大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔 40.3.3

40.3.3

疏「能生貪等無量煩惱如涅槃說」者，即第二十三經〈高貴德王菩薩品〉。 經云「復次善男子！ 一切凡夫雖善護身心，猶故生於三種惡覺。 以是因緣，雖斷煩惱，得生非想非非想處，猶故還墮三惡道中。 善男子！ 譬如有人渡於大海，垂至彼岸沒水而死。 凡夫之人亦復如是，垂盡三有還墮三塗。 何以故？ 無善覺故。 云何善覺？ 所謂六念。 」下廣說惡覺之過，故云「如涅槃說」。 言「加五說有八覺」者，即《俱舍》等論，亦名八尋。 下疏所列惱覺，即是害覺。 《涅槃》通說六念為善，今別說之，故以不淨等治為善，大意可知。 疏「利中身見為本生六十二」者，言身見者，《唯識論》名薩迦耶見。 論云「謂五取蘊執著我我所，一切見趣所依為業。 此見差別有二十句，六十五等分別起攝。 」釋曰：後此見差別下，即疏云「一依三世五蘊」說者。 彼疏釋云「薩迦耶見，具足梵云薩迦耶達利瑟致。 經部師云：薩是偽義，迦耶是身，達利瑟致是見。 身是聚義，即聚集假。 應言緣聚身起見名為身見。 薩婆多云：薩是有義，迦耶等如前。 雖見聚身，而是實有。 身者即是自體異名，應言自體見。 大乘法師解云：僧吃爛底薩，便成移轉，以大乘心心上所變之法故。 」言移轉身見，依五蘊起此我見，此為依故，諸見得生故。 言見趣所依為業者，趣者投也，惑所歸處也。 言二十句者，《對法》第一云「謂如計色是我、我有色、色屬我、我在色中。 一蘊有四，五蘊合有二十句也。 五為我見，餘皆我所，謂相應我所（即我有色）、隨逐我所（即色屬我）、不離我所（即我在色中），故有十五我所。 此即分別行緣蘊，不分別所起處。 若歷三世，便有六十。 加身即我，為六十一。 我復異身，為六十二。 」又計常無常等為六十二，如〈十藏品〉。 論言六十五者，《婆沙論》云「謂如以色為我，於餘四蘊各三我所，謂是我瓔珞、我僮僕、我器，即有十二。 色為一我，即總有十三。 五蘊，總有六十我所見。 有五我見，為六十五。 」此即分別行緣蘊，亦分別所起處。 此等皆是分別我見。 疏「二依異道邪見具如瑜伽八十七說」者，論中約迷前際後際為次。 今依《唯識》，約所依見分之。 謂於前際計四遍常、四一分常，及依； 計後際有想十六、無想、俱非各有八論，共四十種常見差別。 有計後際七斷滅論，此四十七，共因我見而起邊見。 有計前際，二無因論、四有邊論、四不死矯亂，及計後際五現涅槃，故六十二。 此六十二，以邪見邊見二為自體，以餘二見而為眷屬，依於身見以為根本。 此亦舉大數。 次依《瑜伽》以釋相者。 初四遍常者，謂我及世間一切皆常，但有隱顯，依上中下靜慮等起，起宿住隨念生四常論，一由能憶二十成壞劫、二能憶四十劫、三能憶八十劫、四依天眼所見現在世見諸有情死時生時諸蘊相續，彼便執我及世間俱常。 言四一分常者，謂四皆一分。 一者從梵天沒來生此間，得宿住通，作如是等執：梵王是常，我等無常。 故名一分。 二聞梵王有如是見：大種是常，心是無常。 或復翻此。 三有先從戲忘天沒來生此間，得通起執：不生此者常我，生此者是無常。 四有先從恚憤天沒，一分同前。 此天住處，住妙高層級，或三十三天。 釋曰：若依《瑜伽》，此中即說二無因，以同計前際故。 《唯識》此後即明有想十六等，言十六者，有四四句：一我有色，死後有想，執色為我，名我有色。 取諸法說，名為有想。 即欲界全，色界一分，除無想天。 二我無色，死後有想，執無色蘊為我。 此在欲界乃至無所有處，唯除非想。 三我亦有色亦無色，死後有想，執五蘊為我。 四我非有色非無色，死後有色，遮第三也，依尋伺等至皆容得起。 第二四句云：一執我有邊，死後有想，執色為我，體有分限，如指節等。

Regarding the commentary's statement, "can give rise to boundless afflictions such as greed, as taught in the Nirvāṇa [Sūtra]": this refers to the twenty-third fascicle, the chapter "Bodhisattva Noble and Virtuous King". The sūtra states: "Furthermore, good son! Although all ordinary beings guard their bodies and minds well, they still give rise to three kinds of unwholesome thoughts. For this reason, even if they sever the afflictions and obtain rebirth in the station of neither-perception-nor-non-perception, they still fall back into the three evil destinies. Good son! Just like a person crossing a great sea who drowns and dies when about to reach the other shore, ordinary beings are also like this: when about to exhaust the three realms of existence, they fall back into the three evil destinies. Why is this? Because they lack wholesome thoughts. What are wholesome thoughts? They are the so-called six recollections." Below, it extensively explains the faults of unwholesome thoughts; hence it says, "as taught in the Nirvāṇa [Sūtra]". As for "adding five to speak of eight thoughts": these are the eight reflections in treatises such as the Kośa. The afflicted thought listed in the commentary below is indeed the harmful thought. The Nirvāṇa [Sūtra] generally speaks of the six recollections as wholesome; here it speaks of them separately, hence taking remedies such as impurity as wholesome, the general meaning of which can be known. Regarding the commentary's statement, "Among the sharp [afflictions], the view of selfhood is the root and generates the sixty-two [views]": as for the view of selfhood, the Vijñaptimātratā treatise calls it satkāyadṛṣṭi. The treatise states: "It refers to grasping the five clinging aggregates as self and what belongs to self, having the activity of serving as the basis for all resorts of views. The distinctions of this view comprise twenty propositions, sixty-five, and so forth, subsumed under conceptually generated ones." Explanation: from "The distinctions of this view..." onward corresponds to what the commentary calls "one: spoken in reliance on the five aggregates throughout the three times". That commentary explains: "As for satkāyadṛṣṭi, in full Sanskrit it is satkāyadṛṣṭi. The Sautrāntika masters say: 'sat' means false, 'kāya' is body, and 'dṛṣṭi' is view. Body means aggregation, that is, a nominal aggregation. One should say that giving rise to a view based on the aggregated body is called the view of selfhood. The Sarvāstivādins say: 'sat' means existent, and 'kāya' etc. are as before. Although one views an aggregated body, it is truly existent. 'Body' is an alternative name for self-substance; one should call it the view of self-substance. The Mahāyāna master explains: 'saṅkrānti-sat' then becomes transference, because it is a phenomenon transformed upon the mind and mental factors in Mahāyāna." It is called the transference view of selfhood; giving rise to this self-view in reliance on the five aggregates, because this serves as the basis, all views are able to arise. Regarding "having the activity of serving as the basis for all resorts of views": "resort" means turning to, the place whereto delusions repair. Regarding "twenty propositions": the Abhidharmasamuccaya, fascicle 1, states: "That is, such as conceptualizing form as self, self possessing form, form belonging to self, and self being within form. One aggregate has four; the five aggregates together have twenty propositions. Five are views of self, and the rest are what belongs to self: namely, associated possession of self (i.e., self possessing form), attendant possession of self (i.e., form belonging to self), and non-separated possession of self (i.e., self being within form); hence there are fifteen possessions of self. This is conceptually operating in relation to the aggregates without distinguishing their points of arising. If traced across the three times, there are sixty. Adding the body being identical to the self makes sixty-one; and the self being different from the body makes sixty-two." Again, conceptualizing permanence, impermanence, and so forth makes sixty-two, as in the chapter "Ten Treasuries". As for the treatise speaking of sixty-five: the Vibhāṣā says, "That is, taking form as the self, and in each of the remaining four aggregates having three possessions of self—namely, as my ornament, my servant, and my vessel—there are twelve. With form as one self, there are altogether thirteen. Across the five aggregates, there are altogether sixty views of what belongs to self. With the five views of self, they make sixty-five." This is conceptually operating in relation to the aggregates while also distinguishing their points of arising. All of these are conceptually generated self-views. Regarding the commentary's statement, "two: relying on the wrong views of heterodox paths, as fully explained in Yogācāra fascicle eighty-seven": in that treatise they are sequenced in terms of delusion regarding the anterior and posterior limits. Here, relying on the Vijñaptimātratā, they are distinguished in terms of the underlying views upon which they rely. Namely, regarding the anterior limit, conceptualizing four [views of] pervasive permanence, four [views of] partial permanence, and so forth; regarding the posterior limit, conceptualizing sixteen [theories] of having perception, eight each of having no perception and neither-with-nor-without-perception, totaling forty distinct theories of permanence. There are seven theories of annihilation regarding the posterior limit. These forty-seven together give rise to extreme views caused by the view of self. There are conceptualizations regarding the anterior limit: two theories of no cause, four theories of having boundaries, four theories of immortalist equivocations; and conceptualizing regarding the posterior limit five [theories of] nirvāṇa in the present life; hence there are sixty-two. These sixty-two have wrong view and extreme view as their essential nature, have the other two views as their retinue, and rely upon the view of selfhood as their fundamental root. This also gives the large numbers. Next, explaining their characteristics according to the Yogācāra: First, regarding the four pervasive permanences: they refer to [the view that] the self and the world are completely permanent, possessing only latency and manifestation; arising on the basis of superior, middling, and inferior dhyānas and so forth, they give rise to recollections of past abodes, generating four theories of permanence: first, through being able to recollect twenty eons of formation and destruction; second, through being able to recollect forty eons; third, through being able to recollect eighty eons; fourth, relying on what is seen with the divine eye in the present world, seeing the continuity of the aggregates of sentient beings as they die and are born, they then grasp that both the self and the world are permanent. As for the four partial permanences: it means that all four are partial. First: passing away from the Brahmā heaven to be born here, one obtains the supernormal knowledge of past abodes and forms such grasps as: 'King Brahmā is permanent, while we are impermanent.' Hence it is called partial. Second: hearing that King Brahmā holds such a view as: 'The primary elements are permanent, while the mind is impermanent.' Or vice versa. Third: there are those who previously passed away from the heavens of play-forgetfulness to be born here, who obtain supernormal knowledge and give rise to the grasp: 'Those who are not born here are the permanent self, while those born here are impermanent.' Fourth: there are those who previously passed away from the heavens of mutual defilement, whose partial [permanence] is the same as before. The dwelling place of these devas is on the tiers of Mount Meru, or in the Heaven of the Thirty-Three. Explanation: If according to the Yogācāra, the two theories of no cause are explained right here, because they similarly conceptualize the anterior limit. In the Vijñaptimātratā, after this it clarifies the sixteen [theories] of having perception and so forth. As for the sixteen, there are four sets of four propositions. [In the first set:] 1. 'My self has form and has perception after death': grasping form as the self is called 'my self has form'. Spoken with regard to grasping dharmas, it is called 'having perception'. This includes all of the desire realm and a portion of the form realm, excluding the non-percipient heaven. 2. 'My self is formless and has perception after death': grasping the formless aggregates as the self. This is found from the desire realm up to the sphere of nothingness, excluding only [the station of] neither-perception-nor-non-perception. 3. 'My self both has form and is formless, and has perception after death': grasping the five aggregates as the self. 4. 'My self neither has form nor is formless, and has form after death': this negates the third; relying on samāpattis with investigation and examination, it can all be generated. The second set of four propositions states: 1. Grasping that 'my self has a boundary and has perception after death': grasping form as the self whose substance has limits, such as a finger-joint.