大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔 9.25

9.25

疏「緣境斷惑」下，第八能所斷證，即離別中相即之義故。《十地經》云「非初非中後」，論釋義云「是斷結相。此智盡漏為初智斷。為中為後？非初智斷，亦非中後。偈言『非初非中後』故。云何斷耶？如燈之焰，非唯初中後，前中後取故。謂唯取一時則不能斷，三時總取方說能斷。假三時斷則無定性。何者？初若能斷，不假中後。後若能斷，不假初中。既假三時，故知無性。一一推徵，三皆不斷。是故經言『非初非中後』。由三時無斷方能斷結，是故論云『前中後取』故。」論主總取三時，方顯三時無斷。經論言反，意乃相成，經則約性、論則約相，性相無礙方能斷結。大意如此。而疏有二節：初總明無斷之斷、後別明內證之相。今初，文亦影略。若約緣境，不二而二有能所照，二而不二即智證如。若約斷惑，不二而二有能所斷，以能斷是智、所斷是惑。惑體智體無二體故，故名不二。故《涅槃》云「明與無明，其性無二。愚者謂二，智者了達知其無二。」無二之性即是實性，不壞相故有能所斷即名為二。二而不二說為內證。證者以能合所故、惑即如故。疏「照惑無本」下，別明內證之相。謂智有二能：一能斷惑、二能證理。上說斷惑，今明證理。「照惑無本即是智體」者，尋此妄惑都無根本，非內非外亦非中間，三世推求都不可得，從無住本顛倒妄生。既以無住而為其本，則無本矣。無住之本即實相異名，故此惑本便是智體，智體惑體無二體也。「照體無自即是證如」者，即此智體，本唯無念，不能自立。因惑說智，智不自名。智無自性，即是如體。無心存智，是曰證如。若以智合如，非證如矣。疏「非智外如為智所證」下，反成上義。智即是如，如即是智。法界寂然曰如，寂而常照曰智，豈離寂外別有智耶？上二句舉智收如，智外更無如矣。下二句舉如收智，如外豈有智耶？若智外有如，智則收法不盡；若如外有智，真如則不遍智中。舉一全收，不容相並，此即迴向經文。更有文云「無有少法與法同住，則顯法性無容並真。」二既不存，一亦奚立？如斯斷證唯實教宗，不同前宗決有斷證。

The Commentary states: "Taking conditions as the object to sever delusion..." and so forth; this is the eighth [section], the meaning of mutual identity within identity versus difference regarding the capacity and object of severance and realization. Hence the *Daśabhūmika-sūtra* states: 'Neither initial, middle, nor final.' The treatise comments on the meaning: 'This is the characteristic of severing fetters. Is this cognition that exhausts defilements severed by initial cognition? By middle, or by final? It is not severed by initial cognition, nor by middle or final, because the verse states: "Neither initial, middle, nor final." How is it severed? Like the flame of a lamp, it is not merely initial, middle, or final, because the preceding, middle, and final are taken together. That is, if one takes only a single moment, it cannot sever; only when the three moments are taken altogether can it be said to be capable of severing. Since severance depends on the three moments, there is no fixed nature. Why? If the initial could sever, it would not depend on the middle and final. If the final could sever, it would not depend on the initial and middle. Since it depends on the three moments, we know there is no inherent nature. Examining each one individually, none of the three severs. Therefore the sūtra states: "Neither initial, middle, nor final." Only because there is no severance in the three moments can it sever fetters; therefore the treatise states: "Because the preceding, middle, and final are taken together."' The treatise master takes the three moments as a whole, thereby revealing that the three moments are without severance. The words of the sūtra and the treatise seem contradictory, but their intent is mutually complementary: the sūtra concerns nature, while the treatise concerns characteristics; when nature and characteristics are unobstructed, one can then sever fetters. Such is the general purport. And the Commentary has two parts: first, it generally clarifies severance without severance; second, it specifically clarifies the characteristic of internal realization. As for the first, the text is also implicitly concise. In terms of taking conditions as the object, non-dual yet twofold, there are the subjective and objective illuminations; twofold yet non-dual, cognition realizes tathatā. In terms of severing delusion, non-dual yet twofold, there are the subjective and objective severances, because that which can sever is cognition and that which is severed is delusion. Because the entity of delusion and the entity of cognition do not have two entities, it is termed non-dual. Hence the *Nirvāṇa Sūtra* states: 'Clarity and avidyā—their nature is non-dual. Fools say they are two, but the wise thoroughly penetrate and know they are non-dual.' The non-dual nature is precisely the true nature; without destroying characteristics, having subjective and objective severance is named twofold. Twofold yet non-dual is described as internal realization. Realization occurs because the subject unites with the object, and delusion is precisely tathatā. The Commentary states: "Illuminating delusion as without origin..." and so forth; this specifically clarifies the characteristic of internal realization. Cognition has two capacities: first, it can sever delusion; second, it can realize principle. The above explained severing delusion; now it clarifies realizing principle. "Illuminating delusion as without origin is precisely the entity of cognition": seeking this false delusion, it has no root at all, neither internal, external, nor in between; sought throughout the three times, it is entirely unfindable, arising falsely from inversion based on non-abiding. Since it takes non-abiding as its basis, it is without a basis. The basis of non-abiding is precisely another name for the true mark; therefore this basis of delusion is precisely the entity of cognition, and the entity of cognition and the entity of delusion are not two entities. "Illuminating the entity as without self is precisely realizing tathatā": this very entity of cognition is fundamentally just non-thought and cannot stand by itself. Cognition is spoken of because of delusion; cognition does not name itself. Cognition has no self-nature, which is precisely the entity of tathatā. Having no mind that posits cognition is termed realizing tathatā. If one were to use cognition to unite with tathatā, that would not be realizing tathatā. The Commentary states: "It is not that tathatā outside of cognition is realized by cognition..." and so forth; this inversely establishes the above meaning. Cognition is precisely tathatā; tathatā is precisely cognition. The dharmadhātu in quiescence is called tathatā; quiescent yet constantly illuminating is called cognition. How could there be a separate cognition outside of quiescence? The upper two sentences cite cognition to subsume tathatā: outside of cognition there is no further tathatā. The lower two sentences cite tathatā to subsume cognition: outside of tathatā how could there be cognition? If outside of cognition there were tathatā, cognition would not exhaust all phenomena; if outside of tathatā there were cognition, tathatā would not pervade cognition. Citing one completely subsumes the other, not permitting them to stand side by side; this is precisely the sūtra text on pariṇāmanā. There is further text stating: 'There is no slightest dharma that abides together with dharma, which reveals that dharmatā does not permit being juxtaposed with the real.' When the two do not exist, how could the one stand? Such severance and realization belong only to the tradition of the true teaching, unlike the previous tradition where severance and realization are definitively [separate].