大方廣佛華嚴經疏 14.22

14.22

The second [part], five verses, answers the previously posed objections. The text is divided into three: first, three verses directly answer the previous objections; next, one verse explains and establishes the previous meaning; third, one verse sweeps away traces to enter into the profound. As for the first, I will first clarify the general meaning, and next directly explain the text. As for the first [of these]: The previous inquiry contained three levels, and now these three verses each fully answer the three questions above. The first is straightforward. The question asks: 'Since there are various kinds, by what condition do they not know one another?' The previous five verses have already answered this. 'Since they do not know one another, by what condition are there various kinds?' The answer consists of four causes: first, because of false discrimination; second, because of the perfuming of the various consciousnesses; third, because through absence of self-nature they do not know one another; fourth, because tathatā accords with conditions. The first verse possesses the second and third [causes]; the remaining two [verses possess] one meaning each. However, these four causes are merely of one accord: namely, with false discrimination as the condition, tathatā does not maintain its own nature but accords with conditions to become existent, and the various consciousnesses perfume one another boundlessly. If one penetrates the source of falsity, pure pratītyasamutpāda is accomplished. The various traditions each seize [a part] and none strays from the elephant, yet accepting one and rejecting the others is a biased view. The second doubt above stated: 'Is it variety? Or is it a single nature?' Now the answer states: 'It is constantly variety, constantly a single nature.' The third objection stated: 'If the single nature accords with variety, then the ultimate truth is lost; if variety accords with the single nature, then conventional truth is destroyed.' Now the answer states: 'These two mutually establish each other; how could they contradict each other? The nature is not outside phenomena; how could it ever contradict variety? The variety is empty of nature; how could it ever contradict the single nature?' Because of non-existence there is existence, so the single nature can establish variety; because of arising through conditions there is emptiness, so variety can establish the single nature. Therefore, the dharma of pratītyasamutpāda generally possesses four meanings: 1. Because of arising through conditions, it exists: this refers to existence through false mental discrimination and the perfuming of the various consciousnesses. 2. Because of arising through conditions, it is empty: this is what was stated above: 'All dharmas have no activity and also have no essential nature; therefore they all do not know one another.' 3. Because of the absence of self-nature, it exists: the treatise states, 'Because there is the meaning of emptiness, all dharmas are able to be established.' The sūtra states, 'From the basis of non-abiding, all dharmas are established.' This is what was referred to above as acceding to conditions. 4. Because of the absence of self-nature, it is empty: this refers to all being empty and devoid of self-nature. Therefore, because of being empty through having no self-nature and arising through conditions, it is not the emptiness of the view of non-existence or the view of annihilation, but is true emptiness; because of existing through having no self-nature and arising through conditions, it is not the existence of the view of permanence or the view of existence, but is illusory existence. Illusory existence is precisely non-existent existence; true emptiness is precisely non-empty emptiness. Because it is non-empty emptiness, it is called not truly empty; because it is non-existent existence, it is called not genuinely existent. Neither empty nor existent is the meaning of the middle way. Furthermore, unpacking these, emptiness and existence each have two meanings. First, true emptiness necessarily exhausts illusory existence, because if it did not exhaust illusory existence, it would not be true emptiness; second, true emptiness necessarily accomplishes illusory existence, because if it obstructed illusory existence, it would not be true emptiness. Second, as for the two meanings of illusory existence: first, illusory existence necessarily covers true emptiness, because emptiness is concealed and existence is apparent; second, illusory existence necessarily does not obstruct true emptiness, because illusory existence necessarily exhausts itself, allowing true emptiness to be thoroughly apparent. Mañjuśrī raised objections using the first meanings in each case, and Jñānaprabha answered using the latter meanings, because according to the first two meanings, emptiness and existence differ, while according to the latter two meanings, emptiness and existence mutually establish each other. Yet these two are not two: existence and non-existence being non-dual constitutes a single illusory existence; emptiness and non-emptiness being non-dual constitutes a single true emptiness. Moreover, non-emptiness and existence being non-dual constitutes a single illusory existence; emptiness and non-existence being non-dual constitutes a single true emptiness. Furthermore, illusory existence and true emptiness being non-dual constitutes the single-flavor dharmadhātu, which is the meaning of the middle way: the dharma gate that is free from marks and free from nature, unobstructed, and without discrimination. Ponder this to understand it by analogy. Furthermore, 'nature' has two meanings: first, the meaning of existence; second, the meaning of emptiness. It also has two further meanings: first, unchanging; second, according with conditions. Through the meaning of existence, it is said that what is revealed by the two kinds of emptiness is that the dharmatā is originally unarisen; through the meaning of emptiness, it is said that the lack of nature in other-dependence (paratantra) is precisely the consummate (pariniṣpanna)—namely, that they do not know one another. Through the meaning of existence, unchangingness is explained; through the meaning of emptiness, according with conditions is explained. These two are non-dual: according with conditions is precisely unchanging; because it is unchanging, it is able to accord with conditions. If it were solely unchanging, how could the nature pertain to dharmas? If it merely accorded with conditions, how could it be called true nature? Therefore, wherever its stream flows there are various differences, yet its original flavor remains in the Snow Mountains. Furthermore, if the nature were separate from dharmas, it would result in annihilation; if dharmas were separate from the nature, then what was originally non-existent would now exist. Moreover, if dharmas were identical to the nature, then since the nature is permanent, [dharmas] should be permanent; if the nature were identical to dharmas, then when dharmas cease, [the nature] should cease. Therefore, the two mutually establish each other as neither permanent nor annihilated; because the two mutually negate each other, it is said to be neither existent nor empty, which is the meaning of the middle way. If one genuinely attains this integration, one will not be deluded by the differing theories of the hundred schools. I hope all students will empty themselves to seek the fundamental truth.