大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔 45.21.3

45.21.3

身異神異者，有人言：神微細，五情所不得，亦非凡夫人所見； 攝心清淨得禪定人乃能得見。 是故言身異神異。 復次若身即是神，身滅神亦滅，是邪見。 身異神異，身滅神常，是邊見。 」釋曰：論文但釋二句，今經中初句是論初釋身神一句； 第二句是論復次身即是神，身滅神滅是邪見； 第三句正是身神異句，雖麁妙之異身在俱有、身無俱無，為俱句也； 第四即復是身神一句，以身隨神，體皆妙故俱離有無。 疏「然此四句亦有單計」等者，此對前經中二雙立故，亦是《智論》約邊見意。 其「我有所無」，正同《智論》身滅神常。 二「所有我無」者，身麁可見，我無相故。 言「亦不離初之二句」者，我有所有合是初句，我無所無合為第二。 疏「又合上為第三」者，初句我亦有，第二句我亦無，初句所亦有，第二句所亦無，故合為第三。 四既合一處故互相奪。 如我有合我無，則我非有； 所有合所無，則所非有等。 遮無，即為第一俱有句； 遮有，即為第二俱無句，故云亦不出初之二句。 問：如初我及眾生有，即是邪見，以計我故。 次句云我及眾生無，則是二空，有何過耶？ 故疏中云定無著斷，以執定故，非緣生無。 亦應破云：約計實我，此我非有； 隨世假我，此我非無。 故說俱無，亦非當理。 疏「第三門」竪明中，言「有人答問」者，即水南善知識答燕國公張說問云：法在前？ 佛在前？ 答云：法在前，諸佛所師，所謂法故。 便被難云：若爾，最初成佛，前無佛說，何由悟法？ 答云：自然而悟。 如〈月令〉中「獺乃祭天」，豈有人教？ 燕公大伏。 疏「亦為應機」者，歎其善對。 「寧加置記」者，為順經文。 從「若有初佛」下，出不及置記所以。 既有初佛，佛數難窮。 如來具足一切種智，直舉初佛則可示矣。 故雖善對，未息難源。 疏「何法者？ 染淨一切法」者，即如真妄前後之難也。 初會略明，初地當廣。 疏「第四門徵世間所從」中，其諸邪見，初卷已廣。 器界生死共因者，〈出現品〉說。 三謂三災但壞器界，不壞有情。 先令有情生上界竟，方壞器界故。 「四器界因無永斷」者，如染剎之因已亡，不復更修染因招染剎也。 有情染因雖滅，陰識不滅。 五「器界斷而復續」者，約招成壞之剎，壞後更成。 有情若捨異生之性，終不更為凡夫矣。 然此與四似當相違，而四則器界約因斷果不生，有情因斷果不失。 五器界約果斷果更續，有情約妄因已斷妄果不續。 疏「謂若許有終必有始故」，亦如初地。 疏「中論云：大聖之所說」等，即〈本際品〉偈，此中初偈引教立理，顯無始終； 次二句仍上遣中，以無始終可待對故； 後兩句遣其先後，略有三義。 謂應有問言：生死二法為先生後死？ 為先死後生？ 為生死一時，一時名共？ 今且總非，下有偈出非所以，云「若使先有生，後有老死者，不老死有生，生不有老死。 若先有老死，而後有生者，是則為無因，不生有老死。 」釋曰：前偈破先生後死。 生必因死，今先有生，則不因老死而有，故云不老死有生，則亦令生無有老死，先獨生故。 後偈破先死後生。 生是死因，今死在前，則為無因矣。 次破一時，偈云「生及於老死，不得一時共，生時即有死，是二俱無因。 」釋曰：以生不因死、死不因生故。 後結法空云「若使初後共，是皆不然者，何故而戲論，謂有生老死。 」疏「既言本際」下疏釋論，正為證有始終之邪見故。 疏「又有偈云」，此即〈邪見品〉破有邊等偈後，前已引竟。 疏「上諸邪見」下，總結上意。 言「菩薩善知問答」者，具四種答：一正是置答； 二如說生死無有始終，是一向答，三如云眾生器界五種不同，是分別答； 四若有問云：世尊約何法說我、何法說眾生？ 應答言：約假名說我，約因緣說眾生，是名隨問答。 若通前七以辨多聞，問答居然可知。

Regarding 'the body is distinct and the soul is distinct,' someone says: 'The soul is subtle, not to be attained by the five sense-faculties, nor seen by ordinary persons; only someone who collects their mind in purity and attains dhyāna-concentration is able to see it. Therefore it is said that the body is distinct and the soul is distinct. Furthermore, if the body is itself the soul, then when the body perishes the soul also perishes, which is wrong view. If the body is distinct and the soul is distinct, then when the body perishes the soul is permanent, which is an extreme view.' Explication: The text of the treatise explains only two propositions. Now in the sūtra, the first proposition is the treatise's initial explanation of the single proposition of the body and soul; the second proposition is the treatise's 'furthermore, if the body is itself the soul, then when the body perishes the soul perishes, which is wrong view'; the third proposition is precisely the proposition that the body and soul are distinct—although there is the difference of coarse and subtle, while the body exists both exist, and when the body is absent both are absent, so it forms the proposition of 'both'; the fourth proposition is then again the single proposition of body and soul, where because the body accords with the soul and their essence is subtle, both transcend existence and non-existence. Regarding the commentary's 'However, in these four propositions there are also isolated conceptualizations,' and so forth: this is opposed to the two twofold positings in the earlier sūtra, and is also the meaning of the Dazhidulun concerning extreme views. Its 'the self exists and what belongs to it is absent' is precisely identical to the Dazhidulun's 'the body perishes and the soul is permanent.' Second, as for 'what belongs to it exists and the self is absent,' the body is coarse and can be seen, whereas the self is signless. As for saying 'it also does not depart from the initial two propositions,' 'the self exists and what belongs to it exists' combined forms the first proposition; 'the self is absent and what belongs to it is absent' combined forms the second. Regarding the commentary's 'Moreover, combining the above forms the third,' the first proposition has 'the self also exists' and the second proposition has 'the self also is absent'; the first proposition has 'what belongs to it also exists' and the second proposition has 'what belongs to it also is absent'; therefore, combining them forms the third. Since the four are combined in one place, they mutually negate each other: when 'the self exists' is combined with 'the self is absent,' then the self is non-existent; when 'what belongs to it exists' is combined with 'what belongs to it is absent,' then what belongs to it is non-existent, and so forth. Negating non-existence constitutes the first proposition of 'both existing'; negating existence constitutes the second proposition of 'both being absent.' Hence it says: 'It also does not go beyond the initial two propositions.' Question: If, as in the first, 'the self and sentient beings exist,' this is wrong view because it conceptualizes a self. The next proposition states that 'the self and sentient beings are absent,' which then constitutes the two emptinesses; what fault is there? Therefore, the commentary states that 'definitively absent clings to annihilationism,' because it is a fixed clinging, not absence through dependent origination. One should also refute it by saying: in terms of conceptualizing a real self, this self is non-existent; in terms of the conventional self in accord with worldly convention, this self is not non-existent. Therefore, speaking of both being absent also fails to accord with principle. Regarding the commentary's 'the third gate,' in the vertical elucidation, 'someone answered a question' refers to when the good spiritual friend of Shuinan answered the Duke of Yan, Zhang Yue, who asked: 'Does the Dharma come first, or does the Buddha come first?' He answered: 'The Dharma comes first, because that which all Buddhas take as their teacher is the so-called Dharma.' Then the objection was raised: 'If so, when the very first Buddha attained Buddhahood, there was no prior Buddha to preach; through what did he awaken to the Dharma?' He answered: 'He awakened spontaneously. Just as in the "Yueling" where "the otter then offers sacrifice to Heaven"—could anyone have taught it?' The Duke of Yan was greatly humbled. Regarding the commentary's 'it also responded to the capacity,' it praises his skillful reply. 'Why not add setting it aside as undeclared?' is to accord with the sūtra text. From 'if there is an initial Buddha' onward, it brings out the reason why it falls short of setting it aside as undeclared. Since there is an initial Buddha, the number of Buddhas would be hard to exhaust. The Tathāgata is fully endowed with the cognition of all aspects; directly identifying the initial Buddha, it could then be shown. Therefore, although it was a skillful reply, it did not extinguish the source of the objection. Regarding the commentary's 'What phenomena? All phenomena, defiled and pure': this refers to difficulties such as the temporal precedence of reality and delusion. It was briefly explained in the first assembly, and will be extensively treated in the first bhūmi. In the commentary's 'fourth gate: examining that from which the world derives,' the various wrong views have already been extensively treated in the first fascicle. That the receptacle world and saṃsāra share a common cause is spoken in the 'Chapter on Manifestation.' The third point means that the three calamities destroy only the receptacle world and do not destroy sentient beings. This is because they first cause sentient beings to be born in higher realms, and only then destroy the receptacle world. Regarding 'fourth, the cause of the receptacle world is never permanently severed': for example, when the cause for a defiled kṣetra has ceased, one does not again cultivate defiled causes to bring about a defiled kṣetra. Although the defiled causes of sentient beings are extinguished, the aggregates and consciousness are not extinguished. Regarding 'fifth, the receptacle world is severed and then resumes': this is explained in terms of kṣetras that incur formation and destruction, which form again after destruction. If a sentient being abandons the nature of an ordinary being, they will never again become an ordinary person. However, this seems to contradict the fourth point; but in the fourth, the receptacle world is explained in terms of: when the cause is severed, the fruit is not produced, whereas for sentient beings, when the cause is severed, the fruit is not lost. In the fifth, the receptacle world is explained in terms of: when the fruit is severed, the fruit resumes, whereas for sentient beings, when the deluded cause has been severed, the deluded fruit does not resume. Regarding the commentary's 'it means that if an end is accepted, there must be a beginning,' this is also like in the first bhūmi. Regarding the commentary's 'The Madhyamakaśāstra says: "That which the Great Sage has proclaimed..."' and so forth: this is the verse from the 'Chapter on the Prior Limit.' Herein, the first verse cites teaching to establish principle, revealing that there is neither beginning nor end; the next two lines continue the above in discarding the middle, because there is no beginning or end against which to correspond; the final two lines discard their precedence and succession, having roughly three meanings. That is, someone might ask: 'Regarding the two phenomena of birth and death, does one first have birth and afterwards death? Or does one first have death and afterwards birth? Or are birth and death simultaneous, simultaneity being called coexistence?' For now it rejects them collectively, and the verses below present the reasons for the rejection, stating: 'If birth were to exist first / and aging and death afterwards, / then there would be birth without aging and death, / and birth would not involve aging and death. // If aging and death were to exist first / and birth were to exist afterwards, / then it would be uncaused: / without birth, aging and death would exist.' Explication: The former verse refutes birth first and death afterwards. Birth must depend on death; if birth now exists first, then it does not exist dependent on aging and death, hence it says 'there would be birth without aging and death,' and it would also make birth have no aging and death, because it arose alone first. The latter verse refutes death first and birth afterwards. Birth is the cause of death; if death now comes first, it would be uncaused. Next, refuting simultaneity, the verse says: 'Birth and aging and death / cannot coexist simultaneously; / if at the time of birth there is death, / then both of these would be uncaused.' Explication: This is because birth does not depend on death, and death does not depend on birth. Afterwards, concluding with the emptiness of phenomena, it says: 'If beginning, end, and coexistence / are all not so, / why engage in prapañca, / saying that birth, aging, and death exist?' Regarding the commentary's 'Since it says "prior limit"' onward, the commentary explains the treatise precisely to refute the wrong view that posits a beginning and an end. Regarding the commentary's 'There is also a verse': this follows the verses refuting having an end, and so forth, in the 'Chapter on Wrong Views,' which were already cited earlier. From the commentary's 'The above various wrong views' onward, it summarizes the meaning above. As for 'The bodhisattva is skilled in knowing questions and answers,' this is endowed with four kinds of answers: first, precisely setting aside as undeclared; second, as when stating that saṃsāra has no beginning and no end, which is a categorical answer; third, as when stating that sentient beings and the receptacle world have five kinds of differences, which is an analytical answer; fourth, if someone asks: 'Based on what phenomenon does the World-Honoured One speak of a self, and based on what phenomenon does he speak of sentient beings?' one should answer: 'Based on conventional designation, he speaks of a self; based on causes and conditions, he speaks of sentient beings'—this is called an answer according to the question. If one links this with the previous seven to discern extensive learning, the questions and answers will be obvious.