大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔 39.39

39.39

疏「第十觀戒」，文三：初總明、二「其中」下別釋、三料揀。今初。上來九門結觀於後，獨今此段先明實觀。疏「戒性如空」等者，即《法句經》，六度皆有偈文。布施云「說諸布施福，於中三事空，究竟不可得，施福如野馬。」戒云「若說諸持戒，無善無威儀，戒性如虛空，持者為迷倒。」忍云「若見嗔恚者，以忍為䩭鞅，知嗔等陽焰，忍亦無所忍。」精進云「若說諸精進，為增上慢說；無增上慢者，無善無精進。若起精進心，是妄非精進；若能心不妄，精進無有涯。」定云「若學諸三昧，是動非坐禪，心隨境界流，云何名為定？」般若云「森羅及萬像，一法之所印。云何一法中，而生種種見？一亦不為一，為欲破諸數，淺智之所聞，見一以為一。」結云「若有聞斯法，常修寂滅行，知行亦寂滅，是則菩提道。」釋曰：今疏釋戒，但用戒文而離破倒，餘者乃義引耳。疏「不雜二乘心」者，即《涅槃》文。「是名持淨戒」等，總結上文也。疏「乞食四依之一」者，四依，謂一長乞食、二糞掃衣、三冢間樹下坐、四食腐爛藥，亦名四聖種。《智論》七十二云「又受戒法，盡形壽著衲衣、乞食、樹下住、服弊棄藥。」於四種中，頭陀已攝三事。若《俱舍》、《正理》、《婆沙》，前三所得食、衣、臥具，喜足為三。四依有無藥，乃加藥斷樂修聖種。所以不同者，《智論》意顯先古四聖種，即是四依。《婆沙》等依新論師，除藥加第四，以前三為道資緣，四為道體性。言聖種者，謂善故、無漏故名聖。即此能生諸功德法相續不斷，故名為種。故云乞食即四依之一。言「四邪」者，《智論》第四釋比丘名乞士，清淨活命故名乞士。如經中說：舍利弗入城乞食，得已坐食。有梵志名淨目，問言：「汝食耶？」答言：「食。」淨目言：「下口食耶？」答言：「不。」「仰口食耶？」答曰：「不。」「方口食耶？」答曰：「不。」「維口食耶？」答曰：「不。」淨目言：「食有四種，我今問汝，汝皆言不。我今不解，汝當為說。云何下口食？」舍利弗言：「有出家人，合藥種穀植樹等，不淨活命者，是名下口食。觀視星宿日月風雨雷電霹靂，不淨活命者，是名仰口食。曲媚豪勢通使四方巧言多求，不淨活命，是名方口食。學種種呪術卜算吉凶，有如是等不淨活命者，是名維口食。我不墮是四食中，我用清淨乞食活命。」淨目聞已歡喜信解，舍利弗因為說法，得須陀洹。「五邪」者，即《智論》二十二，已見〈淨行品〉，今更重舉。一為利養故，詐現異相奇特。二者為利養故，自說功德。三者為利養故，占相吉凶及為人說。四者為利養故，高聲現威令人畏敬。五者為利養故，稱說自己所得利養以動人心。邪因緣活命，故為邪命。疏「若依菩薩」下，第三料揀。前列十事，參大小乘，此方菩薩律儀闕故。於中有四：一總引二文彰大小異。彌勒羯磨唯請一師，須歸三寶，別有羯磨文等。二「此上十境」下，次出對會所以。以西天大小抗行，寺居不雜，是故結云「即如此方」，謂依小乘受行大乘行。三「又善戒經」下，正示大小二相不同。言「先受前之三戒」者，彼經第五〈菩薩戒品〉云「在家出家戒有三種：一者戒、二者受善法戒、三者為利眾生故行。」釋曰：此即三聚也。次云「云何名戒？所謂七眾戒，比丘、比丘尼、式叉摩那、沙彌、沙彌尼、優婆塞、優婆夷。菩薩摩訶薩若欲受持菩薩戒者，先當淨心受七種戒。七種戒者，是淨心趣菩薩戒。如世間人欲請於王，先當淨治所居室宅。是七種戒俱是在家出家菩薩所受。菩薩戒者亦復如是，俱是在家出家菩薩所受。」釋曰：上語七眾通於男女等。今辨三戒唯約比丘，謂五戒、十戒、二百五十，此三以為菩薩戒前之方便也。彼經云「若言不具優婆塞戒，得沙彌戒，無有是處。不具沙彌戒，得比丘戒者，亦無有是處。不具如是三種戒，得菩薩戒亦無是處。譬如重樓四級，乃至不從三級至第四者，無有是處。」釋曰：以此故須先受三也。四「故所觀境」下，結成本義。所觀通大小者，依菩薩受亦是所觀，依小乘受亦是所觀。「能觀智唯實教大乘」者，即相同性離相戒故。疏「第四如是觀下辨觀成之相」者，即如實觀成。此有二意：今從後意標名。言「望前尋伺即為觀益」者，前來作意觀察十境，故為尋伺，即念想觀猶未除故。今念想觀除，故為前觀之益。義同四加行中四尋伺四如實也。疏「初六句明三輪清淨」者，謂具離三輪。然准《瑜伽》第六，六度各有三輪不同。施三輪者，一施者、二受者、三施物，今皆離之。戒離三輪者，離眾生事、時、分別。忍離三輪者，離自、他、過失分別。進離三輪者，離眾生高下、事、用分別。定離三輪者，離境界、眾生、惑分別。般若離三輪者，離境界、智、眾生分別。今言六句明三者，一即離眾生、二三皆離事。言「亦通不住前法」者，以第三句通不住前眾生及事，不住即離故。次三句三時門，通是離時耳。「兼釋不取等言」者，即以三時釋上三句。不取等者，等取不著不住。言「以剎那不住過未分之」者，剎那生時，未生即未、已生即過，故云已未分之。影公云：「如疾炎過鋒、奔流逕刃，刃上一毫亦為二分，故無現在，故空寂也。以求現不得故。」疏「後二句以不遷理釋成」者，即肇公《不遷論》意，〈問明〉已用，今復用之。疏文有四：一標。二「此世」下用論文釋經。論云「是為昔物自在昔，不從今以至昔；今物自在今，不從昔以至今。故仲尼曰：『回也見新，交臂非故。』如斯則物不相往來明矣。」三「是為因自昔滅」下，以論意出經意。四「以物各性住」下，釋不遷所以。上句即《肇論》所以，後性本空故。疏出所以亦是論意，如下云「既無往返之微眹，復何物而可動哉。」又云「是以言常而不住，稱去而不遷。不遷，故雖往而常靜；不住，故雖靜而常往。雖靜而常往，故往而不遷；雖往而常靜，故住而不留矣。」斯則即動即靜之義，故前標云「必求靜於諸動，故雖動而常靜。」但以正釋，即言「物各性住」，則唯前意，斯則假其性住破其遷流耳。疏「有說無作戒體體即是色」者，即薩婆多宗也。「有說非色非心」者，即曇無德宗義，依《成實論》立。疏「今言為是色者顯非是色」者，其為是之言，此徵辭也，故雙徵云為是色、為非是色？徵此二法俱不可得。應假答云：非是色亦非非色。今疏離斯二句，便破兩宗，上句破有宗、下句破德宗。今初顯非是色，正破色也。以其所立無表依表生，表色無表色者，即出有宗所立色為戒體文也。然《俱舍．界品》立有無表色，有三師義。一雜心師云：表色有變礙，無表隨彼，亦受色名。如樹動時，影必隨動。論主難云：此釋不然，無變礙故。又無表依表生，表色無表色如樹影依樹生，樹色影亦色。又難云：表滅時，無表應滅。如樹滅時，影必隨滅。樹影依樹生，樹滅影亦滅；無表依表生，表滅無表滅。論主云：不然。如子堂牙，子依於父生，父滅子猶在。無表依表生，表滅無表在（堂喻牙喻亦然）。二云：五識所依大種變礙，故無表業亦名為色。即有宗義。若爾，所依有變礙故，眼識等五亦應名色。此難不齊。無表依止大種轉時，如影依樹、光依珠寶。眼識等五依眼等根則不如是，唯能為作助生緣故。意云：不應以眼等為增上緣之疎依，難親緣故。論主又破云：此影依樹、光依寶言，且非扶順《毘婆沙》義。彼宗影等顯色極微，各自依止四大種故。論主又縱破云：設許影光依止樹寶，而無表色不同彼依，彼許所依大種雖滅，而無表色不隨滅故。三復有別釋，彼所難言：眼識等五所依不定，或有變礙，謂眼等根。或無變礙，謂無間意。無表所依則不如是。故前所難定為不齊。變礙名色，理得成就。此即論主成第二師，故名第三。釋曰：上來三義但是二意，以其第三成第二故。雖有二義，並依色成無表色義。故《涅槃》云「菩提王子意疑：比丘善心受戒，至惡無記，應名失戒。」故經「問云：『若有比丘護持禁戒，若發惡心，當知是時失比丘戒？』佛言：『戒有七種，從於身口有無作色，以是無作色因緣故，其心雖在惡無記中，不名失戒，猶名持戒。以何因緣名無作色？非異色因，不作異色因果。』」釋曰：此有兩重問答之意。前答不失戒因，因無表故。後非異色因下，自釋無表得色名因由。言非異色因者，明以色為因，不是異色之外別物為因。言不作異色因果者，明作色果也，不作異色之外別物之果。既以色為因與色作果，故無表戒得成色也。若將此文釋不失戒，則成不知問答之本。餘諸異義，恐繁且止。然今疏意：但取彼立無表是色而為所破，不剋定彼無表色義。若取文同，即《雜心》義。疏今明觀意者，即破意也，執破觀成。然此正破《雜心》，不同《俱舍》破意，彼破其立義不正，今破遣相顯理耳。疏「為非色者顯非非色」者，破德宗意。彼立意云：非變礙故不可為色，非慮知故不可名心。即非色非心，不相應行攝。破意可知。疏「雖空不礙涉有故」，此釋方便自在。即顯雖無心於持犯，而七支皎淨、三業無瑕，攝善利人無不為矣，以前觀空非斷滅故。疏「我不見一法非佛法」者，前已曾引，謂不毀不持法界平等，由此該融故有第九一具一切也。疏「此中五喻」者，疏文顯指〈十忍〉、闇用《淨名》，文並可知。疏「第二大段」等者，此下義則深玄，在文可見，但當細尋，更不繁舉。其「開發之發」等，後品當知。「不由他悟」，含有三義，如〈十住品〉。謂見夫心性，性外皆他，自亦不存，兼顯以心為自、心外為他。今自心不存、豈心外取法？「豈唯定之方寸」等者，顯自心為自、他人為他。前〈十住品〉從麁至細，今此以細況麁耳。

Regarding the commentary's text: 'Tenth, contemplating morality (śīla),' the passage has three parts: first, a general explanation; second, from 'Among them' onward, a distinct exegesis; third, critical selection. Now to the first: The previous nine gates concluded their contemplation at the end, while this section alone first clarifies the actual contemplation. Regarding the commentary's citation 'The nature of morality is like empty space,' and so forth, this comes from the Dharmapadāvadāna Sūtra, where there are gāthās for all six perfections. Concerning giving (dāna), it says: 'It is said that the blessings of all giving / involve the emptiness of the three aspects; / ultimately unattainable, / the blessings of giving are like a mirage.' Concerning morality, it says: 'If one speaks of upholding morality, / there is neither good nor deportment; / the nature of morality is like empty space, / and those who grasp it are deluded and confused.' Concerning forbearance (kṣānti), it says: 'If one encounters an angry person, / one uses forbearance as bridle and rein; / knowing anger is like a mirage, / in forbearance there is also nothing borne.' Concerning vigor (vīrya), it says: 'If one speaks of types of vigor, / that is spoken for those of excessive conceit; / for those without excessive conceit, / there is neither good nor vigor. / If a mind of vigor arises, / that is delusion and not vigor; / if the mind can remain undeluded, / vigor is boundless.' Concerning concentration (dhyāna), it says: 'If one practices various samādhis, / that is motion and not seated meditation; / if the mind flows along with sensory objects, / how can it be called concentration?' Concerning wisdom (prajñā), it says: 'The myriad dense phenomena / are all sealed by the single Dharma. / How is it that within the single Dharma / diverse views arise? / One is also not truly one; / it is used merely to break all numbers; / when heard by those of shallow wisdom, / they see one and take it to be one.' The conclusion states: 'If someone hears this teaching / and constantly cultivates quiescent practice, / knowing practice to be likewise quiescent, / this is the path of bodhi.' Explanation: In explaining morality now, the commentary uses only the verse on morality to eliminate and shatter delusions; the rest are cited merely for the sake of the principle. Regarding the commentary's 'Not mingled with the mind of the two vehicles,' this is from the Nirvāṇa Sūtra. 'This is called upholding pure morality,' and so forth, summarizes the preceding text. Regarding the commentary's 'Alms-gathering is one of the four reliances (niśraya),' the four reliances refer to: first, lifelong alms-gathering; second, robes made of rags from a dust-heap; third, dwelling under a tree or among graves; fourth, using fermented medicine as remedy. They are also called the four noble lineages (āryavaṃśa). Fascicle seventy-two of the Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra states: 'Furthermore, in receiving the precepts, to the end of one's physical life one wears patchwork robes, begs for food, lives under trees, and takes discarded medicine.' Among these four types, the dhūta practices already encompass three matters. If according to the Abhidharmakośa, Nyāyānusāra, and Mahāvibhāṣā, contentment regarding the food, clothing, and bedding obtained through the first three constitutes the three [lineages]. As to whether the four reliances include medicine or not, they add medicine to cut off pleasure and cultivate the noble lineage. The reason for the divergence is that the Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra intends to show that the ancient four noble lineages are precisely the four reliances, whereas the Vibhāṣā and others rely on the newer śāstra masters, who set aside medicine and add a fourth, taking the first three as auxiliary conditions for the path, and the fourth as the essential nature of the path. Speaking of the 'noble lineage,' because it is virtuous and uncontaminated (anāsrava), it is called noble. Because it is capable of generating virtuous dharmas continuously without interruption, it is called a lineage. Therefore, it is said that alms-gathering is one of the four reliances. Regarding 'four wrong [livelihoods],' fascicle four of the Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra explains that a bhikṣu is called a 'mendicant' (yācaka) because he maintains a pure livelihood. As a sūtra states: Śāriputra entered a city to beg for food, and after obtaining it, sat down to eat. A brāhmaṇa named Śucimukha asked, 'Are you eating?' He answered, 'I am eating.' Śucimukha asked, 'Are you eating facing downward?' He answered, 'No.' 'Are you eating facing upward?' He answered, 'No.' 'Are you eating facing the cardinal directions?' He answered, 'No.' 'Are you eating facing the intermediate directions?' He answered, 'No.' Śucimukha said, 'There are four ways of eating; when I ask you, you say no to all of them. I do not understand; you must explain it for me. What is eating facing downward?' Śāriputra said, 'There are renunciants who compound medicines, sow grain, and plant trees, maintaining an impure livelihood—this is called eating facing downward. Observing the constellations, sun, moon, wind, rain, thunder, and lightning, maintaining an impure livelihood—this is called eating facing upward. Flattering the powerful, acting as envoys to the four quarters, and using clever words to seek much, maintaining an impure livelihood—this is called eating facing the cardinal directions. Studying various spells, divining good and bad fortune, and maintaining an impure livelihood through such means—this is called eating facing the intermediate directions. I do not fall into these four manners of eating; I maintain my life by pure alms-gathering.' Hearing this, Śucimukha rejoiced with faithful understanding; Śāriputra then expounded the Dharma for him, and he attained the fruit of stream-enterer (srotāpanna). As for the 'five wrong [livelihoods],' they are found in fascicle twenty-two of the Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra, and were already seen in the 'Chapter on Pure Practice'; they are now cited again: First, for the sake of profit and offerings, deceptively displaying extraordinary and remarkable appearances. Second, for the sake of profit and offerings, proclaiming one's own virtues. Third, for the sake of profit and offerings, divining fortune and misfortune and telling it to others. Fourth, for the sake of profit and offerings, speaking loudly and displaying authority to make others fear and respect one. Fifth, for the sake of profit and offerings, boasting about the offerings one has received to move people's hearts. Because livelihood is sustained through improper causes and conditions, it is called wrong livelihood (mithyājīva). Regarding the commentary's 'If according to the bodhisattva...' onward, this is the third section: critical selection. The ten items listed previously intermingle the Great and Small Vehicles, because the bodhisattva vinaya was deficient in this land [of China]. In this there are four parts: First, generally citing two texts to reveal the differences between the Great and Small [Vehicles]. Maitreya's karmavācanā invites only one master, requires taking refuge in the Three Jewels, and has a distinct karmavācanā text. Second, from 'The above ten sensory fields' onward, next demonstrating the reason for their reconciliation. Because in India the Great and Small Vehicles operated side by side and did not mix in temple residences, it concludes by saying 'precisely like this land,' meaning that one receives precepts according to the Small Vehicle and practices the Great Vehicle conduct. Third, from 'Furthermore, the Bodhisattva-bhūmi Sūtra (Śīlasaṃyukta Sūtra)' onward, directly showing the difference in characteristics between the Great and Small [Vehicles]. Regarding 'First receiving the previous three precepts,' fascicle five of that sūtra, in the 'Chapter on the Bodhisattva Precepts,' states: 'There are three kinds of precepts for householders and renunciants: first, morality; second, the precept of embracing virtuous dharmas; third, practicing for the sake of benefiting sentient beings.' Explanation: These are the three clusters of pure precepts (trividha-śīla). Next it says: 'What is called morality? It refers to the precepts for the seven assemblies: bhikṣus, bhikṣuṇīs, śikṣamāṇās, śrāmaṇeras, śrāmaṇerikās, upāsakas, and upāsikās. If a bodhisattva-mahāsattva wishes to receive and uphold the bodhisattva precepts, he should first receive the seven kinds of precepts with a pure mind. These seven kinds of precepts are the pure mind heading toward the bodhisattva precepts. Just as when a worldly person wishes to invite a king, he must first clean and prepare the dwelling and rooms. These seven kinds of precepts are received by both householder and renunciant bodhisattvas. The bodhisattva precepts are also like this, being received by both householder and renunciant bodhisattvas.' Explanation: The above mentioned seven assemblies apply broadly to men, women, and so forth. Here, distinguishing the three precepts pertains solely to bhikṣus, namely the five precepts, the ten precepts, and the two hundred and fifty precepts; these three are considered the preliminary expedients (upāya) prior to the bodhisattva precepts. That sūtra states: 'If one claims that without being fully endowed with the upāsaka precepts one can obtain the śrāmaṇera precepts, there is no such possibility. If without being endowed with the śrāmaṇera precepts one can obtain the bhikṣu precepts, there is no such possibility. If without being endowed with these three kinds of precepts one can obtain the bodhisattva precepts, there is also no such possibility. For example, in a four-story building, it is impossible to reach the fourth story without passing from the third.' Explanation: Because of this, one must first receive the three. Fourth, from 'Therefore the contemplated objects...' onward, concluding with the original principle. As for the contemplated objects spanning the Great and Small [Vehicles], those received according to the bodhisattva [precepts] are contemplated objects, and those received according to the Small Vehicle are also contemplated objects. 'The contemplating wisdom belongs solely to the actual teaching of the Great Vehicle' means that its characteristics are identical to the nature of morality free from characteristics. Regarding the commentary's 'Fourth, in the phrase "contemplating thus" onward, distinguishing the characteristic of the contemplation being completed,' this is the completion of the contemplation of reality. This has two meanings; the label is designated here following the latter meaning. Regarding 'Looking back to the prior investigation and searching, it constitutes the benefit of contemplation,' previously one intentionally observed the ten sensory fields, which constituted investigation and searching (vitarka and vicāra), because the contemplation of conceptual thoughts had not yet been eliminated. Now that conceptual thoughts and contemplation are eliminated, it constitutes the benefit of the prior contemplation. The principle is identical to the four searches and the four authentic cognitions among the four aids to penetration (nirvedhabhāgīya). Regarding the commentary's 'The first six lines clarify the purity of the three wheels,' this means being fully free from the three wheels (trimaṇḍala). However, according to fascicle six of the Yogācārabhūmi, each of the six perfections differs regarding the three wheels. The three wheels of giving are: first, the giver; second, the receiver; third, the gift. Here all are transcended. Morality's freedom from the three wheels means freedom from discriminations regarding sentient beings, actions, and time. Forbearance's freedom from the three wheels means freedom from discriminations regarding self, other, and faults. Vigor's freedom from the three wheels means freedom from discriminations regarding high and low among sentient beings, actions, and function. Concentration's freedom from the three wheels means freedom from discriminations regarding sensory objects, sentient beings, and afflictions. Wisdom's freedom from the three wheels means freedom from discriminations regarding sensory objects, wisdom, and sentient beings. Now saying that six lines clarify the three wheels means: the first line is freedom from sentient beings; the second and third lines are both freedom from actions. Regarding 'Also applies to not abiding in the preceding dharmas,' it is because the third line broadly applies to not abiding in the preceding sentient beings and actions; non-abiding is itself detachment. The next three lines, on the gate of the three times, broadly represent detachment from time. 'Concurrently explaining words such as "not grasping"' means explaining the above three lines in terms of the three times. 'Not grasping, and so forth' includes not clinging and not abiding. Regarding 'Distinguishing past and future by the moment's non-abiding,' when a moment (kṣaṇa) arises, what has not yet arisen is the future, and what has already arisen is the past; hence it is said to distinguish past and future. Master Dao-ying said: 'Like a rapid flame passing over a blade, or a torrent rushing past a sword's edge, even a fine hair on the blade is divided into two halves; therefore there is no present, and thus it is empty and quiescent, because seeking the present is unattainable.' Regarding the commentary's 'The final two lines explain and establish this by the principle of non-motion,' this reflects the idea of Master Sengzhao's Treatise on the Immutability of Things (Wubuqian lun), which was already used in the 'Inquiry into the Clear' and is now used again. The commentary's text has four parts: First, the heading. Second, from 'This world' onward, using the treatise text to explain the sūtra. The treatise states: 'Thus, past things naturally remain in the past, and do not travel from the present to reach the past; present things naturally remain in the present, and do not travel from the past to reach the present. Therefore Confucius said: "Yen Hui sees everything afresh; as soon as our arms brush, it is no longer the old." From this it is clear that things do not come and go.' Third, from 'Therefore causes perish naturally in the past' onward, deriving the meaning of the sūtra from the meaning of the treatise. Fourth, from 'Because each thing's nature abides' onward, explaining the reason for non-motion. The first phrase is the reason given in Zhao's treatise; the latter phrase means nature is fundamentally empty. The reason presented by the commentary is also the treatise's meaning, as it says below: 'Since there is not the slightest trace of coming and going, what thing could there be that moves?' It also says: 'Therefore, while called eternal it does not abide; while called departing it does not shift. Because it does not shift, though it departs it is ever tranquil; because it does not abide, though it is tranquil it ever departs. Because though tranquil it ever departs, it departs without shifting; because though it departs it is ever tranquil, it abides without remaining.' This is the meaning of identity between motion and stillness; therefore the earlier heading stated: 'One must seek stillness in all motion; thus though moving, it is ever still.' However, in the direct explanation, saying 'Because each thing's nature abides' follows only the former meaning, using their abiding nature provisionally to shatter their flux. Regarding the commentary's 'Some say the essence of the unmanifest precept is precisely physical form,' this is the Sarvāstivāda school. 'Some say it is neither physical form nor mind,' this is the Dharmaguptaka doctrine, established on the basis of the Tattvasiddhi-śāstra. Regarding the commentary's 'Now saying "is it form?" reveals that it is not form,' the phrase 'is it' is a formulation of interrogation. Thus it interrogates both: 'Is it physical form, or is it not physical form?' Interrogating these two dharmas, neither is found. One might hypothetically reply: 'It is neither physical form nor non-form.' Now the commentary, by setting aside these two propositions, shatters both schools: the first line refutes the Sarvāstivāda school, and the second line refutes the Dharmaguptaka school. Here, first revealing that it is not form directly refutes physical form. Because they establish that the unmanifest arises relying on the manifest, and that manifest form has unmanifest form—this is citing the Sarvāstivāda school's text establishing physical form as the essence of precepts. However, in establishing the existence of unmanifest form in the 'Chapter on Dhātus' of the Abhidharmakośa, there are three masters' doctrines. First, the Saṃyuktābhidharmahṛdaya master says: 'Manifest form undergoes change and obstruction (rūpaṇa); unmanifest form follows it and also receives the name of form. Just as when a tree moves, its shadow must move along with it.' The author of the śāstra refutes this: 'This explanation is not correct, because [unmanifest form] lacks change and obstruction. Furthermore, the unmanifest arises relying on the manifest; if the manifest is form, the unmanifest is form, just as the shadow of a tree arises relying on the tree, and the tree's form and shadow are both form.' He also refutes: 'When the manifest perishes, the unmanifest should perish. Just as when a tree perishes, the shadow must perish with it. The tree's shadow arises relying on the tree; when the tree perishes, the shadow also perishes. The unmanifest arises relying on the manifest; when the manifest perishes, the unmanifest should perish.' The author of the śāstra says: 'Not so. Just like a son, a hall, or a sprout: a son arises relying on his father, but when the father dies, the son remains. The unmanifest arises relying on the manifest; when the manifest perishes, the unmanifest remains.' (The analogies of the hall and sprout are likewise). Second, it says: 'Because the great elements (mahābhūta) relied upon by the five consciousnesses possess change and obstruction, unmanifest karma is also called form.' This is the Sarvāstivāda doctrine. If so, since the basis has change and obstruction, the five consciousnesses such as eye-consciousness should also be called form. This refutation is unequal. When unmanifest form operates relying on the great elements, it is like a shadow relying on a tree or light relying on a jewel. The five consciousnesses relying on the sense faculties such as the eye are not like this, functioning solely as auxiliary conditions for generation. The point is: one should not use the eye and others, which are distant conditions (adhipatipratyaya), to challenge an immediate condition. The author of the śāstra also refutes: 'These words that the shadow relies on the tree and light relies on the jewel do not conform to the Vibhāṣā's doctrines. In that school, the atoms of visible color such as shadows each rely on their own four great elements.' The author of the śāstra also grants and refutes: 'Even granting that shadow and light rely on tree and jewel, unmanifest form does not rely on its basis in the same way, because they allow that though the relied-upon great elements perish, unmanifest form does not perish along with them.' Third, there is another explanation: regarding their objection, the basis relied upon by the five consciousnesses such as eye-consciousness is indeterminate—some have change and obstruction, namely the eye faculty and others; some lack change and obstruction, namely the immediately preceding mind. The basis of unmanifest form is not like this. Therefore the previous challenge is certainly unequal. It is logically established that having change and obstruction is called form. This is the author of the śāstra validating the second master, hence named the third. Explanation: The above three doctrines are essentially two perspectives, because the third validates the second. Although there are two perspectives, both establish the meaning of unmanifest form based on physical form. Therefore the Nirvāṇa Sūtra says: 'Prince Bodhi harbored a doubt: When a bhikṣu receives precepts with a virtuous mind, when he reaches an evil or indeterminate mind, he should be said to lose his precepts.' Thus the sūtra asks: 'If a bhikṣu guards and upholds the prohibitive precepts, and if an evil mind arises, should one know that at that time he loses the bhikṣu precepts?' The Buddha said: 'Precepts are of seven kinds. Arising from body and speech, there is unmanifest form (avijñapti-rūpa). Due to the cause and condition of this unmanifest form, even though his mind is in an evil or indeterminate state, he is not said to lose the precepts; he is still called one who upholds the precepts. By what cause and condition is it called unmanifest form? It is not the cause of an alien form, nor does it produce the result of an alien form.' Explanation: This contains the intention of two layers of questions and answers. The former answers the reason for not losing precepts, which is due to the unmanifest. From 'not the cause of an alien form' onward, it self-explains the reason why the unmanifest receives the name of form. Saying 'not the cause of an alien form' clarifies that it takes form as cause, not something else outside of form as cause. Saying 'does not produce the result of an alien form' clarifies that it produces the result of form, and does not produce the result of something else outside of form. Since it takes form as cause and produces the result of form, the unmanifest precept successfully constitutes form. If one uses this text merely to explain not losing precepts, one fails to understand the basis of the question and answer. Other divergent doctrines are set aside for fear of verbosity. Now the commentary's intention: it merely takes their proposition that the unmanifest is form as what is to be refuted, without definitively settling their definition of unmanifest form. If taking textual correspondence, it is the meaning of the Saṃyuktābhidharmahṛdaya. When the commentary now clarifies the intention of contemplation, it is precisely the intention of refutation; when attachment is shattered, contemplation is accomplished. However, this directly refutes the Saṃyuktābhidharmahṛdaya, differing from the refutational intention of the Abhidharmakośa: that works to refute incorrect formulations of doctrine, whereas this refutes by dispelling characteristics to reveal the principle. Regarding the commentary's '"Or is it non-form?" reveals that it is not non-form,' this refutes the intention of the Dharmaguptaka school. Their position states: because it lacks change and obstruction, it cannot be form; because it lacks cogitation and cognition, it cannot be called mind. Thus it is neither form nor mind, subsumed under formations non-associated with mind (cittaviprayuktasaṃskāra). The intention of the refutation can be known. Regarding the commentary's 'Although empty, it does not obstruct engaging in existence,' this explains the ease of expedient means (upāya). It shows that although one has no conceptual mind regarding upholding or transgressing, the seven branches of conduct are spotless, the three karmas are flawless, and there is nothing one does not do in embracing goodness and benefiting others, because the prior contemplation of emptiness was not annihilationism. Regarding the commentary's 'I do not see a single dharma that is not the Buddha-dharma,' this was already cited earlier, meaning that neither defaming nor upholding is equal in the dharmadhātu; because of this pervasive harmony, there is the ninth item where one contains all. Regarding 'The five analogies here,' the commentary explicitly refers to the 'Ten Forbearances' and implicitly uses Vimalakīrti; the text can be understood throughout. Regarding the commentary's 'The second major section' and so forth: The principle from here onward is deep and profound, visible in the text; one should simply examine it closely without further verbose citation. As for 'The arising of development,' and so forth, it should be understood in the subsequent chapters. 'Not awakened through another' contains three meanings, as in the 'Chapter on the Ten Abodes.' It means seeing the nature of mind; outside this nature, all is 'other,' and the self also does not exist; it concurrently shows taking mind as self and outside mind as other. Now, when one's own mind does not exist, how could one seize dharmas outside the mind? Regarding 'How could it merely be fixed in one's square inch of heart?' and so forth, it shows one's own mind as self and other persons as other. The previous 'Chapter on the Ten Abodes' proceeded from the coarse to the subtle; this passage uses the subtle to illustrate the coarse.