大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔 22.8

22.8

Regarding the commentary's passage beginning with, "However, equality of the three periods of time": this re-explains the cognitive stage of well-abiding equality of the three periods of time. Within the text there are three parts: first, pointing to the preceding to raise the topic; second, from "Provisionally relying upon..." onward, individually elucidating the doctrinal characteristics; third, from "According to this explanation..." onward, concluding with an explanation of the phrase "cognitive stage of well-abiding." Within the second part, which directly explains the equality of the three periods of time, there are three sections: first, solely in terms of the Buddhas, as in the "Chapter on Inquiring into Clarity": "All Tathāgatas of the ten directions share the single dharmakāya," and so forth; second, solely in terms of sentient beings: although the six destinies differ, all are subject to the three defilements; third, from "If sentient beings and the Buddha are compared..." onward, stating the meaning of equality between sentient beings and the Buddha. Within this there are two: first, equality at different times; second, equality at the same time. In the first part, it first generally speaks of equality; then, from "This is according to the three periods of time..." onward, it individually indicates the doctrinal characteristics, citing the verse appearing four times in the Nirvāṇa [Sūtra] to explain it. Now, we first relate that sūtra, and only afterward explain the commentary.

When the commentary says "the verse appearing four times," it is because it appears in four places, also called the four abodes: first, appearing in the tenth fascicle; second, in the seventeenth fascicle; third, in the twenty-seventh fascicle; fourth, in the twenty-eighth fascicle.

The first section is in the "Chapter on the Tathāgata Nature," which is Chapter 9, the "Chapter on Bodhisattvas," in the Southern edition. Mañjuśrī addressed the Buddha, saying: "World-Honoured One! Now this Cunda still harbors doubt in his mind." The Buddha questioned Mañjuśrī. Mañjuśrī said: "Cunda's mind doubts that the Tathāgata is permanently abiding, by virtue of having obtained the power of seeing the Buddha-nature. If one is permanent by virtue of seeing the Buddha-nature, before one had originally seen it, one must have been impermanent. If originally impermanent, afterward it must likewise be so. Why? Just as worldly objects, which originally did not exist and now exist, or having existed then cease to exist, all such objects are impermanent. For this reason, between the Buddhas, bodhisattvas, śrāvakas, and pratyekabuddhas, there would be no distinction." At that time, the World-Honoured One spoke this verse: "Originally existing, now non-existent; originally non-existent, now existing—that there are conditioned dharmas of the three periods of time has no basis in reality. Good sons! For this reason, between the Buddhas, bodhisattvas, śrāvakas, and pratyekabuddhas, there are distinctions and there are no distinctions." Mañjuśrī praised him, saying: "Excellent! Truly it is as the holy teaching says. Only now do I understand that between the Buddhas, bodhisattvas, śrāvakas, and pratyekabuddhas, there are distinctions and there are no distinctions." The Buddha said no more, so Kāśyapa then requested the Buddha to speak. The Tathāgata then cited for him the simile of the elder milking the cow to illustrate the Buddha-nature: the color of the milk is always one, just as the nature is without difference. The first appearance above is concluded.

The second appearance is in the seventeenth fascicle, the "Chapter on Pure Conduct," which is the fifteenth fascicle in the Southern edition. Because he had finished explaining non-attainment to Kāśyapa, Kāśyapa grasped the understanding and wished to ask further about the meaning of non-attainment. He brought up the verse spoken earlier by the Buddha, "originally existing, now non-existent," to inquire, and the Tathāgata answered him, saying: "As for 'originally existing,' it is because in the past I originally had immeasurable afflictions. Because of the afflictions, in the present there was no great parinirvāṇa. As for 'originally non-existent,' originally there was no prajñāpāramitā. Because there was no prajñāpāramitā, in the present one fully possesses all bonds of affliction." This explains the first half of the verse. "If there is a śramaṇa, a brāhmaṇa, a deva, a māra, a Brahmā, or a human who says that the Tathāgata has afflictions in the past, future, or present, that has no basis in reality." This explains the second half. Below, the sūtra's meaning is briefly summarized as twofold: First, clarifying that originally having the body born of parents, one lacks the adamantine body; originally lacking the thirty-two marks, one fully possesses the four hundred and four illnesses. Second, stating that originally having impermanence, non-self, and so forth, now one lacks anuttarabodhi; originally lacking the seeing of Buddha-nature, now one has impermanence and so forth. In total there are eight sections, the general meaning of which is largely the same, all clarifying that "originally existing" refers to having worldly false causes; "now non-existent" refers to lacking supramundane true virtues; "originally non-existent" refers to lacking supramundane causes; "now existing" refers to having worldly false dharmas. It concludes: "I sometimes know and speak of not knowing, have marks and speak of having no marks, merely converting beings in accordance with what is appropriate." The above is the conclusion of the second appearance.

The third appearance is in the twenty-seventh fascicle, which is Chapter 25, the "Chapter on the Lion's Roar," in the Southern edition: "Because of saying that all sentient beings will definitely attain bodhi, therefore I say that all sentient beings definitely possess Buddha-nature. Sentient beings in truth do not yet possess the thirty-two marks and eighty minor signs. For this reason, I spoke the verse: 'Originally existing, now non-existent,' and so forth. Good sons! In general, existence is of three kinds: first, future existence; second, present existence; third, past existence. That all sentient beings in the future will have anuttarabodhi is called Buddha-nature. All sentient beings in the present have afflictions, and therefore in the present do not possess the thirty-two marks and eighty minor signs. Sentient beings in past lives had the eradication of afflictions, and therefore in the present are able to see the Buddha-nature. For this reason, I always proclaim that all sentient beings, even icchantikas, possess Buddha-nature, because of future existence. It is like someone having milk, and being asked whether there is ghee." The above is the conclusion of the third appearance.

The fourth appearance is in the twenty-eighth fascicle, which is the twenty-sixth in the Southern edition. Because of clarifying that food is the cause of life, not that food itself is life, this verse is spoken: "Originally existing, now non-existent," and so forth.

Fifth, relating that the ancient masters failed to grasp the intention of the treatise. Explanation: In the four places of the sūtra above, the intention of the verse is largely the same, though its application slightly differs. The various masters mostly explained its characteristics at length under the tenth fascicle. Master Yuan cited the meaning of the seventeenth fascicle, explaining: "The first two lines establish one's own principle; the lower two lines refute the fixed definitions of others." Explaining the upper two lines, he is entirely identical with the seventeenth fascicle. Explaining the lower two lines, he says: "This text is abbreviated; it should also say: 'that there are non-existent dharmas in the three periods of time likewise has no basis in reality.' The meaning is: regarding the Buddha, afflictions existed in the past and are now completely severed; therefore, that there are existing dharmas throughout the three periods of time has no basis in reality. Nirvāṇa did not exist in the past and has now been fully realized; saying that there are non-existent dharmas throughout the three periods of time likewise has no basis in reality. Regarding sentient beings, the reverse can be known. Thus no single dharma is definitively existing in the three periods of time, or definitively non-existent in the three periods of time. This meaning clarifies that they are necessarily mutually existing and mutually non-existent." Next, resolving the objection, he says: "The Buddha now presently realizes it, which differs from the two vehicles; hence they are not without distinction. They too will attain it in the future, so there is likewise no distinction." This answers Mañjuśrī's doubt. Furthermore, he says: "The Buddha has already realized it now; how can one object that afterward it will also be impermanent?" Explanation: This resolves Cunda's doubt. The various masters largely share this view. But then this verse would merely be a dharma of existence and non-existence across the three periods of time; how could it resolve Cunda's objection? The gist of the objection was precisely: if one is permanent by virtue of seeing the Buddha-nature, since seeing has a beginning, it must have an end; just like worldly things, having come into existence, they return to non-existence. Now, by merely clarifying experiential seeing, how could one resolve this? If we look at Dharma Master Chaowu's explanation answering the doubt, his intention is well-constructed and represents Master Sheng's view: "It is only that I first accord with it; it is not that illumination now exists." Yet his explanation of the verse is also mostly identical with Master Yuan's, and using the verse to answer the objection likewise does not accord with reason. Master Jianfu took "originally existing, now non-existent" and, from the treatise's meaning, brought out two kinds of doubts, explaining the lower half of the verse identically with Master Yuan. Failing to grasp the intention of the treatise, it does not exhaust the principle.

Sixth, directly reconciling with the intention of the treatise. Here we first present the treatise's intention, and afterward present the distinct intentions across the four appearances in the sūtra. First, we determine the dharmas of "originally existing, now non-existent." That is, if afflictions and karma are inborn, they are called "original"; if the holy nature of liberation is acquired through cultivation, it is "now." Explanation: This directly accords with the seventeenth fascicle's "originally having afflictions, now lacking nirvāṇa," and so forth. Therefore the treatise says: "Expounding it for the two vehicles does not slander the Mahāyāna; if expounding it for the Mahāyāna, it slanders the Mahāyāna." The meaning is: this is a dharma conforming to marks, a conditioned dharma of the three periods of time. The distinction between delusion and awakening is an impermanent dharma; it can convert the two vehicles, but it is not the true nature of Mahāyāna nirvāṇa. Having determined above the dharmas of "original" and "now," next we directly state the intention of the verse.

The treatise states: "This verse has two intentions: first, refuting erroneous doctrines; second, establishing correct doctrine. Refuting erroneous doctrines relies on language; establishing correct doctrine relies on the meaning, not on language. However, erroneous views are twofold: first, heterodox traditions; second, the Hīnayāna. The upper three lines are the dharmas established by heterodox and Hīnayāna views. The fourth line universally negates them, saying: 'has no basis in reality.' First, as for heterodox traditions: 'originally existing' is identical with the Sāṃkhya view that the effect exists within the cause; 'originally non-existent' is identical with the Vaiśeṣika view that the effect does not exist within the cause; 'existing in the three periods of time' is identical with the Nirgrantha view that the effect both exists and does not exist within the cause. All possess many faults, hence it says: 'has no basis in reality.' Second, as for refuting the Hīnayāna: it is as explained earlier. Stating that afflictions originally exist is taught for the Hīnayāna; for those of the Mahāyāna, it incurs three kinds of faults. That is, if afflictions originally exist, do they exist in the ultimate truth, or do they exist in the conventional truth? If they exist in the ultimate truth, prior and posterior would be without difference, and afflictions could not be severed. If they exist in the conventional truth, the conventional truth has no origin; how could it be called 'originally existing'? Regarding 'originally non-existent, now existing': if originally non-existent, it should not exist later. If an originally non-existent dharma could come to exist, space should produce flowers, and all originally non-existent dharmas should all be produced. If they are shared throughout the three periods of time, it evidently cannot be established, because the three periods of time are mutually contradictory. Therefore it concludes below: 'has no basis in reality.' Thus, refuting the Hīnayāna by stating that existing dharmas of the three periods of time have no basis in reality has already refuted erroneous doctrines.

"As for establishing the correct doctrine: 'originally existing, now existing' transcending the three periods of time is called the correct doctrine. 'Originally existing, now existing' means that from the initial arousal of the mind up to the attainment of nirvāṇa, it is of one flavor without difference, neither relying on productive causes nor relying on destructive causes. Its existence is pure; dharmas of ordinary beings cannot defile it, and dharmas of holy beings cannot purify it, up to transcending all paths of language and all conceptualization, ineffable and inconceivable, encompassing cause and effect while being neither cause nor effect. The single essence of the Tathāgata supremely encompasses all wondrous jewels; this great nirvāṇa transcends the three periods of time, preaching the virtues of nirvāṇa up to permanence, bliss, self, and purity. Furthermore, there are two kinds of meanings: if it is 'originally existing, now existing,' then it is the view of eternalism; if it transcends the three periods of time, then it is the view of annihilationism. If the two meanings are mutually dependent, they constitute freedom from annihilationism and eternalism, which is the meaning of the middle way. In this way, conventional truth and ultimate truth are mutually dependent; hence there is the reality of the twelve links of dependent origination. Why? Free from the two extremes is the true twelve links of dependent origination. If one can skillfully understand this, one sees the Tathāgata presently abiding in the world." Explanation: This latter section further harmonizes nature and marks, rendering them unhindered. The rest is fully as in the treatise.

Having understood the treatise's intention, we now take the treatise to explain the doubts in the sūtra. The treatise states: "Cunda had doubts due to two causes and conditions: first, Cunda saw the identical characteristics and did not see the distinct characteristics, hence generating doubt; second, Mañjuśrī saw the distinct characteristics and did not see the identical characteristics, hence generating doubt." Both were skillful doubts raised on behalf of sentient beings. However, if assigned individually, the first doubt is Cunda's doubt in the sūtra, and the second doubt is Mañjuśrī's doubt. Yet these two doubts in the text reflect and imply each other; in reality, both individuals had both doubts, which is why it says Cunda had two kinds of doubts.

Now first: how did he see the identical? That is, Cunda took the doubt of "originally non-existent, now existing" to be identical with the doubt of "originally existing, now non-existent," saying: "The Buddha originally did not see the Buddha-nature, and later saw the Buddha-nature, thereby attaining permanent abiding; is this not originally non-existent and now existing? Originally non-existent and now existing is a produced dharma. A produced dharma must perish, hence it is impermanent. This is identical with worldly things; hence it is called 'seeing the identical.'" How did he not see the distinct? He did not see that the Tathāgata accords with the absence of the three periods of time, differing from ordinary beings and the Hīnayāna. Therefore, now raising the distinct, the answer states: "In terms of conditions, one first tallies with it, taking it as originally non-existent and now existing. The nature of bodhi does not belong to the three periods of time; when wisdom tallies with this nature, being identical with the nature, it is permanent. How can one object: 'Having a beginning, it must have an end, and is impermanent'?" Cunda's doubtful mind was spontaneously dispelled from this.

As for resolving Mañjuśrī's doubt: Mañjuśrī saw the distinct and did not see the identical, hence doubting. That is, seeing the distinction of delusion and awakening in the three vehicles, and now that they are identical with the two vehicles in being impermanent and utterly extinguished, there would be no distinction. This is called generating doubt from seeing the distinct. How did he not see the identical? He did not see that they are identically devoid of the three periods of time. Now the answer states: "Tallying with the absence of the three periods of time, once attained it is eternally permanent. How could it be identical with the impermanence of the two vehicles? In having no nature of the three periods of time, there is no distinction; in tallying or not tallying, there are distinctions." Those of superior faculties, upon hearing this once, have both doubts abruptly dispelled, while those of middling and lower faculties have not yet awakened. Kāśyapa gave rise to compassion, and in the "Chapter on Pure Conduct," he asked based on non-attainment. The Buddha raised eight sections, and within all eight sections, he invariably concluded: "that there are conditioned dharmas of the three periods of time has no basis in reality"—this is non-attainment.

In the twenty-seventh fascicle, because of saying that all sentient beings will definitely attain bodhi, this is the meaning of future existence. Therefore, he spoke of having three kinds of existence: first, future existence; second, past existence; third, present existence. Clarifying these three kinds of existence is also in terms of delusion and awakening; how could the Buddha-nature of bodhi belong to the three periods of time? In the twenty-eighth fascicle, food is the cause of life, not life itself; just as the Buddha-nature is the cause, not the Buddha himself. This too is a dharma of causes and conditions of the three periods of time spoken in accordance with marks. If one grasps it according to marks, it likewise has no basis in reality.

Explanation: The classification and explanation of the verse appearing four times above exhausts the principle completely. Next, we should explain the intention of the present commentary. According to the seventeenth fascicle, "originally existing" and "now existing" both refer to delusion, while "originally non-existent" and "now non-existent" both refer to the true; hence it says: "I originally had afflictions and now lack nirvāṇa; originally lacked prajñā and now have afflictions." Why is it so? Because it is in terms of the Buddha's past causes. And in the twenty-seventh fascicle, it says that sentient beings in the past had the causes and conditions of severing afflictions and now see the Buddha-nature; this is the true dharma being originally non-existent and now existing. Thus, Cunda's generating doubt was precisely an objection raised in terms of the World-Honoured One having originally not existed and now existing due to seeing the Buddha-nature. From this we know that whether true or false, both apply to "originally existing, now non-existent" and "originally non-existent, now existing." Therefore, the commentary adopts the intention of the sūtra and the intention of that treatise, speaking of both the true and the false in comparing sentient beings and the Buddha. Furthermore, because the seventeenth fascicle speaks in terms of the Buddha's past, it takes the Buddha's past time as the "original." It also takes the past time as "now"; comparing it to sentient beings, it takes the present time as the "original." It also takes the present time as "now," not different from the Buddha having afflictions in the past. All of these reflect and imply each other.

Afterward, explaining the commentary: The present commentary adopts this intention, taking the past as "original" and the present as "now." Regarding afflictions, that the Buddha "originally existed and now does not exist" is because when the Buddha was an ordinary being in the past, he had afflictions, but now, having accomplished right awakening, he lacks afflictions. That sentient beings are "originally non-existent and now existing" is: in terms of the pure nature, they originally lack afflictions; in terms of adventitious defilements, they now have afflictions.