大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔 8.8

8.8

Regarding the commentary’s passage from "Nirvāṇa [Sūtra], fascicle nine" onward: fourth, explaining that there is no such thing as being devoid of Buddha-nature. In that sūtra, after explaining at length that icchantikas lack roots of goodness, it immediately states: "Furthermore, good sons! Just as when lotus blossoms are shone upon by the sun, there is none that does not bloom, all sentient beings are also like this: if they are able to see and hear the sun of the Great Nirvāṇa, those who have not yet aroused the mind [for bodhi] will all arouse their minds, forming a cause for bodhi. For this reason, I say that wherever the light of the Great Nirvāṇa enters the pores, it will certainly serve as a wondrous cause. Although that icchantika has the Buddha-nature, they are bound by immeasurable sinful defilements and cannot escape, like a silkworm inside a cocoon. Because of these karmic conditions, they cannot produce the wondrous cause of bodhi, and revolve through birth-and-death without end." All of the above is the text of the sūtra. The present commentary merely takes the middle portion, its intention resting on the statement 'although they have the Buddha-nature'. Since it says 'although they have it', it is not absent; they merely have not attained its functioning. Therefore, the commentary concludes: "This, then, means it exists and is not absent." Regarding the commentary further stating "Or there is Buddha-nature that an icchantika possesses" and so forth: this is from fascicle thirty-six of the [Northern] Nirvāṇa [Sūtra], and fascicle thirty-two of the Southern text, both being the "Bodhisattva Kāśyapa Chapter". It contains four propositions; here it only cites the first proposition to prove that icchantikas possess the nature. The sūtra states: "Good sons! There is Buddha-nature that an icchantika possesses and a person of roots of goodness lacks. There is Buddha-nature that a person of roots of goodness possesses and an icchantika lacks. There is Buddha-nature that both persons possess. There is Buddha-nature that both persons lack. Good sons! If my disciples understand the meaning of these four propositions, they should not raise objections saying that an icchantika definitely possesses Buddha-nature or definitely lacks Buddha-nature. If one says that sentient beings all possess Buddha-nature, this is called the Tathāgata speaking in accordance with his own intent. When the Tathāgata speaks in accordance with his own intent like this, why do sentient beings interpret it in only one absolute way?" This passage of the sūtra has been explained by commentators near and far with broad agreement and minor differences. Here I follow [the commentary of] Jianfu [temple]. His commentary states: "Now according to the sūtra, it is explained that Buddha-nature briefly has five kinds: namely, wholesome, unwholesome, neutral, as well as principle and fruit, etc. Now saying that an icchantika possesses it and a person of roots of goodness lacks it, this refers to the unwholesome Buddha-nature. However, persons of roots of goodness are of two kinds: first, a person of roots of goodness who has abandoned desire, because by abandoning desire they have cut off all that is unwholesome; second, the five natures—those at the five abodes and above lack the unwholesome nature. Both of these two persons lack the unwholesome nature. As for what the person of roots of goodness possesses and the icchantika lacks, this is the wholesome Buddha-nature. The icchantika has severed all goodness, and is therefore said to lack it. What both persons possess are the principle and the neutral natures. What both persons lack is the nature of the fruit. What is 'possessed' here refers to presently possessing it, not possessing it in the future." However, someone adhered to this sūtra text and asserted that a portion of persons with roots of goodness and a portion of icchantikas lack Buddha-nature, because the sūtra speaks of persons of roots of goodness and icchantikas lacking it. [They claimed that] those who lack it among persons of roots of goodness are people without the nature who have not severed goodness; those who lack it among icchantikas are those who have severed goodness and lack the nature; what both persons possess means both have the nature; what both persons lack means both lack the nature. This interpretation contradicts the sūtra. Therefore, the earlier text of the Nirvāṇa [Sūtra] states: "The Buddha-nature of the Tathāgata has two kinds: first, existence; second, non-existence. Existence refers to the thirty-two marks up to the immeasurable samādhis; this is called existence. Non-existence refers to the Tathāgata's past wholesome, unwholesome, and neutral karmic causes and retributions, afflictions, the five aggregates, and the twelve links of dependent origination; this is called non-existence. And so on up to: the Buddha-nature of an icchantika is also like this." This being so, from the Buddha above down to the icchantika below, all possess the two natures of existence and non-existence. There is no such thing as completely lacking the nature. Because the existence and non-existence of these two natures differ between a person of roots of goodness and an icchantika, the four propositions can obtain. What is explained here is that the many kinds of Buddha-nature differ in existence and non-existence; it does not explain that sentient beings are manifold in having the nature or lacking the nature. How is this known? Because the sūtra says: "There is Buddha-nature that a person of roots of goodness possesses and an icchantika lacks," and so forth; it does not say that there are some persons of roots of goodness who have Buddha-nature and icchantikas who lack Buddha-nature. Therefore, if one cannot even discern the inversion of the phrasing, how could one understand the meaning? Now, regarding these wholesome, unwholesome, causal, fruitional, and principled natures: not a single sentient being completely possesses all of them, nor does a single sentient being completely lack all of them; from beginning to end, this clarifies that all sentient beings possess everything. Between the Buddha and an icchantika there are also four propositions: what the Buddha possesses and the icchantika does not is the fruitional nature; what the icchantika possesses and the Buddha does not is the nature of ignorance and the various fetters; what both possess is the principled nature; what both lack is the nature of wholesome causes. Therefore, an icchantika definitely possesses the Buddha-nature. Furthermore, the earlier sūtra text states: "If one says that apart from sentient beings there is a separate Buddha-nature, this meaning is incorrect. Why is that? Sentient beings are identical with Buddha-nature; Buddha-nature is identical with sentient beings. It is simply due to different times that there are the pure and impure." Explanation: Since sentient beings and the nature are mutually identical, it is clear that wherever there are sentient beings, there is Buddha-nature.