大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔 66.44

66.44

疏「不即不離則名自因」下，第三結示正義。於中，先標。言「亦二義成矣」者，即不斷、助成之二義。後「故論主」下，二引證。於中，先舉論偈文；後「初句泛舉」下，疏釋論偈。謂初句泛舉一切因緣生法，非局此十二因緣，二三兩句明不即離，第四一句結歸中道。從「非斷亦非常」下，疏中有五重中道不斷常義。初一是總，正是因滅不常、果續不斷之義，故云「不即故不常」。即乃因至於果，便墮於常。言「不異故不斷」者，從因生果，是果續義，故是不斷。異則果不續因，便墮於斷。次三義於此開出，而取意別。第二意，於不即不離二義之上，各成不斷不常。初言「不即因故果不斷因不常」者，不即則有果，故果不斷因。不與果俱，故因不常。次云「不異因故果不常因不斷」者，果從因生，故果非常。不異則因能生果，故因不斷。此上因果交絡，明不斷常。第三「又以不即故因果俱不斷」等者，當一句，上即具不斷不常，不即則有因有果故，俱不斷不異故。因果俱不常者，此義難見，故釋云：非無因常。不異則果從因生，故非無因常。不即則因由果顯，亦非無因常。然無因常，乃有二義：一如《涅槃》云「是諸外道無有一法不從緣生，是故無常。如來佛性虛空不從緣生，是故為常。」則是真常，非此所明。二者外道所計微塵世性，前無有因，故說為常。此是邪常，是今所揀。第四「又亦反此」者，應云不即故因果俱不常，不異故因果俱不斷。不斷義易，故更不釋。謂不異，則從因有果，俱不斷滅。不常難見，故今釋云：非相續常者，若即因者，因則至果，如泥至瓶，此因則常，果即是因，果亦相續常也。此常則是邪見，故今揀之。前不斷相續則是正義，以果續不斷故。第五云「又以不離是不即」下，合不即離及不斷不常以為一致。上五釋中，初一望次三，即從總開別；此一望前四，即合於前開，故令思之，以成深觀。疏「文中順」下，第二釋經。然論釋經，先正釋文、後釋自因。自因之義前以廣引，今但釋論子果之言。疏中二釋：前一更是上古所釋；「亦可」下是第二釋，正順論意。亦順《涅槃》二十九師子吼問：「陰無繫者，云何繫縛？」佛答：「以煩惱鎖繫縛五陰，因此便說名色繫縛眾生，眾生繫縛名色等。」師子吼難云：「若有名色是繫縛者，謂阿羅漢未離名色，亦應繫縛。」佛答云：「善男子！解脫有二種：一者子斷、二者果斷。言子斷者，名煩惱斷，未斷果故，名果繫縛。」又引油燈以喻煩惱眾生。釋曰：此明為因義邊名子，羅漢斷煩惱因未脫果縛，故似後義。以論言無明有二，是則為因之時，即是前支能起於後。若前支至後，但有種子，非是正發後支之因，故取子時。子即因耳。故論云「是中子時者，令行不斷有二義故，以自體、助成二義皆屬前支故。而詺因為子者，如穀子生芽故。果即是行，行時有行俱無明，非發業者，故不取之。餘支例然。皆以前支為後支緣，令後不斷，助成後支。」故疏正意，在其後解。疏「後逆觀，論云」下，文二：先引論、後「十二因緣」下解釋。今初。然經中亦歷十二，云無明滅故則行滅。無明因緣無，行滅不助成故。行滅故則識滅。行因緣無，識滅不助成故等。而論云「先際後際滅中際亦無」者，意云：若前際無明行無，中際五果則無，後際愛取有無，中際苦果後更不生。總顯無因則無果義。而謂愛取有為後際者，即次第六段三際輪迴門中，將愛取有以因從果，名後際故。

In the commentary, under "Not identical and not separate is named own-cause," the third section concludes and demonstrates the correct doctrine. Therein, it first marks it. The words "both senses are also established" mean the two senses of non-interruption and contributing to formation. Later, under "Therefore the treatise master," the second part adduces proofs. Therein, it first cites the verses of the treatise; later, under "The first line broadly raises," the commentary explains the verses of the treatise. This means the first line broadly raises all conditioned phenomena, not confined to these twelve causal condition links; the second and third lines clarify non-identity and non-separation; the fourth line concludes by returning to the middle way. From "Neither annihilated nor eternal" downward, the commentary contains five levels of the middle way's meanings of non-annihilation and non-eternity. The first one is general, specifically the meaning of causes ceasing and not being eternal, and effects continuing and not being annihilated; hence it states: "Because of non-identity, it is not eternal." Being identical means the cause reaches to the effect, which falls into eternity. The words "Because of not being different, it is not annihilated" mean producing the effect from the cause, which is the sense of the continuity of effects, and hence it is not annihilated. Being different means the effect does not continue from the cause, which falls into annihilation. The next three meanings are unfolded from this, but their underlying import is distinct. The second import establishes non-annihilation and non-eternity upon both meanings of non-identity and non-separation. First, regarding "Because it is not identical to the cause, the effect is not annihilated and the cause is not eternal": non-identity implies there is an effect, so the effect is not annihilated; the cause does not coexist with the effect, so the cause is not eternal. Next, it states: "Because it is not different from the cause, the effect is not eternal and the cause is not annihilated": the effect is produced from the cause, so the effect is not eternal; not being different means the cause can produce the effect, so the cause is not annihilated. This is an intertwining of cause and effect to clarify non-annihilation and non-eternity. Third, regarding "Furthermore, because of non-identity, cause and effect are both not annihilated," etc.: within a single line, non-annihilation and non-eternity are both present. Because of non-identity, there is a cause and there is an effect; hence neither is annihilated, because they are not different. Why cause and effect are both not eternal is difficult to see; hence it explains: not having an uncaused eternity. Not being different means the effect is produced from the cause, hence it is not an uncaused eternity. Non-identity means the cause is revealed through the effect, which is also not an uncaused eternity. However, uncaused eternity has two meanings: first, as the Nirvāṇa [Sūtra] says, "Among these heterodox paths, there is not a single dharma that is not produced from conditions; therefore, they are impermanent. The Tathāgata, Buddha-nature, and space are not produced from conditions; therefore, they are eternal." This is true eternity, not what is clarified here. Second, the subtle atoms and primordial nature posited by heterodox paths have no preceding cause, so they are spoken of as eternal. This is an erroneous eternity, which is what is discarded here. Fourth, regarding "Furthermore, it is also the reverse of this": it should say that because of non-identity, cause and effect are both not eternal; because of not being different, cause and effect are both not annihilated. The meaning of non-annihilation is easy, so it is not further explained: not being different means there is an effect from the cause, and neither is annihilated. Not eternal is difficult to see, so it now explains: not a continuity-eternity. If it were identical to the cause, the cause would reach to the effect, like clay reaching to the jar; this cause would then be eternal, and the effect being identical to the cause, the effect would also be a continuity-eternity. This eternity is a wrong view, which is why it is now discarded. The preceding continuous non-annihilation is the correct doctrine, because the effect continues without interruption. The fifth says, under "Furthermore, because non-separation is non-identity," it unites non-identity, non-separation, non-annihilation, and non-eternity into a single principle. Among the five explanations above, the first one looks toward the next three, unfolding the specific from the general; this one looks toward the preceding four, uniting what was unfolded before; therefore, one should contemplate it to achieve profound contemplation. In the commentary, under "In the text, the forward [order]," the second part explains the sūtra. In the treatise's explanation of the sūtra, it first directly explains the text and afterward explains own-cause. The meaning of own-cause has already been extensively cited above; now it only explains the treatise's words "seed" and "fruit." In the commentary there are two explanations: the former is also an explanation of antiquity; from "it may also be said" downward is the second explanation, which properly accords with the intention of the treatise. It also accords with Lion's Roar's question in Chapter Twenty-nine of the Nirvāṇa [Sūtra]: "If the aggregates have no binding, how is there bondage?" The Buddha answered: "The five aggregates are bound by the chains of afflictions; therefore, it is said that name-and-form binds sentient beings, and sentient beings bind name-and-form," and so forth. Lion's Roar raised an objection: "If name-and-form is bondage, then an arhat, not having departed from name-and-form, should also be bound." The Buddha answered: "Good son! Liberation is of two kinds: first, the severing of seeds; second, the severing of fruits. Severing seeds is called the severing of afflictions; because the fruit is not yet severed, it is called fruit-bondage." He also cited an oil lamp as an analogy for afflictions and sentient beings. Explanation: this clarifies that being a cause is called a seed; the arhat severs the cause of afflictions but is not yet free from the bondage of the fruit, so it resembles the latter meaning. Because the treatise says avidyā has two, when it serves as a cause, the preceding link is able to give rise to the subsequent. If the preceding link reaches to the subsequent, there are only seeds; it is not the cause that directly generates the subsequent link; hence the time of the seed is taken. A seed is just a cause. Therefore the treatise says: "Here, the time of the seed means there are two senses in causing formations not to be interrupted, because the two senses of self-substance and contributing to formation both belong to the preceding link. That the cause is designated as a seed is like a grain seed sprouting a shoot. The fruit is formations; at the time of formations, there is avidyā concomitant with formations, which does not initiate karma, and hence it is not taken. The remaining links are modeled on this. All take the preceding link as the condition for the subsequent link, causing the subsequent not to be interrupted and contributing to the formation of the subsequent link." Therefore the commentary's primary intention lies in the latter explanation. In the commentary, under "Subsequently, in the reverse contemplation, the treatise says," the text has two parts: first, it cites the treatise; second, under "twelve causal conditions," it explains. Here is the first. In the sūtra, it also runs through the twelve, stating that because avidyā ceases, formations cease—because the causal condition of avidyā is absent, formations cease and are not contributed to their formation, and so forth. Because formations cease, consciousness ceases—because the causal condition of formations is absent, consciousness ceases and is not contributed to its formation, and so forth. But the treatise says: "When the preceding extremity and subsequent extremity cease, the middle extremity is also absent." The meaning is: if the preceding extremity's avidyā and formations are absent, the middle extremity's five fruits are absent; if the subsequent extremity's craving, grasping, and becoming are absent, the middle extremity's painful fruits will never arise again later. It generally reveals the meaning that without cause there is no effect. As for calling craving, grasping, and becoming the subsequent extremity: in the sixth section below, the gate of the saṃsāric transmigration of the three extremities, craving, grasping, and becoming are designated as the subsequent extremity because causes are subsumed under effects.