大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔 37.9

37.9

From the Commentary's "Furthermore, since the above metaphor of the lamp is the correct meaning" downward: this is the second [section], citing objections to establish [the meaning], also from [chapter] twenty-eight. The Commentary text has two parts: first, citing the sūtra to raise the objection; second, resolving the sūtra's intent. In the former, there are two parts: first, Siṃhanāda sets forth [the position]; second, the Tathāgata raises objections. However, the Commentary cites the text abridged according to what is essential. If one speaks of the sūtra in full, it states: "Bodhisattva Siṃhanāda said: 'World-Honoured One! All sentient beings possess the nature of Buddha-nature, just as there is the nature of curd in milk. If milk lacked the nature of curd, why would the Buddha speak of two kinds of causes: first, the primary cause; second, the contributory cause? As for contributory causes, the first is yeast and the second is warmth. Space has no nature, so it lacks contributory causes.' The Buddha said: 'Good son! If milk definitely had the nature, why would it need contributory causes?' Bodhisattva Siṃhanāda said: 'World-Honoured One! Because the nature exists, it requires contributory causes. Why? Because one wishes to see it clearly. The contributory cause is none other than the revealing cause. World-Honoured One! For example, when there are already objects in the dark, in order to see them, one illuminates and reveals them with a lamp. If they originally did not exist, what would the lamp illuminate? Just as there is a pot within clay, so it requires human effort, the potter's wheel, water, cord, and stick as revealing causes. Just as a nyagrodha seed requires earth, water, and dung to act as revealing causes. Yeast and warmth in milk are also like this; they must act as revealing causes. Therefore, although the nature exists beforehand, it must depend on a revealing cause and only then can it be seen. By this meaning, one definitely knows that the nature of curd exists beforehand in milk.' / 'Good son! If milk definitely had the nature of curd, then it would itself be the revealing cause. If it were the revealing cause, why would it need further revealing? Good son! If it were the revealing cause and its nature revealed itself, it should constantly reveal itself; if it cannot reveal itself, how could it reveal another? If you say that the revealing cause has two kinds of nature—first, revealing itself; second, revealing another—this meaning is incorrect. Why? The revealing cause is a single dharma; how could it have two? If it has two, milk should also have two. If milk does not have two characteristics, why should the revealing cause alone have two?' / Siṃhanāda said: 'World-Honoured One! Just as people in the world say, "I together with eight people." The revealing cause is also like this: it reveals itself and reveals another.' / The Buddha said: 'Good son! If the revealing cause were like that, then it would not be a revealing cause. Why? The counter can count his own form and others' forms, and thus can speak of eight. Yet this nature of form of itself has no characteristic of revealing; lacking the characteristic of revealing, it must depend on the nature of wisdom to count self and other. Therefore, the revealing cause can neither reveal itself nor reveal another. Furthermore, good son, if all sentient beings possess Buddha-nature, why do they cultivate immeasurable merits? If you say that cultivation is the revealing cause, that is already destroyed like curd; if you say that the fruit definitely exists within the cause, then discipline, concentration, and wisdom would not increase. I see worldly people who originally lack morality, dhyāna-concentration, and wisdom; having received them from a teacher, they gradually increase. If you say that the teacher's instruction is the revealing cause, at the time of the teacher's instruction, the recipient does not yet possess discipline, concentration, and wisdom. If it were a revealing cause, it should reveal what does not yet exist; why does it reveal discipline, concentration, and wisdom so as to cause them to increase?' / Bodhisattva Siṃhanāda said: 'World-Honoured One! If there were no revealing cause, how could one speak of the existence of milk and curd?' / 'Good son! There are three kinds of answering objections in the world: first, answering by turning [the question]. As previously spoken: why is it called discipline? Because of non-regret, up to: in order to attain the great nirvāṇa. Second, answering with silence. For instance, when a brahmacārin came and asked me, "Is the self permanent?" I was silent at that time. Third, answering with a counter-question. As in this sūtra: if the revealing cause has two, why cannot there be two in milk? Good son! I now answer by turning. Just as people in the world say that milk has curd because it is definitely to be obtained, for this reason one can say that milk has the nature of curd. Buddha-nature is also like this: sentient beings have Buddha-nature because they will see it in the future.'" / Explanation: When the above citation is compared with the present Commentary, one knows its breadth and brevity; it merely requires the meaning of "why need it be revealed?" However, the Master of Zezhou explained: "From here down is the fifth [section], where Siṃhanāda uses the two causes, contributory and primary, to prove that the nature originally exists, and the Tathāgata counters and refutes him. The Buddha's refutation has three parts: first, with respect to the metaphor; second, with respect to the dharma; third, with respect to both dharma and metaphor. First, in the refutation with respect to the metaphor, saying: 'If milk definitely had the nature of curd, it would itself be the revealing cause'—since milk can have the nature of curd, and the nature exists by being revealed, one clearly knows that milk has the revealing of the nature. Within the refutation of the nature's revealing, the text specifically has four parts: first, 'if it were the revealing cause, why would it need further revealing?' examines the external by means of the internal. Since milk originally has its own revealing cause within, why would it need yeast and warmth outside the milk as revealing causes? This refutes the internal by means of the external." Now the Commentary's citation, "Furthermore, good son, if all sentient beings possess Buddha-nature" downward, is precisely his refutation with respect to the dharma. The phrase "already destroyed like curd" is a challenge that refutes the necessity of revealing. Siṃhanāda's intention in establishing [his thesis] was: although the essence of the nature exists, one must cultivate revealing causes to reveal it and make it manifest. Therefore [the Buddha] raises this to refute it. In the prior refutation of the metaphor: if there were the nature of curd, there should be the revealing of the nature; if there were the revealing of the nature, why need external conditions as revealing causes? Refuting this is the same as that, which is called "destroyed like curd." Since the metaphor has already been refuted, and the dharma is completely identical to the metaphor, how could it not be refuted?