大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔 48.3

48.3

疏「此為入空之方便」者，真空非得而無不得故。疏「欲顯隨相離相無前後故」者，釋上，正用前意也。欲將離相無得導前隨相之有故。言「義兼於後」者，前意是結前；此意是生後，亦不住於離相故。疏「準大般若」下，例釋無得為方便。如清淨歷一切法，則以清淨為方便也。若云無生，即云行般若波羅蜜時知一切法無生，所謂色無生、受想行識無生，眼無生、耳鼻舌身意無生等。今此猶是略舉能入方便，廣更有多，故復有等言，等取無依無作、清淨、不增不減、不垢不淨、不可取不可見、不可動不可壞等。疏「謂事法既虛」下，分二：初總釋、次「業空故」下別釋。此有二意：一正以緣生即空破權小見，顯業不能為因招果，果亦不能為果酬因。二兼破外道因中有果等。彼計因中有果者，如乳是酪因，乳中有酪，成酪之後亦有於乳，故曰果中有因。疏「若約觀心」者，上約法理通境及智，今約觀心。但一是非有即名為寂，亦無心於事理方稱為寂。不失於照故名為用，不取用相即用常寂。疏「此與初句但事理之異」者，初句約理，無入而入。今約事上，無入能入，以諸法即事而能深入，故云「即事入玄」。疏「大般若云」下，引此文者，揀義不同。謂般若意，却是即用而寂。同上須彌山頂偈云「無見即是見，能見一切法。於法若有見，是則無所見。」此偈則先正後反，《大般若》則先反後正。今此中意，明理不礙事，故意別也。疏「末句不有能所見」者，以文言不有於法，法通能所見也。何以得知法是能所見？以下句云「悉知見故」，即同金剛如來悉知悉見。疏「待對假言故皆不可得」者，出絕事理之意。一相待門，謂待事說理、待理說事。如因長有短，短不可得等。二云假言者，諸法寂滅，本絕名言。今云事理皆假名耳，故皆雙絕。上是疏家釋成，下句經自釋成。疏「良以事虛」下，出事理無礙之相。是總意，亦十門中相即門，是三義中無礙義也，廣如上說。疏「上四句」下，總融前四。言「有未曾損」者，法即是空，非法滅空故。「有未始存」者，即空之有，有相虛故。言「無隱無顯」者，事存則空隱，理存則空顯，今由兩亡故非隱顯。言「存沒同時」者，空不礙有故存，有不礙空故沒。然隱顯皆就理明，存沒並約事說，亦影略耳。疏「四句鎔融」下，總結。此則非唯離前隨相，亦離離相，真無礙也，真實際也。疏「因緣故有」者，然通相說，總有四義：一緣生故有、二無性故空、三緣生故空、四無性故有。今但取因緣二句，謂法從緣生，安得言無？二從緣無性，故名為空。上二即空有二門。從因緣故不有者，即明中道亦從因緣。謂既緣有，有即不有；既從緣空，空即不空。合前二句，即亦空亦有。四門之理皆從因緣。後「因緣故流轉」下，辨生死涅槃亦皆因緣。「乃至一切」下，結。例上所明義，略舉綱要耳。疏「故中論云」下，引證皆從因緣。然論此偈前有一偈云「因緣所生法，我說即是空，亦為是假名，亦是中道義。未曾有一法，不從因緣生，是故一切法，無不是空者。」前偈亦得證前四句成三觀義，而後偈釋於前偈，故但引之。而論略結云「是故一切法無不是空者」，亦合云「未曾有一法不從因緣生」，是故一切法無不是假者，又是故一切法無不是中者，今此但取一切法從緣之義耳。疏「有為緣生」下，通妨。妨云：《涅槃》云「我觀諸行悉皆無常。云何知耶？以因緣故。若一切法從緣生者則知無常，是諸外道無有一法不從緣生，是故無常。虛空如來佛性不從緣生，是故名常，則無為非因緣。」何言為無為法皆從因緣？故今答云：從緣有二，一從緣生，有無常義；二約緣顯，何得非緣？故說佛性了因所了，豈非因緣生？此是一義。次云「因有有為」下，相待門釋，待於有為即從緣義。復云「又形奪相盡」者，要待形奪相盡，故真無為亦是從緣。疏「論云若見因緣法則為能見佛」者，上偈及此皆〈四諦品〉。下句云「見苦集滅道」，亦可證第二句。疏「尚無有二何況有五」者，結彈五性。疏「以業攝報」等者，以經但云業境，今業攝報故有因果，境必對心故有內外。疏「六即事顯理而不壞事」者，有為事也，無為理也。事能顯理，故云於有為界示無為法。事即是理故不壞事，若壞於事成斷滅故。下句反此，可知。疏「若滅壞有為」下，反成上二。「是以若約相即」下，結成正義。於中略有數門：一相即門。二「若約無礙」下，即相成門。又云「而非理而非事」，即不相是門。即是事理無礙十門中六門，謂真理即事門、事法即理門、依理成事門、事能顯理門、真理非事門、事法非理門。又前有形奪相盡，即真理奪事門、事能隱理門。通辨無礙，即事遍於理、理遍於事也。八門非異、不相是二門非一，故疏結云「為與無為體非一異」也。疏「示謂顯示」下，隨難別釋。

Regarding the Commentary's stating, "This is an upāya for entering emptiness": this is because true emptiness is unobtained, yet nothing is not obtained. Regarding the Commentary's stating, "In order to show that conforming to characteristics and parting from characteristics have no prior or posterior": in explaining the above, it properly uses the preceding meaning. This is because it intends to employ the parting from characteristics and non-attainment to guide the preceding existence of conforming to characteristics. Regarding the statement, "The meaning also covers what follows": the preceding meaning concludes what came before; this meaning generates what follows, because one also does not abide in parting from characteristics. Regarding the Commentary's stating from "Based on the *Mahāprajñāpāramitā*" onwards: this illustrates by parallel example that non-attainment serves as an upāya. Just as purity runs through all dharmas, so purity is taken as an upāya. If one speaks of non-arising, one then says that when practicing the prajñāpāramitā, one knows that all dharmas are unarisen—namely, that form is unarisen, sensation, conception, volition, and consciousness are unarisen, the eye is unarisen, and the ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind are unarisen, and so forth. Here, this is still merely a brief mention of the upāyas that enable entry; extensively, there are many more. Therefore, the text adds the word "and so forth," which collectively encompasses being without reliance, without activity, purity, neither increasing nor decreasing, neither defiled nor pure, ungraspable, invisible, immovable, indestructible, and so on. Regarding the Commentary's stating from "Because phenomenal dharmas are already insubstantial" onwards: this is divided into two parts: first, a general explanation; next, the specific explanation from "Because karma is empty" onwards. Here there are two intentions: first, properly using the principle that conditioned arising is empty to refute provisional and Hinayāna views, revealing that karma cannot act as a cause to bring about a fruit, nor can a fruit act as a fruit to requite a cause. Second, it concurrently refutes the heterodox views that the fruit is present within the cause, and so forth. Those who assert that the fruit is present within the cause claim, for instance, that milk is the cause of curd, that curd is present within milk, and that after curd is formed, milk is also present within it; hence they say that the cause is present within the fruit. Regarding the Commentary's stating, "If understood in terms of the contemplating mind": above, it was explained in terms of the principle of dharmas, spanning both object and cognition; here, it is explained in terms of the contemplating mind. Whenever either [affirmation or negation] is not existent, it is called quiescence; furthermore, when the mind does not dwell on phenomena or principle, only then is it called quiescence. Not losing illumination is called function; not grasping at the characteristic of function means that function is constantly quiescent. Regarding the Commentary's stating, "This differs from the initial line only in terms of phenomenon and principle": the initial line is in terms of principle—entering without entering. Here, it is in terms of phenomena—being able to enter without entering. Because all dharmas are deep-seated precisely as phenomena, it states: "entering the profound right through phenomena." Regarding the Commentary's citing the text from "The *Mahāprajñāpāramitā* states" onwards: this passage is cited to distinguish differing nuances of meaning. That is, the intention of the *Prajñāpāramitā* is rather that quiescence occurs precisely through function. This is the same as the verse atop Mount Sumeru cited earlier: "Non-seeing is precisely seeing, / able to see all dharmas. / If one has seeing regarding dharmas, / that is seeing nothing at all." This verse first presents the positive and then the counter-position, whereas the *Mahāprajñāpāramitā* first presents the counter-position and then the positive. The intention here is to clarify that principle does not obstruct phenomena; hence the intention is distinct. Regarding the Commentary's stating, "The final line does not assert an agent or object of seeing": because the text says "not having dharmas," and "dharmas" encompasses both the agent and the object of seeing. How is it known that dharmas are both the agent and object of seeing? Because the lower line says "completely knowing and seeing," which is identical to the Vajra[cchedikā]'s statement that the Tathāgata completely knows and completely sees. Regarding the Commentary's stating, "Being provisional designations based on mutual dependence, they are both unattainable": this brings out the meaning of transcending phenomena and principle. First is the gate of mutual dependence: that is, principle is spoken of in dependence on phenomena, and phenomena are spoken of in dependence on principle. Just as short exists in dependence on long, short is unattainable, and so forth. Second, regarding "provisional designations": all dharmas are quiescent and extinguished, fundamentally transcending name and speech. Here it is said that phenomena and principle are merely provisional designations, and thus both are mutually transcended. The above is the commentator's analytical exposition; the lower line is the sūtra's own analytical exposition. Regarding the Commentary's stating from "Truly, because phenomena are insubstantial" onwards: this brings out the characteristic of the non-obstruction of phenomena and principle. This is the general intention, and also the gate of mutual identity among the ten gates, and the meaning of non-obstruction among the three meanings, extensively discussed as above. Regarding the Commentary's stating from "The above four lines" onwards: this generally harmonizes the preceding four. The statement "existence has never been diminished" means that dharmas are precisely emptiness, not that emptiness results from the destruction of dharmas. "Existence has never persisted" means that it is the existence of emptiness itself, for the characteristics of existence are insubstantial. The statement "neither hidden nor manifest" means that when phenomena persist, emptiness is hidden, and when principle persists, emptiness is manifest; now, because both have ceased, it is neither hidden nor manifest. The statement "persistence and vanishing are simultaneous" means that because emptiness does not obstruct existence, there is persistence; because existence does not obstruct emptiness, there is vanishing. However, hidden and manifest are both explained in terms of principle, while persistence and vanishing are both stated in terms of phenomena; this is also a complementary and abridged phrasing. Regarding the Commentary's concluding from "The four lines are fused" onwards: this not only departs from the preceding conformity to characteristics, but also departs from departing from characteristics; this is true non-obstruction, true bhūtakoṭi. Regarding the Commentary's stating, "Existing due to causes and conditions": generally speaking, there are four meanings in all: 1. existing due to conditioned arising; 2. being empty due to having no intrinsic nature; 3. being empty due to conditioned arising; 4. existing due to having no intrinsic nature. Here, it merely takes the two lines on causes and conditions: that is, when dharmas arise from conditions, how could one call them nonexistent? Second, from conditions they lack intrinsic nature, and are therefore called empty. The above two are the two gates of emptiness and existence. To state that from causes and conditions they are not existent clarifies that the Middle Way also derives from causes and conditions. That is, since they exist conditionally, existence is precisely non-existence; since they are empty from conditions, emptiness is precisely non-emptiness. Combining the preceding two lines yields being both empty and existent. The principles of the four gates all derive from causes and conditions. Further, from "Due to causes and conditions there is transmigration" onwards, it distinguishes that saṃsāra and nirvāṇa are also both due to causes and conditions. From "Up to and including everything" onwards, it concludes. This parallels the meanings clarified above, merely giving an outline. Regarding the Commentary's stating from "Therefore the *Madhyamakaśāstra* says" onwards: this cites scriptural proof that all derive from causes and conditions. However, preceding this verse in the treatise is a verse stating: "Whatever dharma is produced from causes and conditions, / that I declare to be emptiness; / it is also a provisional designation, / and also the meaning of the Middle Way. / There has never been a single dharma / that does not arise from causes and conditions; / therefore, among all dharmas, / there are none that are not empty." The preceding verse could also verify that the preceding four lines establish the meaning of the three contemplations, but the subsequent verse explains the preceding verse, so it is solely cited. And the treatise summarily concludes, "Therefore among all dharmas, there are none that are not empty"; it could likewise say, "There has never been a single dharma that does not arise from causes and conditions; therefore among all dharmas, there are none that are not provisional," and also, "Therefore among all dharmas, there are none that are not the Middle." Here, it merely takes the meaning that all dharmas derive from conditions. Regarding the Commentary's dealing with an objection from "Conditioned dharmas are conditionally arisen" onwards: the objection asks: "The *Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra* states, 'I contemplate all conditioned factors as being entirely impermanent. How is this known? Because of causes and conditions. If all dharmas arise from conditions, one knows they are impermanent; among all heterodox teachings, there is not a single dharma that does not arise from conditions, and therefore they are impermanent. Space, the Tathāgata, and the Buddha-nature do not arise from conditions, and are therefore called permanent; thus the unconditioned is not due to causes and conditions.' Why then say that conditioned and unconditioned dharmas both derive from causes and conditions?" Therefore it now answers: deriving from conditions has two meanings: 1. arising from conditions, which has the meaning of impermanence; 2. being revealed in relation to conditions, so how could it not be conditional? Therefore it says that the Buddha-nature is revealed by revealing causes (vyañjakahetu)—how could it not be arisen from causes and conditions? This is one meaning. Next, it states from "Dependent on the existence of the conditioned" onwards, explaining via the gate of mutual dependence: depending on the conditioned is precisely the meaning of deriving from conditions. It further says, "Moreover, by mutually overshadowing and exhausting characteristics": it must wait for mutual overshadowing and exhaustion of characteristics, and therefore true unconditioned nature also derives from conditions. Regarding the Commentary's stating, "The treatise says, 'If one sees the dharma of causes and conditions, one is able to see the Buddha'": both the verse above and this passage are from the "Chapter on the Four Noble Truths." The line below says, "seeing suffering, origination, cessation, and the path," which can also verify the second line. Regarding the statement, "There are not even two, how much less five": this concludes by rebuking the five natures doctrine. Regarding the statement, "Karma subsumes retribution," and so forth: because the sūtra merely speaks of the realm of karma, now karma subsumes retribution, so there are cause and effect; the objective realm must correspond to mind, so there are internal and external. Regarding the Commentary's stating, "Six: manifesting principle right through phenomena without destroying phenomena": the conditioned is phenomena, and the unconditioned is principle. Phenomena can manifest principle; therefore it says, "within the conditioned realm, displaying unconditioned dharmas." Phenomena are precisely principle, so phenomena are not destroyed; if one were to destroy phenomena, it would result in annihilationism. The lower line is the inverse of this, as can be understood. Regarding the Commentary's stating from "If one extinguishes and destroys the conditioned" onwards: this conversely establishes the above two. From "Therefore, if viewed in terms of mutual identity" onwards, it concludes and establishes the correct doctrine. Within this, there are briefly several gates: 1. the gate of mutual identity. 2. From "If viewed in terms of non-obstruction" onwards: that is the gate of mutual formation. It also says, "yet neither principle nor phenomena": that is the gate of not being identical. These are six of the ten gates of the non-obstruction of phenomena and principle: namely, the gate of true principle being identical to phenomena, the gate of phenomenal dharmas being identical to principle, the gate of phenomena being formed based on principle, the gate of phenomena being able to manifest principle, the gate of true principle not being phenomena, and the gate of phenomenal dharmas not being principle. Furthermore, what was earlier referred to as "mutually overshadowing and exhausting characteristics" is the gate of true principle overshadowing phenomena and the gate of phenomena being able to conceal principle. Discussing non-obstruction generally means that phenomena pervade principle and principle pervades phenomena. Eight gates are not different, and the two gates of not being identical are not one; therefore the Commentary concludes, "Conditioned and unconditioned essences are neither one nor different." Regarding the Commentary's stating from "'Displaying' means showing" onwards: it individually explains according to difficulties.