大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔 40.3

In the commentary, from 'Hence the sūtra says: between the initial aspiration and ultimate [realization], the two are not distinct' onwards, is the sixth section, citing texts to establish [the point]. This is a text from the *Nirvāṇa-sūtra*. The second half of the verse says: 'Not yet having crossed over oneself, one first crosses over others; therefore I pay homage to the initial aspiration of the mind.' When we reach the 'Chapter on the Dharmadhātu', it will be cited more extensively. 'Dharmamati deferring with reverence' reflects the intention of this sūtra. As for 'if not yet understood': 'not yet understood' means not yet clear. There is a text in the *Śrīmālādevī-sūtra*, which is extensively explained in the 'Ten Grounds' [chapter]. The *Śrīmālādevī-sūtra* speaks of three kinds of cognition; this is the third, 'cognition of deferring with reverence.' In the commentary, 'or saying one-sixteenth' is because a steelyard pound contains sixteen ounces. However, this statement comes from the sixth fascicle of the *Nirvāṇa-sūtra*, the 'Chapter on the Tathāgata Nature', which states: 'If there are sentient beings who generate bodhicitta in the presence of as many Buddhas as the sands of four Gaṅgā rivers, only then will they be able to refrain from slandering this Dharma in an evil age, to uphold, read, recite, and copy the scrolls of the sūtra, and to broadly explain to others one part of the meaning among sixteen parts, though their explanation is still incomplete. Serving the Buddhas of five Gaṅgās, they can explain eight of the sixteen parts; six Gaṅgās, twelve parts; seven Gaṅgās, fourteen parts; only before the Buddhas of eight Gaṅgās can they explain the sixteen parts in full.' Master Yuan also adduced the steelyard, without further explanation. In the commentary, 'here called nearly small' cites the *Mahāprajñāpāramitā* from the *Sound and Meaning*. It is translated as *upaniṣad*; *upa* means near, and *niṣad* means small. Or it is called 'nearly compared', meaning to compare in close proximity. Or it is called 'extremely small'. In the commentary, 'phenomena harmonize in accord with nature, so this and that are mutually identical': as the sūtra says, 'within the tip of a single hair, the differentiated nature of all worlds,' this means the nature of a single hair-tip is the differentiated nature of all worlds. Now, all worlds are phenomena; in accord with their dharmatā, they are identical to a single hair-tip, because the nature is identical to the hair-tip and the various worlds are identical to the nature. The following sentence is also like this: the nature within all worlds is the nature of a single hair-tip; a single hair, in accord with nature, is all worlds. The former sentence means the many are identical to the one; the latter sentence means the one is identical to the many. As for 'phenomena arise by gathering the nature, so this and that mutually enter': this means the phenomenon of a single hair-tip is accomplished by gathering the nature of all worlds; therefore, all worlds, in accord with their manifold nature, are within a single hair. The following sentence is also like this: all worlds are accomplished by gathering the nature of a single hair-tip; therefore, a single hair, in accord with nature, is pervasively present within all worlds. As for 'each having the identical substance and different substances': this means that a single hair-tip and all realms each have them. What is the different substance? Because each and every realm, and so forth, has its own substance. What is the identical substance? Because the substance of the differentiated realms is a single, identical substance. Now, within a single hair there is its own nature of substance, which is the different substance; yet it is identical to the substance of all realms, hence it is called the identical substance. Each of all realms has its own substance, yet is shared in a single, identical substance with the hair-tip. Now, the characteristics of all realms, in accord with their different substances, are identical to the identical substance of that hair-tip; thus the realms are identical to the hair-tip. The different substance of the hair-tip, in accord with its identical substance, is pervasive in the different substances of all realms; thus that substance is identical to the realms, and hence the hair is identical to the substance of all realms. However, the above explanation of the harmonization and penetration of the nature of principle did not extensively set forth the meaning of identical and different substances, but merely had its intent. As the text above says: 'when a single phenomenon that is not different from principle completely integrates the nature of principle,' this is the meaning of identical substance. Now, those manifold phenomena that are not different from principle, in accord with the principle upon which they rely, are all manifested within the one; this is the different substance following the identical. Hence it says, 'deliberate on it based on the above.' In the commentary, 'namely, all conditioned arisings mutually generate one another': the oneness of a single hair is due to the multiplicity of realms; realms are the generating, and the hair is the generated. Dependent on the oneness of the hair, there is the multiplicity of realms; multiplicity is the generated, and the generated lacks substance. Multiplicity is identical to a single hair; the generating possesses substance, so the hair gathers the realms. Above, the hair was the generated; conversely to this, it can be known. A single hair being the generating means it is potent. All realms being the generated means they are impotent. Potency gathers impotence, so a single hair possesses manifold realms. Manifold realms being able to generate a single hair means the single hair is impotent; potency gathers impotence, so the hair enters manifold realms. Identical substance and different substance are extensively detailed as in the *Prolegomena*. In the commentary, 'because the great is not determinately great, it can be identical to the small', and so on: 'and so on' encompasses that the small is not determinately small, so it can be identical to the great, as well as defilement not being determinately defiled, so it can be identical to purity, and purity not being determinately pure, so it can be identical to defilement, and so forth. The utmost great possesses the characteristic of the small without destroying the great: the small enters the great. Conversely, it shows that the utmost small possesses the characteristic of the great without destroying the characteristic of the small: then a mustard seed contains Sumeru. In the commentary, 'in the specific [section], speaking of equality applies to mutual identity', and so on: this generally takes the equality of all lines. Yet with the word 'equality', only when there are characteristics such as long and short can there be identity and entrance. Regarding the term 'kalpa': fascicle 135 of the *Vibhāṣā* states: 'Differentiating periods of time, it is called a kalpa. Its substance is the arising and ceasing of the five aggregates to form a kalpa.' The Mahāyāna takes time as its substance. When the sūtra states 'long kalpas and short kalpas are equal,' and so on, the meaning is: long kalpas are identical to short kalpas, and short kalpas are identical to long kalpas; this too is equality. Long kalpas enter short kalpas, and short kalpas also [enter] long kalpas; this too is equality. 'In terms of conditions' refers to the gateway of mutual dependence in conditioned arising; 'in terms of nature' refers to the gateway of the harmonization and penetration of dharmatā; 'mind-only' refers to the gateway of manifestation by mind-only: these are three of the ten causes, encompassing the remaining seven, such as dreams and illusions. In the commentary, 'the second, third, and fourth texts can all be understood': the second is the one and the many. The third is having Buddhas and not having Buddhas: as in the past Glorious Kalpa, the present Wise Kalpa, and the future Constellation Kalpa, each has a thousand Buddhas, which are called kalpas with Buddhas. Following this, for sixty-two thousand kalpas, [time] passes emptily without a Buddha, which is called a kalpa without Buddhas. The fourth is few and many: as when Weiguang cultivated causes, within the Kalpa of Various Adornments there were as many Buddhas as the dust motes of ten Mount Sumerus. In the *Lotus Sūtra*, regarding the place of the Buddha Mahābhijñājñānābhibhū, the Brahmā kings of the southeast praised: 'For one hundred and eighty kalpas, [time] passed emptily without a Buddha.' According to the tenth fascicle of the *Daśabhūmika-vibhāṣā*: 'As stated in the sūtra: "O monks! Ninety-one kalpas before this Wise Kalpa, Vipaśyin Buddha appeared. One hundred and thirty-one kalpas ago, two Buddhas appeared, the first named Śikhin and the second named Viśvabhū. In this Wise Kalpa, Krakucchanda, Kanakamuni, and Kāśyapa Buddhas have appeared. For sixty-two thousand kalpas, [time] passes emptily without a Buddha."' In the commentary, 'as in the Superior Lotus World', and so on, refers to the 'Chapter on the Life Span'.

Regarding the commentary's statement, "Its nature is to endorse and retain a determined object," and so forth: this means that by the power of proof through teachings and reasonings, whether erroneous or correct, one judges, determines, endorses, and retains the object grasped; because of this, other conditions cannot divert or alter it. Regarding an object of doubt, resolute determination (adhimokṣa) is entirely absent, as there is no judging and determining. Regarding "In the specific [explanations], there are altogether thirteen clauses": these are clauses of meaning, as each comprehension constitutes a clause. Regarding "It is subsumed under the cognition of resolute determination": this is said in terms of the cognitions of the ten powers, since the cognition of various determinations is also termed "aspiration" (chanda). In terms of the characteristics of dharmas, aspiration and determination are distinct, each being one of the five object-specific mental factors (viniyata); yet in the ten powers they are combined into one, differing merely in the name adopted. Regarding "Because what they are relative to is different," and so forth: the previous three expedient means belong to determination, whereas these now belong to the various dhyānas. Regarding "Namely the cognition of others' minds": if viewed under the ten powers, this is subsumed under realms (dhātu). Regarding "All afflictions each have degrees of lightness and heaviness": this is because they are divided into nine grades. In "In terms of the arising of afflictions" below, the source of their lightness and heaviness is explained. For instance, regarding the single affliction of greed, the heavy grade arises with fierce greed toward an inferior object. The medium grade arises in proportion to the object. The lower grade is light and weak even toward a superior object, and so on. As each of the three grades has three subdivisions, they make nine grades. In "According to difficulty and ease" below, their lightness and heaviness are discussed by comparing them respectively. In saying "Seeds are heavy": for example, the seeds of innately active afflictions are severed completely only by the vajropamasamādhi. Hence the sūtra states below: "Extinction is only final through the path of the vajra." Regarding "Again, the conceptually constructed are light": they are severed all at once in the true path of seeing (darśanamārga); hence the Vijñaptimātratā states: "The afflictions to be severed by seeing, all ten together, are severed all at once, because the true path of seeing generally takes the truths as its object." This is according to the Mahāyāna. If common to the three vehicles, the *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi* states: "Those heavy afflictive hindrances to be severed by seeing are severed all at once in the position of the path of seeing, within the true path of seeing, across the three vehicles." In saying "The innately active are heavy": it is because they can be severed only by repeatedly cultivating non-conceptual cognition in the path of cultivation (bhāvanāmārga). The rest is as explained at the beginning of the "Ten Grounds". Regarding "Wrong view is the heaviest": the *Nirvāṇa-sūtra* states, "All afflictions are completely encompassed by wrong view." Among the ten major precepts of the Vinaya, slandering the Three Jewels is the heaviest; the same applies to the ten unwholesome actions. Regarding "Anger is the heaviest": as the chapter "Practices of Samantabhadra" states: "When a single thought of anger arises, a million obstacle-gates open." Regarding "Avidyā, craving, and grasping are heavy": the *Vimalakīrti-sūtra* states, "From delusion there is craving, and thus my illness arises." The *Nirvāṇa-sūtra* states, "The fundamental origins of saṃsāra are generally of two kinds: first, avidyā; second, craving and so forth." Regarding "The three poisons are heavy": the *Caritranirdeśa-sūtra* states, "Among the poisons of the world, none exceeds the three poisons; moreover, the secondary afflictions all arise from these." Regarding "View and pride are heavy": as for views, one universally clings to a single principle that penetrates the mind to the core—how could one accept the noble teaching? Pride having already relied upon oneself—how could one seek from others? Regarding "Self-love and pride are heavy": there are briefly three meanings. First, in terms of consciousness, reaching the seventh [consciousness], they are associated with the four afflictions. Second, in terms of practice, they extend to the various dhyānas, as will be distinguished in the chapter "Clarifying the Dharma". Third, in terms of the arhat of the four fruits: if one forms the thought, 'I have attained the path of the arhat,' one has not attained it. Regarding "The ten great afflictions are heavy": the *Vijñaptimātratā* states, "The afflictions are greed, anger, delusion, pride, doubt, and bad views—namely, the six root afflictions." The *Abhidharmakośa* states, "The six, through the division of views, become ten; that is, bad views are expanded into five: first, view of individuality; second, extreme view; third, wrong view; fourth, clinging to views; fifth, clinging to rules and vows." Regarding "Among the secondary afflictions, the greater, medium, and lesser secondary afflictions are reciprocally heavy and light": the greater secondary afflictions are heavy, while the medium and lesser are light; the medium secondary afflictions are heavy, while the lesser are light—this is called reciprocal. Regarding "secondary afflictions" (upakleśa): the *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi* states, "Secondary afflictions are wrath, resentment, concealment, distress, jealousy, stinginess, deceit, flattery, malice, complacency, lack of shame, lack of conscience, restlessness, torpor, lack of faith, laziness, heedlessness, loss of mindfulness, distraction, and incorrect comprehension." The prose commentary explains: "Because they are exclusively different states and niṣyanda of the afflictions, they are named secondary afflictions." Its commentary explains: "Wrath and the other ten, along with loss of mindfulness, incorrect comprehension, heedlessness, and so on, are nominal defiled mental factors that are different states of greed and the others, and are named secondary afflictions. Although the seven dharmas—lack of shame, lack of conscience, restlessness, torpor, distraction, lack of faith, and laziness—exist in distinct states, their essence is the niṣyanda of the former root afflictions, and they are therefore named secondary afflictions. Because they exist with afflictions as their cause, the treatise states that these twenty kinds are divided into three: wrath and the other ten arise separately from one another, so they are named the lesser secondary afflictions. Lack of shame and lack of conscience universally accompany the unwholesome, so they are named the medium secondary afflictions. Restlessness and the other eight universally accompany defiled minds, so they are named the greater secondary afflictions." The commentary explains: "However, wrath and the other ten arise separately when compared among their own kind; because they do not fail to coexist with the medium and greater afflictions, and their scope of occurrence is restricted, they are named lesser. Lack of shame and lack of conscience can coexist among their own kind, extend to wrath and so on, and universally accompany the unwholesome, but their scope is restricted. The latter eight can only be named medium. Restlessness and the other eight can arise together with their own kind, and universally accompany all that is defiled; because they can arise together, they cannot be named lesser; and because they universally accompany all that is defiled, they cannot be named medium. Since the two meanings differ, these eight are named greater." Regarding "Traces (vāsanā) are light": these are the residual traces of arhats and others, as can be understood. Regarding "There are other approaches that may be briefly stated": above, there have already been ten approaches of explanation. Some hold that among the five entrenchments of affliction, avidyā is heavy because it obstructs great bodhi, while the first four are light because they obstruct seeing and cultivation. Here, because the first four positions also obstruct bodhi and the entrenchment of avidyā also obstructs seeing and cultivation, this is not retained. Again, some say: the equal portion is light because it arises in proportion to the object; the predominant portion is heavy because it arises exceeding the object. Again, it is said: that which arises temporarily, intermittently, or feebly is light; that which arises frequently, constantly, or fiercely is heavy. These two are subsumed under the previous explanation according to grades. Again, it is said: delusion regarding facts is light, being severed by subsequent cognition; delusion regarding principle is heavy, being severed by fundamental cognition. This is also slightly at variance with the earlier view that avidyā is heavy because it obstructs bodhi; hence it is omitted and not mentioned. It is not that it lacks reason; hence it says "may be briefly [stated]". Delusion regarding facts and delusion regarding principle will be extensively distinguished in the "Ten Grounds".

Regarding the commentary's statement, "can give rise to boundless afflictions such as greed, as taught in the Nirvāṇa [Sūtra]": this refers to the twenty-third fascicle, the chapter "Bodhisattva Noble and Virtuous King". The sūtra states: "Furthermore, good son! Although all ordinary beings guard their bodies and minds well, they still give rise to three kinds of unwholesome thoughts. For this reason, even if they sever the afflictions and obtain rebirth in the station of neither-perception-nor-non-perception, they still fall back into the three evil destinies. Good son! Just like a person crossing a great sea who drowns and dies when about to reach the other shore, ordinary beings are also like this: when about to exhaust the three realms of existence, they fall back into the three evil destinies. Why is this? Because they lack wholesome thoughts. What are wholesome thoughts? They are the so-called six recollections." Below, it extensively explains the faults of unwholesome thoughts; hence it says, "as taught in the Nirvāṇa [Sūtra]". As for "adding five to speak of eight thoughts": these are the eight reflections in treatises such as the Kośa. The afflicted thought listed in the commentary below is indeed the harmful thought. The Nirvāṇa [Sūtra] generally speaks of the six recollections as wholesome; here it speaks of them separately, hence taking remedies such as impurity as wholesome, the general meaning of which can be known. Regarding the commentary's statement, "Among the sharp [afflictions], the view of selfhood is the root and generates the sixty-two [views]": as for the view of selfhood, the Vijñaptimātratā treatise calls it satkāyadṛṣṭi. The treatise states: "It refers to grasping the five clinging aggregates as self and what belongs to self, having the activity of serving as the basis for all resorts of views. The distinctions of this view comprise twenty propositions, sixty-five, and so forth, subsumed under conceptually generated ones." Explanation: from "The distinctions of this view..." onward corresponds to what the commentary calls "one: spoken in reliance on the five aggregates throughout the three times". That commentary explains: "As for satkāyadṛṣṭi, in full Sanskrit it is satkāyadṛṣṭi. The Sautrāntika masters say: 'sat' means false, 'kāya' is body, and 'dṛṣṭi' is view. Body means aggregation, that is, a nominal aggregation. One should say that giving rise to a view based on the aggregated body is called the view of selfhood. The Sarvāstivādins say: 'sat' means existent, and 'kāya' etc. are as before. Although one views an aggregated body, it is truly existent. 'Body' is an alternative name for self-substance; one should call it the view of self-substance. The Mahāyāna master explains: 'saṅkrānti-sat' then becomes transference, because it is a phenomenon transformed upon the mind and mental factors in Mahāyāna." It is called the transference view of selfhood; giving rise to this self-view in reliance on the five aggregates, because this serves as the basis, all views are able to arise. Regarding "having the activity of serving as the basis for all resorts of views": "resort" means turning to, the place whereto delusions repair. Regarding "twenty propositions": the Abhidharmasamuccaya, fascicle 1, states: "That is, such as conceptualizing form as self, self possessing form, form belonging to self, and self being within form. One aggregate has four; the five aggregates together have twenty propositions. Five are views of self, and the rest are what belongs to self: namely, associated possession of self (i.e., self possessing form), attendant possession of self (i.e., form belonging to self), and non-separated possession of self (i.e., self being within form); hence there are fifteen possessions of self. This is conceptually operating in relation to the aggregates without distinguishing their points of arising. If traced across the three times, there are sixty. Adding the body being identical to the self makes sixty-one; and the self being different from the body makes sixty-two." Again, conceptualizing permanence, impermanence, and so forth makes sixty-two, as in the chapter "Ten Treasuries". As for the treatise speaking of sixty-five: the Vibhāṣā says, "That is, taking form as the self, and in each of the remaining four aggregates having three possessions of self—namely, as my ornament, my servant, and my vessel—there are twelve. With form as one self, there are altogether thirteen. Across the five aggregates, there are altogether sixty views of what belongs to self. With the five views of self, they make sixty-five." This is conceptually operating in relation to the aggregates while also distinguishing their points of arising. All of these are conceptually generated self-views. Regarding the commentary's statement, "two: relying on the wrong views of heterodox paths, as fully explained in Yogācāra fascicle eighty-seven": in that treatise they are sequenced in terms of delusion regarding the anterior and posterior limits. Here, relying on the Vijñaptimātratā, they are distinguished in terms of the underlying views upon which they rely. Namely, regarding the anterior limit, conceptualizing four [views of] pervasive permanence, four [views of] partial permanence, and so forth; regarding the posterior limit, conceptualizing sixteen [theories] of having perception, eight each of having no perception and neither-with-nor-without-perception, totaling forty distinct theories of permanence. There are seven theories of annihilation regarding the posterior limit. These forty-seven together give rise to extreme views caused by the view of self. There are conceptualizations regarding the anterior limit: two theories of no cause, four theories of having boundaries, four theories of immortalist equivocations; and conceptualizing regarding the posterior limit five [theories of] nirvāṇa in the present life; hence there are sixty-two. These sixty-two have wrong view and extreme view as their essential nature, have the other two views as their retinue, and rely upon the view of selfhood as their fundamental root. This also gives the large numbers. Next, explaining their characteristics according to the Yogācāra: First, regarding the four pervasive permanences: they refer to [the view that] the self and the world are completely permanent, possessing only latency and manifestation; arising on the basis of superior, middling, and inferior dhyānas and so forth, they give rise to recollections of past abodes, generating four theories of permanence: first, through being able to recollect twenty eons of formation and destruction; second, through being able to recollect forty eons; third, through being able to recollect eighty eons; fourth, relying on what is seen with the divine eye in the present world, seeing the continuity of the aggregates of sentient beings as they die and are born, they then grasp that both the self and the world are permanent. As for the four partial permanences: it means that all four are partial. First: passing away from the Brahmā heaven to be born here, one obtains the supernormal knowledge of past abodes and forms such grasps as: 'King Brahmā is permanent, while we are impermanent.' Hence it is called partial. Second: hearing that King Brahmā holds such a view as: 'The primary elements are permanent, while the mind is impermanent.' Or vice versa. Third: there are those who previously passed away from the heavens of play-forgetfulness to be born here, who obtain supernormal knowledge and give rise to the grasp: 'Those who are not born here are the permanent self, while those born here are impermanent.' Fourth: there are those who previously passed away from the heavens of mutual defilement, whose partial [permanence] is the same as before. The dwelling place of these devas is on the tiers of Mount Meru, or in the Heaven of the Thirty-Three. Explanation: If according to the Yogācāra, the two theories of no cause are explained right here, because they similarly conceptualize the anterior limit. In the Vijñaptimātratā, after this it clarifies the sixteen [theories] of having perception and so forth. As for the sixteen, there are four sets of four propositions. [In the first set:] 1. 'My self has form and has perception after death': grasping form as the self is called 'my self has form'. Spoken with regard to grasping dharmas, it is called 'having perception'. This includes all of the desire realm and a portion of the form realm, excluding the non-percipient heaven. 2. 'My self is formless and has perception after death': grasping the formless aggregates as the self. This is found from the desire realm up to the sphere of nothingness, excluding only [the station of] neither-perception-nor-non-perception. 3. 'My self both has form and is formless, and has perception after death': grasping the five aggregates as the self. 4. 'My self neither has form nor is formless, and has form after death': this negates the third; relying on samāpattis with investigation and examination, it can all be generated. The second set of four propositions states: 1. Grasping that 'my self has a boundary and has perception after death': grasping form as the self whose substance has limits, such as a finger-joint.

Second, grasping that the self is boundless and possesses perception after death, one grasps that which is non-form as the self because it pervades all places. Third, grasping that the self is both bounded and boundless and possesses perception after death, one grasps that the self contracts and expands following the body, and so on. Fourth, grasping that the self is neither bounded nor boundless and possesses perception after death, negates the third [alternative]; or these [views] arise based on both discursive thought and meditative attainment. As for the third set of four positions: 1. The self has a single perception; 2. The self has manifold perceptions; 3. The self has small perception; 4. The self has immeasurable perception. 'A single perception' pertains to the first three formless [realms]. 'Manifold perceptions' pertains to the desire realm and the form realm, excluding the Heaven of Non-Perception. Third, grasping limited form or grasping limited non-form as the perception of the self, or as that which belongs to the self, where the self is united with it—this is termed 'small perception'. This is in the desire and form realms, excluding the Heaven of Non-Perception. Fourth, 'immeasurable perception' means grasping immeasurable form as the perception of the self, or as that which belongs to the self, where the self is united with it; this is termed 'immeasurable perception'. As for the fourth set of four positions: 1. The self experiences pure pleasure and possesses perception after death, which pertains to the first three dhyānas. 2. The self experiences pure pain and possesses perception after death, which pertains to hell. 3. The self experiences both pain and pleasure and possesses perception after death, which pertains to the realms of humans, desire-realm devas, hungry ghosts, and animals. 4. The self experiences neither pain nor pleasure and possesses perception after death, which pertains to the fourth dhyāna. All of the above can arise through either discursive thought or meditative attainment. Regarding the eight doctrines of non-perception and the eight doctrines of neither [perception nor non-perception]: the eight doctrines of non-perception have two sets of four positions. As for the first set of four positions: 1. The self has form and lacks perception after death; grasping form as the self, one attains the concentration of non-perception, or seeing others attain this concentration and be born there, one forms this calculation. 2. The self is formless and lacks perception after death; grasping the life-faculty as the self, one attains the concentration of non-perception. 3. Grasping that the self is both with form and formless and lacks perception after death; one doubly grasps both form and the life-faculty as the self, giving rise to a single notion of self in both. 4. Grasping that the self is neither with form nor formless and lacks perception after death; this negates the third position, for both meditative attainment and discursive thought can give rise to it. As for the second set of four positions: 1. Grasping that the self is bounded and lacks perception after death; grasping form as the self, its measure being narrow and small, and so on, one attains the concentration of non-perception. 2. Grasping that the self is boundless and lacks perception after death; grasping form as the self, pervading all places, and so on. 3. Grasping that the self is both bounded and boundless and lacks perception after death; grasping form as the self because it expands and contracts following the body. The fourth position negates the third position and has no separate meaning; both meditative attainment and discursive thought can give rise to it. Next, the eight doctrines of neither [perception nor non-perception] have two sets of four positions. The first [set] states: 1. Grasping that the self has form and is neither percipient nor non-percipient after death; grasping form as the self, seeing sentient beings enter the concentration of neither-perception-nor-non-perception where perception is not clear and sharp, one forms this grasp; it is grasped solely through discursive thought, not through attaining the concentration. 2. Grasping that the self is formless and after death is as before; grasping the formless aggregates as the self, etc., because upon entering the concentration of neither-perception-nor-non-perception the perception is not distinct, one forms this grasp. 3. Grasping that the self is both with form and formless and after death is as before; grasping both form and the formless as the self, seeing sentient beings, etc., as before. The above all arise based on discursive thought, not from meditative attainment. The fourth position negates the third position, with no separate meaning. The second set of four positions states: 1. Grasping that the self is bounded and is neither percipient nor non-percipient after death, up through the fourth position; the text is easy to understand. All of these grasp the four formless [aggregates] as the self; because of attaining the concentration of neither-perception-nor-non-perception, this grasp can occur. 1. Because the duration of that concentration is brief, one takes each aggregate separately as an object of cognition and grasps that the self is bounded. 2. Because the duration of that concentration is long, one takes all four aggregates collectively as an object of cognition, and grasps that the self is boundless. 3. Because through that concentration, one takes either each separate aggregate or all collectively as an object of cognition, this forms the third position. The fourth position negates the third, with no separate meaning. As for the seven doctrines of annihilationism: 1. Grasping that the self has coarse form, having the nature of being composed of the four great elements, and after death is annihilated and ultimately non-existent; because one sees that the body exists and then ceases to exist after death. 2. The self is a desire-realm deva and after death is annihilated. 3. The self is a form-realm deva and after death is annihilated. 4. The self is in the stage of infinite space, up to neither-perception-[nor-non-perception], and in all cases one says that after death it is annihilated. The latter four grasps consider their respective planes to be the summit of cyclic existence. The preceding forty views are eternalism; the latter seven views are annihilationism. These are all abandoned by seeing and are termed 'conceptually generated'. Regarding the statement that there are the two doctrines of non-causality calculating the prior edge, and so on: these all arise due to wrong views; because the view is improper, it is called 'wrong'. As for the two [doctrines of] non-causality: 1. Dying from the Heaven of Non-Perception and coming to be born here, lacking the supernormal knowledge of past lives, one cannot recollect all the states prior to the emergence of mind, and thus grasps that all dharmas arise from having previously been non-existent, just as my self must also have arisen from having previously been non-existent; one then gives rise to the grasp, saying: 'I and the world have arisen without a cause.' 2. Due to discursive thought failing to recollect previous lives, one forms this grasp that they arise without a cause. These two views arise due to the two factors of the Heaven of Non-Perception and false discursive thought. As for the four [doctrines of] having an end: 1. Because one can solely recollect the upper and lower [realms]—down to the Avīci Hell and up to the fourth dhyāna—one grasps that the self fully pervades therein, and then forms this thought: 'Beyond this, if there were a self, I should be able to see it; therefore I know it has an end.' 2. Because one can solely recollect that the horizontal directions have no end, one grasps that the self pervades them, and therefore grasps that it is endless. 3. Because one can recollect both upper and lower as well as the horizontal, one doubly grasps both having an end and endless. 4. Because one can recollect the phases of the kalpa of destruction, one gives rise to the thought that it neither has an end nor is endless, because no container world can be found. As for the four kinds of immortality-evasive equivocation, first is an overall explanation of the name. Following the intent of the Vibhāṣā, non-Buddhists calculate devas as permanent, calling them 'immortals', and calculate that answering without disorder allows one to be born in those heavens. Now the Buddhadharma rebukes them, saying: 'Your statements of secret [meanings] and so forth are simply evasive equivocations.' As for the four kinds: 1. Fearing their own ignorance, thinking: 'I do not know what is wholesome and unwholesome, etc.; if others ask me, I must not answer definitely. If I answer definitely, I fear others will discern the cause of my ignorance and will laugh at and ridicule me. The secret meanings of those heavens ought not to be fully spoken, and so on.' 2. Those who practice flattery and deviousness contemplate: 'It is not the case that our pure heavens permit all concealed secrets to be predicted'—referring to one's own realizations and the path of purity. 3. Harbouring fear and making no prediction: fearing that their dullness and inferiority will become known to others, and that due to this cause and condition they will not attain liberation, they use this as a chamber in which to comfortably abide, because they harbour fear. 4. Those with foolish stupidity who single-mindedly cultivate quietude without knowing anything: 'If someone asks me, I will cross-examine them; whatever they say, I will confirm and agree with without diminution.'

As for the five doctrines of nirvāṇa in the present life: 1. Seeing that one presently experiences the pleasures of the five desires, whether as a deva or a human, one calls this nirvāṇa. 2. Although revulsed by the five desires, presently dwelling in the first dhyāna is taken to be nirvāṇa; drawing it into the body is called obtaining pleasure; seeing another presently dwell in the concentration is also like this. The following are all based on this. 3. Due to revulsion toward discursive thought and examination, presently attaining the second dhyāna is taken to be nirvāṇa. 4. Due to revulsion toward discursive thought, examination, and joy, presently dwelling in the third dhyāna is taken to be nirvāṇa. 5. Revulsing joy and pleasure, up to inhalation and exhalation, presently dwelling in the fourth dhyāna is taken to be nirvāṇa. In relation to the past, these are termed the 'posterior edge'. Furthermore, calculating that since the self presently has pleasure, it will also have pleasure later, they are subsumed under the posterior edge. Taking present pleasure as primary while grasping at future pleasure, they are collectively termed 'in the present life'. These do not arise based on view of self, and therefore are subsumed under wrong views. The general meaning of the sixty-two views is now complete. The commentary's 'all with non-attainment' expresses the intent of the Mahāprajñā[pāramitā-sūtra]; it will be explained when reaching the 'Transference' [chapter]. The commentary's 'desire is the path' is spoken in the section on Jayoṣmīṣa.