大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔 37.9

37.9

疏「又上燈喻既是正義」下，第二引難成立，亦二十八。疏文有二：先引經立難、後決擇經意。前中二：先師子吼立、後如來難。然疏引文，隨要略引。若經具云「師子吼菩薩言：『世尊！一切眾生有佛性性，如乳中酪性。若乳無酪性，云何佛說有二種因：一者正因、二者緣因。緣因者，一酵二暖，虛空無性，故無緣因。』佛言：『善男子！若使乳中定有性者，何須緣因？』師子吼菩薩言：『世尊！以有性故，故須緣因。何以故？欲明見故。緣因者即是了因。世尊！譬如暗中先有諸物，為欲見故，以燈照了。若本無者，燈何所照？如土中有缾，故須人工水輪繩杖等而為了因。如尼拘陀子，須地水糞而作了因。乳中酵暖亦復如是，須作了因。是故雖先有性，要假了因然後得見。以是義故，定知乳中先有酪性。』『善男子！若使乳中定有酪性者，即是了因。若是了因，復何須了？善男子！若是了因，性自了者，常應自了；若自不了，何能了他？若言了因有二種性：一者自了、二者了他。是義不然。何以故？了因一法，云何有二？若有二者，乳亦應二。若使乳中無有二相者，云何了因而獨有二？』師子吼言：『世尊！如世人言：我共八人。了因亦爾，自了了他。』佛言：『善男子！了因若爾，則非了因。何以故？數者能數自色他色，故得言八。而此色性自無了相，無了相故要須智性乃數自他，是故了因不能自了亦不了他。又善男子！一切眾生有佛性者，何故修習無量功德？若言修習是了因者，已同酪壞；若言因中定有果者，戒定智慧則無增長。我見世人本無禁戒禪定智慧，從師受已漸漸增益。若言師教是了因者，當師教時，受者未有戒定智慧。若是了因，應了未有，云何乃了戒定智慧令得增長？』師子吼菩薩言：『世尊！若了因無者，云何得名有乳有酪？』『善男子！世間答難凡有三種：一者轉答。如先所說，何故名戒？以不悔故，乃至為得大涅槃故。二者默然答。如有梵志來問我言：「我是常耶？」我時默然。三者疑答。如此經中，若了因有二，乳中何故不得有二？善男子！我今轉答。如世人言乳有酪者，以定得故，是故得名乳有酪性。佛性亦爾，有眾生有佛性，以當見故。』」釋曰：此上所引對今疏文，則知廣略，但要何須了義。然澤州釋云：「自下第五師子吼，以其緣正二因證性本有，如來對破。佛破有三：一就喻、二就法、三雙就法喻。初就喻中云：若使乳中定有酪性即是了因者，乳中既得有其酪性，性由了有，明知乳中即有性了。破性了中，文別有四：一若是了因復何須了者，以內徵外。乳中先自有其了因，何須乳外酵暖為了因？此即是以外破內。」今疏云「又善男子一切眾生有佛性者」下，即彼就法破。言已同酪壞者，難破須了。師子吼立意：性體雖有，須修了因，了之令現。故舉破之。前破喻中，若有酪性應有性了，若有性了何須外緣以為了因？破此同彼，名同酪壞。喻既已破，法全同喻，何得不破？

From the Commentary's "Furthermore, since the above metaphor of the lamp is the correct meaning" downward: this is the second [section], citing objections to establish [the meaning], also from [chapter] twenty-eight. The Commentary text has two parts: first, citing the sūtra to raise the objection; second, resolving the sūtra's intent. In the former, there are two parts: first, Siṃhanāda sets forth [the position]; second, the Tathāgata raises objections. However, the Commentary cites the text abridged according to what is essential. If one speaks of the sūtra in full, it states: "Bodhisattva Siṃhanāda said: 'World-Honoured One! All sentient beings possess the nature of Buddha-nature, just as there is the nature of curd in milk. If milk lacked the nature of curd, why would the Buddha speak of two kinds of causes: first, the primary cause; second, the contributory cause? As for contributory causes, the first is yeast and the second is warmth. Space has no nature, so it lacks contributory causes.' The Buddha said: 'Good son! If milk definitely had the nature, why would it need contributory causes?' Bodhisattva Siṃhanāda said: 'World-Honoured One! Because the nature exists, it requires contributory causes. Why? Because one wishes to see it clearly. The contributory cause is none other than the revealing cause. World-Honoured One! For example, when there are already objects in the dark, in order to see them, one illuminates and reveals them with a lamp. If they originally did not exist, what would the lamp illuminate? Just as there is a pot within clay, so it requires human effort, the potter's wheel, water, cord, and stick as revealing causes. Just as a nyagrodha seed requires earth, water, and dung to act as revealing causes. Yeast and warmth in milk are also like this; they must act as revealing causes. Therefore, although the nature exists beforehand, it must depend on a revealing cause and only then can it be seen. By this meaning, one definitely knows that the nature of curd exists beforehand in milk.' / 'Good son! If milk definitely had the nature of curd, then it would itself be the revealing cause. If it were the revealing cause, why would it need further revealing? Good son! If it were the revealing cause and its nature revealed itself, it should constantly reveal itself; if it cannot reveal itself, how could it reveal another? If you say that the revealing cause has two kinds of nature—first, revealing itself; second, revealing another—this meaning is incorrect. Why? The revealing cause is a single dharma; how could it have two? If it has two, milk should also have two. If milk does not have two characteristics, why should the revealing cause alone have two?' / Siṃhanāda said: 'World-Honoured One! Just as people in the world say, "I together with eight people." The revealing cause is also like this: it reveals itself and reveals another.' / The Buddha said: 'Good son! If the revealing cause were like that, then it would not be a revealing cause. Why? The counter can count his own form and others' forms, and thus can speak of eight. Yet this nature of form of itself has no characteristic of revealing; lacking the characteristic of revealing, it must depend on the nature of wisdom to count self and other. Therefore, the revealing cause can neither reveal itself nor reveal another. Furthermore, good son, if all sentient beings possess Buddha-nature, why do they cultivate immeasurable merits? If you say that cultivation is the revealing cause, that is already destroyed like curd; if you say that the fruit definitely exists within the cause, then discipline, concentration, and wisdom would not increase. I see worldly people who originally lack morality, dhyāna-concentration, and wisdom; having received them from a teacher, they gradually increase. If you say that the teacher's instruction is the revealing cause, at the time of the teacher's instruction, the recipient does not yet possess discipline, concentration, and wisdom. If it were a revealing cause, it should reveal what does not yet exist; why does it reveal discipline, concentration, and wisdom so as to cause them to increase?' / Bodhisattva Siṃhanāda said: 'World-Honoured One! If there were no revealing cause, how could one speak of the existence of milk and curd?' / 'Good son! There are three kinds of answering objections in the world: first, answering by turning [the question]. As previously spoken: why is it called discipline? Because of non-regret, up to: in order to attain the great nirvāṇa. Second, answering with silence. For instance, when a brahmacārin came and asked me, "Is the self permanent?" I was silent at that time. Third, answering with a counter-question. As in this sūtra: if the revealing cause has two, why cannot there be two in milk? Good son! I now answer by turning. Just as people in the world say that milk has curd because it is definitely to be obtained, for this reason one can say that milk has the nature of curd. Buddha-nature is also like this: sentient beings have Buddha-nature because they will see it in the future.'" / Explanation: When the above citation is compared with the present Commentary, one knows its breadth and brevity; it merely requires the meaning of "why need it be revealed?" However, the Master of Zezhou explained: "From here down is the fifth [section], where Siṃhanāda uses the two causes, contributory and primary, to prove that the nature originally exists, and the Tathāgata counters and refutes him. The Buddha's refutation has three parts: first, with respect to the metaphor; second, with respect to the dharma; third, with respect to both dharma and metaphor. First, in the refutation with respect to the metaphor, saying: 'If milk definitely had the nature of curd, it would itself be the revealing cause'—since milk can have the nature of curd, and the nature exists by being revealed, one clearly knows that milk has the revealing of the nature. Within the refutation of the nature's revealing, the text specifically has four parts: first, 'if it were the revealing cause, why would it need further revealing?' examines the external by means of the internal. Since milk originally has its own revealing cause within, why would it need yeast and warmth outside the milk as revealing causes? This refutes the internal by means of the external." Now the Commentary's citation, "Furthermore, good son, if all sentient beings possess Buddha-nature" downward, is precisely his refutation with respect to the dharma. The phrase "already destroyed like curd" is a challenge that refutes the necessity of revealing. Siṃhanāda's intention in establishing [his thesis] was: although the essence of the nature exists, one must cultivate revealing causes to reveal it and make it manifest. Therefore [the Buddha] raises this to refute it. In the prior refutation of the metaphor: if there were the nature of curd, there should be the revealing of the nature; if there were the revealing of the nature, why need external conditions as revealing causes? Refuting this is the same as that, which is called "destroyed like curd." Since the metaphor has already been refuted, and the dharma is completely identical to the metaphor, how could it not be refuted?