大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔 32.5

32.5

Regarding the Commentary's line beginning with "Therefore, because they are devoid of intrinsic nature and dependently arisen, they are empty": this is the second [section], reconciling with the import of the middle way, clarifying that emptiness and existence here are both the middle way. Within the text there are three [parts]: first, rejecting the erroneous and revealing the correct; second, establishing the meaning of the middle way; third, concluding the establishment of the middle way. In the first part, "because they are devoid of intrinsic nature and dependently arisen, they are empty" reiterates together the two kinds of emptiness from the previous four phrases. Both of these two kinds of emptiness are free from the nonexistence of the view of annihilationism. The nonexistence of the view of annihilationism is a determinate nonexistence; determinate nonexistence clings to annihilation. Here, being empty because of dependent arising is not determinate nonexistence, and being empty because of being devoid of intrinsic nature is also not determinate nonexistence. What is determinately nonexistent is categorically devoid of entity, like the hair of a tortoise or the horns of a hare. Here, [dharmas] are merely dependently arisen and devoid of intrinsic nature; hence, it is not determinate nonexistence. The above rejects the erroneous to constitute true emptiness. Second, revealing the correct: the phrase "because they are devoid of intrinsic nature and dependently arisen, they exist" also reiterates together the previous two kinds of existence, both of which are not the existence of the view of eternalism. The existence of the view of eternalism is existence with a fixed intrinsic nature; here, existence from conditions is not existence with a fixed intrinsic nature—how much less could existence due to being devoid of intrinsic nature be determinate existence? This also rejects the erroneous above to constitute illusory existence. Revealing that it is illusory existence means that, arising from conditions and devoid of intrinsic nature, it is like an illusory person. It is not that there is no illusory person, but the illusory person is not real; therefore it is called illusory existence, and is also called subtle existence. Because it takes non-existence as existence, it is called subtle existence. However, since the views of annihilationism and eternalism arise from nonexistence and existence, the views of nonexistence and existence are themselves the views of annihilationism and eternalism. Why does the Commentary reiterate them? There is a profound intention here: the two views of annihilationism and eternalism mostly belong to heterodox traditions, being the view of extremes subsumed under the five sharp afflictive views; whereas the views of nonexistence and existence permeate the correct Dharma when grasping at the characteristics of emptiness and existence without yet being able to accord with principle, which constitutes the views of nonexistence and existence. Truly abandoning these views of nonexistence and existence once and for all belongs solely to great bodhisattvas. Hence the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa says: "Teaching the Dharma as neither existing nor nonexistent, all dharmas arise through causes and conditions." The two extremes of existence and nonexistence have no remaining habituations; yet in the sūtra below, when good friends who had served all Buddhas throughout history and already verified Dharma gates, it is still said that they nevertheless conceptualised what was nonexistent in dharmas as existing, and so forth.