大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔 8.8

8.8

疏「涅槃第九」下，第四明無有無性。彼經廣說闡提無善根竟，即云「復次善男子！譬如蓮華為日所照，無不開敷。一切眾生亦復如是，若得見聞大涅槃日，未發心者皆悉發心，為菩提因。是故我說大涅槃光所入毛孔必為妙因。彼一闡提雖有佛性，而為無量罪垢所纏，不能得出，如蠶處繭。以是業緣，不能生於菩提妙因，流轉生死無有窮。」已上皆經文，今疏但取中間，意在雖有佛性之言。既言雖有，則非無也，但未得其用耳。故疏結云「此則有而非無」。疏又云「或有佛性一闡提有」等者，即《涅槃》第三十六、南經三十二，皆〈迦葉菩薩品〉。具有四句，今但引第一句者，是證闡提有性。經云「善男子！或有佛性，一闡提有、善根人無。或有佛性，善根人有、一闡提無。或有佛性，二人俱有。或有佛性，二人俱無。善男子！我諸弟子若解如是四句義者，不應難云一闡提人定有佛性、定無佛性。若言眾生悉有佛性，是名如來隨自意語。如來如是隨自意語，眾生云何一向作解？」此一段經近遠皆釋，大同小異。今依薦福故。彼疏云「今準經明佛性略有五種，謂善、不善、無記及理、果等。今言一闡提有、善根人無者，此是不善佛性也。然善根人有其二種：一是離欲善根人，離欲斷一切不善故；二是五性，五住已上無不善性故。此之二人俱無不善性也。善根人有、闡提人無者，此是善佛性也。闡提斷一切善，故云無也。二人俱有者，理及無記性也。二人俱無者，俱無果性。此中有者是現有，非當有也。」然有人執此經文，謂一分善根人及一分闡提無有佛性，以經說有善根人及一闡提無故。善根人無者，是無性不斷善人。闡提人無者，是斷善無性。二人俱有者，俱是有性。二人俱無者，俱是無性。此釋違經，故《涅槃》上文云「如來佛性則有二種：一有、二無。有者，所謂三十二相，乃至無量三昧，是名為有。無者，所謂如來過去諸善、不善、無記業因果報、煩惱五陰十二因緣，是名為無。乃至闡提佛性亦爾。」是則上從乎佛、下至闡提，皆有有無二性。無全無性，由善根人與一闡提有無二性異故，得有四句。此中明佛性多種有無不同，不明眾生多種有性無性。所以得知者，經言「或有佛性，善根人有、闡提人無」等，故不言或有善根人有佛性、闡提人無佛性。故談文尚不識顛倒，尚能解義。今此善不善因果理性。無一眾生悉具一切、無一眾生悉無一切，始末以明一切眾生具一切也。佛與闡提亦有四句，佛有非闡提者，謂果性。闡提有非佛者，謂無明諸結性。二人俱有者，是理性。二人俱無者，善因性。故闡提決有佛性。又上經云「若言眾生中別有佛性。是義不然。何以故？眾生即佛性、佛性即眾生，直以時異有淨不淨。」解曰：生之與性既二互相即，明有眾生即有佛性矣。

Regarding the commentary’s passage from "Nirvāṇa [Sūtra], fascicle nine" onward: fourth, explaining that there is no such thing as being devoid of Buddha-nature. In that sūtra, after explaining at length that icchantikas lack roots of goodness, it immediately states: "Furthermore, good sons! Just as when lotus blossoms are shone upon by the sun, there is none that does not bloom, all sentient beings are also like this: if they are able to see and hear the sun of the Great Nirvāṇa, those who have not yet aroused the mind [for bodhi] will all arouse their minds, forming a cause for bodhi. For this reason, I say that wherever the light of the Great Nirvāṇa enters the pores, it will certainly serve as a wondrous cause. Although that icchantika has the Buddha-nature, they are bound by immeasurable sinful defilements and cannot escape, like a silkworm inside a cocoon. Because of these karmic conditions, they cannot produce the wondrous cause of bodhi, and revolve through birth-and-death without end." All of the above is the text of the sūtra. The present commentary merely takes the middle portion, its intention resting on the statement 'although they have the Buddha-nature'. Since it says 'although they have it', it is not absent; they merely have not attained its functioning. Therefore, the commentary concludes: "This, then, means it exists and is not absent." Regarding the commentary further stating "Or there is Buddha-nature that an icchantika possesses" and so forth: this is from fascicle thirty-six of the [Northern] Nirvāṇa [Sūtra], and fascicle thirty-two of the Southern text, both being the "Bodhisattva Kāśyapa Chapter". It contains four propositions; here it only cites the first proposition to prove that icchantikas possess the nature. The sūtra states: "Good sons! There is Buddha-nature that an icchantika possesses and a person of roots of goodness lacks. There is Buddha-nature that a person of roots of goodness possesses and an icchantika lacks. There is Buddha-nature that both persons possess. There is Buddha-nature that both persons lack. Good sons! If my disciples understand the meaning of these four propositions, they should not raise objections saying that an icchantika definitely possesses Buddha-nature or definitely lacks Buddha-nature. If one says that sentient beings all possess Buddha-nature, this is called the Tathāgata speaking in accordance with his own intent. When the Tathāgata speaks in accordance with his own intent like this, why do sentient beings interpret it in only one absolute way?" This passage of the sūtra has been explained by commentators near and far with broad agreement and minor differences. Here I follow [the commentary of] Jianfu [temple]. His commentary states: "Now according to the sūtra, it is explained that Buddha-nature briefly has five kinds: namely, wholesome, unwholesome, neutral, as well as principle and fruit, etc. Now saying that an icchantika possesses it and a person of roots of goodness lacks it, this refers to the unwholesome Buddha-nature. However, persons of roots of goodness are of two kinds: first, a person of roots of goodness who has abandoned desire, because by abandoning desire they have cut off all that is unwholesome; second, the five natures—those at the five abodes and above lack the unwholesome nature. Both of these two persons lack the unwholesome nature. As for what the person of roots of goodness possesses and the icchantika lacks, this is the wholesome Buddha-nature. The icchantika has severed all goodness, and is therefore said to lack it. What both persons possess are the principle and the neutral natures. What both persons lack is the nature of the fruit. What is 'possessed' here refers to presently possessing it, not possessing it in the future." However, someone adhered to this sūtra text and asserted that a portion of persons with roots of goodness and a portion of icchantikas lack Buddha-nature, because the sūtra speaks of persons of roots of goodness and icchantikas lacking it. [They claimed that] those who lack it among persons of roots of goodness are people without the nature who have not severed goodness; those who lack it among icchantikas are those who have severed goodness and lack the nature; what both persons possess means both have the nature; what both persons lack means both lack the nature. This interpretation contradicts the sūtra. Therefore, the earlier text of the Nirvāṇa [Sūtra] states: "The Buddha-nature of the Tathāgata has two kinds: first, existence; second, non-existence. Existence refers to the thirty-two marks up to the immeasurable samādhis; this is called existence. Non-existence refers to the Tathāgata's past wholesome, unwholesome, and neutral karmic causes and retributions, afflictions, the five aggregates, and the twelve links of dependent origination; this is called non-existence. And so on up to: the Buddha-nature of an icchantika is also like this." This being so, from the Buddha above down to the icchantika below, all possess the two natures of existence and non-existence. There is no such thing as completely lacking the nature. Because the existence and non-existence of these two natures differ between a person of roots of goodness and an icchantika, the four propositions can obtain. What is explained here is that the many kinds of Buddha-nature differ in existence and non-existence; it does not explain that sentient beings are manifold in having the nature or lacking the nature. How is this known? Because the sūtra says: "There is Buddha-nature that a person of roots of goodness possesses and an icchantika lacks," and so forth; it does not say that there are some persons of roots of goodness who have Buddha-nature and icchantikas who lack Buddha-nature. Therefore, if one cannot even discern the inversion of the phrasing, how could one understand the meaning? Now, regarding these wholesome, unwholesome, causal, fruitional, and principled natures: not a single sentient being completely possesses all of them, nor does a single sentient being completely lack all of them; from beginning to end, this clarifies that all sentient beings possess everything. Between the Buddha and an icchantika there are also four propositions: what the Buddha possesses and the icchantika does not is the fruitional nature; what the icchantika possesses and the Buddha does not is the nature of ignorance and the various fetters; what both possess is the principled nature; what both lack is the nature of wholesome causes. Therefore, an icchantika definitely possesses the Buddha-nature. Furthermore, the earlier sūtra text states: "If one says that apart from sentient beings there is a separate Buddha-nature, this meaning is incorrect. Why is that? Sentient beings are identical with Buddha-nature; Buddha-nature is identical with sentient beings. It is simply due to different times that there are the pure and impure." Explanation: Since sentient beings and the nature are mutually identical, it is clear that wherever there are sentient beings, there is Buddha-nature.