大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔 45.21.1

45.21.1

疏「文分五段」下，二辨相也。 便有釋文就常等破，皆《中論》意。 疏文分五別，即第二辯相，便為釋文。 疏「今初段中句雖十六」下，釋此第一就我明無記。 中二：先辯見所依、後正釋文。 今初有三：一明不離斷常。 二「言世間」下，明世間同異，明見依我起。 疏「準大品中通三世間」者，即上二十一經，而三世間是《智論》釋。 論云「世間有三種」等，餘如疏辯。 三「初有邊四句」下，釋。 此我不同，不出三世，涅槃為起見處，就引《中論．邪見品》。 「我於過去世」等者，偈首之我即今世我。 意問：今世之我於過去世，為先已有？ 為先未有？ 若先已有即是計常，若先是無今此新起即是無常。 三則雙立，四則雙非邊等諸義，次下當釋。 《中論．涅槃品》偈云「滅後有無等，無邊等常等，諸見依涅槃，未來過去世。 」釋曰：此即總示所依。 依前別配，可知。 疏「第一四句」等，然論先明常等，後說邊等廣破常等、例破邊等。 今順經次，先明邊等。 文中有三：初辯四句之相、二明不答之意、三破其所見。 今初，即前偈中「我於未來世，為作為無作。 」初以無作為有邊，而是斷見外道，亦先偈首之我是今世我。 四句之相，疏文自明。 二「既皆邪見」下，明無記義，即出不答所以也。 三「若欲破者，初之二句皆墮無後世過」者，合破二句。 論云「若世間有邊，云何有後世？ 若世間無邊，云何有後世？ 」釋曰：有邊則後無續，故無後世； 無邊則常相續，亦無後世。 有邊則斷，無邊則常。 疏「無後世者」下，出無後世過，亦即斷常過也。 論又云「五陰常相續，猶如燈火焰。 以是故世間，不應邊無邊」等。 前出過破，定有定無故墮斷常。 今立理破，如焰從緣，不可為無； 無定實故，不可為有。 故離二邊。 又前破人我，此破法我。 今經正破人我，故不引破法。 又論反破云「若先五蘊壞，不因是五陰，更生後五陰，世間則有邊。 若先陰不壞，亦不因是陰，而生後五陰，世間則無邊。 」釋曰：此亦正破五陰世間。 五陰和合為眾生世間，既破五陰即破眾生，眾生即假我故。 上云外道依之計我，今破五陰亦已破我。 又上二偈亦別破二句，亦兼明第三俱句。 疏「第三句」等者，然論廣破常等，後例破邊等。 故論云「我於未來世，為作為不作？ 如是之見者，皆同過去世。 」然破邊等無有，身一異破。 身一異破，即前破常等之中。 今依論例破，故取前勢。 若論破第三句云：若世半有邊半無邊，是則亦有邊亦無邊。 不然。 彼受五陰者，云何一分破，一分而不破？ 是事則不然。 受亦復如是，云何一分破，一分而不破？ 釋曰：前偈破眾生即是遣我，後偈破受陰即是破法。 然俱是相違破，無有一法亦常亦無常故。 此相難見，故疏取前破常等例。 前破常偈云「若謂我即是，而身有異相。 當知離於身，何處別有我？ 離身無有我，是事為已成。 若謂身即我、若都無有我，但身不有我，身相生滅故。 」釋曰：此則破常等以一異門，今將例破邊等四句也。 疏若「謂捨人生天」下，遮救，即論正破邊等之意。 然偈云「若天即是人，則墮於常邊。 天則為無生，常法不生故。 若天異人者，是即為無常。 若天異人者，是則無相續。 」釋曰：前偈破常即破無邊，後偈破斷即破有邊。 次偈云「若半天半人，則墮於二邊。 常及於無常，是事則不然。 」今疏即影公取偈之意。 「捨人生天，人分猶在天分更增」等，上即縱立則半天，下正破。 結言略明，故皆不然。 不然之由，即如偈文「亦常亦無常，二相違故」，猶如水火，義無並立。 疏「第四句」下，論但躡前破云「若有邊無邊，是二亦應成。 」釋曰：此即縱破。 亦相待破，有第三句可待對。 此有第四非有邊無邊句，以有無相待故。 今無第三之源，何有第四之末？

Regarding the commentary's: "The text is divided into five sections", next is the second [section], which differentiates their characteristics. Thereupon there is an explanation of the text that refutes them in terms of permanence and so forth, all reflecting the intent of the Madhyamakaśāstra. The text of the commentary is divided into five parts, which constitutes the second [section], differentiating their characteristics, and thereupon serves as the explanation of the text.
Regarding the commentary's: "Now in this first section, although there are sixteen propositions", below, it explains this first [part], elucidating the unrecorded (avyākrta) in terms of the self. Within this there are two [parts]: first, distinguishing that upon which the views depend; second, properly explaining the text. Now, the first has three [points]: 1. Explaining that they do not deviate from annihilationism and eternalism. 2. From "Speaking of the 'world'" onward, explaining the identity and difference of the world, making clear that views arise in dependence on a self. Regarding the commentary's: "According to the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā, this applies across the three worlds", this refers to fascicle 21 above, where the "three worlds" are explained in the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa. The treatise states: "There are three kinds of worlds", etc.; the rest is as differentiated in the commentary. 3. From "The four propositions of having an end, etc." onward, it explains. This self differs, yet does not go beyond the three times; nirvāṇa is the basis upon which views arise, citing the "Chapter on Heterodox Views" of the Madhyamakaśāstra. As for "Did I in past times", etc., the "I" at the beginning of the verse is the self of this present lifetime. The intent asks: With regard to the self of this present lifetime in past times, did it already exist beforehand? Or did it not exist beforehand? If it already existed beforehand, that is grasping at permanence; if it was non-existent beforehand and has only newly arisen now, that is impermanence. The third affirms both, and the fourth negates both. The various meanings of having an end, etc., will be explained next below. A verse in the "Chapter on Nirvāṇa" of the Madhyamakaśāstra states: "Views of existence and non-existence after cessation, of having no end and the like, and of permanence and the like, depend on nirvāṇa, the future, and the past." Explanation: This directly indicates their basis in general. Based on the previous specific assignments, this can be known.
Regarding the commentary's: "The first four propositions", etc., the treatise first elucidates permanence and the like, and then speaks of having an end and the like, extensively refuting permanence, etc., and by analogy refuting having an end, etc. Here, following the order of the sūtra, it first elucidates having an end and the like. Within the text there are three [points]: first, discerning the characteristics of the four propositions; second, explaining the intent of not answering; third, refuting what is viewed. Now, the first corresponds to the earlier verse's: "In future lifetimes, will I be made or not be made?" Taking non-making at first as "having an end" represents an annihilationist non-Buddhist; here also the "I" at the beginning of the earlier verse is the self of this present lifetime. The characteristics of the four propositions are clearly set forth in the commentary itself.
Second, from "Since they are all heterodox views" onward, it explains the meaning of "unrecorded" (avyākrta), which reveals the reason for not answering.
Third, as for "If one wishes to refute them, the first two propositions both fall into the fault of having no future life", this refutes the two propositions together. The treatise states: "If the world has an end, how could there be a future life? If the world has no end, how could there be a future life?" Explanation: If it has an end, then later there is no continuity, and therefore no future life; if it has no end, then it is perpetually continuous, and likewise has no future life. Having an end is annihilation, while having no end is permanence. Regarding the commentary's: "'Having no future life'", below, it brings out the fault of having no future life, which is also the fault of annihilationism and eternalism. The treatise also states: "The five aggregates are perpetually continuous, just like the flame of a lamp. For this reason, the world should not be said to have an end or have no end", etc. The previous refutation brought out the faults, falling into annihilationism or eternalism because of positing definitive existence or definitive non-existence. Now it establishes a rational refutation: just as a flame depends on conditions, it cannot be considered non-existent; because it lacks a definitive reality, it cannot be considered existent. Therefore, it is free from the two extremes. Furthermore, previously it refuted the personal self (pudgalātman), whereas here it refutes the phenomenal self (dharmātman). The present sūtra primarily refutes the personal self, which is why it does not cite the refutation of phenomena. Furthermore, the treatise refutes in reverse, saying: "If the earlier five aggregates perish, and without depending on these five aggregates, later five aggregates are produced anew, then the world has an end. If the earlier aggregates do not perish, and neither depending on these aggregates are later five aggregates produced, then the world has no end." Explanation: This also directly refutes the world of the five aggregates. The combination of the five aggregates constitutes the world of sentient beings; since the five aggregates are refuted, sentient beings are refuted, because a sentient being is merely a provisional self. Above it was said that non-Buddhists rely on them to grasp at a self; now, refuting the five aggregates also refutes the self. Furthermore, the two verses above also separately refute the two propositions, and concurrently elucidate the third proposition of both.
Regarding the commentary's: "The third proposition", etc., the treatise extensively refutes permanence and so forth, and afterwards by analogy refutes having an end and so forth. Hence the treatise states: "In future lifetimes, will I be made or not made? Views such as these are all identical to those concerning the past." Yet in refuting having an end and the like, there is no refutation based on the body being identical to or different [from the self]. The refutation based on the body being identical or different occurred earlier in the refutation of permanence, etc. Now, following the treatise's analogical refutation, it takes up the thrust of the earlier [argument]. As for the treatise's refutation of the third proposition, it states: "If the world is half with an end and half without an end, then it both has an end and has no end. This is not so. For the one who receives the five aggregates, how could one part perish and one part not perish? That is impossible. The received [aggregates] are also like this: how could one part perish and one part not perish?" Explanation: The former verse refutes sentient beings, which is dispensing with the self; the latter verse refutes the aggregate of appropriation, which is refuting phenomena. Both, however, are refutations based on mutual contradiction, because there is no single phenomenon that is both permanent and impermanent. This characteristic is difficult to perceive, which is why the commentary takes the precedent of the earlier refutation of permanence and the like. The earlier verse refuting permanence states: "If one claims that the self exists, yet the body has distinct characteristics, one should know that apart from the body, where else could there be a distinct self? That there is no self apart from the body is already established. If one claims the body is the self, or if there is no self at all, the body merely does not possess a self, because the characteristics of the body are subject to arising and ceasing." Explanation: This refutes permanence and the like through the approaches of identity and difference; now this is applied by analogy to refute the four propositions of having an end and the like.
Regarding the commentary's: "If one claims that shedding human form to be born in heaven", below, it wards off an objection, which represents the intent of the treatise's proper refutation of having an end and the like. The verse states: "If a deva is identical to a human, one falls into the extreme of permanence. The deva would then be unproduced, because permanent phenomena are not produced. If a deva is different from a human, then it is impermanent. If a deva is different from a human, then there is no continuity." Explanation: The former verse, by refuting permanence, refutes having no end; the latter verse, by refuting annihilation, refutes having an end. The next verse states: "If it is half-deva and half-human, one falls into both extremes. Being both permanent and impermanent—such a thing is impossible." Now the commentary reflects Master [Hui]yuan's adoption of the verse's meaning: "shedding human form to be born in heaven, the human part still remaining while the deva part further increases", etc. The above is conceding the premise that it is half-deva, while the below properly refutes it. The concluding statement briefly clarifies that all are impossible. The reason it is impossible is just as stated in the verse: "both permanent and impermanent, because the two characteristics contradict each other", just like fire and water, which logically cannot coexist.
Regarding the commentary's: "The fourth proposition", below, the treatise merely takes up what precedes and refutes it, saying: "If having an end and having no end were established, then these two would also be established." Explanation: This is a concessive refutation. It is also a relative refutation: if there were a third proposition to stand in opposition, then there would be this fourth proposition of neither having an end nor having no end, because existence and non-existence are mutually dependent. Now that the root of the third is absent, how could the branch of the fourth exist?