大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔 79.96

79.96

疏「是知現惡明無則無惡必有」者，即生公意。生公忍死待得大經以證大義，如何至今猶不信耶？廣如玄中，今當重釋。言「現惡明無」者，正作闡提撥無因果故無。「無惡必有」者，由撥因果之惡故無，今無此惡是則有矣。故應問言：頗有新作一闡提不？復有闡提後生信不？若有新作，未作之時有佛性不？若未作時有、作時無者，佛性可斷；若先無者，則不由於闡提無也，本自無故。後生信心，亦復如是。若有佛性，佛性是可生之法。前則本有今無，此則本無今有。若發信心亦無性者，此亦不干闡提故無。故知但是約於長時未成果善，抑言無耳。謂抑令恐怖，使發大心，未作闡提令其莫作，故皆誘物，何定言無？疏「故涅槃」下，引證。此引二經。先引《涅槃》。自有二文唯證闡提有性，成上不捨邪見水輪。初意即第九經，玄中已引，今復略明。經云「彼一闡提雖有佛性，而為無量罪垢所纏，不能得見，如蠶處繭，則有而非無。」三十五經云「斷善根人，以現在世煩惱因緣能斷善根，未來佛性力因緣故還生善根。」亦有文也。復云「若能發心，非闡提者。」即二十六經〈高貴德王菩薩品〉。經云「善男子！一闡提輩若遇善友諸佛菩薩聞說深法，及以不遇，俱不得離一闡提心。何以故？斷善根故。一闡提輩亦得阿耨多羅三藐三菩提。所以者何？若能發於菩提之心，則不名為一闡提也。」即其文矣。

Regarding the Commentary's statement, "Hence one knows that the statement of present evil shows non-existence, then the absence of evil will necessarily entail existence," this expresses Master [Daosheng]'s intention. Master Sheng endured death while waiting to obtain the Mahā[parinirvāṇa]-sūtra to verify this great doctrine; how is it that even today people still do not believe it? It is explained extensively in the Prolegomena, and shall now be explained again. "The statement of present evil shows non-existence" means that precisely when an icchantika repudiates causality, [buddha-nature] is non-existent. "The absence of evil will necessarily entail existence" means that it is non-existent because of the evil of repudiating causality; once this evil is absent, it is then existent. Therefore, one should ask: Can one newly become an icchantika, or not? Can an icchantika later give rise to faith, or not? If one can newly become [an icchantika], was buddha-nature present before doing so, or not? If it was present when not doing so and absent when doing so, then buddha-nature could be severed. If it was absent beforehand, then its absence is not due to being an icchantika, because it was originally absent of itself. The same applies to later generating faith: if there is buddha-nature, then buddha-nature would be an arisable dharma. In the former case, it would be originally existent and now non-existent; in the latter case, it would be originally non-existent and now existent. If, even after generating faith, one also lacked [buddha-]nature, then this absence likewise would have nothing to do with being an icchantika. Hence one knows that this was merely spoken in terms of not yet achieving the goodness of the fruit over a long time, deprecatingly saying it is non-existent. That is, by deprecatingly frightening them to make them generate the great mind, and instructing those who have not become icchantikas not to become one, these are all ways of guiding beings—how could it definitely be said to be non-existent? Regarding the Commentary's citation of proof from "Hence the Nirvāṇa..." onward, it cites two sūtras. First, it cites the Nirvāṇa [Sūtra]. It contains two passages solely proving that icchantikas possess the nature, thereby completing the above [explanation of] the water wheel that does not abandon wrong views. The first meaning is from the ninth fascicle, which was already cited in the Prolegomena and is now briefly clarified again. The sūtra says: "Although that icchantika possesses buddha-nature, being wrapped in boundless defilements and impurities, they cannot see it; like a silkworm in a cocoon, it exists and is not non-existent." The thirty-fifth fascicle says: "A person who severs good roots severs good roots due to the conditions of afflictions in the present life; due to the power and conditions of future buddha-nature, good roots will be born again." This is also textually attested. It also says: "If one can generate the mind, one is not an icchantika." This is from the twenty-sixth fascicle, the "Chapter on Bodhisattva Noble Virtue King." The sūtra says: "Good sons! Whether icchantikas encounter good friends, the buddhas and bodhisattvas, and hear profound Dharma explained, or do not encounter them, in both cases they cannot leave behind the icchantika mind. Why? Because they have severed good roots. Yet icchantikas also attain anuttarasamyaksaṃbodhi. Why is that? If one can generate bodhicitta, one is no longer called an icchantika." This is that passage.