大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔 9.25

9.25

The Commentary states: "Taking conditions as the object to sever delusion..." and so forth; this is the eighth [section], the meaning of mutual identity within identity versus difference regarding the capacity and object of severance and realization. Hence the *Daśabhūmika-sūtra* states: 'Neither initial, middle, nor final.' The treatise comments on the meaning: 'This is the characteristic of severing fetters. Is this cognition that exhausts defilements severed by initial cognition? By middle, or by final? It is not severed by initial cognition, nor by middle or final, because the verse states: "Neither initial, middle, nor final." How is it severed? Like the flame of a lamp, it is not merely initial, middle, or final, because the preceding, middle, and final are taken together. That is, if one takes only a single moment, it cannot sever; only when the three moments are taken altogether can it be said to be capable of severing. Since severance depends on the three moments, there is no fixed nature. Why? If the initial could sever, it would not depend on the middle and final. If the final could sever, it would not depend on the initial and middle. Since it depends on the three moments, we know there is no inherent nature. Examining each one individually, none of the three severs. Therefore the sūtra states: "Neither initial, middle, nor final." Only because there is no severance in the three moments can it sever fetters; therefore the treatise states: "Because the preceding, middle, and final are taken together."' The treatise master takes the three moments as a whole, thereby revealing that the three moments are without severance. The words of the sūtra and the treatise seem contradictory, but their intent is mutually complementary: the sūtra concerns nature, while the treatise concerns characteristics; when nature and characteristics are unobstructed, one can then sever fetters. Such is the general purport. And the Commentary has two parts: first, it generally clarifies severance without severance; second, it specifically clarifies the characteristic of internal realization. As for the first, the text is also implicitly concise. In terms of taking conditions as the object, non-dual yet twofold, there are the subjective and objective illuminations; twofold yet non-dual, cognition realizes tathatā. In terms of severing delusion, non-dual yet twofold, there are the subjective and objective severances, because that which can sever is cognition and that which is severed is delusion. Because the entity of delusion and the entity of cognition do not have two entities, it is termed non-dual. Hence the *Nirvāṇa Sūtra* states: 'Clarity and avidyā—their nature is non-dual. Fools say they are two, but the wise thoroughly penetrate and know they are non-dual.' The non-dual nature is precisely the true nature; without destroying characteristics, having subjective and objective severance is named twofold. Twofold yet non-dual is described as internal realization. Realization occurs because the subject unites with the object, and delusion is precisely tathatā. The Commentary states: "Illuminating delusion as without origin..." and so forth; this specifically clarifies the characteristic of internal realization. Cognition has two capacities: first, it can sever delusion; second, it can realize principle. The above explained severing delusion; now it clarifies realizing principle. "Illuminating delusion as without origin is precisely the entity of cognition": seeking this false delusion, it has no root at all, neither internal, external, nor in between; sought throughout the three times, it is entirely unfindable, arising falsely from inversion based on non-abiding. Since it takes non-abiding as its basis, it is without a basis. The basis of non-abiding is precisely another name for the true mark; therefore this basis of delusion is precisely the entity of cognition, and the entity of cognition and the entity of delusion are not two entities. "Illuminating the entity as without self is precisely realizing tathatā": this very entity of cognition is fundamentally just non-thought and cannot stand by itself. Cognition is spoken of because of delusion; cognition does not name itself. Cognition has no self-nature, which is precisely the entity of tathatā. Having no mind that posits cognition is termed realizing tathatā. If one were to use cognition to unite with tathatā, that would not be realizing tathatā. The Commentary states: "It is not that tathatā outside of cognition is realized by cognition..." and so forth; this inversely establishes the above meaning. Cognition is precisely tathatā; tathatā is precisely cognition. The dharmadhātu in quiescence is called tathatā; quiescent yet constantly illuminating is called cognition. How could there be a separate cognition outside of quiescence? The upper two sentences cite cognition to subsume tathatā: outside of cognition there is no further tathatā. The lower two sentences cite tathatā to subsume cognition: outside of tathatā how could there be cognition? If outside of cognition there were tathatā, cognition would not exhaust all phenomena; if outside of tathatā there were cognition, tathatā would not pervade cognition. Citing one completely subsumes the other, not permitting them to stand side by side; this is precisely the sūtra text on pariṇāmanā. There is further text stating: 'There is no slightest dharma that abides together with dharma, which reveals that dharmatā does not permit being juxtaposed with the real.' When the two do not exist, how could the one stand? Such severance and realization belong only to the tradition of the true teaching, unlike the previous tradition where severance and realization are definitively [separate].