大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔 71.3

71.3

疏「於此三中各有定不定」下，第三釋論定不定言。於中，上二句標、「謂前二」下釋。然即《俱舍》意，頌云「此有定不定，定三順現等。或說業有五，餘師說四句。」釋曰：初句標、次句別釋現生、後三即三定業。加於不定即有四業。或說業有五者，或有欲令不定受業復有二種，謂於異熟及時有定不定，開為二種：一異熟定時不定，謂果必定受於三世，時即不定也。二異熟與時二俱不定，謂果與時俱不定受，但有果定、時不定。無有時定果不定者，但於時定，於果必定，以時離果無別性故。雖開合有異，其理無別也。餘師說四句者，謂譬喻師，說業分八種，故為四句。彼許時定於果不定，於不定中時復分三，兼前五業，故成八種。第一句者，於時分定、異熟不定，謂順現等三業，三世時定，於果不定。若現在世獲其果即受，現若不受，永更不受。於時必定，於果不定。順現既然，生後亦爾。此分三種，謂一順現定果不定、二順生定果不定、三順後定果不定。第二句者，有業於異熟定、於時不定。謂不定業定得異熟，此但為一，謂果定、時不定。第三句者，有業於二俱定，謂順現等定得異熟。此有三種：一順現時果俱定、二順生時果俱定、三順後時果俱定。第四句者，有業於二俱不定。謂不定業非定得異熟，此但為一，謂果不定時不定也。釋曰：上《俱舍》三師，後後漸開，疏中總攝而言小異。言此三俱有定不定者，已總攝三師，而正收初師。即《俱舍》云「此有定不定三順現等，兼不定為四。」疏「謂前二」下，別示其相。雖通第三師四句，而有通局。前二時定者，以現若受名現報業，現若不受非現報業。生報亦然，要次生受方名生報，故說前二時則定也。「報通定不定」者，有造現報之業，應合現受，更遇勝緣排而不受，此報不定。生報亦爾。無有移此更別時故，無時不定也。後一俱通定不定者，即第四句時報俱不定，及第三句時報俱定，并第二句報定時不定。謂順後受不定業，有業定受而不定，一生二生多生故，是報定時不定。有不定業，於第三生應合受之，遇緣業壞，是為時定報不定也。或復有業未定生數而受果報，忽遇緣壞，故俱不定。然《俱舍》中報定時不定，義通三報，今何就於順於受耶？答：《俱舍》以業就時，謂有業定受，而或現或生或後。今明以時取業，要現受報方名現業。現若受者即現定業，現若不受即非現業，故無現報時不定也。若是生受即是生業，不受則非生報之業，故無生報時不定也。各取一義，亦不相違。問：現見有業合受現報，而以力排，便受生報。或合受生報，由異因緣，便受後報。如末利夫人專精施戒，合受生報生兜率天，臨終小嗔，先生蝎中，七日之後轉報生天。問：據此三業皆有報定而時不定，何得言無？答：現報緣排而受生者，即是生報，不名現報時不定也。生報亦然，思之可解。對前三師，疏意便當第四師也。業力甚深，不妨廣解，或當更有餘經論明。

Regarding the commentary's phrase “Within these three, each has determinate and indeterminate,” this is third, explaining the treatise's words on determinate and indeterminate. Therein, the first two lines set forth the heading, and from “meaning the first two” downward is the explanation. This follows the meaning of the Abhidharmakośa, which versifies: “These have determinate and indeterminate; determinate are the three: experiencing in the present [life], and so forth. Some say karma is fivefold, while other teachers speak of four alternatives.” The explanation says: The first line states the heading; the next line distinguishes experiencing in the present life, the next life, and subsequent lives, these three being the three determinate karmas. Adding the indeterminate yields four karmas. As for “some say karma is fivefold,” some wish to divide the indeterminate karma further into two types, holding that there are determinate and indeterminate with respect to both fruition (vipāka) and time, unfolding them into two: first, fruition is determinate but time is indeterminate, meaning the result must definitely be experienced across the three times, but the time itself is not fixed; second, both fruition and time are indeterminate, meaning both the result and the time are experienced indeterminately. There is only “result determinate, time indeterminate”; there is none where “time is determinate, result indeterminate,” for if the time is determinate, the result must be determinate, because apart from the result time has no distinct nature. Although unfolding and combining differ, their principle is not different. As for “other teachers speak of four alternatives,” this refers to the Dārṣṭāntikas, who divide karma into eight kinds, hence forming four alternatives. They allow that time may be determinate while the result is indeterminate; within the indeterminate, time is further divided into three, which, combined with the previous five karmas, makes eight kinds. The first alternative is: determinate regarding the time period, indeterminate regarding fruition. This means that for the three karmas of experiencing in the present and so forth, the time across the three periods is determinate, but the result is indeterminate. If one obtains its result in the present life, one experiences it; if it is not experienced in the present, it is never experienced again. It is determinate as to time, indeterminate as to result. If this is so for experiencing in the present, it is likewise for experiencing in the next and subsequent lives. This divides into three: first, experiencing in the present is determinate while the result is indeterminate; second, experiencing in the next life is determinate while the result is indeterminate; third, experiencing in subsequent lives is determinate while the result is indeterminate. The second alternative is: there is karma that is determinate regarding fruition and indeterminate regarding time. This means that indeterminate karma definitely obtains its fruition; this constitutes only one kind, namely result determinate and time indeterminate. The third alternative is: there is karma where both are determinate, meaning experiencing in the present and so forth definitely obtain their fruition. This has three kinds: first, experiencing in the present with both time and result determinate; second, experiencing in the next life with both time and result determinate; third, experiencing in subsequent lives with both time and result determinate. The fourth alternative is: there is karma where both are indeterminate. This means that indeterminate karma does not definitely obtain its fruition; this constitutes only one kind, namely result indeterminate and time indeterminate. The explanation says: The above three masters in the Abhidharmakośa gradually unfold [the categories]; the commentary summarizes them with slight differences. Saying that “all three have determinate and indeterminate” already embraces the three masters, but primarily takes up the first master. That is what the Abhidharmakośa means by “These have determinate and indeterminate; determinate are the three: experiencing in the present, etc., which, together with indeterminate, make four.” The commentary's passage from “meaning the first two” downward distinguishes their characteristics. Although it accommodates the four alternatives of the third master, there are broader and narrower applications. The first two having determinate time is because if it is experienced in the present, it is called karma of present retribution; if it is not experienced in the present, it is not karma of present retribution. The same applies to retribution in the next life: only when it must be experienced in the immediately following birth is it named retribution in the next life; therefore, it is said that the time of the first two is determinate. Regarding “retribution admits of both determinate and indeterminate”: there may be one who creates karma for present retribution, which should properly be experienced in the present, but encountering superior conditions it is displaced and not experienced—this retribution is indeterminate. Retribution in the next life is also like this. Because there is no shifting this to a different time, there is no indeterminacy of time. The latter one admitting of both determinate and indeterminate refers to the fourth alternative where both time and retribution are indeterminate, the third alternative where both time and retribution are determinate, and the second alternative where retribution is determinate and time indeterminate. This means that with indeterminate karma experienced in subsequent lives, there is karma that is definitely experienced but indeterminate as to whether it is in one birth, two births, or many births; this is retribution determinate, time indeterminate. There is indeterminate karma that should properly be experienced in the third birth, but encountering conditions the karma is destroyed; this is time determinate, retribution indeterminate. Or again, there is karma whose number of births is not yet determined before the retribution is experienced, and suddenly encountering conditions it is destroyed, so that both are indeterminate. However, in the Abhidharmakośa, retribution determinate and time indeterminate applies generally across the three retributions; why does it here apply only to experiencing in subsequent lives? Answer: The Abhidharmakośa takes karma in relation to time, meaning there is karma definitely experienced, but it is either present, in the next life, or subsequent. Here, we clarify by taking karma according to time: only when retribution is experienced in the present is it called present karma. If it is experienced in the present, it is determinate present karma; if it is not experienced in the present, it is not present karma; hence, there is no indeterminacy of time for present retribution. If it is experienced in the next life, it is next-life karma; if it is not experienced, it is not karma of next-life retribution; hence, there is no indeterminacy of time for next-life retribution. Each adopts a distinct perspective, and they are not contradictory. Question: We see at present that some karma properly incurs present retribution, but through force it is displaced so that one incurs retribution in the next life. Or, properly incurring retribution in the next life, due to different causes and conditions one incurs subsequent retribution. For example, Queen Mallikā devotedly observed giving and precepts and properly should have incurred retribution in the next life being born in Tuṣita Heaven; yet at the point of death, a slight anger arose, so that she was first born among scorpions, and after seven days her retribution shifted and she was born in heaven. Question: According to this, all three karmas have retribution determinate and time indeterminate; how can one say there is none? Answer: When present retribution is displaced by conditions and experienced in the next life, it simply is retribution of the next life; it is not called present retribution with indeterminate time. The same applies to next-life retribution; through reflection this can be understood. In relation to the previous three masters, the commentary's intention corresponds to the fourth master. The power of karma is extremely profound; there is no harm in explaining it broadly, or it may be clarified in other sūtras and treatises.