華嚴經探玄記 1.56

1.56

The first [gate] has two parts: first discriminating the Hīnayāna, and later demonstrating the Mahāyāna. Within the former, relying on the masters of the Sarvāstivāda school, there are three explanations. One states: only name-bodies, phrase-bodies, and phoneme-bodies constitute the essence of the teaching. Therefore the *Jñānaprasthāna* states: "What is the nature of the twelvefold scriptures? Answer: the sequential residence of name-bodies, phrase-bodies, phoneme-bodies, and so forth." Another states: because voice is virtuous, it is the essence of the Buddha's teaching, while names and the like, being indeterminate, are the function of the teaching. Fascicle 126 of the *Mahāvibhāṣā* states: "What is the Buddha's teaching? Answer: it refers to the Buddha's spoken words, chanting and discourse, speech sounds, pathways of speech, and vocal intimation—these are the Buddha's teaching; down to the vocal karma of the speaker being its essence. What dharmas are the Buddha's words? Answer: they refer to name-bodies, phrase-bodies, and phoneme-bodies, sequentially arrayed, sequentially established, and sequentially joined; this comprehensively demonstrates the function of the Buddha's teaching." The explanation says: the correct doctrine of the commentators takes sound as the essence. The Sautrāntika school also takes sound as the nature; therefore fascicle 14 of the *Nyāyānusāra* refutes the Sautrāntikas, stating: "You should not establish that name-bodies, phrase-bodies, and phoneme-bodies take sound itself as their essence." Furthermore, Asvabhāva's commentary on the *Mahāyānasaṃgraha* refutes them, saying: "That the words of all sūtras have speech as their own-nature is unreasonable, because the former belongs to the āyatana of dharmas, while the latter belongs to the āyatana of sound." Furthermore, drawing from the two prior explanations, various masters combine both to constitute the essence of the teaching; the rest is as stated there. With regard to the Mahāyāna school, there are four propositions: First, subsuming the nominal under the real: sound alone is the essence, because names and the like are nominally established based on the inflections of sound, lacking a separate essence. Asvabhāva's commentary on the *Mahāyānasaṃgraha* says: "Based on the great vow, the sound 'bodhisattva' is established." The *Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā* says: "Sound that has been produced: that refers to the speech of the noble ones." Second, differentiating the nominal from the real: taking names and the like as the nature. Fascicle 2 of the *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi* states: "If names, phrases, and the like were not distinct from sound, the objects of the unhindered Dharma and unhindered expression would not differ." Third, jointly discriminating the nominal and the real: both sound and names and the like. The *Vimalakīrti Sūtra* states: "There are those who perform the Buddha's work by means of sounds, speech, and letters." In the *Daśabhūmikavyākhyāna*, the speaker speaks by means of two things, and the listener hears by means of two things: namely, sounds and names. Question: according to this school, sound expresses good and bad, yet sound is indeterminate; furthermore, names, phrases, and phonemes are intrinsically indeterminate; how could the indeterminate be the essence of the noble teaching? Answer: if transformed by the defiled mind, it may well be indeterminate; but if spoken by the subsequent attainment wisdom of buddhas and bodhisattvas, both are subsumed under the virtuous. The *Daśabhūmikavyākhyāna* states: "What things does it rely upon? It refers to sounds and virtuous characters." Fourth, doubly eliminating both nominal and real: neither sound nor name, because it is identical to emptiness, and speech is identical to non-speech. The *Vimalakīrti Sūtra* states: "The detachment of the nature of letters is itself liberation." In the *Daśabhūmikavyākhyāna*, the wind is a metaphor for sound, and a painting is a metaphor for names; if it is the wind moving tree leaves and a painting upon a wall, these can indeed be grasped; but if it is wind in the sky and a painting in the sky, neither can be grasped. One should know that the sounds and names of the Mahāyāna are also like this: none can be grasped, because their marks are exhausted. These four propositions above constitute one teaching-essence; therefore the non-obstruction of emptiness and existence is called the Mahāyāna Dharma. That is, emptiness is not distinct from existence: existence is illusory existence; while illusory existence is vividly present, its entire essence is empty. Existence is not distinct from emptiness: emptiness is true emptiness; while true emptiness is serenely clear, its entire essence is existent. Therefore between emptiness and existence there is not a hair's breadth of distinction. Hence the *Buddhapiṭaka Sūtra* states: "If all dharmas were unempty even by the measure of a fine hair, all buddhas would not appear in the world." And it states below: "All dharmas are ultimately empty, without the mark of a hair's tip." Passages like these are not singular.