華嚴經探玄記 3.58

3.58

Sixth, regarding shared and unshared, herein there are two parts: first, clarifying the boundaries; second, revealing the doctrinal characteristics.
In the first, each single world is entirely sentient beings; that is, the vipākavijñāna, through the maturation power of the seeds of shared characteristics, transforms into the semblance of the container world of matter and so forth.
Question: For an ordinary single world, how many sentient beings' vipākavijñāna transforms it?
Answer: In the Cheng weishi lun there are explanations by three masters. The first master says: All sentient beings [transform it], because the sūtras say: 'It is co-arisen by the sovereign power of the karma of all sentient beings.'
The second master refutes this, saying: If that were so, the Buddhas and bodhisattvas would actually have to transform into this defiled and impure land; ordinary beings and the like would actually have to transform into the various pure and wondrous lands of other directions and of this realm; furthermore, when noble ones develop aversion to having form and are born in the formless realm, they will definitely not be born below, so what purpose would it serve to transform into this land? Because of these three great faults, it is clear that it cannot extend to all sentient beings. One should say that it is those currently residing and those who are to be born whose vipākavijñāna transforms into this realm; the sūtra uses the word 'all' on the basis of a portion, because all those with shared karma transform it together.
The third master in turn refutes the second, saying: If that were so, when the container world is about to be destroyed, since there are neither current residents nor those to be born, whose vipākavijñāna transforms into this realm? Furthermore, when various ordinary beings develop aversion to having form and are born in the formless realm, presently possessing formless bodies, what purpose would it serve to pre-emptively transform into a land? Supposing they had form-realm bodies, and the receptacle of a different plane is far removed in terms of coarseness and fineness and does not support or sustain them, what benefit would there also be in this transforming into that? Because of these three great faults, neither current residents nor those to be born succeed in transforming it. That is to say: first, when the receptacle is about to be destroyed, neither those to be born nor current residents have any enjoyment of it; second, if one currently receives a formless-realm body, then in this land there is no sense of enjoyment; third, even supposing there is a form-realm body, its difference from this in coarseness and fineness means there is also no supportive enjoyment. Therefore, in these three cases there is no sense of transformation.
If so, whose consciousness transforms it? The orthodox meaning should be: whatever land is transformed is fundamentally for the sake of the material body's support and enjoyment. If it can be used to support the body, then even if one is born in another direction, that consciousness of one's own plane can also transform into this land. Therefore, when the container world is about to be destroyed or newly formed, although there are no sentient beings, there is presently a land. All of this regarding the land is distinguished according to the Cheng weishi lun.
Second, revealing the characteristics of the meaning of shared and unshared: in the Hīnayāna, since it is co-produced through the assembly of paramāṇus, it is exclusively shared.
In the Three Vehicles, there are four propositions:
First, either it is also exclusively shared; that is, although that circumstantial retribution is not separate from consciousness, yet the consciousnesses are distinct while the characteristics of the land are one, because it is commonly manifested by the seeds of shared characteristics within those various consciousnesses. Just as gathering the four dusts together forms one pillar, and the characteristic of the single pillar is not separate from the four dusts, yet there are not four pillars corresponding to the four dusts, one should know that the principle here is likewise. As for the land of personal enjoyment, a Buddha shares a single land with all Buddhas, just as all Buddhas jointly rely on the dharmakāya, because it is a land of identical dharmatā. As for the land of enjoyment for others, it is also shared between Buddhas and bodhisattvas, just as a king and his ministers share a single country. Various defiled lands are also manifested by the shared karma of sentient beings, so they are not distinct.
Second, such retributive circumstantial results are actually all unshared, because each is manifested within one's own fundamental consciousness. The treatise says: 'All are transformed individually by the vipākavijñāna of sentient beings, occupying the same place with similar characteristics without obstructing one another, like the lights of many lamps, or like many dreaming; because the types of causes are distinct, the characteristics of the results are similar, and the locations are identical, it is metaphorically named shared, but in reality each is distinct. The pure lands of the Buddhas are also like this: transformed by distinct consciousnesses, each pervades the dharmadhātu, and occupying the same place with similar characteristics, they are described as shared.' It is explained: if there were a single land that did not vary with consciousness, then there would be dharmas outside the mind, and Consciousness-Only would not be established. The treatise says: 'I teach that the object of consciousness is only manifested by consciousness.' From this, one should know that all are transformed by one's own consciousness, and thus each is distinct.
Third, both shared and unshared: because the preceding two explanations are not separated from each other. The Yogācārabhūmi says: 'External objects and so forth either have unshared conceptualization as their cause, or they also have shared conceptualization as their cause. If they are arisen from shared conceptualization, then although [one's own] conceptualization is absent, because they are sustained by others' conceptualization, they are not permanently destroyed. If it were not so, others' conceptualization would lack its fruit. Even though it is not destroyed, one who attains purity perceives purity precisely in that object. For example, in the case of many practitioners of contemplation, in one single object, through the wisdom of a concentrated mind, varied and boundless different perceptions can be obtained. This is also like that.' It is explained: this states that circumstantial retribution follows shared conceptualization; its unshared conceptualization is the same as the second [proposition] above. Therefore, every external container world is established by possessing both of these two meanings, and thus both are preserved.
Fourth, neither shared nor unshared: there are two meanings. (1) Because the preceding two explanations mutually exclude each other, and grasping either one definitively is unattainable, it is therefore neither. (2) Because the land relies on consciousness and the characteristics of the land are exhausted, and consciousness arises from conditions and lacks self-nature, the nature and characteristics of both shared and unshared are transcended and ineffable.
The above, if in terms of what is transformed by the retributive vipākavijñāna, etc., belongs to the Initial Teaching. If manifested by the tathāgatagarbha-ālayavijñāna, it belongs to the Final Teaching. If all characteristics are exhausted and there is only a single pure mind that is equal of equals, transcending words and cutting off thought, it belongs to the Sudden Teaching.
According to the Perfect Teaching, there are two meanings: (1) As expounded in the preceding teachings, it is identical with the boundless dharmadhātu, Indra's net layer upon layer, entering into each other without obstruction, fully endowed with master and companions; it is subsumed under this. (2) Investigated through its principle, there are also four propositions: (a) or exclusively shared, because it is of the same dharmadhātu and because of mutual identity; (b) or exclusively unshared, because dependent origination is distinct in each case and because characteristics are unmixed; (c) or both, because the above two meanings are not separated from each other, and because the entire essence is mutually identical without being destroyed; (d) or neither, because both characteristics are obliterated, and mutual exclusion is exhausted.