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華嚴經探玄記 4.56

華嚴經探玄記 4.56

Language
Classical Chinese

4.56

五釋文者,此中三品則為三:初品明信中解、次品依解起行、後品解行具故成德耳。又釋:初行、次願、後德位。就初中二:初正辨十義、後結通普見。前中依遷禪師釋,為十甚深義。於中分二:初文殊問、眾人答,明妙慧導眾行;後眾人問、文殊答,明以眾行成妙慧。又衍法師云:初一人問多人,明一中解無量;二多人問一人,明無量中解一。又文殊為法主,故多人同問佛境深法也。初一是緣起甚深、二教化甚深、三業果甚深、四佛說法甚深、五福田甚深、六正教甚深、七正行甚深、八助道甚深、九一乘甚深、十佛境界甚深。初緣起者,諸法依阿賴耶識自性緣生方得集起故也。何故最初辨此義者?《攝論》云「菩薩初學,應先觀諸法如實因緣,以成正信解故。」此之謂也。於中先問、後答。亦是先明設於難、後明解於難。前中二:初總告。何故最初問覺首者?謂創發厭求,非初覺不起,如善財初發於覺城故。又緣起甚深,亦非覺不達故。二正難中,此難何因生者?凡諸菩薩起信解行等,皆依如此唯心道理,得異凡小而成正行故。《起信論》云「有法能起摩訶衍信根,是故應說。」所言法者,眾生心。是心即攝一切世間出世間法,是故於此而起難問。問意云:心性是一,果報種種,云何一心而生多報?又心性既一,果亦應一;果報既多,心亦應多。設爾何失?謂心若隨報成多,則失於唯識;報若如心為一,則乖於業果。設若救言:若立唯一性心,無有能熏,可如所難。今明心性雖一,隨善惡業等能熏轉故生果報異。此有何失?後遮此救,重更難云:業不知心、心不知業等。既不相知,何成熏習?熏習不成,何得種種?難意如此。文中二:初舉法設難、後五句遮救重難。前中三:初一句舉法案定、次一句正顯相違、後五句釋成違相。初云心性一者,謂心之性故,是如來藏平等一味,故云一也。又心即性故,是第八識無二類,故云一也。云何能生種種果報者,顯相違也。此是本末相違難。三或至善趣等者,釋成違相。於中五對:初一約依報,善趣是人天、惡趣三塗。二對約正報,於善趣中眼等諸根有具不具,惡趣中亦爾。三對重就依報,於根具中屠獵等為惡處,戒施等為善處,根不具中亦爾。四對重約正報,就善處中有端正醜陋,惡處中亦爾。五對就端正中有苦樂,醜中亦爾。如是種種差別,故云不同。報既如此不同,其一心之義何在?自下五句,古人釋云:約不相知為難。謂心以覺知為性,能生於業,心之與業竝得相知。云何經言業不知心、心不知業等?此釋恐不順文。何者?此不相知等,與上諸句為同成一難?為更成別難?若同成一難,前心性是一,果報種種,正是相違。故已成難,此不相知於彼何用?若成別難,復因何義而生此難?故知文意少別。是故今釋不同古也,謂此即是遮救重難。然救在文外,設若救言心性雖一,然有善惡業等熏習種子功能生果有別,所依心性一而無二,故無失也。今重難中有五對:初一約能依所依不相知故不成熏。此中業是能依、心是所依,離所無能,能不知所,故業不知心;離能無所,所不知能,故心不知業。既不相知,何成熏習?熏習無故,豈得因業心生多報?此等相知約性力說,但無性無力,故不相知,非約情知。上約本識因相說。第二約果相,謂因果不相知。果謂異熟果報,具有二義:一能受報心,是本識種子識;二所受報相,是果報識。以種是果因,不自因故,受不知報;以報是因果,不自果故,報不知受。既不相知,因果斯泯。心生種種,其義安在?第三約新熏不相知。謂於此報上,受謂採納,則諸轉識以為能熏,不同受報。心謂集起,則第八識以為所熏。互無自性,各不相知。熏習既亡,一心云何能生種種?故《瑜伽》云「不見藏住、不見熏習,是名菩薩菩薩。」第四約親疎不相知。謂種子為因、所依本識為緣,以相待無性,謂不自不他不共等故,親疎相盡,故不相知。因緣既離,心生何在?第五約境智不相知。智謂能知,即諸識見分;法謂所知,即諸識相分。俱依一心,各無自體。自體無矣,誰共相知?心境既亡,能所斯寂,心生種種其義安在?又釋:境法是心變,故不知心;心託境生,故不知法。無有境外心能取心外境,是故俱不相知,相無不盡也。

Fifth, regarding explaining the text: the three chapters here constitute three parts: the first chapter clarifies understanding within faith, the next chapter arises practice based on understanding, and the subsequent chapter, because understanding and practice are complete, accomplishes virtues. Another interpretation states: the first is practice, the next is vow, and the subsequent is virtue and stage. Regarding the first, there are two parts: first, directly distinguishing the ten meanings; second, concluding with their pervading universal vision. In the former, relying on the commentary of Dhyāna Master Qian, they are the ten profound meanings. Within this, there are two parts: first, Mañjuśrī asks and the multitude answers, clarifying that wondrous wisdom guides the multitude of practices; second, the multitude asks and Mañjuśrī answers, clarifying that the multitude of practices accomplishes wondrous wisdom. Dharma Master Yan also states: first, one person asks many people, clarifying that the immeasurable is understood within the one; second, many people ask one person, clarifying that the one is understood within the immeasurable. Furthermore, Mañjuśrī is the master of Dharma; hence many people together inquire about the profound Dharma of the Buddha's realm. The first is the profundity of dependent origination; the second, the profundity of teaching and transforming; the third, the profundity of karma and fruition; the fourth, the profundity of the Buddha preaching the Dharma; the fifth, the profundity of the field of merit; the sixth, the profundity of the correct teaching; the seventh, the profundity of correct practice; the eighth, the profundity of aids to the path; the ninth, the profundity of the One Vehicle; the tenth, the profundity of the Buddha's realm. As for the first, dependent origination: it is because all dharmas arise dependently on the intrinsic nature of the ālaya-vijñāna and only then are gathered and arise. Why is this meaning distinguished first? The Mahāyānasaṃgraha states: 'When a bodhisattva first begins to learn, he should first contemplate the causes and conditions of all dharmas as they truly are, so as to accomplish correct faith and understanding.' This is what it refers to. Within this, there is first the question and then the answer. This also means first presenting the challenge and then resolving the challenge. In the former, there are two parts: first, the general address. Why ask Jñānamukha first? It is said that in initially generating aversion [to saṃsāra] and seeking [bodhi], it cannot arise without initial awakening, just as Sudhana first generated [the aspiration] in the city of Jñānaprabha. Furthermore, dependent origination is profound, and cannot be penetrated without awakening. Second, regarding the direct challenge: what cause gives rise to this challenge? Generally, whenever bodhisattvas generate faith, understanding, practice, and so on, all rely on this principle of mind-only, thereby becoming distinct from ordinary beings and followers of the Small [Vehicle] and accomplishing correct practice. The Awakening of Faith states: 'There is a dharma that can give rise to the roots of faith in the Mahāyāna; therefore, it should be explained.' That which is called 'dharma' is the mind of sentient beings. This mind encompasses all mundane and supramundane dharmas; therefore, the challenge and inquiry are raised regarding this. The intention of the question states: the nature of the mind is one, but the retributive fruits are various; how can the one mind give rise to multiple retributions? Furthermore, since the nature of the mind is one, the fruit should also be one; since the retributive fruits are many, the mind should also be manifold. If that were so, what error would there be? Namely: if the mind becomes manifold in accordance with retribution, then consciousness-only is lost; if retribution were one like the mind, then karma and its fruit would be violated. Suppose a defense is made, saying: 'If one posited only a single mind of single nature without that which perfumes, it might be as challenged. Now, although the nature of the mind is one, because it changes according to that which perfumes—such as good and bad karma—diverse retributive fruits arise. What error is there in this?' Later, refuting this defense, it challenges again, saying: karma does not know the mind, and the mind does not know karma, and so on. Since they do not know each other, how could perfuming be accomplished? If perfuming is not accomplished, how could there be various [retributions]? Such is the intention of the challenge. Within the text, there are two parts: first, presenting the dharma to pose the challenge; second, five lines refuting the defense and raising the challenge again. In the former, there are three parts: first, one line presenting the dharma to settle the premise; next, one line directly revealing the contradiction; later, five lines explaining and completing the contradictory characteristics. As for the first stating 'the nature of the mind is one': it refers to the nature of the mind; because it is the tathāgatagarbha, impartial and of one taste, it is said to be 'one'. Furthermore, because mind is identical with nature, it is the eighth consciousness without two kinds; hence it is said to be 'one'. As for 'how can it give rise to various retributive fruits?': this reveals the contradiction. This is the challenge of the contradiction between root and branches. Third, regarding 'sometimes reaching the good destinies' and so on: this explains and completes the contradictory characteristics. Within this, there are five pairs: the first pair concerns environmental retribution: the good destinies are humans and devas; the bad destinies are the three wretched paths. The second pair concerns direct retribution: within the good destinies, sense faculties such as the eye may be complete or incomplete, and likewise in the bad destinies. The third pair concerns environmental retribution again: among those with complete faculties, occupations like butchering and hunting are bad places, while precepts and giving are good places, and likewise among those with incomplete faculties. The fourth pair concerns direct retribution again: within good places, there are the handsome and the ugly, and likewise in bad places. The fifth pair concerns that within the handsome, there are suffering and pleasure, and likewise among the ugly. Because of such various distinctions, it is said to be 'different'. Since retributions are thus different, where does the meaning of the one mind lie? Regarding the subsequent five lines, ancient commentators explained: the challenge is made in terms of not knowing each other. That is, the mind has awareness and knowledge as its nature and can give rise to karma, so mind and karma both come to know each other. Why does the sūtra say that karma does not know mind, and mind does not know karma, and so on? This explanation, it is feared, does not follow the text. Why? Do these [lines on] not knowing each other and so on form the same single challenge together with the preceding lines, or do they form a separate challenge? If they form the same challenge, the previous 'the nature of the mind is one, but retributive fruits are various' is precisely the contradiction; hence the challenge was already accomplished, so what use is this 'not knowing each other' to it? If it forms a separate challenge, again on the basis of what meaning does this challenge arise? Therefore, we know that the meaning of the text is somewhat different. For this reason, the present explanation differs from the ancients: this is a re-challenging that refutes the defense. However, the defense lies outside the text: suppose a defense says that although the nature of the mind is one, yet there are functions of perfumed seeds of good and bad karma and so on that give rise to differences in fruits, while the supported nature of the mind is one and without duality; hence there is no fault. Now, in raising the challenge again, there are five pairs: the first pair concerns the inability to accomplish perfuming because the supported and the supporting do not know each other. Here, karma is that which is supported, and mind is that which supports; apart from the supported, there is no supporting, and the supporting does not know the supported, so karma does not know the mind; apart from the supporting, there is no supported, and the supported does not know the supporting, so the mind does not know karma. Since they do not know each other, how can perfuming be accomplished? Because perfuming does not exist, how could the mind give rise to multiple retributions on account of karma? These 'knowings of each other' are spoken of in terms of the power of nature: it is simply that lacking nature and lacking power, they therefore do not know each other, not spoken in terms of sentient knowing. The above is spoken in terms of the causal aspect of the fundamental consciousness. The second pair concerns the aspect of fruition, meaning that cause and fruit do not know each other. 'Fruit' refers to the fruit of maturation, which possesses two meanings: first, the mind that experiences retribution, which is the seed consciousness of the fundamental consciousness; second, the characteristics of the retribution experienced, which is the retributive consciousness. Because the seed is the cause of the fruit, and does not take itself as cause, experiencing does not know retribution; because retribution is the fruit of the cause, and does not take itself as fruit, retribution does not know experiencing. Since they do not know each other, cause and fruit are obliterated. Where does the meaning of the mind giving rise to various things reside? The third pair concerns newly perfumed [seeds] not knowing each other. That is, upon this retribution, 'experiencing' refers to receiving and gathering, in which case the transforming consciousnesses are that which perfumes, differing from experiencing retribution. 'Mind' refers to gathering and arising, in which case the eighth consciousness is that which is perfumed. Mutually lacking intrinsic nature, each does not know the other. Since perfuming has vanished, how can the one mind give rise to various things? Therefore the Yogācārabhūmi states: 'Not seeing the storehouse abiding, not seeing perfuming, this is called a bodhisattva-bodhisattva.' The fourth pair concerns direct and indirect [conditions] not knowing each other. That is, seeds are the cause, and the supported fundamental consciousness is the condition; because they are mutually dependent and devoid of nature—meaning neither from self, nor from other, nor from both, and so on—direct and indirect characteristics are exhausted, and therefore they do not know each other. Since cause and condition are separated, where does the mind's giving rise [to things] reside? The fifth pair concerns the object and cognition not knowing each other. 'Cognition' refers to that which knows, namely the seeing division of the consciousnesses; 'dharma' refers to that which is known, namely the sign division of the consciousnesses. Both relying on the one mind, each is without self-substance. When self-substance is absent, who mutually knows whom? When mind and object have both vanished, supporting and supported are completely quiescent; where does the meaning of the mind giving rise to various things reside? Another explanation: the objective dharma is transformed by the mind, and therefore does not know the mind; the mind arises relying on the object, and therefore does not know the dharma. There is no mind outside objects that can grasp objects outside mind; therefore, neither knows the other, and characteristics are entirely exhausted.

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