大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔 40.3.1

40.3.1

疏「故經云發心畢竟二不別」下，第六引文成立。 即《涅槃》文。 下半頌云「自未得度先度他，是故我禮初發心。 」至〈法界品〉當更廣引。 「法慧仰推」，即當經意。 「如或未喻」者，未喻即未曉也。 《勝鬘》有文，〈十地〉廣釋。 《勝鬘》說三種智，此即第三仰推智也。 疏「或曰十六分之一」者，如秤斤有十六兩故。 然此言出《涅槃》第六〈如來性品〉云「若有眾生於四恒河沙佛所發菩提心，然後乃能於惡世中不謗是法，受持讀誦書寫經卷，為他廣說十六分中一分之義，雖復演說亦不具足。 供五恒佛，能說十六分之八分； 六恒說十二分； 七恒說十四分； 八恒佛所方說十六分方具。 」遠公亦舉如秤，不別解釋。 疏「此云近少」，即《音義》中引《大般若》。 譯為塢波尼殺曇，塢波近也，尼殺曇少也。 或云近對，謂相近比對。 或謂極少也。 疏「事隨性融此彼相即」者，如經「一毛端中一切世界差別性」者，謂一毛端性即是一切世界差別性。 今一切世界即事，隨其法性即一毛端，以性即毛端，諸界即性故。 下句亦然。 一切世界中性，即是一毛端性； 一毛隨性，即一切世界。 上句多即一，下句一即多。 言「事攬性起彼此相入」者，謂一毛端之事，攬一切世界性成，故一切世界隨其多性在一毛中。 下句亦然。 一切世界攬一毛端性成，故一毛隨性遍在一切世界中。 言「各有同體異體」者，謂一毛端及一切剎為各有也。 云何異體？ 一一剎等各有體故。 云何同體？ 差別界體同一體故。 今一毛中自有體性是為異體，而同諸剎體故曰同體。 一一諸剎各自有體，即與毛端共同一體。 今諸剎相隨其異體即彼毛端之同體，故剎即毛端，毛端異體隨其同體遍於諸剎之異體，故彼體即剎，故毛即諸剎體。 然上釋理性融通之中却不廣出同異體義但有其意。 如上文云「謂不異理之一事，具攝理性時」，即同體義。 今彼不異理之多事，隨所依理皆於一中現，即異體隨同也。 故云「準上思之」。 疏「謂諸緣起更互相生」者，一毛之一由剎之多，剎為能生、毛為所生。 因毛之一有剎之多，多為所生，所生無體。 多即一毛，能生有體，毛攝諸剎。 上毛為所生，反此可知。 一毛是能生，即是有力。 諸剎是所生，即是無力。 力攝無力，一毛有於多剎。 多剎能生一毛，一毛即無力，力攝無力，毛入多剎。 同體異體，廣如玄中。 疏「以大非定大故能即小」等者，等取小非定小故能即大，及等染非定染故能即淨，淨非定淨故能即染等。 至大有於小相，不壞於大，小入大也。 反顯至小有於大相，不壞小相，則芥納須彌。 疏「別中言平等者，通相即」等者，總取諸句平等。 而平等字，要須長短等相方有即入故。 然云劫者，《婆沙》一百三十五云「分別時分，故名為劫。 體即五蘊生滅以成於劫。 」大乘即以時為體。 經云「長劫與短劫平等」等者，意云：長劫即短劫、短劫即長劫，亦是平等。 長劫入短劫，短劫亦長劫，亦是平等。 「就緣」即緣起相由門，「就性」即法性融通門，「唯心」即唯心所現門，即十因中之三，等取餘夢幻等七。 疏「二三及四文並可知」者，二即一多。 三即有佛無佛，如過去莊嚴、現在賢劫、未來星宿，各有千佛，名為有佛劫。 此後六萬二千劫，空過無有佛，名為無佛劫。 四即多少，如威光修因，種種莊嚴劫中，有十須彌山微塵數佛。 《法華》大通智勝佛處，東南方梵王讚云「一百八十劫，空過無有佛。 」準《十住毘婆沙》第十云「如經中說：『諸比丘！ 是賢劫前九十一劫，毘婆尸佛出。 百三十一劫，有二佛出，一名尸棄、二名毘式婆。 此賢劫中，鳩樓孫、迦那含牟尼、迦葉佛出。 六萬二千劫，空過無佛。 』」疏「如勝蓮華界」等，即〈壽量品〉。

In the commentary, from 'Hence the sūtra says: between the initial aspiration and ultimate [realization], the two are not distinct' onwards, is the sixth section, citing texts to establish [the point]. This is a text from the *Nirvāṇa-sūtra*. The second half of the verse says: 'Not yet having crossed over oneself, one first crosses over others; therefore I pay homage to the initial aspiration of the mind.' When we reach the 'Chapter on the Dharmadhātu', it will be cited more extensively. 'Dharmamati deferring with reverence' reflects the intention of this sūtra. As for 'if not yet understood': 'not yet understood' means not yet clear. There is a text in the *Śrīmālādevī-sūtra*, which is extensively explained in the 'Ten Grounds' [chapter]. The *Śrīmālādevī-sūtra* speaks of three kinds of cognition; this is the third, 'cognition of deferring with reverence.' In the commentary, 'or saying one-sixteenth' is because a steelyard pound contains sixteen ounces. However, this statement comes from the sixth fascicle of the *Nirvāṇa-sūtra*, the 'Chapter on the Tathāgata Nature', which states: 'If there are sentient beings who generate bodhicitta in the presence of as many Buddhas as the sands of four Gaṅgā rivers, only then will they be able to refrain from slandering this Dharma in an evil age, to uphold, read, recite, and copy the scrolls of the sūtra, and to broadly explain to others one part of the meaning among sixteen parts, though their explanation is still incomplete. Serving the Buddhas of five Gaṅgās, they can explain eight of the sixteen parts; six Gaṅgās, twelve parts; seven Gaṅgās, fourteen parts; only before the Buddhas of eight Gaṅgās can they explain the sixteen parts in full.' Master Yuan also adduced the steelyard, without further explanation. In the commentary, 'here called nearly small' cites the *Mahāprajñāpāramitā* from the *Sound and Meaning*. It is translated as *upaniṣad*; *upa* means near, and *niṣad* means small. Or it is called 'nearly compared', meaning to compare in close proximity. Or it is called 'extremely small'. In the commentary, 'phenomena harmonize in accord with nature, so this and that are mutually identical': as the sūtra says, 'within the tip of a single hair, the differentiated nature of all worlds,' this means the nature of a single hair-tip is the differentiated nature of all worlds. Now, all worlds are phenomena; in accord with their dharmatā, they are identical to a single hair-tip, because the nature is identical to the hair-tip and the various worlds are identical to the nature. The following sentence is also like this: the nature within all worlds is the nature of a single hair-tip; a single hair, in accord with nature, is all worlds. The former sentence means the many are identical to the one; the latter sentence means the one is identical to the many. As for 'phenomena arise by gathering the nature, so this and that mutually enter': this means the phenomenon of a single hair-tip is accomplished by gathering the nature of all worlds; therefore, all worlds, in accord with their manifold nature, are within a single hair. The following sentence is also like this: all worlds are accomplished by gathering the nature of a single hair-tip; therefore, a single hair, in accord with nature, is pervasively present within all worlds. As for 'each having the identical substance and different substances': this means that a single hair-tip and all realms each have them. What is the different substance? Because each and every realm, and so forth, has its own substance. What is the identical substance? Because the substance of the differentiated realms is a single, identical substance. Now, within a single hair there is its own nature of substance, which is the different substance; yet it is identical to the substance of all realms, hence it is called the identical substance. Each of all realms has its own substance, yet is shared in a single, identical substance with the hair-tip. Now, the characteristics of all realms, in accord with their different substances, are identical to the identical substance of that hair-tip; thus the realms are identical to the hair-tip. The different substance of the hair-tip, in accord with its identical substance, is pervasive in the different substances of all realms; thus that substance is identical to the realms, and hence the hair is identical to the substance of all realms. However, the above explanation of the harmonization and penetration of the nature of principle did not extensively set forth the meaning of identical and different substances, but merely had its intent. As the text above says: 'when a single phenomenon that is not different from principle completely integrates the nature of principle,' this is the meaning of identical substance. Now, those manifold phenomena that are not different from principle, in accord with the principle upon which they rely, are all manifested within the one; this is the different substance following the identical. Hence it says, 'deliberate on it based on the above.' In the commentary, 'namely, all conditioned arisings mutually generate one another': the oneness of a single hair is due to the multiplicity of realms; realms are the generating, and the hair is the generated. Dependent on the oneness of the hair, there is the multiplicity of realms; multiplicity is the generated, and the generated lacks substance. Multiplicity is identical to a single hair; the generating possesses substance, so the hair gathers the realms. Above, the hair was the generated; conversely to this, it can be known. A single hair being the generating means it is potent. All realms being the generated means they are impotent. Potency gathers impotence, so a single hair possesses manifold realms. Manifold realms being able to generate a single hair means the single hair is impotent; potency gathers impotence, so the hair enters manifold realms. Identical substance and different substance are extensively detailed as in the *Prolegomena*. In the commentary, 'because the great is not determinately great, it can be identical to the small', and so on: 'and so on' encompasses that the small is not determinately small, so it can be identical to the great, as well as defilement not being determinately defiled, so it can be identical to purity, and purity not being determinately pure, so it can be identical to defilement, and so forth. The utmost great possesses the characteristic of the small without destroying the great: the small enters the great. Conversely, it shows that the utmost small possesses the characteristic of the great without destroying the characteristic of the small: then a mustard seed contains Sumeru. In the commentary, 'in the specific [section], speaking of equality applies to mutual identity', and so on: this generally takes the equality of all lines. Yet with the word 'equality', only when there are characteristics such as long and short can there be identity and entrance. Regarding the term 'kalpa': fascicle 135 of the *Vibhāṣā* states: 'Differentiating periods of time, it is called a kalpa. Its substance is the arising and ceasing of the five aggregates to form a kalpa.' The Mahāyāna takes time as its substance. When the sūtra states 'long kalpas and short kalpas are equal,' and so on, the meaning is: long kalpas are identical to short kalpas, and short kalpas are identical to long kalpas; this too is equality. Long kalpas enter short kalpas, and short kalpas also [enter] long kalpas; this too is equality. 'In terms of conditions' refers to the gateway of mutual dependence in conditioned arising; 'in terms of nature' refers to the gateway of the harmonization and penetration of dharmatā; 'mind-only' refers to the gateway of manifestation by mind-only: these are three of the ten causes, encompassing the remaining seven, such as dreams and illusions. In the commentary, 'the second, third, and fourth texts can all be understood': the second is the one and the many. The third is having Buddhas and not having Buddhas: as in the past Glorious Kalpa, the present Wise Kalpa, and the future Constellation Kalpa, each has a thousand Buddhas, which are called kalpas with Buddhas. Following this, for sixty-two thousand kalpas, [time] passes emptily without a Buddha, which is called a kalpa without Buddhas. The fourth is few and many: as when Weiguang cultivated causes, within the Kalpa of Various Adornments there were as many Buddhas as the dust motes of ten Mount Sumerus. In the *Lotus Sūtra*, regarding the place of the Buddha Mahābhijñājñānābhibhū, the Brahmā kings of the southeast praised: 'For one hundred and eighty kalpas, [time] passed emptily without a Buddha.' According to the tenth fascicle of the *Daśabhūmika-vibhāṣā*: 'As stated in the sūtra: "O monks! Ninety-one kalpas before this Wise Kalpa, Vipaśyin Buddha appeared. One hundred and thirty-one kalpas ago, two Buddhas appeared, the first named Śikhin and the second named Viśvabhū. In this Wise Kalpa, Krakucchanda, Kanakamuni, and Kāśyapa Buddhas have appeared. For sixty-two thousand kalpas, [time] passes emptily without a Buddha."' In the commentary, 'as in the Superior Lotus World', and so on, refers to the 'Chapter on the Life Span'.