大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔 32.5

32.5

疏「是以無性緣生故空」下，第二會中道意，明此中空有皆是中道。文中三：初揀非顯正、二立中道義、三結成中道。初中「無性緣生故空」者，雙牒前四句中兩種空也。此二種空，並離斷見之無。斷見之無定無，定無則著斷。今緣生故空，非是定無，無性故空亦非定無。定無者一向無物，如龜毛兔角。今但從緣無性，故非定無。此上揀非為真空也。二顯是。言「無性緣生故有」者，亦雙牒前之二有並非常見之有。常見之有是定性有，今從緣有非定性有，況由無性有，豈定有耶？亦是上揀非是幻有也。顯是幻有者，從緣無性，如幻化人。非無幻化人，幻化人非真，故云幻有，亦名妙有。以非有為有，故名妙有。然斷常見既由有無，則有無見即斷常見。疏何重牒？此有深意。斷常二見多是邪宗，即五利使，邊見所攝。其有無見，通涉正法取空有相，未能契理，為有無見。此有無見，究竟遠離唯大菩薩。故《淨名》云「說法不有亦不無，以因緣故諸法生。」有無二邊無復餘習，下經善友歷事諸佛已證法門，尚云猶於諸法中無而計為有等。

Regarding the Commentary's line beginning with "Therefore, because they are devoid of intrinsic nature and dependently arisen, they are empty": this is the second [section], reconciling with the import of the middle way, clarifying that emptiness and existence here are both the middle way. Within the text there are three [parts]: first, rejecting the erroneous and revealing the correct; second, establishing the meaning of the middle way; third, concluding the establishment of the middle way. In the first part, "because they are devoid of intrinsic nature and dependently arisen, they are empty" reiterates together the two kinds of emptiness from the previous four phrases. Both of these two kinds of emptiness are free from the nonexistence of the view of annihilationism. The nonexistence of the view of annihilationism is a determinate nonexistence; determinate nonexistence clings to annihilation. Here, being empty because of dependent arising is not determinate nonexistence, and being empty because of being devoid of intrinsic nature is also not determinate nonexistence. What is determinately nonexistent is categorically devoid of entity, like the hair of a tortoise or the horns of a hare. Here, [dharmas] are merely dependently arisen and devoid of intrinsic nature; hence, it is not determinate nonexistence. The above rejects the erroneous to constitute true emptiness. Second, revealing the correct: the phrase "because they are devoid of intrinsic nature and dependently arisen, they exist" also reiterates together the previous two kinds of existence, both of which are not the existence of the view of eternalism. The existence of the view of eternalism is existence with a fixed intrinsic nature; here, existence from conditions is not existence with a fixed intrinsic nature—how much less could existence due to being devoid of intrinsic nature be determinate existence? This also rejects the erroneous above to constitute illusory existence. Revealing that it is illusory existence means that, arising from conditions and devoid of intrinsic nature, it is like an illusory person. It is not that there is no illusory person, but the illusory person is not real; therefore it is called illusory existence, and is also called subtle existence. Because it takes non-existence as existence, it is called subtle existence. However, since the views of annihilationism and eternalism arise from nonexistence and existence, the views of nonexistence and existence are themselves the views of annihilationism and eternalism. Why does the Commentary reiterate them? There is a profound intention here: the two views of annihilationism and eternalism mostly belong to heterodox traditions, being the view of extremes subsumed under the five sharp afflictive views; whereas the views of nonexistence and existence permeate the correct Dharma when grasping at the characteristics of emptiness and existence without yet being able to accord with principle, which constitutes the views of nonexistence and existence. Truly abandoning these views of nonexistence and existence once and for all belongs solely to great bodhisattvas. Hence the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa says: "Teaching the Dharma as neither existing nor nonexistent, all dharmas arise through causes and conditions." The two extremes of existence and nonexistence have no remaining habituations; yet in the sūtra below, when good friends who had served all Buddhas throughout history and already verified Dharma gates, it is still said that they nevertheless conceptualised what was nonexistent in dharmas as existing, and so forth.