大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔 32.45

32.45

Regarding the Commentary's 'Second, the upper two lines: "phenomena arisen from causes and conditions"...' and so forth: this reconciles the meaning of the threefold contemplation in the Dharmatā tradition. Wishing to show its comprehensiveness, it adopts the text with slight differences. The Madhyamakaśāstra verse says: 'Phenomena arisen from causes and conditions, / I state to be precisely empty; / it is also a conventional designation, / and also the meaning of the Middle Way.' Matching it with the sūtra can be understood. However, the phrase 'Middle Way' does not exist in the sūtra text, but merely contains the lower half where emptiness and existence constitute the middle. If taken as distinctly revealed, it is also in the previous verse, 'the dharmatā is non-arisen'; that is, the previous verse also possesses the threefold contemplation: the first line is the Middle Way, the next line is conventional designation, and the lower half is emptiness. Because it was previously matched with tathatā's concordance with conditions, it was not made explicit. Furthermore, tathatā's concordance with conditions is also not different from the threefold contemplation, which can be understood by contemplation. The threefold contemplation has already been elaborated in the Profound Discussion Notes, and the commentary on the 'Chapter on Xianshou' and other chapters will explain it further. Above, the two traditions were separately brought out, adopting texts with slight differences. If reconciled through meaning, the two traditions do not contradict each other: 'Phenomena arisen from causes and conditions' generally adduces the phenomena on which the three natures rely. 'I state to be precisely empty' is the imagined nature. 'It is also a conventional designation' is other-dependent arising. 'And also the meaning of the Middle Way' is consummate reality. Yet if the three natures are kept strictly distinct, that is the Faxiang tradition. Here, all saying 'precisely is' belongs to the Dharmatā tradition; merely whether they are identical or not differs slightly, yet turns into a gulf as vast as heaven. However, the Faxiang tradition also does not hold that they are completely identical or separate, mostly resulting in non-identity; in the Dharmatā tradition, it also does not hold that they are completely identical or separate, mostly resulting in non-difference. In the Faxiang tradition, due to the principle of non-identity, the imagined is empty, but it is merely empty non-existence. The Dharmatā tradition clarifies that due to the absence of the imagined, it renders other-dependence empty. Thus they turn into a gulf as vast as heaven. Later people follow their own attachments, and the two become mutually contradictory; if one empties oneself and seeks the great purport, there is no difference, and to show that the sūtra encompasses both, it fully cites both texts. Furthermore, the sūtra's purport has no discrepancy; the two traditions merely adopt it as they will. Regarding the Commentary's 'Furthermore, that which exists through the discrimination of the delusional mind is posited by subjective attachment as existing' onward: this is the second answer to the question expressing doubt. That is, the question above asked: Is it a single nature, or is it various kinds? Therefore it now answers: because it is permanently empty, it is permanently a single nature; because it is permanently existing, it is permanently various kinds. From 'this is precisely the self-emptiness of the ten thousand things' onward, it is the intention of Master Zhao's Treatise on the Non-Absolute Emptiness. The intention is: when the ten thousand things are of themselves empty, then they are permanently one and permanently many. Therefore that treatise says: 'Investigating that which is neither existent nor non-existent: how could it mean scouring away the ten thousand things, blocking sight and hearing, and making everything desolate and vacuous before it is considered the ultimate truth? Truly, by according with and penetrating right within things, nothing goes against them; being right within the false is right within the true, so the nature does not change. Because the nature does not change, though non-existent, it exists; because nothing goes against things, though existing, it is non-existent. Existing though non-existent is what is called non-existence; non-existent though existing is what is called not non-existence. Thus, it is not that there are no things; things are not real things. Since things are not real things, regarding what thing could they be treated as things? The sūtra says: "The nature of form is of itself empty; it is not that form is destroyed to become empty." This clarifies that the sage, in regard to things, relies on the self-emptiness of the ten thousand things—how could he wait for butchering and slicing to seek penetration?' Commenting, I say: This clarifies that comprehending phenomena is precisely emptiness; it is not analyzing phenomena to clarify emptiness.