大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔 40.3.3

40.3.3

Regarding the commentary's statement, "can give rise to boundless afflictions such as greed, as taught in the Nirvāṇa [Sūtra]": this refers to the twenty-third fascicle, the chapter "Bodhisattva Noble and Virtuous King". The sūtra states: "Furthermore, good son! Although all ordinary beings guard their bodies and minds well, they still give rise to three kinds of unwholesome thoughts. For this reason, even if they sever the afflictions and obtain rebirth in the station of neither-perception-nor-non-perception, they still fall back into the three evil destinies. Good son! Just like a person crossing a great sea who drowns and dies when about to reach the other shore, ordinary beings are also like this: when about to exhaust the three realms of existence, they fall back into the three evil destinies. Why is this? Because they lack wholesome thoughts. What are wholesome thoughts? They are the so-called six recollections." Below, it extensively explains the faults of unwholesome thoughts; hence it says, "as taught in the Nirvāṇa [Sūtra]". As for "adding five to speak of eight thoughts": these are the eight reflections in treatises such as the Kośa. The afflicted thought listed in the commentary below is indeed the harmful thought. The Nirvāṇa [Sūtra] generally speaks of the six recollections as wholesome; here it speaks of them separately, hence taking remedies such as impurity as wholesome, the general meaning of which can be known. Regarding the commentary's statement, "Among the sharp [afflictions], the view of selfhood is the root and generates the sixty-two [views]": as for the view of selfhood, the Vijñaptimātratā treatise calls it satkāyadṛṣṭi. The treatise states: "It refers to grasping the five clinging aggregates as self and what belongs to self, having the activity of serving as the basis for all resorts of views. The distinctions of this view comprise twenty propositions, sixty-five, and so forth, subsumed under conceptually generated ones." Explanation: from "The distinctions of this view..." onward corresponds to what the commentary calls "one: spoken in reliance on the five aggregates throughout the three times". That commentary explains: "As for satkāyadṛṣṭi, in full Sanskrit it is satkāyadṛṣṭi. The Sautrāntika masters say: 'sat' means false, 'kāya' is body, and 'dṛṣṭi' is view. Body means aggregation, that is, a nominal aggregation. One should say that giving rise to a view based on the aggregated body is called the view of selfhood. The Sarvāstivādins say: 'sat' means existent, and 'kāya' etc. are as before. Although one views an aggregated body, it is truly existent. 'Body' is an alternative name for self-substance; one should call it the view of self-substance. The Mahāyāna master explains: 'saṅkrānti-sat' then becomes transference, because it is a phenomenon transformed upon the mind and mental factors in Mahāyāna." It is called the transference view of selfhood; giving rise to this self-view in reliance on the five aggregates, because this serves as the basis, all views are able to arise. Regarding "having the activity of serving as the basis for all resorts of views": "resort" means turning to, the place whereto delusions repair. Regarding "twenty propositions": the Abhidharmasamuccaya, fascicle 1, states: "That is, such as conceptualizing form as self, self possessing form, form belonging to self, and self being within form. One aggregate has four; the five aggregates together have twenty propositions. Five are views of self, and the rest are what belongs to self: namely, associated possession of self (i.e., self possessing form), attendant possession of self (i.e., form belonging to self), and non-separated possession of self (i.e., self being within form); hence there are fifteen possessions of self. This is conceptually operating in relation to the aggregates without distinguishing their points of arising. If traced across the three times, there are sixty. Adding the body being identical to the self makes sixty-one; and the self being different from the body makes sixty-two." Again, conceptualizing permanence, impermanence, and so forth makes sixty-two, as in the chapter "Ten Treasuries". As for the treatise speaking of sixty-five: the Vibhāṣā says, "That is, taking form as the self, and in each of the remaining four aggregates having three possessions of self—namely, as my ornament, my servant, and my vessel—there are twelve. With form as one self, there are altogether thirteen. Across the five aggregates, there are altogether sixty views of what belongs to self. With the five views of self, they make sixty-five." This is conceptually operating in relation to the aggregates while also distinguishing their points of arising. All of these are conceptually generated self-views. Regarding the commentary's statement, "two: relying on the wrong views of heterodox paths, as fully explained in Yogācāra fascicle eighty-seven": in that treatise they are sequenced in terms of delusion regarding the anterior and posterior limits. Here, relying on the Vijñaptimātratā, they are distinguished in terms of the underlying views upon which they rely. Namely, regarding the anterior limit, conceptualizing four [views of] pervasive permanence, four [views of] partial permanence, and so forth; regarding the posterior limit, conceptualizing sixteen [theories] of having perception, eight each of having no perception and neither-with-nor-without-perception, totaling forty distinct theories of permanence. There are seven theories of annihilation regarding the posterior limit. These forty-seven together give rise to extreme views caused by the view of self. There are conceptualizations regarding the anterior limit: two theories of no cause, four theories of having boundaries, four theories of immortalist equivocations; and conceptualizing regarding the posterior limit five [theories of] nirvāṇa in the present life; hence there are sixty-two. These sixty-two have wrong view and extreme view as their essential nature, have the other two views as their retinue, and rely upon the view of selfhood as their fundamental root. This also gives the large numbers. Next, explaining their characteristics according to the Yogācāra: First, regarding the four pervasive permanences: they refer to [the view that] the self and the world are completely permanent, possessing only latency and manifestation; arising on the basis of superior, middling, and inferior dhyānas and so forth, they give rise to recollections of past abodes, generating four theories of permanence: first, through being able to recollect twenty eons of formation and destruction; second, through being able to recollect forty eons; third, through being able to recollect eighty eons; fourth, relying on what is seen with the divine eye in the present world, seeing the continuity of the aggregates of sentient beings as they die and are born, they then grasp that both the self and the world are permanent. As for the four partial permanences: it means that all four are partial. First: passing away from the Brahmā heaven to be born here, one obtains the supernormal knowledge of past abodes and forms such grasps as: 'King Brahmā is permanent, while we are impermanent.' Hence it is called partial. Second: hearing that King Brahmā holds such a view as: 'The primary elements are permanent, while the mind is impermanent.' Or vice versa. Third: there are those who previously passed away from the heavens of play-forgetfulness to be born here, who obtain supernormal knowledge and give rise to the grasp: 'Those who are not born here are the permanent self, while those born here are impermanent.' Fourth: there are those who previously passed away from the heavens of mutual defilement, whose partial [permanence] is the same as before. The dwelling place of these devas is on the tiers of Mount Meru, or in the Heaven of the Thirty-Three. Explanation: If according to the Yogācāra, the two theories of no cause are explained right here, because they similarly conceptualize the anterior limit. In the Vijñaptimātratā, after this it clarifies the sixteen [theories] of having perception and so forth. As for the sixteen, there are four sets of four propositions. [In the first set:] 1. 'My self has form and has perception after death': grasping form as the self is called 'my self has form'. Spoken with regard to grasping dharmas, it is called 'having perception'. This includes all of the desire realm and a portion of the form realm, excluding the non-percipient heaven. 2. 'My self is formless and has perception after death': grasping the formless aggregates as the self. This is found from the desire realm up to the sphere of nothingness, excluding only [the station of] neither-perception-nor-non-perception. 3. 'My self both has form and is formless, and has perception after death': grasping the five aggregates as the self. 4. 'My self neither has form nor is formless, and has form after death': this negates the third; relying on samāpattis with investigation and examination, it can all be generated. The second set of four propositions states: 1. Grasping that 'my self has a boundary and has perception after death': grasping form as the self whose substance has limits, such as a finger-joint.