大方廣佛華嚴經疏 14.22

14.22

第二五偈答前設難。文分為三：初三偈正答前難、次一偈釋成前義、第三一偈拂迹入玄。今初，先明大意、次正釋文。今初。前問有三重，今此三偈一一具答上之三問，謂第一直耳。問云：既有種種，何緣得不相知？前五偈答竟。既不相知，何緣種種？答有四因：一妄分別故，二諸識熏習故，三由無性不相知故，四真如隨緣故。初偈具二三，餘二各一義。然此四因但是一致，謂由妄分別為緣，令真如不守自性、隨緣成有，諸識熏習展轉無窮。若達妄源，成淨緣起。諸宗各取並不離象，受一非餘，斯為偏見。上第二疑云：為是種種？為是一性？今答云：常種種、常一性。第三難云：一性隨於種種則失真諦，種種隨於一性則壞俗諦。今答云：此二互相成立，豈當相乖？性非事外，曾何乖乎種種？種種性空，曾何乖乎一性？由無方有，一性能成種種；緣生故空，種種能成一性。是以緣起之法總有四義：一緣生故有，即妄心分別有，及諸識熏習是也。二緣生故空，即上云「諸法無作用亦無有體性，是故彼一切各各不相知」是也。三無性故有，論云「以有空義故，一切法得成。」經云「從無住本立一切法。」即上隨緣是也。四無性故空，即一切空無性是也。是以無性緣生故空，則非無見斷見之空，為真空也；無性緣生故有，則非常見有見之有，是幻有也。幻有即是不有有，真空即是不空空。不空空故名不真空，不有有故名非實有，非空非有是中道義。又開此空有各有二義：一真空必盡幻有，以若不盡幻有非真空故；二真空必成幻有，以若礙幻有非真空故。二幻有二義者，一幻有必覆真空，以空隱有現故；二幻有必不礙真空，以幻有必自盡令真空徹現故。文殊各以初義致難，覺首各以後義而答，以初二義空有異故，以後二義空有相成故。然此二不二，謂有非有無二為一幻有，空非空無二為一真空。又非空與有無二為一幻有，空與非有無二為一真空。又幻有與真空無二為一味法界，即中道義離相離性、無障無礙、無分別法門。思以準之。復次性有二義：一者有義、二者空義。復有二義：一者不變、二者隨緣。以有義故，說二空所顯即法性本無生也；以空義故，說依他無性即是圓成，即各不相知。以有義故說於不變，以空義故說於隨緣，此二不二，隨緣即是不變，不變故能隨緣。若唯不變，性何預於法？若但隨緣，豈稱真性？故隨其流處有種種異，而其本味停留雪山。又若性離於法則成斷滅，法離於性則本無今有。又法若即性，性常應常；性若即法，法滅應滅。故二相成非常非斷，此二相奪故說非有非空，為中道義。苟得其會，不惑百家異說，願諸學者虛己求宗。

The second [part], five verses, answers the previously posed objections. The text is divided into three: first, three verses directly answer the previous objections; next, one verse explains and establishes the previous meaning; third, one verse sweeps away traces to enter into the profound. As for the first, I will first clarify the general meaning, and next directly explain the text. As for the first [of these]: The previous inquiry contained three levels, and now these three verses each fully answer the three questions above. The first is straightforward. The question asks: 'Since there are various kinds, by what condition do they not know one another?' The previous five verses have already answered this. 'Since they do not know one another, by what condition are there various kinds?' The answer consists of four causes: first, because of false discrimination; second, because of the perfuming of the various consciousnesses; third, because through absence of self-nature they do not know one another; fourth, because tathatā accords with conditions. The first verse possesses the second and third [causes]; the remaining two [verses possess] one meaning each. However, these four causes are merely of one accord: namely, with false discrimination as the condition, tathatā does not maintain its own nature but accords with conditions to become existent, and the various consciousnesses perfume one another boundlessly. If one penetrates the source of falsity, pure pratītyasamutpāda is accomplished. The various traditions each seize [a part] and none strays from the elephant, yet accepting one and rejecting the others is a biased view. The second doubt above stated: 'Is it variety? Or is it a single nature?' Now the answer states: 'It is constantly variety, constantly a single nature.' The third objection stated: 'If the single nature accords with variety, then the ultimate truth is lost; if variety accords with the single nature, then conventional truth is destroyed.' Now the answer states: 'These two mutually establish each other; how could they contradict each other? The nature is not outside phenomena; how could it ever contradict variety? The variety is empty of nature; how could it ever contradict the single nature?' Because of non-existence there is existence, so the single nature can establish variety; because of arising through conditions there is emptiness, so variety can establish the single nature. Therefore, the dharma of pratītyasamutpāda generally possesses four meanings: 1. Because of arising through conditions, it exists: this refers to existence through false mental discrimination and the perfuming of the various consciousnesses. 2. Because of arising through conditions, it is empty: this is what was stated above: 'All dharmas have no activity and also have no essential nature; therefore they all do not know one another.' 3. Because of the absence of self-nature, it exists: the treatise states, 'Because there is the meaning of emptiness, all dharmas are able to be established.' The sūtra states, 'From the basis of non-abiding, all dharmas are established.' This is what was referred to above as acceding to conditions. 4. Because of the absence of self-nature, it is empty: this refers to all being empty and devoid of self-nature. Therefore, because of being empty through having no self-nature and arising through conditions, it is not the emptiness of the view of non-existence or the view of annihilation, but is true emptiness; because of existing through having no self-nature and arising through conditions, it is not the existence of the view of permanence or the view of existence, but is illusory existence. Illusory existence is precisely non-existent existence; true emptiness is precisely non-empty emptiness. Because it is non-empty emptiness, it is called not truly empty; because it is non-existent existence, it is called not genuinely existent. Neither empty nor existent is the meaning of the middle way. Furthermore, unpacking these, emptiness and existence each have two meanings. First, true emptiness necessarily exhausts illusory existence, because if it did not exhaust illusory existence, it would not be true emptiness; second, true emptiness necessarily accomplishes illusory existence, because if it obstructed illusory existence, it would not be true emptiness. Second, as for the two meanings of illusory existence: first, illusory existence necessarily covers true emptiness, because emptiness is concealed and existence is apparent; second, illusory existence necessarily does not obstruct true emptiness, because illusory existence necessarily exhausts itself, allowing true emptiness to be thoroughly apparent. Mañjuśrī raised objections using the first meanings in each case, and Jñānaprabha answered using the latter meanings, because according to the first two meanings, emptiness and existence differ, while according to the latter two meanings, emptiness and existence mutually establish each other. Yet these two are not two: existence and non-existence being non-dual constitutes a single illusory existence; emptiness and non-emptiness being non-dual constitutes a single true emptiness. Moreover, non-emptiness and existence being non-dual constitutes a single illusory existence; emptiness and non-existence being non-dual constitutes a single true emptiness. Furthermore, illusory existence and true emptiness being non-dual constitutes the single-flavor dharmadhātu, which is the meaning of the middle way: the dharma gate that is free from marks and free from nature, unobstructed, and without discrimination. Ponder this to understand it by analogy. Furthermore, 'nature' has two meanings: first, the meaning of existence; second, the meaning of emptiness. It also has two further meanings: first, unchanging; second, according with conditions. Through the meaning of existence, it is said that what is revealed by the two kinds of emptiness is that the dharmatā is originally unarisen; through the meaning of emptiness, it is said that the lack of nature in other-dependence (paratantra) is precisely the consummate (pariniṣpanna)—namely, that they do not know one another. Through the meaning of existence, unchangingness is explained; through the meaning of emptiness, according with conditions is explained. These two are non-dual: according with conditions is precisely unchanging; because it is unchanging, it is able to accord with conditions. If it were solely unchanging, how could the nature pertain to dharmas? If it merely accorded with conditions, how could it be called true nature? Therefore, wherever its stream flows there are various differences, yet its original flavor remains in the Snow Mountains. Furthermore, if the nature were separate from dharmas, it would result in annihilation; if dharmas were separate from the nature, then what was originally non-existent would now exist. Moreover, if dharmas were identical to the nature, then since the nature is permanent, [dharmas] should be permanent; if the nature were identical to dharmas, then when dharmas cease, [the nature] should cease. Therefore, the two mutually establish each other as neither permanent nor annihilated; because the two mutually negate each other, it is said to be neither existent nor empty, which is the meaning of the middle way. If one genuinely attains this integration, one will not be deluded by the differing theories of the hundred schools. I hope all students will empty themselves to seek the fundamental truth.