大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔 45.21

Regarding the commentary's: "The text is divided into five sections", next is the second [section], which differentiates their characteristics. Thereupon there is an explanation of the text that refutes them in terms of permanence and so forth, all reflecting the intent of the Madhyamakaśāstra. The text of the commentary is divided into five parts, which constitutes the second [section], differentiating their characteristics, and thereupon serves as the explanation of the text.
Regarding the commentary's: "Now in this first section, although there are sixteen propositions", below, it explains this first [part], elucidating the unrecorded (avyākrta) in terms of the self. Within this there are two [parts]: first, distinguishing that upon which the views depend; second, properly explaining the text. Now, the first has three [points]: 1. Explaining that they do not deviate from annihilationism and eternalism. 2. From "Speaking of the 'world'" onward, explaining the identity and difference of the world, making clear that views arise in dependence on a self. Regarding the commentary's: "According to the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā, this applies across the three worlds", this refers to fascicle 21 above, where the "three worlds" are explained in the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa. The treatise states: "There are three kinds of worlds", etc.; the rest is as differentiated in the commentary. 3. From "The four propositions of having an end, etc." onward, it explains. This self differs, yet does not go beyond the three times; nirvāṇa is the basis upon which views arise, citing the "Chapter on Heterodox Views" of the Madhyamakaśāstra. As for "Did I in past times", etc., the "I" at the beginning of the verse is the self of this present lifetime. The intent asks: With regard to the self of this present lifetime in past times, did it already exist beforehand? Or did it not exist beforehand? If it already existed beforehand, that is grasping at permanence; if it was non-existent beforehand and has only newly arisen now, that is impermanence. The third affirms both, and the fourth negates both. The various meanings of having an end, etc., will be explained next below. A verse in the "Chapter on Nirvāṇa" of the Madhyamakaśāstra states: "Views of existence and non-existence after cessation, of having no end and the like, and of permanence and the like, depend on nirvāṇa, the future, and the past." Explanation: This directly indicates their basis in general. Based on the previous specific assignments, this can be known.
Regarding the commentary's: "The first four propositions", etc., the treatise first elucidates permanence and the like, and then speaks of having an end and the like, extensively refuting permanence, etc., and by analogy refuting having an end, etc. Here, following the order of the sūtra, it first elucidates having an end and the like. Within the text there are three [points]: first, discerning the characteristics of the four propositions; second, explaining the intent of not answering; third, refuting what is viewed. Now, the first corresponds to the earlier verse's: "In future lifetimes, will I be made or not be made?" Taking non-making at first as "having an end" represents an annihilationist non-Buddhist; here also the "I" at the beginning of the earlier verse is the self of this present lifetime. The characteristics of the four propositions are clearly set forth in the commentary itself.
Second, from "Since they are all heterodox views" onward, it explains the meaning of "unrecorded" (avyākrta), which reveals the reason for not answering.
Third, as for "If one wishes to refute them, the first two propositions both fall into the fault of having no future life", this refutes the two propositions together. The treatise states: "If the world has an end, how could there be a future life? If the world has no end, how could there be a future life?" Explanation: If it has an end, then later there is no continuity, and therefore no future life; if it has no end, then it is perpetually continuous, and likewise has no future life. Having an end is annihilation, while having no end is permanence. Regarding the commentary's: "'Having no future life'", below, it brings out the fault of having no future life, which is also the fault of annihilationism and eternalism. The treatise also states: "The five aggregates are perpetually continuous, just like the flame of a lamp. For this reason, the world should not be said to have an end or have no end", etc. The previous refutation brought out the faults, falling into annihilationism or eternalism because of positing definitive existence or definitive non-existence. Now it establishes a rational refutation: just as a flame depends on conditions, it cannot be considered non-existent; because it lacks a definitive reality, it cannot be considered existent. Therefore, it is free from the two extremes. Furthermore, previously it refuted the personal self (pudgalātman), whereas here it refutes the phenomenal self (dharmātman). The present sūtra primarily refutes the personal self, which is why it does not cite the refutation of phenomena. Furthermore, the treatise refutes in reverse, saying: "If the earlier five aggregates perish, and without depending on these five aggregates, later five aggregates are produced anew, then the world has an end. If the earlier aggregates do not perish, and neither depending on these aggregates are later five aggregates produced, then the world has no end." Explanation: This also directly refutes the world of the five aggregates. The combination of the five aggregates constitutes the world of sentient beings; since the five aggregates are refuted, sentient beings are refuted, because a sentient being is merely a provisional self. Above it was said that non-Buddhists rely on them to grasp at a self; now, refuting the five aggregates also refutes the self. Furthermore, the two verses above also separately refute the two propositions, and concurrently elucidate the third proposition of both.
Regarding the commentary's: "The third proposition", etc., the treatise extensively refutes permanence and so forth, and afterwards by analogy refutes having an end and so forth. Hence the treatise states: "In future lifetimes, will I be made or not made? Views such as these are all identical to those concerning the past." Yet in refuting having an end and the like, there is no refutation based on the body being identical to or different [from the self]. The refutation based on the body being identical or different occurred earlier in the refutation of permanence, etc. Now, following the treatise's analogical refutation, it takes up the thrust of the earlier [argument]. As for the treatise's refutation of the third proposition, it states: "If the world is half with an end and half without an end, then it both has an end and has no end. This is not so. For the one who receives the five aggregates, how could one part perish and one part not perish? That is impossible. The received [aggregates] are also like this: how could one part perish and one part not perish?" Explanation: The former verse refutes sentient beings, which is dispensing with the self; the latter verse refutes the aggregate of appropriation, which is refuting phenomena. Both, however, are refutations based on mutual contradiction, because there is no single phenomenon that is both permanent and impermanent. This characteristic is difficult to perceive, which is why the commentary takes the precedent of the earlier refutation of permanence and the like. The earlier verse refuting permanence states: "If one claims that the self exists, yet the body has distinct characteristics, one should know that apart from the body, where else could there be a distinct self? That there is no self apart from the body is already established. If one claims the body is the self, or if there is no self at all, the body merely does not possess a self, because the characteristics of the body are subject to arising and ceasing." Explanation: This refutes permanence and the like through the approaches of identity and difference; now this is applied by analogy to refute the four propositions of having an end and the like.
Regarding the commentary's: "If one claims that shedding human form to be born in heaven", below, it wards off an objection, which represents the intent of the treatise's proper refutation of having an end and the like. The verse states: "If a deva is identical to a human, one falls into the extreme of permanence. The deva would then be unproduced, because permanent phenomena are not produced. If a deva is different from a human, then it is impermanent. If a deva is different from a human, then there is no continuity." Explanation: The former verse, by refuting permanence, refutes having no end; the latter verse, by refuting annihilation, refutes having an end. The next verse states: "If it is half-deva and half-human, one falls into both extremes. Being both permanent and impermanent—such a thing is impossible." Now the commentary reflects Master [Hui]yuan's adoption of the verse's meaning: "shedding human form to be born in heaven, the human part still remaining while the deva part further increases", etc. The above is conceding the premise that it is half-deva, while the below properly refutes it. The concluding statement briefly clarifies that all are impossible. The reason it is impossible is just as stated in the verse: "both permanent and impermanent, because the two characteristics contradict each other", just like fire and water, which logically cannot coexist.
Regarding the commentary's: "The fourth proposition", below, the treatise merely takes up what precedes and refutes it, saying: "If having an end and having no end were established, then these two would also be established." Explanation: This is a concessive refutation. It is also a relative refutation: if there were a third proposition to stand in opposition, then there would be this fourth proposition of neither having an end nor having no end, because existence and non-existence are mutually dependent. Now that the root of the third is absent, how could the branch of the fourth exist?

In the commentary, [he] immediately points out the fault and refutes [it]. Because "neither existence" negates existence, it does not escape non-existence; because "nor non-existence" negates non-existence, how could it be free from existence? Therefore it reverts to becoming both existence and non-existence, and there is no meaning of the fourth [position] merely negating [them], because all [these views] grasp at what is not the Middle Way. From "How in this..." onwards, [he] concludes by censuring erroneous views. Regarding the commentary's "Second, the four propositions of permanence and so forth": compared to the refutation of the finite and so forth above, where [he] first stated the four propositions and only afterwards refuted them individually, here with the proposition of permanence, it is established and immediately refuted. In the first proposition, permanence, it is first established. Now, the previous questioning verse stated: "Did I in past eras / exist, or was I non-existent?" That is, it asks: did the present self of now already exist previously in the past? Now the first proposition says it did exist; therefore, the self of past eras is this present self. The treatise, first refuting the proposition of permanence, states: "That there was a self in past eras / is untenable. / The self in past eras / does not become the self of the present era." Regarding the commentary's "If one says it is permanent, there is a great fault..." and so forth: this points out the fault and refutes [it]. That is, the prose text of that [treatise] states: "The self in the previous era does not become the present self, because of the fault of permanence. If it were permanent, there would be limitless faults. Why? Just as a person, by causal conditions of cultivating merit, becomes a deva, and afterwards becomes a human: if the self of the previous era were identical with the present self, then a deva would be a human. By causal conditions of sinful karma one becomes a caṇḍāla, and afterwards becomes a brāhmaṇa: if the self of the previous era were identical with the present self, a caṇḍāla would be a brāhmaṇa," and so forth. Regarding the commentary's "If one claims that I now...": this is the second proposition; it is likewise first established, and then refuted from "If so..." onwards. There are two kinds of refutations: first, refutation by causes and conditions, [since] what is made by conditions is impermanent, while you posit a permanent self; second, because it falls into [the fault of having] no cause. Therefore the treatise states: "If the past self did not do [this], that is incorrect; / that the self in past eras is different from the present is also incorrect. / If one claims there is a difference, / apart from that [past self] there should be a present [self]. / My abiding in the past era / while the present self arises of itself— / if so, there would be annihilation, / and loss of karmic retribution; / that one would act and this one receive [it]— / there are faults such as these. / That it was previously non-existent and now exists / also contains a fault here: / the self would then be a fabricated dharma, / and it would also be uncaused." Explanation: Here, the first two lines reiterate the claim and refute it generally; the next two lines state the fault of being different; the next two verses contrast the two eras to explain the fault of difference; the final verse takes up the future alone to reveal its fault: the upper two lines indicate it, the lower two lines make it clear; the third line [shows that] because it begins to exist only now, it becomes a fabricated dharma and thus falls into impermanence; the next line points to its agreement with the preceding refutation, saying "it would also be [uncaused]". The previous loss of karmic result was precisely [falling into] being uncaused; if the present self arises of itself, how could that not be uncaused? Regarding the commentary's "Third, seeing the above...": this means that seeing the faults of the previous two, one immediately posits both. It is refuted from "apart from the body" onwards: this is the approach of identity and difference in the previously cited verse. Second, regarding "It also incurs the above two faults": also permanent is the same as the first proposition, and also impermanent is the same as the second. The fourth proposition merely inverts and applies the previous propositions to establish and refute, and thus reverts to being the same as the third. The verse of the treatise merely states: "As in past eras, / views of having a self and not having a self, / whether combined or not combined— / none of these meanings is correct." Regarding the commentary's "Furthermore, the Madhyamakaśāstra states...": this is the verse at the end of the chapter, which sums up the above faults and reveals them to be empty by nature. The final verse further states: "Gautama, the Great Holy Lord, / out of pity for sentient beings, / completely severed all views; / I now bow my head in reverence to him." This concludes the entire chapter. Regarding the commentary's "Third, after the Tathāgata's parinirvāṇa...": earlier, in explaining what the views rely upon, following its latter meaning, it was said to arise relying upon nirvāṇa; whereas its former meaning generally arises relying upon the aggregates of the self in the three times, conforming to the Jin translation of the sūtra. Regarding the commentary's "If according to the Madhyamakaśāstra...": in the second meaning, there are two [parts]: first, determining the basis of the views and the distinction regarding the Tathāgata, because non-Buddhists themselves claim that Ṛṣabha and others are World-Honoured Ones and Tathāgatas. Therefore in the Śataśāstra, in the preface [extolling] virtues in comparison, it is stated that Ulūka and others are also World-Honoured Ones. Regarding the commentary's "Some claim that after the Tathāgata's parinirvāṇa, he definitely exists unchangingly": this distinguishes and shows the four propositions. The initial demonstration can be understood; later, from "Because all four propositions become prapañca...", it explains the meaning of refuting the undeclared (avyākṛta). Above, relying upon the verses of the "Nirvāṇa Chapter" of the Madhyamakaśāstra, it states: "After the Tathāgata has passed into extinction, / one does not say he exists or does not exist, / nor does one say he both exists and does not exist, / nor neither exists nor does not exist." And it further states: "Between nirvāṇa and the mundane world / there is not the slightest difference; / between the mundane world and nirvāṇa / there is also not the slightest difference. / The bhūtakoṭi of nirvāṇa / and the limit of the mundane world: / between these two limits / there is not a hair's breadth of difference." Explanation: The first single verse is spoken relying upon the two truths; the latter two verses rely solely upon the ultimate truth (paramārtha-satya), identical to the Yogācārabhūmi. Regarding the commentary's "Yogācārabhūmi fascicle eighty-seven...": this corroborates and establishes the above meaning, revealing that the first verse of the Madhyamakaśāstra applies equally to both truths. In terms of the conventional truth, it only explains two propositions, the word "and so forth" being equivalent to the third and fourth. In terms of nirvāṇa, it only explains the first two propositions. From "Furthermore, because this nirvāṇa is extremely difficult to know...", the three meanings generally reveal freedom from the four propositions and severance of the hundred negations. The final verse of the Madhyamakaśāstra states: "All dharmas are empty: / how could there be the finite or the infinite, / both finite and infinite, / neither finite nor infinite? / What is identical or different? / How could there be permanent or impermanent, / both permanent and impermanent, / neither permanent nor impermanent? / All dharmas are unobtainable; / all prapañca is extinguished; / there is no person and no self; / the Buddha also taught nothing." Explanation: This verse may conclude the section on the undeclared (avyākṛta); it is cited here because the text is continuous. In the commentary's "Fourth, the four propositions of the existence, non-existence, and so forth of the self and sentient beings", regarding the phrase "positing both": this posits both self and dharmas, since sentient beings are the aggregates, and the aggregates are dharmas; hence the commentary directly explains existence and non-existence in terms of the principle of dharmas arising through conditions. However, regarding these four propositions, the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā, the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa, the Abhidharmakośa, and so forth posit two propositions for this position. The Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā and others say that the body and the soul (jīva) being one and being different constitute two propositions; the Abhidharmakośa says that the life-principle and the body being identical and distinct constitute two propositions. The first proposition, saying both exist, means that there is an attachment claiming: wherever there is a body, there is a soul-self; wherever there is a soul-self, there must be a body, because the body and the soul are not separated from each other. Explanation: This is the single proposition of the body and the soul; hence the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa states: "Regarding 'the soul is identical with the body,' some say: the body is identical with the soul. Why? Analyzing this body, in seeking the soul it cannot be found; because what is received, whether coarse or subtle, is all body, therefore it is said that the body is identical with the soul."

Regarding 'the body is distinct and the soul is distinct,' someone says: 'The soul is subtle, not to be attained by the five sense-faculties, nor seen by ordinary persons; only someone who collects their mind in purity and attains dhyāna-concentration is able to see it. Therefore it is said that the body is distinct and the soul is distinct. Furthermore, if the body is itself the soul, then when the body perishes the soul also perishes, which is wrong view. If the body is distinct and the soul is distinct, then when the body perishes the soul is permanent, which is an extreme view.' Explication: The text of the treatise explains only two propositions. Now in the sūtra, the first proposition is the treatise's initial explanation of the single proposition of the body and soul; the second proposition is the treatise's 'furthermore, if the body is itself the soul, then when the body perishes the soul perishes, which is wrong view'; the third proposition is precisely the proposition that the body and soul are distinct—although there is the difference of coarse and subtle, while the body exists both exist, and when the body is absent both are absent, so it forms the proposition of 'both'; the fourth proposition is then again the single proposition of body and soul, where because the body accords with the soul and their essence is subtle, both transcend existence and non-existence. Regarding the commentary's 'However, in these four propositions there are also isolated conceptualizations,' and so forth: this is opposed to the two twofold positings in the earlier sūtra, and is also the meaning of the Dazhidulun concerning extreme views. Its 'the self exists and what belongs to it is absent' is precisely identical to the Dazhidulun's 'the body perishes and the soul is permanent.' Second, as for 'what belongs to it exists and the self is absent,' the body is coarse and can be seen, whereas the self is signless. As for saying 'it also does not depart from the initial two propositions,' 'the self exists and what belongs to it exists' combined forms the first proposition; 'the self is absent and what belongs to it is absent' combined forms the second. Regarding the commentary's 'Moreover, combining the above forms the third,' the first proposition has 'the self also exists' and the second proposition has 'the self also is absent'; the first proposition has 'what belongs to it also exists' and the second proposition has 'what belongs to it also is absent'; therefore, combining them forms the third. Since the four are combined in one place, they mutually negate each other: when 'the self exists' is combined with 'the self is absent,' then the self is non-existent; when 'what belongs to it exists' is combined with 'what belongs to it is absent,' then what belongs to it is non-existent, and so forth. Negating non-existence constitutes the first proposition of 'both existing'; negating existence constitutes the second proposition of 'both being absent.' Hence it says: 'It also does not go beyond the initial two propositions.' Question: If, as in the first, 'the self and sentient beings exist,' this is wrong view because it conceptualizes a self. The next proposition states that 'the self and sentient beings are absent,' which then constitutes the two emptinesses; what fault is there? Therefore, the commentary states that 'definitively absent clings to annihilationism,' because it is a fixed clinging, not absence through dependent origination. One should also refute it by saying: in terms of conceptualizing a real self, this self is non-existent; in terms of the conventional self in accord with worldly convention, this self is not non-existent. Therefore, speaking of both being absent also fails to accord with principle. Regarding the commentary's 'the third gate,' in the vertical elucidation, 'someone answered a question' refers to when the good spiritual friend of Shuinan answered the Duke of Yan, Zhang Yue, who asked: 'Does the Dharma come first, or does the Buddha come first?' He answered: 'The Dharma comes first, because that which all Buddhas take as their teacher is the so-called Dharma.' Then the objection was raised: 'If so, when the very first Buddha attained Buddhahood, there was no prior Buddha to preach; through what did he awaken to the Dharma?' He answered: 'He awakened spontaneously. Just as in the "Yueling" where "the otter then offers sacrifice to Heaven"—could anyone have taught it?' The Duke of Yan was greatly humbled. Regarding the commentary's 'it also responded to the capacity,' it praises his skillful reply. 'Why not add setting it aside as undeclared?' is to accord with the sūtra text. From 'if there is an initial Buddha' onward, it brings out the reason why it falls short of setting it aside as undeclared. Since there is an initial Buddha, the number of Buddhas would be hard to exhaust. The Tathāgata is fully endowed with the cognition of all aspects; directly identifying the initial Buddha, it could then be shown. Therefore, although it was a skillful reply, it did not extinguish the source of the objection. Regarding the commentary's 'What phenomena? All phenomena, defiled and pure': this refers to difficulties such as the temporal precedence of reality and delusion. It was briefly explained in the first assembly, and will be extensively treated in the first bhūmi. In the commentary's 'fourth gate: examining that from which the world derives,' the various wrong views have already been extensively treated in the first fascicle. That the receptacle world and saṃsāra share a common cause is spoken in the 'Chapter on Manifestation.' The third point means that the three calamities destroy only the receptacle world and do not destroy sentient beings. This is because they first cause sentient beings to be born in higher realms, and only then destroy the receptacle world. Regarding 'fourth, the cause of the receptacle world is never permanently severed': for example, when the cause for a defiled kṣetra has ceased, one does not again cultivate defiled causes to bring about a defiled kṣetra. Although the defiled causes of sentient beings are extinguished, the aggregates and consciousness are not extinguished. Regarding 'fifth, the receptacle world is severed and then resumes': this is explained in terms of kṣetras that incur formation and destruction, which form again after destruction. If a sentient being abandons the nature of an ordinary being, they will never again become an ordinary person. However, this seems to contradict the fourth point; but in the fourth, the receptacle world is explained in terms of: when the cause is severed, the fruit is not produced, whereas for sentient beings, when the cause is severed, the fruit is not lost. In the fifth, the receptacle world is explained in terms of: when the fruit is severed, the fruit resumes, whereas for sentient beings, when the deluded cause has been severed, the deluded fruit does not resume. Regarding the commentary's 'it means that if an end is accepted, there must be a beginning,' this is also like in the first bhūmi. Regarding the commentary's 'The Madhyamakaśāstra says: "That which the Great Sage has proclaimed..."' and so forth: this is the verse from the 'Chapter on the Prior Limit.' Herein, the first verse cites teaching to establish principle, revealing that there is neither beginning nor end; the next two lines continue the above in discarding the middle, because there is no beginning or end against which to correspond; the final two lines discard their precedence and succession, having roughly three meanings. That is, someone might ask: 'Regarding the two phenomena of birth and death, does one first have birth and afterwards death? Or does one first have death and afterwards birth? Or are birth and death simultaneous, simultaneity being called coexistence?' For now it rejects them collectively, and the verses below present the reasons for the rejection, stating: 'If birth were to exist first / and aging and death afterwards, / then there would be birth without aging and death, / and birth would not involve aging and death. // If aging and death were to exist first / and birth were to exist afterwards, / then it would be uncaused: / without birth, aging and death would exist.' Explication: The former verse refutes birth first and death afterwards. Birth must depend on death; if birth now exists first, then it does not exist dependent on aging and death, hence it says 'there would be birth without aging and death,' and it would also make birth have no aging and death, because it arose alone first. The latter verse refutes death first and birth afterwards. Birth is the cause of death; if death now comes first, it would be uncaused. Next, refuting simultaneity, the verse says: 'Birth and aging and death / cannot coexist simultaneously; / if at the time of birth there is death, / then both of these would be uncaused.' Explication: This is because birth does not depend on death, and death does not depend on birth. Afterwards, concluding with the emptiness of phenomena, it says: 'If beginning, end, and coexistence / are all not so, / why engage in prapañca, / saying that birth, aging, and death exist?' Regarding the commentary's 'Since it says "prior limit"' onward, the commentary explains the treatise precisely to refute the wrong view that posits a beginning and an end. Regarding the commentary's 'There is also a verse': this follows the verses refuting having an end, and so forth, in the 'Chapter on Wrong Views,' which were already cited earlier. From the commentary's 'The above various wrong views' onward, it summarizes the meaning above. As for 'The bodhisattva is skilled in knowing questions and answers,' this is endowed with four kinds of answers: first, precisely setting aside as undeclared; second, as when stating that saṃsāra has no beginning and no end, which is a categorical answer; third, as when stating that sentient beings and the receptacle world have five kinds of differences, which is an analytical answer; fourth, if someone asks: 'Based on what phenomenon does the World-Honoured One speak of a self, and based on what phenomenon does he speak of sentient beings?' one should answer: 'Based on conventional designation, he speaks of a self; based on causes and conditions, he speaks of sentient beings'—this is called an answer according to the question. If one links this with the previous seven to discern extensive learning, the questions and answers will be obvious.

The rest can be inferred by analogy.