大方廣佛華嚴經疏 29.36

29.36

Third, the virtue of the ease of harmonising contradictions has two parts within it: first, concluding what came before and introducing what follows; this conclusion has two parts: first, it closely concludes the previous fruit-virtue—because the fruit-virtue is boundless and was said above to be inexhaustible, it says, "all meritorious qualities are purified"; second, it generally concludes cause and fruit, because, the benefits following marks having ended, wanting to clarify that having obtained the benefits following marks entails transcending marks, it thus generally concludes, "obtaining all meritorious qualities, up to and including fulfilling adornments," and from this there is non-contradiction, and so forth. Second, from "when making such a pariṇāmanā" onward, it directly reveals the benefit of harmonising contradictions. There are fifteen pairs, broadly divided into four: the first eleven pairs are the non-contradiction of phenomena facing phenomena; the next two pairs are non-contradiction across worlds; the next pair is non-contradiction between worlds and phenomena; the final pair is the non-contradiction of cause and effect, which is the general conclusion. The first of these is divided into three: the first six pairs are the non-contradiction between phenomena and phenomena; next, from "dharmatā" onward, two pairs are the non-contradiction between phenomena and noumenon; third, from "equality of kṣetras" onward, three pairs are the non-contradiction between noumenon and noumenon. Now for the first: 1. the environment and the sentient being; 2. karma and retribution; 3. primary consciousness and mental concomitants; 4. mind and object; 5. karma and karmic fruition—the second being projecting karma and this being fulfilling karma; 6. primary and auxiliary being non-contradictory. The volition prior to action being the expedient that produces karma is merely called "karma"; the bodily, verbal, and mental actions generated by volition are called the "path of karma" (karmapatha), because it is what is traversed by volition. The Jin translation of the sūtra calls it "karmic traces" (yeji); "traces" means "path." That these phenomena and phenomena are non-contradictory is because they interpenetrate following nature, because dependent arising is mutually conditioning, and because they share the identical sense of dependent arising; it is also because the latter two sections cause this non-contradiction. As for the next two pairs of non-contradiction between noumenon and phenomena, the first pair treats the non-contradiction of nature and mark regarding the marked dharmas, and the latter pair explains the non-contradiction of nature and mark regarding the four marking characteristics, briefly mentioning only arising. Nature does not contradict marks because noumenon can accomplish phenomena. Marks do not contradict nature because phenomena can reveal noumenon, because all dharmas are established without moving from the true limit, and because the real mark is spoken without destroying nominal designations. Third, the three pairs of non-contradiction between noumenon and noumenon: 1. environment and sentient being; 2. person and dharma; 3. subject and object. Realising the limit of detachment from desire is the realised noumenon; sentient beings dwelling peacefully is the realising wisdom; because wisdom is merged in noumenon, the two do not contradict each other. However, regarding the non-contradiction of the above three sections: the first and third sections are considered only between disparate kinds, because in the latter section, taking noumenon by means of phenomena possesses multiple equalities; the middle non-contradiction between noumenon and phenomena has two meanings: first, looking within the same kind, as when considering a kṣetra to a kṣetra as equal; second, looking between disparate kinds, as when considering a kṣetra to sentient beings as equal—equality being the noumenon of having no intrinsic nature. Unfolding this gives four propositions; if examined in detail, there are fivefold sets of four propositions: The first four propositions: 1. kṣetra, 2. sentient beings, 3. the natureless noumenon of the kṣetra, 4. the natureless noumenon of sentient beings; these four are the basis. The second four propositions: 1. the kṣetra is identical to the kṣetra's naturelessness, because phenomena do not persist; 2. it is not identical, because phenomena are not destroyed; 3. the kṣetra's naturelessness is identical to the kṣetra, because it does not maintain its own nature; 4. it is not identical to the kṣetra, because the nature does not change. The third four propositions: sentient beings and naturelessness are also the same as kṣetra, stating the above two sets of four propositions. The first and third of each are looking within the same kind in the second section's non-contradiction between nature and marks; the second and fourth of each, though not unimpeded, are also not contradictory, the meaning being as explained above. The fourth four propositions: 1. the naturelessness of the kṣetra is identical to the naturelessness of sentient beings, because they are non-dual; 2. it is not identical, because there is nothing to be identical with; 3. the kṣetra is identical to sentient beings, because naturelessness is sentient beings, and since the kṣetra is natureless, it is identical to sentient beings; 4. the kṣetra is not identical to sentient beings, because they do not obstruct co-existence. Here, the first two propositions are the third section's non-contradiction between noumenon and noumenon, because there is nothing to be identical with and nothing to be contradictory with; the third proposition is the first section's non-contradiction among phenomena; the fourth proposition, though not unobstructed, is also not contradictory. The fifth set of four propositions: 1. the kṣetra is identical to the naturelessness of sentient beings; 2. it is not identical; 3. sentient beings are identical to the naturelessness of the kṣetra; 4. they are not identical. Here, the first and third propositions are looking between disparate phenomena and noumenon in the second section's non-contradiction between noumenon and phenomena; the second and fourth propositions, though not destroying nature and marks, are also not contradictory. However, since the perspectives are different, there are many distinctions; in actual truth, none of the propositions fail to interpenetrate. Second, on world and world, third, on world and dharma, and fourth, on cause and effect, the texts can all be understood.