大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔 32

English (machine translation) 32

Language: English

32.1

Exounded by the Śramaṇa Chengguan of the Great Huayan Monastery on Mount Qingliang under the Tang

Regarding the commentary’s text from “By relying on non-existence there is existence” downward: above it discriminated non-contradiction, and now it clarifies mutual completion. Now, when phenomena and principle are considered with respect to each other, there are roughly three meanings: first, the meaning of mutual contradiction; second, the meaning of mutual non-obstruction; third, the meaning of mutual creation. Here the latter two are employed; the first meaning is that used by the questioner.

32.3

Regarding the Commentary's line beginning with "Therefore, the dharmas of dependent origination": this is the second [section], which comprehensively explains the meaning of dependent origination. Within it there are four [parts]: first, a general explanation; second, opening up the meanings; third, harmonisation and integration; fourth, a separate explanation of the meaning of nature. The first part has two sections: first, establishing the meaning and correlating it with the sūtras; and second, from "Therefore, because they are devoid of intrinsic nature and dependently arisen, they are empty" onwards, reconciling and returning to the middle way. Now for the first. Among the four meanings, two meanings are the meaning of emptiness and existence: that is, being dependently arisen and therefore existing is the meaning of existence; being devoid of intrinsic nature and therefore empty is the meaning of emptiness. Two meanings are the rationale for emptiness and existence: that is, being devoid of intrinsic nature and therefore existing is the rationale for existence; being dependently arisen and therefore empty is the rationale for emptiness. The "rationale" is simply causes and conditions. That is to say, on what grounds does [the notion of] being devoid of intrinsic nature establish the meaning of emptiness? The explanation states: because [dharmas] arise from conditions, they are devoid of intrinsic nature. Therefore, dependent arising devoid of intrinsic nature is the rationale for emptiness. On what grounds does dependent arising serve as the meaning of existence? The explanation states: precisely because they lack a fixed intrinsic nature, they first come to constitute illusory existence from conditions; therefore, being devoid of intrinsic nature is the rationale for existence. Hence the Madhyamakaśāstra, "Chapter on the Four Noble Truths", states: "If one does not know emptiness, does not know the causes and conditions of emptiness, and does not know the meaning of emptiness, one will consequently produce vexation for oneself—just as one who is unskilled in incantations or unskilled in seizing a venomous snake." If one views these four phrases collectively in relation to emptiness and existence, they are all called rationales; therefore it is said that because they are dependently arisen, they are called existing, and because they are dependently arisen, they are called empty; because they are devoid of intrinsic nature, they are called existing, and because they are devoid of intrinsic nature, they are called empty. Truly, because all dharmas necessarily arise from conditions, existing from conditions they are necessarily devoid of intrinsic nature; and because they are devoid of intrinsic nature, they therefore follow conditions. Conditioning is existence and nature is nonexistence—there are no two dharmas whatsoever; yet, in terms of the myriad differentiated classes of illusory existence, it is termed the conventional truth, and in terms of the single flavour of being devoid of intrinsic nature, it is termed the ultimate truth. Furthermore, regarding the fact that among the four phrases, only the third phrase cites scriptural proof for its establishment: this is because [the principle of] "existing because of being devoid of intrinsic nature" is difficult to reveal. If one provides proofs in full: first, regarding "existing because of being dependently arisen", the Lotus Sūtra says: "They exist only through causes and conditions, being spoken of because they arise from inverted views"; the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa says: "All dharmas arise by reason of causes and conditions"; the Madhyamakaśāstra says: "Never has there been a single dharma that does not arise from causes and conditions", and so forth—all of which are the meaning of "existing through causes and conditions". Second, regarding "being empty because of being dependently arisen", a sūtra says: "That which is produced by causes and conditions is devoid of arising"; the treatise says: "If a dharma arises from conditions, it is devoid of intrinsic nature. If it is devoid of intrinsic nature, how can this dharma exist?" Third, as for the statement, "Because the meaning of emptiness exists, all dharmas can be established", this is also a passage from the "Chapter on the Four Noble Truths". Because the preceding chapters eliminated existence by means of emptiness, the Hīnayāna pointed out a fault to the bodhisattva, saying: "If all dharmas are empty, devoid of arising and devoid of cessation, then the dharmas of the four noble truths would not exist." The bodhisattva replied by reversing it, saying: "If everything were not empty, devoid of arising and devoid of cessation, then the dharmas of the four noble truths would not exist." That is to say, the Hīnayāna maintains that because of emptiness the four truths do not exist, whereas the bodhisattva maintains that because of non-emptiness the four truths would not exist; if the meaning of emptiness exists, only then are the four truths established. Hence the verse states: "Because the meaning of emptiness exists, / All dharmas can be established; / If the meaning of emptiness does not exist, / Then nothing can be established." This is precisely "existing because of being devoid of intrinsic nature".

32.4

Regarding the Commentary's line, "The sūtra says: 'From the basis of non-abiding all dharmas are established'": this has already been cited above, but should now be cited again. This is from the second chapter of the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa, investigating the basis of the wholesome and unwholesome. The sūtra therefore states: "'What is the basis of the wholesome and unwholesome?' The answer was: 'The body is the basis.' It was further asked: 'What is the basis of the body?' The answer was: 'Desire and craving are the basis.' It was further asked: 'What is the basis of desire and craving?' The answer was: 'False conceptual discrimination is the basis.' It was further asked: 'What is the basis of false conceptual discrimination?' The answer was: 'Inverted thought is the basis.' It was further asked: 'What is the basis of inverted thought?' The answer was: 'Non-abiding is the basis.' It was further asked: 'What is the basis of non-abiding?' The answer was: 'Non-abiding has no basis. Mañjuśrī! From the basis of non-abiding all dharmas are established.'" Venerable Rui explained: "'Non-abiding' is another name for the real mark, and the real mark is another name for the emptiness of nature; therefore from being devoid of intrinsic nature all dharmas exist." The rest is as explained elsewhere. For the fourth, one should cite the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa: "By what are they empty? They are empty merely by virtue of names." In this way, these two dharmas have no determinate nature. A sūtra says: "The dharmatā is originally empty and tranquil, devoid of grasping and devoid of seeing." It also says: "All dharmas are devoid of intrinsic nature; this is the true essence of the Buddha." The eighth bhūmi says: "Taking the absence of nature as nature." The beginning and end of the Madhyamakaśāstra both elucidate the absence of nature in order to reveal true emptiness.

32.5

Regarding the Commentary's line beginning with "Therefore, because they are devoid of intrinsic nature and dependently arisen, they are empty": this is the second [section], reconciling with the import of the middle way, clarifying that emptiness and existence here are both the middle way. Within the text there are three [parts]: first, rejecting the erroneous and revealing the correct; second, establishing the meaning of the middle way; third, concluding the establishment of the middle way. In the first part, "because they are devoid of intrinsic nature and dependently arisen, they are empty" reiterates together the two kinds of emptiness from the previous four phrases. Both of these two kinds of emptiness are free from the nonexistence of the view of annihilationism. The nonexistence of the view of annihilationism is a determinate nonexistence; determinate nonexistence clings to annihilation. Here, being empty because of dependent arising is not determinate nonexistence, and being empty because of being devoid of intrinsic nature is also not determinate nonexistence. What is determinately nonexistent is categorically devoid of entity, like the hair of a tortoise or the horns of a hare. Here, [dharmas] are merely dependently arisen and devoid of intrinsic nature; hence, it is not determinate nonexistence. The above rejects the erroneous to constitute true emptiness. Second, revealing the correct: the phrase "because they are devoid of intrinsic nature and dependently arisen, they exist" also reiterates together the previous two kinds of existence, both of which are not the existence of the view of eternalism. The existence of the view of eternalism is existence with a fixed intrinsic nature; here, existence from conditions is not existence with a fixed intrinsic nature—how much less could existence due to being devoid of intrinsic nature be determinate existence? This also rejects the erroneous above to constitute illusory existence. Revealing that it is illusory existence means that, arising from conditions and devoid of intrinsic nature, it is like an illusory person. It is not that there is no illusory person, but the illusory person is not real; therefore it is called illusory existence, and is also called subtle existence. Because it takes non-existence as existence, it is called subtle existence. However, since the views of annihilationism and eternalism arise from nonexistence and existence, the views of nonexistence and existence are themselves the views of annihilationism and eternalism. Why does the Commentary reiterate them? There is a profound intention here: the two views of annihilationism and eternalism mostly belong to heterodox traditions, being the view of extremes subsumed under the five sharp afflictive views; whereas the views of nonexistence and existence permeate the correct Dharma when grasping at the characteristics of emptiness and existence without yet being able to accord with principle, which constitutes the views of nonexistence and existence. Truly abandoning these views of nonexistence and existence once and for all belongs solely to great bodhisattvas. Hence the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa says: "Teaching the Dharma as neither existing nor nonexistent, all dharmas arise through causes and conditions." The two extremes of existence and nonexistence have no remaining habituations; yet in the sūtra below, when good friends who had served all Buddhas throughout history and already verified Dharma gates, it is still said that they nevertheless conceptualised what was nonexistent in dharmas as existing, and so forth.

32.6

Regarding the Commentary's line beginning with "Illusory existence is precisely the existence that is non-existence": this is the second [section], establishing the meaning of the middle way. Here there are three middle ways: First, illusory existence is in itself the middle way: that is, because existence and non-existence are unobstructed with each other, they constitute the middle way; hence it is said that existence is the existence that is non-existence. Speaking of "non-existence", its entire essence is completely empty, because there is nothing possessed. Speaking of "existence" again, it is also called "not non-existence", meaning that it does not depend on destroying differentiated characteristics. Hence the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā states: "All dharmas, having nothing possessed, exist in this manner"; therefore, being neither existent nor non-existent is called the middle way; this is the meaning of illusory existence. Second, the statement "True emptiness is the emptiness that is not empty" explains the middle way upon true emptiness itself: that is, because non-emptiness and emptiness are unimpeded. Speaking of "not empty", it is because emptiness has no characteristic of emptiness. Speaking of "empty" again, it is also called "not non-empty", meaning that all other characteristics without exception are exhausted. Therefore, being neither empty nor non-empty is called the middle way; this is the meaning of true emptiness. A sūtra says: "Emptiness and non-emptiness cannot be spoken of; it is called true emptiness." The Madhyamakaśāstra says: "The dharma devoid of nature is also nonexistent, because all dharmas are empty." Reiterating the emptiness that is not empty, it is therefore called "unreal emptiness". Regarding "Because it is an existence that is non-existence, it is called non-real existence": this incidentally reconciles a differing interpretation, its intent being no different from the preceding. That is, it comprehensively reconciles Master Zhao's Treatise on Unreal Emptiness. Master Kang said: "Because the ten thousand dharmas are not real, they are empty"—this failed to grasp Zhao's intention. Master Da said: "Non-motion pertains to the conventional; the conventional does not arise. Unreal constitutes the ultimate; the ultimate is merely a nominal designation"—this indeed grasped Zhao's intention. Here, "true emptiness" is not the true emptiness spoken of previously in contrast to subtle existence; here, "true emptiness" is the object to be refuted in the diseased person, referring to the view that the ultimate truth is categorically devoid of entity as the meaning of true emptiness. Therefore Master Zhao negated it with "not", saying that it is not categorically devoid of entity; hence he called it "unreal emptiness". That is to say, the very absence of intrinsic nature in the ten thousand existents is termed the ultimate truth—how could it ever be categorically empty? Therefore he called it "unreal emptiness". This unreal emptiness is precisely the true emptiness mentioned before. Regarding "Because it is an existence that is non-existence, it is called non-real existence": this is distinguished in contrast to the "unreal emptiness" above. True emptiness and real existence are both the two extremes; unreal and non-real are precisely the correct principle.

32.7

Regarding the Commentary's line, "Neither empty nor existent is the meaning of the middle way": this is the third [part], concluding the establishment of the middle way. However, its primary intention is that, combining the two previous meanings of true emptiness, they are collectively called "not empty"; and combining the two previous meanings of illusory existence, they are both called "not existent"; emptiness and existence being non-dual constitutes the middle way. Furthermore, taking illusory existence as "not empty" and true emptiness as "not existent" are both the meaning of the middle way. In reality, above the emptiness and existence mentioned above there are two middle ways; together with this one they make three, which will be expounded extensively in the harmonization below. The above completes the first gateway of general explanation.

32.8

Regarding the Commentary's line beginning with "Furthermore, opening up this emptiness and existence": this is the second [part], opening up the meanings and separately explaining them. Within this there are two: first, opening them up directly; second, from "Mañjuśrī respectively by..." onwards, concluding by demonstrating questions and answers. Now for the first. "First, true emptiness necessarily exhausts illusory existence": this is the meaning of mutual subversion, and is also the gateway where true principle deprives phenomena in the Dharmadhātu Contemplation. Because phenomena gather principle to be completed, they cause phenomenal characteristics to be without exception exhausted, so that only the one true principle appears equally—because apart from the true principle not a fragment of phenomena can be found. It is like water depriving waves: no wave is not exhausted. The Prajñāpāramitā states: "Therefore in emptiness there is no form, no feeling, perception, formation, or consciousness", and so forth. "Second, true emptiness necessarily accomplishes illusory existence": this is the meaning of mutual production and the meaning of non-obstruction, and is also the gateway where phenomena are accomplished based on principle in the Dharmadhātu Contemplation. That is to say, phenomena have no separate substance and must depend on the true principle to be established, because all dependent originations are devoid of intrinsic nature. Because of the principle of the absence of nature, phenomena are first accomplished—just as waves, gathering water, are established. It is also that based on the tathāgatagarbha all dharmas can exist. Hence the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā states: "If all dharmas were not empty, there would be no path and no fruit." The Madhyamakaśāstra states: "Because the meaning of emptiness exists, all dharmas can be established."

32.9

Regarding the commentary's statement, "First, illusory existence necessarily conceals true emptiness": this is the meaning of mutual opposition, and also the gate of "phenomena concealing principle" in the contemplation of the dharmadhātu. That is to say, true principle accords with conditions to form various phenomenal dharmas; however, since these phenomenal dharmas are opposed to principle, they cause phenomena to be apparent while principle is not manifest. Because apart from phenomena there is no principle, it is like waves overtaking the water, such that the water is inevitably concealed; thus within form there is no characteristic of emptiness. "Second, illusory existence necessarily does not obstruct true emptiness": this is the meaning of non-obstruction, and also the meaning of mutual production, as well as the gate of "phenomena revealing principle" in the contemplation of the dharmadhātu. That is to say, because phenomena integrate principle, phenomena are vacuous while principle is real. Because phenomena are vacuous, the principle within the entirety of phenomena stands out revealed, just as the vacuous characteristic of waves reveals the essence of the water. Hence the treatise says: "If a dharma arises from conditions, it is devoid of intrinsic nature." However, in the two meanings of true emptiness above, the second meaning subsumed non-obstruction under mutual production. Now, in the second meaning of illusory existence, it subsumes mutual production under non-obstruction. What is the reason for this? In reality, the second meanings of both emptiness and existence contain both mutual production and non-obstruction, and the alternating omission is because phenomena are established based on principle, and thus previously there was mutual production; principle is not fabricated by phenomena, and thus now there is no mutual production. Yet, when the preceding three meanings spoke of emptiness and existence mutually producing one another, it was merely in terms of phenomenal dharmas being able to reveal principle that it was called "producing principle." Moreover, these four meanings are precisely the four previous meanings of "arising from conditions, therefore empty," and so forth. First, "true emptiness necessarily extinguishes illusory existence" is the meaning of emptiness due to lack of intrinsic nature. Second, "necessarily establishes illusory existence" is the meaning of existence due to lack of intrinsic nature. Third, "illusory existence necessarily conceals true emptiness" is the meaning of existence due to arising from conditions. Fourth, "necessarily does not obstruct true emptiness" is the meaning of emptiness due to arising from conditions. The former four generally illuminated the rationale of emptiness and existence; the present four directly explain the characteristics of emptiness and existence.

32.10

Regarding the commentary from "However, these two being non-dual" downwards: this is the third [part], fusion. Within it are two: first, directly explaining; second, concluding with praise. The first combines the previous four meanings. One must understand that the four meanings have different designations in two places: above, "true emptiness necessarily extinguishes illusory existence" is the meaning of emptiness on [the side of] true emptiness; second, "necessarily establishes illusory existence" is the meaning of non-emptiness on [the side of] true emptiness; third, "illusory existence necessarily conceals true emptiness" is the meaning of existence on [the side of] illusory existence; fourth, "necessarily does not obstruct true emptiness" is the meaning of non-existence on [the side of] illusory existence. Furthermore, one must understand that existence and non-existence, emptiness and non-emptiness each have two meanings. The two meanings on existence are: first, the meaning of not destroying the characteristic of existence; second, the meaning of precluding annihilationism; thus existence is designated as "not non-existent." The two meanings on non-existence are: first, the meaning of transcending the characteristic of existence; second, the meaning of being identical with emptiness. The two meanings on emptiness are: first, the meaning of not destroying nature; second, the meaning of precluding definitive existence; thus emptiness is designated as "not non-empty." The two meanings on non-emptiness are: first, the meaning of transcending the characteristic of emptiness; second, the meaning of being identical with existence. Having understood designations and meanings, now the commentary's fusion comprises five tiers, constituting five kinds of Middle Way. The first states, "Meaning that existence and non-existence being non-dual constitute one illusory existence": this is the mutual combination of the two meanings on existence; however, taking the meaning of not destroying characteristics on existence and the meaning of transcending the characteristic of existence on non-existence, they combine into one illusory existence, which is the Middle Way of conventional truth.

32.11

Regarding the commentary's "Emptiness and non-emptiness being non-dual constitute one true emptiness": the two meanings on emptiness combine on their own; however, taking the meaning of not destroying nature on emptiness and the meaning of transcending the characteristic of emptiness on non-emptiness, they combine into one true emptiness, which is the Middle Way of ultimate truth. The former is the Middle Way of being identical with characteristics yet devoid of characteristics; this one is the Middle Way of being identical with nature yet devoid of nature; it is also the meaning of preservation and annihilation being non-dual.

32.12

Regarding the commentary's "Furthermore, non-emptiness and existence being non-dual constitute one illusory existence": the preceding pair was the self-combination of emptiness and existence; this next pair is the interlacing and combining of the four meanings of emptiness and existence. Now this third one takes the meaning of non-emptiness on true emptiness and the meaning of existence on illusory existence, these two meanings according with each other to illuminate their non-duality. However, on non-emptiness it takes the meaning of being identical with existence, and on existence it takes the meaning of precluding annihilationism; hence they jointly constitute illusory existence, which is the Middle Way of non-emptiness and non-non-existence, where preservation and annihilation are unobstructed.

32.13

Regarding the commentary's "Emptiness and non-existence being non-dual constitute one true emptiness": this is the fourth, taking the meaning of emptiness on true emptiness and the meaning of non-existence on illusory existence, these two meanings according with each other to illuminate their non-duality. However, it is the meaning of precluding definitive existence on emptiness, and the meaning of being identical with emptiness on non-existence; hence the two accord with each other to constitute true emptiness, which is the Middle Way of non-existence and non-non-emptiness, where preservation and annihilation are unobstructed. The third preserves the conventional and annihilates the ultimate; this one preserves the ultimate and annihilates the conventional. Furthermore, the third is emptiness penetrating existence; this one is existence penetrating emptiness; both are the mutual penetration of the two truths.

32.14

Regarding the commentary's "Furthermore, illusory existence and true emptiness being non-dual constitute the one-taste dharmadhātu": this is the fifth, collectively combining the previous four to render them non-dual. However, the respective combinations and mutual penetrations above did not go beyond true emptiness and illusory existence; therefore now they are combined into the one-taste dharmadhātu, which is the Middle Way wherein the two truths are completely fused. Although the third and fourth fused the two truths, emptiness and existence were fused separately; now this is the non-obstruction of emptiness and existence, which is precisely the non-obstruction of non-emptiness and non-existence, where raising one completely encompasses [all]. If making the ultimate identical with the conventional is solely one illusory existence, and fusing the conventional to be identical with the ultimate is solely one true emptiness, then the non-duality of emptiness and existence is the Middle Way of dual illumination, and the non-duality of non-emptiness and non-existence is the Middle Way of dual negation; negation and illumination are simultaneous, preservation and annihilation unobstructed. Hence, in the second part of the commentary, concluding with praise, it says: "The Dharma gate devoid of characteristics and devoid of nature, unimpeded, unobstructed, and non-conceptualizing." This is because illusory existence is regarded as characteristic, and true emptiness is regarded as nature. Furthermore, both emptiness and existence are characteristics, while non-emptiness and non-existence are nature. Furthermore, separate manifestation is characteristic, while collective fusion is nature. Now, mutually superseding and dually fusing, both are completely transcended. The non-conceptualizing Dharma is spoken solely in terms of cognition; only non-conceptual cognition can exhaust its source. That which is unimpeded and unobstructed applies to both object and cognition: the five tiers above are mostly spoken in terms of object, and when mind and cognition accord with them, they become the five contemplations. Since the five objects are fused, the five contemplations are also fused; using completely fused cognition to accord with unobstructed objects, mind and object are unobstructed. In the mind are inexhaustible objects; on the objects is the unobstructed mind; therefore one must discard words to accord with this principle. In summary, these are the profound characteristics of conditioned arising; the remaining meanings have already been clarified in the overarching introduction.

32.15

Regarding the commentary from "Furthermore, nature has two meanings" downwards: this is the fourth, separately explaining the meaning of nature. Within it are four: first, direct explanation; second, proof through negation; third, concluding by returning to the Middle Way; fourth, concluding with an exhortation to cultivate and study. For the first, the text has four sections: first, jointly positing the two gates; second, from "Because of the meaning of existence, it is said to be revealed by the two kinds of emptiness" downwards, explaining the meanings of emptiness and existence; third, from "Because of the meaning of existence, it is said to be unchanging" downwards, using the initial gate to explain changing and unchanging; fourth, from "These two being non-dual" downwards, jointly fusing the two gates of unchanging and according with conditions. Regarding the third explanation of changing and unchanging: why is unchanging spoken of through the meaning of existence? Since tathatā is revealed by the two kinds of emptiness, it is quiescent, eternally enduring, and its essence undergoes no change. Why is according with conditions spoken of through the meaning of emptiness? Because other-dependence lacking intrinsic nature is precisely the meaning of emptiness, the principle of emptiness can only be revealed within conditions. Therefore one knows that among the four [points] of according with conditions, the above takes either meaning to subsume the two schools: because the Dharma-characteristics School only [maintains] unchanging, and the Markless School only [maintains] nature-emptiness, one must have the fourth, jointly fusing the two gates completely and unobstructed, to accord with the intent of the Perfectly Fused Dharmatā School. Since the two meanings are identical with emptiness and identical with existence, they are also identical with according with conditions and identical with unchanging; therefore the nature of emptiness is precisely the nature of existence. Because it is unchanging, it can accord with conditions; thus the nature of existence is precisely the nature of emptiness. Were it not truly existent, what would accord with conditions to form all dharmas? Just as if there were originally no water, what would accord with the wind to form waves?

32.16

Regarding the commentary from "If it were solely unchanging" downwards: this is the second, proof through negation. "If it were solely unchanging, how could nature participate in dharmas?" That is, nature would be like empty space, and dharmas like the stars and constellations: empty space is not the nature of the stars and constellations, so how could tathatā be the nature of all dharmas? Then nature and dharmas would be different, so how could they relate to each other? "If it only accorded with conditions, how could it be called true nature?" Because conditions have arising and ceasing, it would not be true. The commentary from "According to where it flows" downwards borrows the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra to establish the two meanings. Having differences according to its flow is the meaning of according with conditions; the fundamental taste remaining is the meaning of unchanging. That is, in the seventh fascicle (the eighth fascicle of the Southern text), the "Chapter on the Nature of the Tathāgata," answering Kāśyapa's question, reveals that nature is permanent. The sūtra says: "Furthermore, good son! For example, on the Snow Mountains there is a medicine of single taste called 'medicinal taste.' Its taste is extremely sweet; being beneath deep thickets, people cannot see it. If someone smells its fragrance, they immediately know that this medicine must exist in that place. In the past, there was a wheel-turning king who, for the sake of this medicine, made wooden pipes in place after place on the Snow Mountains to receive this medicine. When this medicine matured, it flowed out from the ground and gathered in the wooden pipes; its taste was genuine and pure. After the king passed away, thereafter this medicine became sour or salty, sweet or bitter, pungent or bland. In this way, the single taste had various differences according to where it flowed, while the true taste of this medicine remained on the mountain, like the full moon. Common people of meager merit, although digging and toiling with utmost effort, were unable to obtain it. Then another holy king appeared in the world; due to causes and conditions of merit, he immediately obtained the genuine and pure taste of this medicine. Good son! The secret treasury of the Tathāgata, its taste is also like this. Being covered by the thicket of afflictions, sentient beings of ignorance cannot see it. The medicine of single taste is an analogy for the Buddha-nature. Due to afflictions, it produces various tastes, namely: hells, animals, hungry ghosts, devas, humans; male, female, neither male nor female; kṣatriya, brāhmaṇa, vaiśya, śūdra. The Buddha-nature is valorous and difficult to destroy; therefore, there is none who can kill or destroy it. If there were one who could kill it, then it would sever the Buddha-nature. Such Buddha-nature can ultimately never be severed; that it could be severed is impossible. What is termed the nature of the self is precisely the secret treasury of the Tathāgata; such a secret treasury cannot be destroyed or burned by anything. Although indestructible, yet it cannot be seen. If one succeeds in accomplishing anuttarasamyaksaṃbodhi, only then does one realize and know it. For this reason, there is none who can kill it." Explanation: Matching the Dharma to the metaphor, the text is also easy to see. However, that secret treasury of the Tathāgata and Buddha-nature, matching the single taste, is precisely the two meanings of unchanging and according with conditions of the nature of the tathāgatagarbha here being clearly distinguished. The Snow Mountains illustrate the sūtra; its past king illustrates past buddhas; the another holy king is precisely "if one attains bodhi" in the application; the rest can all be understood.

32.17

The commentary's statement, "Furthermore, if nature were separated from phenomena," repeatedly establishes the above meaning. Above, it said, "how could the nature participate in phenomena?" which is the meaning of separation. As for "it would result in annihilation," if nature were separated from phenomena and not identical to the emptiness of phenomena, the nature would result in annihilation. As for "phenomena being separated from nature would be non-existent originally and existing now," nature has existed from of old; this is original existence. Since phenomena are separated from nature, they would be non-existent originally and existing now. What fault is there in being non-existent originally and existing now? [It would mean that] sentient beings, originally non-existent in empty space, would constantly emerge. If so, phenomena being identical to nature should mean they are not non-existent originally and existing now; why then does the treatise say that coming from non-existence into existence is called "arising," and going from self-existence back to non-existence is called "cessation"? The explanation is: when conditions assemble and things become manifest, that is "non-existent originally and existing now"; beginningless sentient beings cannot be said to be "non-existent originally and existing now." Furthermore, the Nirvāṇa [Sūtra] says: "Non-existent originally and existing now, originally existing and now non-existent—that there are phenomena of the three periods of time is impossible." The first half is based on characteristics; the second half is based on nature. Since characteristics and nature cannot be separated from each other, phenomena that are originally non-existent are not entirely non-existent originally, and phenomena that exist now are not entirely new in their existence now. Therefore, it says below that "that there are phenomena of the three periods of time is impossible." The extensive meaning of this verse has already appeared in the first chapter.

32.18

As for the commentary's statement, "Furthermore, if phenomena were identical to nature, the permanence of the nature would entail [phenomena] being permanent": however, permanence and impermanence are neither identical nor separate; this uses non-identity to challenge extreme identity. As for "if nature were identical to phenomena, the cessation of phenomena would entail [the nature] ceasing": this means that if water were identical to waves, the cessation of waves would mean the cessation of water. Now, only the waves cease while the water does not cease; thus, when phenomena cease, the nature does not cease, meaning they are not entirely identical. Hence, in the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā, "The Buddha asked Subhūti: 'When mind arises, is it identical to the nature or not?' He answered: 'It is identical to the nature.' 'Does this mind cease or not?' He answered: 'Arisen phenomena must cease.' The Buddha said: 'Does the true nature cease or not?' He answered: 'It does not cease.' The Buddha said: 'Is this point conceivable or not?' He answered: 'It is inconceivable.'" This is precisely that meaning.

32.19

Regarding the commentary's statement, "Therefore the two mutually establish each other," thirdly, it concludes by returning to the middle way, which roughly has three tiers. The above "neither identical nor separate" is the middle way, and because of this, "neither annihilation nor permanence" and "neither existence nor non-existence" are established; one should also say "neither changing nor unchanging."

32.20

Regarding the commentary's statement, "If one can truly apprehend this conjunction," fourthly, it concludes by exhorting practice and study, preventing one-sided attachments. Above, the general meaning has been clarified; next comes the formal explanation of the text. The commentary states, "First, answering by what cause [there are] various kinds, this has two senses": this indicates the topic. That is to say, this single verse contains, among the four causes, the second, the perfuming of the eight consciousnesses, and the third, having no fixed nature.

32.21

Regarding the commentary's statement, "First, through the eight consciousnesses," it distinguishes the second cause.

32.22

Regarding the commentary's statement, "In the next line, 'mind' is the basic consciousness in its sense of gathering and arising," and so forth: the fifth fascicle of the Cheng weishi [lun] says: "How should one know that this seventh and eighth consciousnesses have distinct substances separate from the eye-consciousness and so forth? Explanation: Because the Hīnayāna claims that this is merely the sixth [consciousness] having entered the past, this question is posed. The treatise says: Because sacred teachings and correct reasoning are the valid measures. That is, the Bhagavān in various sūtras speaks of the three distinct meanings of mind (citta), thought (manas), and consciousness (vijñāna): gathering and arising is called 'mind,' deliberation is called 'thought,' and discernment is called 'consciousness'—these are the three distinct meanings. Explanation: The above is the general explanation. That is, the Hīnayāna claims that the future is called 'mind,' the past is called 'thought,' the present is 'consciousness,' and so forth. Although there are various conceptual differentiations, there are no distinct substances. Now, to show the sūtra evidence, the treatise states: Although these three meanings apply generally across the eight consciousnesses, yet according to what is predominantly manifest, the eighth is called 'mind,' because it gathers the seeds of all dharmas and gives rise to all dharmas. The seventh is called 'thought,' because it takes the storehouse consciousness and so forth as its object and constantly and attentively deliberates upon it as a self and so forth. The remaining six are called 'consciousness,' because they operate discerning the six distinct objects in a coarse, shifting, and discontinuous manner." The explanation is: Being perfumed by all active dharmas is gathering the seeds of all dharmas; taking present dharmas as support and seeds as causes, it can produce all dharmas, hence it is said to "give rise to all dharmas." As for "takes the storehouse consciousness and so forth as its object": on the causal stage with outflows, it only takes the object of the self; on the causal stage without outflows, it takes the eighth [consciousness] and tathatā as objects; and on the fruitional stage, it is permitted to take all dharmas as objects, which is why the treatise says "and so forth." As for "coarse, shifting," and so on: easily discerned is called "coarse," changing and shifting is called "shifting," not continuous is called "intermittent"; each having its distinct object, they obtain their specific names. The treatise refers to the gāthā in the ninth fascicle of the Laṅkāvatāra: "The storehouse consciousness is called 'mind'; the nature of deliberation is called 'thought'; that which can discern the characteristics of objects is what is called 'consciousness.'"

32.23

Regarding the commentary's statement, "This is according to the specific meaning," it reveals the meanings of general and specific. The sixty-third fascicle of the Yogācāra[-bhūmi] also only has the specific names, largely identical to the Weishi [lun], and does not offer a separate explanation below. In "Generally, then, the eight consciousnesses," it generally sets forth the characteristics whereby all eight consciousnesses obtain all three names. The speaker should say: If one explains mind by gathering and arising, the eighth alone is named mind. If one explains mind by accumulation, all eight consciousnesses are named mind. If one explains thought by deliberation, the seventh alone is named thought. If one explains thought by equal and immediate [antecedent], all eight consciousnesses are named thought. If one explains consciousness by discerning distinct objects, the first six alone are named consciousness, meaning they discern the distinctive realms of the six dusts. If one explains consciousness by discernment [in general], all eight consciousnesses are named consciousness. This is the meaning of distinct consciousnesses, and its meaning is well established. The first fascicle of the Weishi [lun] says: "Discerning distinct objects and coarse, manifest objects belongs only to the first six, because the six consciousnesses are spoken of in relation to these six dusts." This is precisely that meaning. The general and specific designations are manifestly easy to understand.

32.24

Regarding the commentary's statement, "The sensory faculties apply across the eight consciousnesses, and their kinds are not singular": that all eight consciousnesses have the sense of being faculties is already established as not singular, let alone that among the eight there are further two classes: the first five rely on form, and the latter three rely on mind. Among the three that rely on mind, there are further differences of relying singularly or mutually relying in pairs; if fully stated, there are further differences in number. Thus, the fourth fascicle of the Weishi [lun] says: "All minds and mental factors have three reliances: First, reliance on causes and conditions, meaning that all conditioned dharmas rely on their own seeds, for separated from their own causes and conditions, they definitely do not arise. Second, reliance on sovereign conditions, meaning that all minds and mental factors of the internal six bases rely on this, for separated from simultaneous faculties, they definitely do not operate. Third, reliance on equal and immediate conditions, meaning that all minds and mental factors taking the immediately ceased thought as object rely on this, for separated from the opening and guiding faculty, they definitely do not arise." The explanation is: Faculty and consciousness being simultaneous is called "simultaneous." The preceding ceased consciousness and so forth can still yield and guide the subsequent arising, which is called "opening and guiding." But among these three reliances, what are the distinct characteristics of the terms "arising" (生), "operating" (轉), and "starting up" (起)? Arising is stated in terms of relying on seeds to produce the substance and arise; operating is stated in terms of according with and imparting power to cause to operate; starting up is stated in terms of opening the path from before so that the subsequent can be raised. But regarding the simultaneous reliance of the eight consciousnesses, four masters differ; here we only employ the fourth, Dharmapāla. Dharmapāla extensively refuted the previous views; hence the Weishi [lun] concludes: "Due to this, the simultaneous reliances of the five consciousnesses are definitely of four kinds: the five material faculties, and the sixth, seventh, and eighth consciousnesses; for if any one is lacking, they definitely do not operate, because the shared-object, discriminating, defiled-pure, and fundamental reliances are distinct." The explanation is: The shared-object is the five material faculties, because faculty and consciousness mutually cognize the same object. Discriminating is the sixth, because it discriminates distinctions. Defiled-pure is the seventh, because based on this, defiled and pure consciousnesses and so forth can arise. Fundamental is the eighth, because if separated from the eighth, the others are not established. The treatise says: "The sacred teachings say they rely only on the five faculties because they are unshared; furthermore, they must share the object, being proximately compliant." The explanation is: This harmonizes a contradiction. That is, the first fascicle of the Abhidharma[-samuccaya-vyākhyā] says only that the eye-consciousness relies on the material faculty. Harmonizing this by "unshared" means that the eye faculty is only the reliance for the eye-consciousness, not the reliance for the other consciousnesses, and so too for the other four. The sixth, seventh, and eighth consciousnesses serve generally as reliances for the other consciousnesses. Moreover, "must share the object" means that the faculty must cognize the object together with the consciousness. Furthermore, "proximately compliant" means that the sixth, seventh, and other consciousnesses are distant; therefore, the five consciousnesses definitely have four reliances. The treatise says: "The simultaneous reliances of the sixth mental consciousness are of only two kinds: the seventh and eighth consciousnesses, for if any one is lacking, it definitely does not operate. Although it apprehends objects clearly together with the five consciousnesses, they are not definitely present, hence they are not reliances. The sacred teachings say it relies only on the seventh because it is the defiled-pure reliance, belongs to the category of evolving consciousnesses, and is proximately compliant." The explanation is: In the treatise there are three parts: First, it directly clarifies. Next, from "Although together with the five consciousnesses" downward, it resolves an outside objection. That is, someone asks: The mental consciousness apprehends objects clearly with the five [consciousnesses]; why does it not also take the five consciousnesses as reliances? Therefore it answers: Because they are not definitely present, for when the mental consciousness does not obtain the five consciousnesses, it can cognize independently. Lastly, from "The sacred teachings say it relies only on the seventh" downward, it harmonizes with other teachings, which is also the Abhidharma. The harmonization also has three points: First, it clarifies that it is its defiled-pure faculty; second, the sixth and seventh are both evolving consciousnesses; third, it predominantly induces the mental consciousness to give rise to defiled attachments, hence it is called "compliant." The treatise says: "The simultaneous reliance of the seventh mental consciousness is of only one kind, namely the eighth storehouse consciousness; if this is absent, it definitely does not operate. As the gāthā says: 'With the ālaya as reliance, manas therefore operates; relying on citta and manas, the other evolving consciousnesses can arise.' The simultaneous reliance of the ālaya consciousness is also of only one kind, namely the seventh consciousness; for if the supporting consciousness is absent, it definitely does not operate. The treatise says that the storehouse consciousness constantly operates simultaneously with manas. Furthermore, it says that the storehouse consciousness constantly relies on the defiled, which is this manas." The explanation is: The gāthā cited above is from the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra; the treatise cited above is the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra. Now, as cited above, the Weishi explains the distinctions of consciousnesses differently; hence the present commentary says, "their kinds are not singular." Yet, in accordance with the various sacred teachings, it speaks in terms of the predominant: thus, among the five, it takes the unshared reliance; for the sixth, it takes the defiled; and so it mentions one for each. The other meanings are implicit within "their kinds are not singular," and are subsumed in the subsequent commentary text that re-clarifies the seventh and eighth consciousnesses. Since the seventh is the defiled faculty, it serves as the defiled-pure reliance for the preceding six. As the eighth is the universal reliance, it serves as the fundamental reliance for the preceding seven. As for "defiled faculty": the fourth fascicle of the treatise says: "This thought spontaneously and constantly takes the storehouse consciousness as object, and is associated with four fundamental afflictions. What are the four? They are self-delusion, self-view, together with self-pride and self-love; these are named the four kinds. Self-delusion means avidyā: being ignorant of the characteristics of a self and deluded about the principle of non-self, it is called self-delusion. Self-view means grasping at a self: falsely calculating non-self dharmas to be a self, it is called self-view. Self-pride means arrogance: relying on the grasped self to cause the mind to be haughty, it is called self-pride. Self-love means self-greed: generating deep attachment to the grasped self, it is called self-love. 'Together with self-pride and love' means that view, pride, and love occur together, refuting the non-association doctrine of other schools." That commentary explains: "Other schools refers to the Sarvāstivādins, because [for them] view, love, and pride cannot arise together. The treatise says that these four constantly arise to agitate and turbid the inner mind, causing the external evolving consciousnesses to constantly become contaminated; sentient beings, due to this, transmogrify in the cycle of birth and death and cannot escape, hence they are called afflictions." The explanation is: Exactly because the four afflictions are constantly concomitant and so forth, it is called the defiled faculty. In the treatise text below, it is frequently named the defiled manas.

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大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔 — Classical Chinese