大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔 21.28

21.28

疏「空有四義含於五法」者，四義即無生等，五法即名等。今當先釋五法，後消疏文。五法，諸經論皆具，且依《楞伽》列次者，即名、相、妄想、正智、如如，以為其次。若《瑜伽》七十二云「一相、二名、三分別、四真如、五正智。分別，妄想異名。相謂言談，安足事處。名即於相所有，增語分別，謂三界行中所有心心所。真如謂無為法。無我所顯聖智所行，非一切言談安足事處。正智略有二種：一唯出世間正智、二世間出世間正智。」釋曰：上即根本，下即後得。此之五法為假為實？然相通假實，亦具假實二有。名唯假有。分別同相，以有三界心心所實法，故是實有；若虛妄計度故是假有。真如唯實有。二智俱實有。此五二諦何諦所攝？前三世俗有，真如勝義有，根本智勝義有，後得智通二有。五從何生？名從欲生。相與分別俱，從想分別生。真如無生智，從聽聞正法如理作意生。此之五法為一為異？今且將相望餘四法論異不異者，一相與名異，若言其異，名應實有；若言不異，取相應得名。二相與分別若異，則分別應非相；若不異，分別外相應以分別為性。三相與真如若異，則相之勝義應非是如，觀者應捨相求如，正覺真如應不覺相；若言不異，真如無差別，相亦無差別，得相之時應得真如，又得真如時亦應得相，應不清淨。四相與正智，如相與分別說。應知名與分別及正智，及分別於正智，皆當言異。餘略可知。已知五法名相差別，今當消疏文。疏中先以五法屬文、後「迷如」下辯因起融攝。言「迷如以成名相則妄想是生」者，此顯迷時唯有三法：一名、二相、三妄想。故此五法通該一切而不必同時，謂妄想、正智此必不並，故今有妄想決無正智。其如如、名相則有隱顯，此中迷故，如如則隱、名相則顯。次云「悟名相之本如執翻成智」者，此顯悟時但有其二：一正智、二如如。既有正智，決無妄想。了得如如，名相即隱。雖不壞相，舉體即空。理奪於事，無不蕩盡，是故空中無色等法。故《楞伽》云「謂了名相及與妄想，體本不可得，名為正智。如如即是名相，妄想本自不生。」釋曰：名相不生則境如矣。妄想不生則心如矣。了心境如，是為正智，故唯正智及如如存。次云「如外無智，智體即如」者，復融上二以為一味。如外無智，即以如攝智。智體即如，是以智攝如，合為一味。故下經云「無有智外如為智所入，亦無如外智能證於如。」即斯義也。故疏結云「此二猶空，寂照無礙。」寂即是如，照即是智。如日合空，雖有二事，一相難分。

Regarding the commentary's phrase “emptiness has four meanings that encompass the five dharmas”: the four meanings are non-arising and so forth, and the five dharmas are names and so forth. Now I shall first explain the five dharmas, and afterward elucidate the commentary's text. The five dharmas are complete in various sūtras and treatises; relying for now on the sequence listed in the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra, they are: name, characteristic, conceptual proliferation (vikalpa), correct cognition, and suchness (tathatā), which form the sequence. As the Yogācārabhūmi, fascicle seventy-two, states: “First, characteristic; second, name; third, discrimination; fourth, tathatā; fifth, correct cognition. Discrimination is an alternate term for conceptual proliferation. ‘Characteristic’ refers to verbal discourse and the actual bases where things are established. ‘Name’ refers to the designations and discriminations applied to characteristics, meaning all minds and mental factors within the activities of the three realms. ‘Tathatā’ refers to unconditioned dharmas; it is revealed by selflessness, is the sphere of action of noble cognition, and is not an actual basis where any verbal discourse is established. There are broadly two kinds of correct cognition: first, correct cognition that is solely supramundane; second, correct cognition that is both mundane and supramundane.” / Explication: the former is the fundamental [cognition], and the latter is subsequent [cognition]. Are these five dharmas nominal or real? Characteristics pervade both nominal and real, and also possess both nominal and real existence. Names are solely nominal existence. Discrimination is the same as characteristics: because there are the real dharmas of the minds and mental factors of the three realms, it is real existence; if considered as false conceptualizations, it is nominal existence. Tathatā is solely real existence. Both cognitions are real existence. In terms of the two truths, by which truth are these five subsumed? The first three are conventional existence; tathatā is ultimate existence; fundamental cognition is ultimate existence; subsequent cognition pervades both existences. From what do the five arise? Names arise from desire. Characteristics and discrimination together arise from ideation and discrimination. Tathatā is non-arisen. Cognition arises from hearing the correct Dharma and from proper mental application. Are these five dharmas identical or different? Now, comparing characteristics with the remaining four dharmas to discuss difference and non-difference: First, characteristics and names are different; if one says they are different, names should be real existence; if one says they are not different, apprehending characteristics should yield names. Second, if characteristics and discrimination are different, then discrimination should not be a characteristic; if they are not different, characteristics external to discrimination should take discrimination as their nature. Third, if characteristics and tathatā are different, then the ultimate truth of characteristics should not be suchness, a contemplator should abandon characteristics to seek suchness, and correctly awakening to tathatā one should not awaken to characteristics; if one says they are not different, since tathatā has no distinctions, characteristics would also have no distinctions—when attaining characteristics one should attain tathatā, and when attaining tathatā one should also attain characteristics, which would mean it is not pure. Fourth, characteristics and correct cognition are explained just as characteristics and discrimination. One should know that names versus discrimination and correct cognition, as well as discrimination versus correct cognition, must all be said to be different. The rest can be understood by extension. Having understood the distinctions among the names and characteristics of the five dharmas, we shall now elucidate the commentary's text. In the commentary, it first applies the five dharmas to the text, and afterward, beginning with “being deluded about suchness,” it explains cause-arising, fusing and subsumption. Regarding the statement “being deluded about suchness so as to form names and characteristics, conceptual proliferation is then produced”: this reveals that at the time of delusion there are only three dharmas: first, name; second, characteristic; third, conceptual proliferation. Thus, these five dharmas pervade all things yet need not occur simultaneously: conceptual proliferation and correct cognition certainly do not coexist; therefore, now that there is conceptual proliferation, there is definitely no correct cognition. As for suchness and names/characteristics, they have concealment and manifestation; here, due to delusion, suchness is concealed while names and characteristics are manifested. Next, it says: “awakening to the fundamental suchness of names and characteristics, attachment turns into cognition”: this reveals that at the time of awakening there are only two: first, correct cognition; second, suchness. Since there is correct cognition, there is definitely no conceptual proliferation. Comprehending suchness, names and characteristics are then concealed. Although they do not destroy characteristics, their entire essence is empty. Principle overcomes phenomena so that nothing is not swept away completely; therefore, in emptiness there are no dharmas such as form. Hence the Laṅkāvatāra states: “Comprehending that names, characteristics, and conceptual proliferation are fundamentally unobtainable in essence is called correct cognition. Suchness is just that names, characteristics, and conceptual proliferation are fundamentally unarisen.” / Explication: when names and characteristics do not arise, the objective realm is suchness. When conceptual proliferation does not arise, the mind is suchness. Comprehending the suchness of mind and objective realm is correct cognition; therefore, only correct cognition and suchness remain. Next, it says: “outside of suchness there is no cognition; the essence of cognition is just suchness”: this again fuses the above two into a single flavor. “Outside of suchness there is no cognition” means that suchness subsumes cognition. “The essence of cognition is just suchness” means that cognition subsumes suchness, merging into a single flavor. Thus the subsequent sūtra states: “There is no suchness outside of cognition that is entered by cognition, nor is there cognition outside of suchness that can realize suchness.” This is precisely the meaning. Therefore, the commentary concludes: “These two are like empty space; quiescence and illumination are unobstructed.” Quiescence is suchness; illumination is cognition. Like the sun merging with empty space, although there are two things, they are difficult to distinguish as a single characteristic.