大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔 31.30

31.30

疏「小乘亦說」下，第六揀定不相知理。文中二，先舉小乘、後「而不知」下舉大異小。小乘即《俱舍論．業品》中釋身表許別形，非行動為體，以諸有為法有剎那盡故。論文初句，論主標有宗義，下三句破正量部，以正量部謂以動身為身表體，故論破之。然正量部心心所法則有剎那，此之動色無有剎那。今論主明諸有為法皆有剎那，何以知有？後有盡故。既後有盡，知前有滅，故論云「若此處生即此處滅，無容從此轉至餘方。」釋曰：此生此滅不至餘方，同不遷義。而有法體是生是滅，故非大乘。大乘之法，緣生無性，生即不生、滅即不滅，故遷即不遷。則其理懸隔。然肇公論則含二意：顯文所明多同前義，故云「傷夫！人情之惑久矣！目對真而莫覺。既知往物而不來，而謂今物而可往。往物既不來，今物何所往？何則？求向物於向，於向未嘗無；責向物於今，於今未嘗有。於今未嘗有，以明物不來；於向未嘗無，故知物不去。覆而求今，今亦不往。是謂昔物自在昔，不從今以至昔；今物自在今，不從昔以至今。故仲尼曰：『回也見新，交臂非故。』如此則物不相往來明矣。既無往返之微眹，有何物而可動乎？」即云然則旋嵐等。下文又云「若古不至今，今亦不至古，事各性住於一世，有何物而可去來？」釋曰：觀肇公意，既以物各性住而為不遷，則濫小乘無容從此轉至餘方。下論云「故談真有不遷之稱，導物有流動之說。」此則以真諦為不遷，而不顯真諦之相。若但用於物各性住為真諦相，寧非性空無可遷也。不真空義方顯性空義，約俗諦為不遷耳。

Regarding the Commentary's statement starting with "The Hīnayāna also speaks of": this is sixth, determining the principle of not knowing one another. In the text there are two parts: first, citing the Hīnayāna; later, from "yet without knowing" downward, setting forth the Mahāyāna as distinct from the Hīnayāna. The Hīnayāna refers to the "Chapter on Karma" in the *Abhidharmakośa-śāstra*, where in explaining bodily uninformative form it accepts distinct shapes, but not movement as its essence, because all conditioned dharmas perish in a kṣaṇa. In the first line of the treatise text, the author of the treatise states the doctrine of the Sarvāstivāda school; the lower three lines refute the Sammatīya school, because the Sammatīya school holds that moving the body is the essence of bodily uninformative form, which the treatise therefore refutes. However, in the Sammatīya school, the mind and mental factors do have kṣaṇas, but this moving form does not have kṣaṇas. Now the author of the treatise clarifies that all conditioned dharmas have kṣaṇas. How is it known that they exist? Because in the end there is cessation. Since in the end there is cessation, one knows that previously there was cessation. Therefore the treatise states: "If it arises in this place, it ceases in this place; there is no possibility of its moving from here to another location." Explanation: this arising here and ceasing here without reaching another location agrees with the meaning of immutability. Yet it posits an essence of dharmas that arises and ceases; therefore it is not the Mahāyāna. In the teaching of the Mahāyāna, arising from conditions is devoid of intrinsic nature: arising is precisely non-arising, and ceasing is precisely non-ceasing; therefore changing is precisely non-changing. Thus their principles are far apart. However, Master Zhao's treatise contains two meanings: what is clarified in the explicit text largely agrees with the former meaning, hence it states: "Alas! The delusion of human sentiment has lasted long! Facing truth directly, they do not realize it. Knowing that past things do not come, they yet say that present things can pass away. Since past things do not come, where could present things go? Why is this? If you seek a past thing in the past, in the past it was never absent; if you look for a past thing in the present, in the present it has never existed. Its never having existed in the present shows that things do not come; its never having been absent in the past shows that things do not depart. Inverting this to seek the present, the present also does not pass away. This means that past things naturally remain in the past and do not go from the present to the past; present things naturally remain in the present and do not go from the past to the present. Therefore Confucius said: 'Yan Hui sees what is new; when our sleeves brush, it is no longer the old.' From this it is clear that things do not go and come to each other. Since there is not even a subtle sign of going and returning, what thing could there be that can move?" Then it says, "Thus, a whirling whirlwind..." and so forth. Later in the text it also states: "If antiquity does not reach the present, and the present does not reach antiquity, each matter's nature abides in a single era—what thing could there be that goes and comes?" Explanation: observing Master Zhao's intention, since he takes things each having their nature abide as immutability, this becomes confounded with the Hīnayāna's 'no possibility of moving from here to another location'. Later in the treatise it says: "Therefore, speaking of the true, there is the term 'immutability'; guiding worldly things, there is the discourse of 'flowing motion'." Here, then, it takes ultimate truth as immutability, without revealing the characteristics of ultimate truth. If one merely adopts things each having their nature abide as the characteristics of ultimate truth, how could this not be nature-emptiness with nothing that can change? The meaning of non-absolute emptiness alone reveals the meaning of nature-emptiness, taking conventional truth as immutability.