華嚴經探玄記 4.56

4.56

Fifth, regarding explaining the text: the three chapters here constitute three parts: the first chapter clarifies understanding within faith, the next chapter arises practice based on understanding, and the subsequent chapter, because understanding and practice are complete, accomplishes virtues. Another interpretation states: the first is practice, the next is vow, and the subsequent is virtue and stage. Regarding the first, there are two parts: first, directly distinguishing the ten meanings; second, concluding with their pervading universal vision. In the former, relying on the commentary of Dhyāna Master Qian, they are the ten profound meanings. Within this, there are two parts: first, Mañjuśrī asks and the multitude answers, clarifying that wondrous wisdom guides the multitude of practices; second, the multitude asks and Mañjuśrī answers, clarifying that the multitude of practices accomplishes wondrous wisdom. Dharma Master Yan also states: first, one person asks many people, clarifying that the immeasurable is understood within the one; second, many people ask one person, clarifying that the one is understood within the immeasurable. Furthermore, Mañjuśrī is the master of Dharma; hence many people together inquire about the profound Dharma of the Buddha's realm. The first is the profundity of dependent origination; the second, the profundity of teaching and transforming; the third, the profundity of karma and fruition; the fourth, the profundity of the Buddha preaching the Dharma; the fifth, the profundity of the field of merit; the sixth, the profundity of the correct teaching; the seventh, the profundity of correct practice; the eighth, the profundity of aids to the path; the ninth, the profundity of the One Vehicle; the tenth, the profundity of the Buddha's realm. As for the first, dependent origination: it is because all dharmas arise dependently on the intrinsic nature of the ālaya-vijñāna and only then are gathered and arise. Why is this meaning distinguished first? The Mahāyānasaṃgraha states: 'When a bodhisattva first begins to learn, he should first contemplate the causes and conditions of all dharmas as they truly are, so as to accomplish correct faith and understanding.' This is what it refers to. Within this, there is first the question and then the answer. This also means first presenting the challenge and then resolving the challenge. In the former, there are two parts: first, the general address. Why ask Jñānamukha first? It is said that in initially generating aversion [to saṃsāra] and seeking [bodhi], it cannot arise without initial awakening, just as Sudhana first generated [the aspiration] in the city of Jñānaprabha. Furthermore, dependent origination is profound, and cannot be penetrated without awakening. Second, regarding the direct challenge: what cause gives rise to this challenge? Generally, whenever bodhisattvas generate faith, understanding, practice, and so on, all rely on this principle of mind-only, thereby becoming distinct from ordinary beings and followers of the Small [Vehicle] and accomplishing correct practice. The Awakening of Faith states: 'There is a dharma that can give rise to the roots of faith in the Mahāyāna; therefore, it should be explained.' That which is called 'dharma' is the mind of sentient beings. This mind encompasses all mundane and supramundane dharmas; therefore, the challenge and inquiry are raised regarding this. The intention of the question states: the nature of the mind is one, but the retributive fruits are various; how can the one mind give rise to multiple retributions? Furthermore, since the nature of the mind is one, the fruit should also be one; since the retributive fruits are many, the mind should also be manifold. If that were so, what error would there be? Namely: if the mind becomes manifold in accordance with retribution, then consciousness-only is lost; if retribution were one like the mind, then karma and its fruit would be violated. Suppose a defense is made, saying: 'If one posited only a single mind of single nature without that which perfumes, it might be as challenged. Now, although the nature of the mind is one, because it changes according to that which perfumes—such as good and bad karma—diverse retributive fruits arise. What error is there in this?' Later, refuting this defense, it challenges again, saying: karma does not know the mind, and the mind does not know karma, and so on. Since they do not know each other, how could perfuming be accomplished? If perfuming is not accomplished, how could there be various [retributions]? Such is the intention of the challenge. Within the text, there are two parts: first, presenting the dharma to pose the challenge; second, five lines refuting the defense and raising the challenge again. In the former, there are three parts: first, one line presenting the dharma to settle the premise; next, one line directly revealing the contradiction; later, five lines explaining and completing the contradictory characteristics. As for the first stating 'the nature of the mind is one': it refers to the nature of the mind; because it is the tathāgatagarbha, impartial and of one taste, it is said to be 'one'. Furthermore, because mind is identical with nature, it is the eighth consciousness without two kinds; hence it is said to be 'one'. As for 'how can it give rise to various retributive fruits?': this reveals the contradiction. This is the challenge of the contradiction between root and branches. Third, regarding 'sometimes reaching the good destinies' and so on: this explains and completes the contradictory characteristics. Within this, there are five pairs: the first pair concerns environmental retribution: the good destinies are humans and devas; the bad destinies are the three wretched paths. The second pair concerns direct retribution: within the good destinies, sense faculties such as the eye may be complete or incomplete, and likewise in the bad destinies. The third pair concerns environmental retribution again: among those with complete faculties, occupations like butchering and hunting are bad places, while precepts and giving are good places, and likewise among those with incomplete faculties. The fourth pair concerns direct retribution again: within good places, there are the handsome and the ugly, and likewise in bad places. The fifth pair concerns that within the handsome, there are suffering and pleasure, and likewise among the ugly. Because of such various distinctions, it is said to be 'different'. Since retributions are thus different, where does the meaning of the one mind lie? Regarding the subsequent five lines, ancient commentators explained: the challenge is made in terms of not knowing each other. That is, the mind has awareness and knowledge as its nature and can give rise to karma, so mind and karma both come to know each other. Why does the sūtra say that karma does not know mind, and mind does not know karma, and so on? This explanation, it is feared, does not follow the text. Why? Do these [lines on] not knowing each other and so on form the same single challenge together with the preceding lines, or do they form a separate challenge? If they form the same challenge, the previous 'the nature of the mind is one, but retributive fruits are various' is precisely the contradiction; hence the challenge was already accomplished, so what use is this 'not knowing each other' to it? If it forms a separate challenge, again on the basis of what meaning does this challenge arise? Therefore, we know that the meaning of the text is somewhat different. For this reason, the present explanation differs from the ancients: this is a re-challenging that refutes the defense. However, the defense lies outside the text: suppose a defense says that although the nature of the mind is one, yet there are functions of perfumed seeds of good and bad karma and so on that give rise to differences in fruits, while the supported nature of the mind is one and without duality; hence there is no fault. Now, in raising the challenge again, there are five pairs: the first pair concerns the inability to accomplish perfuming because the supported and the supporting do not know each other. Here, karma is that which is supported, and mind is that which supports; apart from the supported, there is no supporting, and the supporting does not know the supported, so karma does not know the mind; apart from the supporting, there is no supported, and the supported does not know the supporting, so the mind does not know karma. Since they do not know each other, how can perfuming be accomplished? Because perfuming does not exist, how could the mind give rise to multiple retributions on account of karma? These 'knowings of each other' are spoken of in terms of the power of nature: it is simply that lacking nature and lacking power, they therefore do not know each other, not spoken in terms of sentient knowing. The above is spoken in terms of the causal aspect of the fundamental consciousness. The second pair concerns the aspect of fruition, meaning that cause and fruit do not know each other. 'Fruit' refers to the fruit of maturation, which possesses two meanings: first, the mind that experiences retribution, which is the seed consciousness of the fundamental consciousness; second, the characteristics of the retribution experienced, which is the retributive consciousness. Because the seed is the cause of the fruit, and does not take itself as cause, experiencing does not know retribution; because retribution is the fruit of the cause, and does not take itself as fruit, retribution does not know experiencing. Since they do not know each other, cause and fruit are obliterated. Where does the meaning of the mind giving rise to various things reside? The third pair concerns newly perfumed [seeds] not knowing each other. That is, upon this retribution, 'experiencing' refers to receiving and gathering, in which case the transforming consciousnesses are that which perfumes, differing from experiencing retribution. 'Mind' refers to gathering and arising, in which case the eighth consciousness is that which is perfumed. Mutually lacking intrinsic nature, each does not know the other. Since perfuming has vanished, how can the one mind give rise to various things? Therefore the Yogācārabhūmi states: 'Not seeing the storehouse abiding, not seeing perfuming, this is called a bodhisattva-bodhisattva.' The fourth pair concerns direct and indirect [conditions] not knowing each other. That is, seeds are the cause, and the supported fundamental consciousness is the condition; because they are mutually dependent and devoid of nature—meaning neither from self, nor from other, nor from both, and so on—direct and indirect characteristics are exhausted, and therefore they do not know each other. Since cause and condition are separated, where does the mind's giving rise [to things] reside? The fifth pair concerns the object and cognition not knowing each other. 'Cognition' refers to that which knows, namely the seeing division of the consciousnesses; 'dharma' refers to that which is known, namely the sign division of the consciousnesses. Both relying on the one mind, each is without self-substance. When self-substance is absent, who mutually knows whom? When mind and object have both vanished, supporting and supported are completely quiescent; where does the meaning of the mind giving rise to various things reside? Another explanation: the objective dharma is transformed by the mind, and therefore does not know the mind; the mind arises relying on the object, and therefore does not know the dharma. There is no mind outside objects that can grasp objects outside mind; therefore, neither knows the other, and characteristics are entirely exhausted.