大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔 22.8

22.8

疏「然三世平等」下，重釋善住三世平等智地。文中三：初指前標舉、二「且依」下別明義相、三「依此釋者」下結釋善住智地之言。二中即正釋三世平等，於中三：初唯約佛，如〈問明品〉「十方諸如來，同共一法身」等。二唯約生，六道雖差，皆三雜染。三「若生佛相望」下，生佛對說平等之義。於中二：先異時平等、後同時平等。前中，先總言等；後「此約三世」下，別示義相，便引《涅槃》四出偈釋。今先敘彼經，後方釋疏。疏言「四出偈」者，四處出故，亦名四住，一即第十經中出、二即十七經、三即二十七經、四即二十八經。初段即〈如來性品〉、南經第九〈菩薩品〉。文殊師利白佛言：「世尊！今此純陀者，猶有疑心。」佛徵文殊。文殊師利言：「純陀心疑如來常住，以得知見佛性力故。若見佛性而為常者，本未見時應是無常。若本無常，後亦應爾。何以故？如世間物，本無今有、已有還無，如是等物悉是無常。以是義故，諸佛菩薩聲聞緣覺無有差別。」爾時世尊即說偈言：「本有今無、本無今有，三世有法，無有是處。善男子！以是義故，諸佛菩薩聲聞緣覺，亦有差別亦無差別。」文殊師利讚言：「善哉！誠如聖教。我今始解諸佛菩薩聲聞緣覺，亦有差別亦無差別。」佛更不說，迦葉便請佛說。如來便為引長者𤚲牛之喻以況佛性。乳色皆一，如性無異。上第一出竟。第二出即第十七經〈梵行品〉、南經十五。因為迦葉說無所得竟，迦葉領解，更欲請問無所得義。舉佛先說本有今無偈問，如來為答云：「本有者，我昔本有無量煩惱故。以煩惱故，現在無有大般涅槃。言本無者，本無般若波羅蜜。以無般若波羅蜜故，現在具有諸煩惱結。」此釋上半。「若有沙門婆羅門，若天若魔若梵若人，說言如來去來現在有煩惱者，無有是處。」此釋下半。下略經意有二：一明本有父母之身、無金剛身，本無三十二相，具有四百四病。二云本有無常無我等，今無無上菩提。本無見佛性，今有無常等。總有八段，大意多同，皆明本有，有世間妄因；今無，無出世真德。本無，無出世因；今有，有世間妄法。結云「我或知言不知，有相言無相，隨宜化物耳。」上即第二出竟。第三出，即二十七經、南經二十五〈師子吼品〉。「因說一切眾生定得菩提，是故我說一切眾生定有佛性。一切眾生真實未有三十二相八十種好。以是義故，我說偈云『本有今無』等。善男子！凡有有三種：一未來有、二現在有、三過去有。一切眾生未來當有無上菩提，是名佛性。一切眾生現在悉有煩惱，是故現在無有三十二相八十種好。一切眾生過去之世有斷煩惱，是故現在得見佛性。以是義故，我常宣說一切眾生乃至一闡提亦有佛性，未來有故。如有乳者，問言有酥。」上即第三出竟。第四出，即二十八經、南經二十六。因明食為命因，非即食為命，故說此偈「本有今無」等。五敘古人不得論意。釋曰：上四處經，偈意大同而用小異。諸公多於第十經中廣釋其相。遠公引十七經意，釋云：上二句自立道理，下二句破他定義。釋上二句，一同第十七經。釋下二句云：此文語略，亦合云三世無法，亦無是處。意云：於佛，煩惱昔有，今已斷竟，故三世有法無有是處。涅槃昔無，今已證竟，言三世無法，亦無是處。於眾生，反此可知。故無一法三世定有、三世定無。此意明必互有互無。次通難意云：佛今現證，有異二乘，故非無差。彼亦當得，則亦無差別。此答文殊疑。又云：佛今已證，何得難言後亦無常。釋曰：此通純陀疑，諸公大同此意，則成此偈但是三世有無之法，如何能通純陀之難？難意正云：由見佛性而為常者，見既有始，後必當終。如世間物，有已還無。今明證見，何能通此？若超悟法師說答疑意，意則善成，是生公意。但是我始會之，非照今有。而其釋偈亦多同遠公，將偈答難，亦不順理。薦福即用本有今無，論意出二種疑，釋偈下半，亦同遠公。不得論意，故非盡理。六正會論意。今先出論意、後出經中四出別意。今初，先定本有今無之法。謂煩惱業若是生得名本，解脫聖性是修得是今。釋曰：今此正順十七經「本有煩惱，今無涅槃」等。故論云「為二乘說，不謗大乘；若為大乘說，是謗大乘。」意云：此是隨相之法，是三世有法。迷悟之殊是無常法，可化二乘，非是大乘涅槃真性。上定本今之法，次正說偈意。論云「此偈有二意：一破邪義、二立正義。破邪義者，依語言說。立正義者，依於義說，不依語言。然邪復有二：一者外道、二者小乘。上三句，是邪小所立之法。第四句，總非云無有是處。初外道者，謂本有，同僧佉因中有果。本無，同衛世因中無果。三世有，同勒沙婆因中亦有果亦無果。皆有多過，故云無有是處。二破小乘者，如向所說。為小乘說煩惱本有，為大乘者說過三種義。謂若煩惱本有，為真諦有？為俗諦有？若真諦有，前後無異，煩惱不可斷；若俗諦有，俗諦無本，何名本有？言本無今有者，若本無者，後不應有。若本無法而得有者，空應生華，諸本無法皆應當生。若三世共有，居然不成，三世相違故。故下結云無有是處。則破小乘，說三世有法無有是處，已破邪義。所言立正義者，本有今有過於三世，是名正義。本有今有者，從初發心至得涅槃，一味無異，不依生因、不依滅因。有則清淨，凡夫法不能染污、聖人法不能清淨，乃至過一切語言道及一切思惟，不可說不可思惟，攝受因果非因非果。如來一體最極攝受一切妙寶，是大涅槃超過三世，為說涅槃功德乃至常樂我淨。復次有二種義：若本有今有，則是常見；若過三世，則是斷見。若二義相待，成離斷常，是中道義。如是俗諦真諦相待，故有十二因緣真實。何以故？離二邊是真十二因緣。若能善解，則見如來現在於世。」釋曰：此後一段，復融性相令其無礙。餘廣如論。已知論意，今將論釋經之疑。論云「純陀有二因緣故疑：一純陀見同相、不見異相，故生疑。二文殊見異相、不見同相，故生疑。」皆是權為物疑。然若別配，初疑即經中純陀疑、後疑即文殊疑。然此二疑文即影略，實即二人俱有此疑，故云純陀有二種疑。今初，云何見同？謂純陀將本無今有疑同本有今無疑，云：佛本不見佛性，後見佛性而得常住，豈非本無今有。本無今有，即是生法。生法必滅，故是無常。即與世同，故云見同。云何不見異？不見如來契無三世，異於凡小。故今舉異答云：約緣始會，以本無今有。菩提之性不屬三世，智契此性，同性是常。何得難言：有始必有終，是無常耶？純陀疑心自茲遣矣。若通文殊疑者，文殊見異不見同故疑。謂見三乘迷悟差別，今同二乘無常盡滅，即無差別。此名見異生疑。云何不見同？不見同無三世故。今答云：契無三世，一得永常。何得同於二乘無常？無三世性則無差別，會與不會則有差別，上根一聞二疑頓遣，中下未悟。迦葉起悲，〈梵行品〉中因無得問，佛舉八段，八段之中皆悉結云「三世有者無有是處」，斯無得矣。二十七經，因說一切眾生定得菩提，是當有義，是故說言有三種有：一未來有、二過去有、三現在有。明此三有，亦約迷悟，佛性菩提豈屬三世？二十八經，食為命因，非即是命。如佛性為因，非即是佛，亦是三世因緣之法隨相而說。若隨相取，亦無是處。釋曰：上來判釋四出之偈，理無不盡。次當解釋今疏用意。按十七經，本有今有皆約於妄故，本無今無並約於真故，故云我本有煩惱、今無涅槃，本無般若、今有煩惱。所以爾者？約佛昔因故。及二十七經，則云眾生過去有斷煩惱因緣，今見佛性，則是真法本無今有。故純陀生疑，正約世尊因見佛性本無今有為難。是知若真若妄，皆通本有今無、本無今有，故疏取經意及彼論意，故約生佛相望真妄並說。又十七經約佛昔說故，即以佛昔時為本。亦以昔時為今，例於眾生，則以今時為本。亦以今時為今，如佛昔有煩惱無異。皆是影略。後釋疏。今疏取意，則以昔為本，現在為今。言煩惱，佛則本有今無者，以佛昔為凡夫則有煩惱，今成正覺故無煩惱。言眾生則本無今有者，約性淨故本無煩惱，約客塵故今有煩惱。

Regarding the commentary's passage beginning with, "However, equality of the three periods of time": this re-explains the cognitive stage of well-abiding equality of the three periods of time. Within the text there are three parts: first, pointing to the preceding to raise the topic; second, from "Provisionally relying upon..." onward, individually elucidating the doctrinal characteristics; third, from "According to this explanation..." onward, concluding with an explanation of the phrase "cognitive stage of well-abiding." Within the second part, which directly explains the equality of the three periods of time, there are three sections: first, solely in terms of the Buddhas, as in the "Chapter on Inquiring into Clarity": "All Tathāgatas of the ten directions share the single dharmakāya," and so forth; second, solely in terms of sentient beings: although the six destinies differ, all are subject to the three defilements; third, from "If sentient beings and the Buddha are compared..." onward, stating the meaning of equality between sentient beings and the Buddha. Within this there are two: first, equality at different times; second, equality at the same time. In the first part, it first generally speaks of equality; then, from "This is according to the three periods of time..." onward, it individually indicates the doctrinal characteristics, citing the verse appearing four times in the Nirvāṇa [Sūtra] to explain it. Now, we first relate that sūtra, and only afterward explain the commentary.

When the commentary says "the verse appearing four times," it is because it appears in four places, also called the four abodes: first, appearing in the tenth fascicle; second, in the seventeenth fascicle; third, in the twenty-seventh fascicle; fourth, in the twenty-eighth fascicle.

The first section is in the "Chapter on the Tathāgata Nature," which is Chapter 9, the "Chapter on Bodhisattvas," in the Southern edition. Mañjuśrī addressed the Buddha, saying: "World-Honoured One! Now this Cunda still harbors doubt in his mind." The Buddha questioned Mañjuśrī. Mañjuśrī said: "Cunda's mind doubts that the Tathāgata is permanently abiding, by virtue of having obtained the power of seeing the Buddha-nature. If one is permanent by virtue of seeing the Buddha-nature, before one had originally seen it, one must have been impermanent. If originally impermanent, afterward it must likewise be so. Why? Just as worldly objects, which originally did not exist and now exist, or having existed then cease to exist, all such objects are impermanent. For this reason, between the Buddhas, bodhisattvas, śrāvakas, and pratyekabuddhas, there would be no distinction." At that time, the World-Honoured One spoke this verse: "Originally existing, now non-existent; originally non-existent, now existing—that there are conditioned dharmas of the three periods of time has no basis in reality. Good sons! For this reason, between the Buddhas, bodhisattvas, śrāvakas, and pratyekabuddhas, there are distinctions and there are no distinctions." Mañjuśrī praised him, saying: "Excellent! Truly it is as the holy teaching says. Only now do I understand that between the Buddhas, bodhisattvas, śrāvakas, and pratyekabuddhas, there are distinctions and there are no distinctions." The Buddha said no more, so Kāśyapa then requested the Buddha to speak. The Tathāgata then cited for him the simile of the elder milking the cow to illustrate the Buddha-nature: the color of the milk is always one, just as the nature is without difference. The first appearance above is concluded.

The second appearance is in the seventeenth fascicle, the "Chapter on Pure Conduct," which is the fifteenth fascicle in the Southern edition. Because he had finished explaining non-attainment to Kāśyapa, Kāśyapa grasped the understanding and wished to ask further about the meaning of non-attainment. He brought up the verse spoken earlier by the Buddha, "originally existing, now non-existent," to inquire, and the Tathāgata answered him, saying: "As for 'originally existing,' it is because in the past I originally had immeasurable afflictions. Because of the afflictions, in the present there was no great parinirvāṇa. As for 'originally non-existent,' originally there was no prajñāpāramitā. Because there was no prajñāpāramitā, in the present one fully possesses all bonds of affliction." This explains the first half of the verse. "If there is a śramaṇa, a brāhmaṇa, a deva, a māra, a Brahmā, or a human who says that the Tathāgata has afflictions in the past, future, or present, that has no basis in reality." This explains the second half. Below, the sūtra's meaning is briefly summarized as twofold: First, clarifying that originally having the body born of parents, one lacks the adamantine body; originally lacking the thirty-two marks, one fully possesses the four hundred and four illnesses. Second, stating that originally having impermanence, non-self, and so forth, now one lacks anuttarabodhi; originally lacking the seeing of Buddha-nature, now one has impermanence and so forth. In total there are eight sections, the general meaning of which is largely the same, all clarifying that "originally existing" refers to having worldly false causes; "now non-existent" refers to lacking supramundane true virtues; "originally non-existent" refers to lacking supramundane causes; "now existing" refers to having worldly false dharmas. It concludes: "I sometimes know and speak of not knowing, have marks and speak of having no marks, merely converting beings in accordance with what is appropriate." The above is the conclusion of the second appearance.

The third appearance is in the twenty-seventh fascicle, which is Chapter 25, the "Chapter on the Lion's Roar," in the Southern edition: "Because of saying that all sentient beings will definitely attain bodhi, therefore I say that all sentient beings definitely possess Buddha-nature. Sentient beings in truth do not yet possess the thirty-two marks and eighty minor signs. For this reason, I spoke the verse: 'Originally existing, now non-existent,' and so forth. Good sons! In general, existence is of three kinds: first, future existence; second, present existence; third, past existence. That all sentient beings in the future will have anuttarabodhi is called Buddha-nature. All sentient beings in the present have afflictions, and therefore in the present do not possess the thirty-two marks and eighty minor signs. Sentient beings in past lives had the eradication of afflictions, and therefore in the present are able to see the Buddha-nature. For this reason, I always proclaim that all sentient beings, even icchantikas, possess Buddha-nature, because of future existence. It is like someone having milk, and being asked whether there is ghee." The above is the conclusion of the third appearance.

The fourth appearance is in the twenty-eighth fascicle, which is the twenty-sixth in the Southern edition. Because of clarifying that food is the cause of life, not that food itself is life, this verse is spoken: "Originally existing, now non-existent," and so forth.

Fifth, relating that the ancient masters failed to grasp the intention of the treatise. Explanation: In the four places of the sūtra above, the intention of the verse is largely the same, though its application slightly differs. The various masters mostly explained its characteristics at length under the tenth fascicle. Master Yuan cited the meaning of the seventeenth fascicle, explaining: "The first two lines establish one's own principle; the lower two lines refute the fixed definitions of others." Explaining the upper two lines, he is entirely identical with the seventeenth fascicle. Explaining the lower two lines, he says: "This text is abbreviated; it should also say: 'that there are non-existent dharmas in the three periods of time likewise has no basis in reality.' The meaning is: regarding the Buddha, afflictions existed in the past and are now completely severed; therefore, that there are existing dharmas throughout the three periods of time has no basis in reality. Nirvāṇa did not exist in the past and has now been fully realized; saying that there are non-existent dharmas throughout the three periods of time likewise has no basis in reality. Regarding sentient beings, the reverse can be known. Thus no single dharma is definitively existing in the three periods of time, or definitively non-existent in the three periods of time. This meaning clarifies that they are necessarily mutually existing and mutually non-existent." Next, resolving the objection, he says: "The Buddha now presently realizes it, which differs from the two vehicles; hence they are not without distinction. They too will attain it in the future, so there is likewise no distinction." This answers Mañjuśrī's doubt. Furthermore, he says: "The Buddha has already realized it now; how can one object that afterward it will also be impermanent?" Explanation: This resolves Cunda's doubt. The various masters largely share this view. But then this verse would merely be a dharma of existence and non-existence across the three periods of time; how could it resolve Cunda's objection? The gist of the objection was precisely: if one is permanent by virtue of seeing the Buddha-nature, since seeing has a beginning, it must have an end; just like worldly things, having come into existence, they return to non-existence. Now, by merely clarifying experiential seeing, how could one resolve this? If we look at Dharma Master Chaowu's explanation answering the doubt, his intention is well-constructed and represents Master Sheng's view: "It is only that I first accord with it; it is not that illumination now exists." Yet his explanation of the verse is also mostly identical with Master Yuan's, and using the verse to answer the objection likewise does not accord with reason. Master Jianfu took "originally existing, now non-existent" and, from the treatise's meaning, brought out two kinds of doubts, explaining the lower half of the verse identically with Master Yuan. Failing to grasp the intention of the treatise, it does not exhaust the principle.

Sixth, directly reconciling with the intention of the treatise. Here we first present the treatise's intention, and afterward present the distinct intentions across the four appearances in the sūtra. First, we determine the dharmas of "originally existing, now non-existent." That is, if afflictions and karma are inborn, they are called "original"; if the holy nature of liberation is acquired through cultivation, it is "now." Explanation: This directly accords with the seventeenth fascicle's "originally having afflictions, now lacking nirvāṇa," and so forth. Therefore the treatise says: "Expounding it for the two vehicles does not slander the Mahāyāna; if expounding it for the Mahāyāna, it slanders the Mahāyāna." The meaning is: this is a dharma conforming to marks, a conditioned dharma of the three periods of time. The distinction between delusion and awakening is an impermanent dharma; it can convert the two vehicles, but it is not the true nature of Mahāyāna nirvāṇa. Having determined above the dharmas of "original" and "now," next we directly state the intention of the verse.

The treatise states: "This verse has two intentions: first, refuting erroneous doctrines; second, establishing correct doctrine. Refuting erroneous doctrines relies on language; establishing correct doctrine relies on the meaning, not on language. However, erroneous views are twofold: first, heterodox traditions; second, the Hīnayāna. The upper three lines are the dharmas established by heterodox and Hīnayāna views. The fourth line universally negates them, saying: 'has no basis in reality.' First, as for heterodox traditions: 'originally existing' is identical with the Sāṃkhya view that the effect exists within the cause; 'originally non-existent' is identical with the Vaiśeṣika view that the effect does not exist within the cause; 'existing in the three periods of time' is identical with the Nirgrantha view that the effect both exists and does not exist within the cause. All possess many faults, hence it says: 'has no basis in reality.' Second, as for refuting the Hīnayāna: it is as explained earlier. Stating that afflictions originally exist is taught for the Hīnayāna; for those of the Mahāyāna, it incurs three kinds of faults. That is, if afflictions originally exist, do they exist in the ultimate truth, or do they exist in the conventional truth? If they exist in the ultimate truth, prior and posterior would be without difference, and afflictions could not be severed. If they exist in the conventional truth, the conventional truth has no origin; how could it be called 'originally existing'? Regarding 'originally non-existent, now existing': if originally non-existent, it should not exist later. If an originally non-existent dharma could come to exist, space should produce flowers, and all originally non-existent dharmas should all be produced. If they are shared throughout the three periods of time, it evidently cannot be established, because the three periods of time are mutually contradictory. Therefore it concludes below: 'has no basis in reality.' Thus, refuting the Hīnayāna by stating that existing dharmas of the three periods of time have no basis in reality has already refuted erroneous doctrines.

"As for establishing the correct doctrine: 'originally existing, now existing' transcending the three periods of time is called the correct doctrine. 'Originally existing, now existing' means that from the initial arousal of the mind up to the attainment of nirvāṇa, it is of one flavor without difference, neither relying on productive causes nor relying on destructive causes. Its existence is pure; dharmas of ordinary beings cannot defile it, and dharmas of holy beings cannot purify it, up to transcending all paths of language and all conceptualization, ineffable and inconceivable, encompassing cause and effect while being neither cause nor effect. The single essence of the Tathāgata supremely encompasses all wondrous jewels; this great nirvāṇa transcends the three periods of time, preaching the virtues of nirvāṇa up to permanence, bliss, self, and purity. Furthermore, there are two kinds of meanings: if it is 'originally existing, now existing,' then it is the view of eternalism; if it transcends the three periods of time, then it is the view of annihilationism. If the two meanings are mutually dependent, they constitute freedom from annihilationism and eternalism, which is the meaning of the middle way. In this way, conventional truth and ultimate truth are mutually dependent; hence there is the reality of the twelve links of dependent origination. Why? Free from the two extremes is the true twelve links of dependent origination. If one can skillfully understand this, one sees the Tathāgata presently abiding in the world." Explanation: This latter section further harmonizes nature and marks, rendering them unhindered. The rest is fully as in the treatise.

Having understood the treatise's intention, we now take the treatise to explain the doubts in the sūtra. The treatise states: "Cunda had doubts due to two causes and conditions: first, Cunda saw the identical characteristics and did not see the distinct characteristics, hence generating doubt; second, Mañjuśrī saw the distinct characteristics and did not see the identical characteristics, hence generating doubt." Both were skillful doubts raised on behalf of sentient beings. However, if assigned individually, the first doubt is Cunda's doubt in the sūtra, and the second doubt is Mañjuśrī's doubt. Yet these two doubts in the text reflect and imply each other; in reality, both individuals had both doubts, which is why it says Cunda had two kinds of doubts.

Now first: how did he see the identical? That is, Cunda took the doubt of "originally non-existent, now existing" to be identical with the doubt of "originally existing, now non-existent," saying: "The Buddha originally did not see the Buddha-nature, and later saw the Buddha-nature, thereby attaining permanent abiding; is this not originally non-existent and now existing? Originally non-existent and now existing is a produced dharma. A produced dharma must perish, hence it is impermanent. This is identical with worldly things; hence it is called 'seeing the identical.'" How did he not see the distinct? He did not see that the Tathāgata accords with the absence of the three periods of time, differing from ordinary beings and the Hīnayāna. Therefore, now raising the distinct, the answer states: "In terms of conditions, one first tallies with it, taking it as originally non-existent and now existing. The nature of bodhi does not belong to the three periods of time; when wisdom tallies with this nature, being identical with the nature, it is permanent. How can one object: 'Having a beginning, it must have an end, and is impermanent'?" Cunda's doubtful mind was spontaneously dispelled from this.

As for resolving Mañjuśrī's doubt: Mañjuśrī saw the distinct and did not see the identical, hence doubting. That is, seeing the distinction of delusion and awakening in the three vehicles, and now that they are identical with the two vehicles in being impermanent and utterly extinguished, there would be no distinction. This is called generating doubt from seeing the distinct. How did he not see the identical? He did not see that they are identically devoid of the three periods of time. Now the answer states: "Tallying with the absence of the three periods of time, once attained it is eternally permanent. How could it be identical with the impermanence of the two vehicles? In having no nature of the three periods of time, there is no distinction; in tallying or not tallying, there are distinctions." Those of superior faculties, upon hearing this once, have both doubts abruptly dispelled, while those of middling and lower faculties have not yet awakened. Kāśyapa gave rise to compassion, and in the "Chapter on Pure Conduct," he asked based on non-attainment. The Buddha raised eight sections, and within all eight sections, he invariably concluded: "that there are conditioned dharmas of the three periods of time has no basis in reality"—this is non-attainment.

In the twenty-seventh fascicle, because of saying that all sentient beings will definitely attain bodhi, this is the meaning of future existence. Therefore, he spoke of having three kinds of existence: first, future existence; second, past existence; third, present existence. Clarifying these three kinds of existence is also in terms of delusion and awakening; how could the Buddha-nature of bodhi belong to the three periods of time? In the twenty-eighth fascicle, food is the cause of life, not life itself; just as the Buddha-nature is the cause, not the Buddha himself. This too is a dharma of causes and conditions of the three periods of time spoken in accordance with marks. If one grasps it according to marks, it likewise has no basis in reality.

Explanation: The classification and explanation of the verse appearing four times above exhausts the principle completely. Next, we should explain the intention of the present commentary. According to the seventeenth fascicle, "originally existing" and "now existing" both refer to delusion, while "originally non-existent" and "now non-existent" both refer to the true; hence it says: "I originally had afflictions and now lack nirvāṇa; originally lacked prajñā and now have afflictions." Why is it so? Because it is in terms of the Buddha's past causes. And in the twenty-seventh fascicle, it says that sentient beings in the past had the causes and conditions of severing afflictions and now see the Buddha-nature; this is the true dharma being originally non-existent and now existing. Thus, Cunda's generating doubt was precisely an objection raised in terms of the World-Honoured One having originally not existed and now existing due to seeing the Buddha-nature. From this we know that whether true or false, both apply to "originally existing, now non-existent" and "originally non-existent, now existing." Therefore, the commentary adopts the intention of the sūtra and the intention of that treatise, speaking of both the true and the false in comparing sentient beings and the Buddha. Furthermore, because the seventeenth fascicle speaks in terms of the Buddha's past, it takes the Buddha's past time as the "original." It also takes the past time as "now"; comparing it to sentient beings, it takes the present time as the "original." It also takes the present time as "now," not different from the Buddha having afflictions in the past. All of these reflect and imply each other.

Afterward, explaining the commentary: The present commentary adopts this intention, taking the past as "original" and the present as "now." Regarding afflictions, that the Buddha "originally existed and now does not exist" is because when the Buddha was an ordinary being in the past, he had afflictions, but now, having accomplished right awakening, he lacks afflictions. That sentient beings are "originally non-existent and now existing" is: in terms of the pure nature, they originally lack afflictions; in terms of adventitious defilements, they now have afflictions.