大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔 41.12

41.12

Regarding the commentary's phrase, "the second, the true nature of non-arising," etc., this concurrently cultivates the meaning of ultimate naturelessness (niḥsvabhāvatā). Regarding the commentary's phrase, "the latter verse eliminates the subject that contemplates," these two meanings within this commentary also apply to the preceding other-dependent (paratantra) and perfected (pariniṣpanna) [natures]. According to the former meaning, both the other-dependent and perfected are without anything understood; according to the latter meaning, both the other-dependent and perfected lack that which can understand. Both result from the fact that being identical with nature is being identical with naturelessness. Therefore, the commentary concludes by stating, "both subject and object perish," which directly summarizes the two meanings above, and also generally concludes the subjects and objects of the two preceding verses. Regarding the commentary's phrase, "failing to understand that lands and so forth are other-dependent, one takes them as directly perceived," as for the word "and so forth," lands are born through the conditions of shared karma, and because the subsequent verse generally concludes with "the nature of worldly lands," the term "worldly" applies to the realm of sentient beings as well; hence the word "and so forth" is used. As for "taking them as directly perceived," when the Hīnayāna is refuted in the Madhyamakaśāstra, they all rescue [their position] by saying: "Because it is directly perceived in the world." The intent is that it is unfitting to contradict the world. Furthermore, the Buddha said: "What worldly wisdom says exists, I also say exists; what worldly wisdom says does not exist, I also say does not exist." Now we directly see the existence of lands and other dharmas; how could one say they do not exist? Thus, quoting the Jin [dynasty] sūtra: "One should know that due to that which is produced, that which is produced becomes manifest; hence one sees lands and so forth." The fourth bodhisattva is understandable. As for the fifth bodhisattva: regarding the commentary from "the latter verse reveals that cognition arises from..." onward, the commentary has three parts: first, explaining based on the sūtra; second, reconciling with the true meaning; third, from "if based on the Jin..." onward, reconciling with the Jin sūtra. Now in the first, there are two ideas. In the former idea, it says: it is like plucking a lotus from deep water, which reveals what is appropriate; but doing so at the tips of trees is not appropriate. This is the intent of the Chuci (Songs of Chu), which says, "plucking a lotus at the tips of trees"—this clarifies that it is inappropriate. Regarding the commentary's phrase, "the second is that after attainment, cognition arises from the perfuming of its own seeds," within this there are two parts: first, directly explaining; second, resolving objections and reconciling. In the former part, it means that by the concurrence of the fundamentally existent uncontaminated seeds with the perfuming of extensive listening, uncontaminated cognition arises. According to the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi-śāstra, concerning fundamentally existent and newly perfumed [seeds], there are differing theories of three masters. The first master, Candragupta and others, posited only fundamentally existent [seeds]; thus the treatise states: "There is an opinion: all seeds are innately existent in their nature, not born from perfuming; through the power of perfuming they can merely increase." The second master, Nanda, posited only newly perfumed [seeds]; thus the treatise states: "There is an opinion: seeds are all born due to perfuming; both the perfumed and the perfumer have existed from beginningless time, and therefore all seeds are accomplished from beginningless time." The third is the correct opinion of Dharmapāla; the treatise states: "There is an opinion: seeds are each of two kinds: first, fundamentally existent; second, newly arisen." It further says, up to: "From this, one should believe that all sentient beings have possessed uncontaminated seeds from beginningless time, which are established by the nature of things without depending on perfuming." It also says: "Its perfuming by listening is not only contaminated; when hearing the true Dharma, it also perfumes the fundamentally existent uncontaminated seeds, causing them gradually to increase and flourish, developing progressively until producing the supramundane mind." In explanation: the "supramundane mind" is the path of seeing. This third meaning is precisely identical with the thirty-fifth fascicle of the Yogācārabhūmi, the "Chapter on Gotra." The treatise states: "What is gotra? There are, in brief, two kinds: first, the gotra abiding in its original nature; second, the nature accomplished through practice. The gotra abiding in nature means that the six bases of the bodhisattvas possess such characteristics of superiority; received by the nature of things as handed down progressively from beginningless eons, it is called the gotra abiding in its original nature." Now when the commentary says that perfuming is arising from newly perfuming one's own seeds, perfuming merely perfumes what was former; there is no distinct newly completed [seed]. Regarding the commentary from "if so, why does the sūtra say..." onward, this is the second part, resolving objections and reconciling. There are two levels of objections: the first cites the second fascicle of the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa, the "Chapter on the Buddha Path," to raise an objection about the cause. Vimalakīrti asked Mañjuśrī: "What is the seed of the Tathāgata?" Mañjuśrī said: "The view of having a body is the seed; ignorance and craving for existence are the seed; the four inversions are the seed; the five hindrances are the seed; the six sense bases are the seed; the seven stations of consciousness are the seed; the eight wrong dharmas are the seed; the nine grounds of annoyance are the seed; the ten non-virtuous courses of action are the seed. To state the essence, the sixty-two views and all afflictions are all seeds of buddhahood." "What does this mean?" He answered: "If one sees the unconditioned and enters the correct determination, one can no longer generate the mind of anuttarasamyaksaṃbodhi. Just as lotus flowers do not grow on high plateaus or dry land, but these flowers grow in low, damp mud and mire, likewise, those who see the unconditioned and enter the correct determination will ultimately never be able to produce the Buddha's dharmas; only within the mud of afflictions do sentient beings raise the Buddha's dharmas." Now the commentary cites this to frame an objection. Furthermore, the first fascicle of the Mahāyānāvatāra-śāstra cites Nāgārjuna's verse: "Not existing from empty space, nor born from earthly seeds, but only from within afflictions is bodhi realized and perfected." These are all this meaning. Regarding the commentary from "this refers to the enmeshed..." onward, the commentary answers. However, according to that sūtra's text, those who see the unconditioned and enter the correct determination do not produce the Buddha's dharmas, meaning that once one has entered the path of seeing, one can no longer generate it. If interpreted according to Kāśyapa's comprehension: "Such śrāvakas whose fetters are severed have no further benefit in the Buddha's dharmas," then all ordinary persons and bodhisattvas before the bhūmis, who possess afflictions, increase the cultivation of antidotes and complete the gates of the pāramitās, so that [afflictions] can serve as the seeds of buddhahood. If the fetters are already severed, they cannot serve as the cause of omniscience; therefore bodhisattvas retain delusions to moisten rebirth until delusions are exhausted. Hence the Mahāyānasaṃgraha says: "Afflictions are subdued and do not arise, as if stricken by a poisonous spell; retaining delusions until delusions are exhausted, one realizes the Buddha's omniscience." This is the explicit meaning of the sūtra. What the present commentary clarifies is the implicit meaning of the sūtra, which is the meaning of the Śrīmālādevī, the Laṅkāvatāra, and so forth; hence it says "the tathāgatagarbha enmeshed [in defilements]." Afflictions are like mud covering the two garbhas. Yet great cognition naturally arises from the meaning that what is contained is not empty, and that the radiance of great cognition universally illuminates the dharmadhātu; thus the two characteristics are also distinct. Regarding the commentary's phrase, "if so, how does one reconcile that afflictions are themselves bodhi?", this is the second level of objection. Since it says "are themselves," one cannot say that the two matters are distinct. That is, deludedly straying from the true to give rise to the false is called affliction; the essence of the false is itself the true, which originally is the seed of buddhahood. The *Apratiṣṭhita-cārya-sūtra* states: "Lust is itself the Path; anger and delusion are also likewise," and so on. Regarding the commentary from "because it is in terms of the essence..." onward, the commentary answers the objection above with two meanings: first, in terms of the essence, the nature of affliction is itself bodhi, not in terms of the characteristics. Thus the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa states: "Afflictions are the bodhimanda, because one knows them as they truly are." The *Apratiṣṭhita-cārya-sūtra* states: "Greed and anger—no one can grasp them; these dharmas are all like space; knowing this is itself becoming a Buddha." Thus we know that the real nature of afflictions is itself bodhi. It also clarifies according to characteristics that the two matters are not one. Second, regarding the statement "in terms of that which is strayed from," this is the second meaning. That is, deludedly straying from the true gives rise to the false; apart from the true, there is no deluded mind that can stray, hence it is said to be "itself bodhi." The true is nature-pure bodhi. Just as waves and wetness serve as a twofold analogy for the two above, wetness is the nature of waves and waves are the characteristics of wetness; stirring wetness forms waves, so [wetness] is that upon which waves rely. The subject and object of reliance being different, they are therefore not one. Regarding the commentary from "however, as for the real meaning..." onward, the second reconciles with the real meaning, comprehensively reconciling both sections to reveal the Middle Way. Directly reconciling the objection that afflictions are themselves bodhi reveals the meaning of the mutual interpenetration of the true and the false. Although three gates are spoken of, the meaning encompasses four propositions; that is, first, "the two gates stand opposed": relying on principle to accomplish phenomena, there is only the false and not the true; phenomena being able to reveal principle, there is only the true and not the false; therefore each stands opposed. From "if one speaks of them as one..." onward, it clarifies that these two sections are precisely meant to shatter errors. According to the bodhisattva, both converge in the Middle. Moreover, this section has the two gates standing opposed, while the subsequent section has the two characteristics tranquil; therefore, combining these two, they are neither identical nor separate. Regarding "if one speaks of them as one, one separates them to make them different," suppose someone asks: "The myriad dharmas are identical with the true, identical with the one tathatā without difference. Therefore, what fault is there if the false is identical with the true?" Answer: there are, in brief, three faults. First, that which relies would be identical with that upon which it relies; that is, relying on the true there is the false, just as relying on water there are waves. If the false were now identical with the true, there would be no that which relies, and because there is no that which relies, that upon which it relies would also be lost, so that neither arising-and-ceasing nor tathatā would be established. Second, since the two would not be different, both the true and the false would also be lost. Because the false would be identical with the true, there would be no false; with no false, in contrast to what could the true be spoken of? Third, one would also lose the two gates of the true and the provisional. If they are distinguished, then the three meanings are all established, like gold and ornaments, or waves and water. Moving and wetness, essence and characteristics, are both different; that which relies and that upon which it relies each have three meanings, and none are confused. Regarding the commentary's phrase, "if one says they are different, one unites them to make them identical," the subsequent section says: "Like gold and the color of gold, their nature has no distinction," and so forth. Regarding the commentary from "the aggregates of consciousnesses..." onward, this is the explanation. There are four ideas here: first, the eye only sees visible forms, the ear only hears sounds, and so forth. Second, "the meeting of conditions is different" means that the eye takes visible forms and so forth as conditions, and the ear uses sounds and so forth as conditions. Third, "the eye does not have the function of the ear" is spoken in contrast to the mutual functioning at the stage of fruition. The first idea reveals oneself; this idea excludes the other. Fourth, "moreover, this eye-consciousness does not join with the other sense faculties" is also spoken in contrast to the meaning of the mutual functioning of the six faculties. Regarding the meaning of mutual functioning, some say the eye faculty produces the eye-consciousness to understand the six sense objects, and the other faculties are also like this; the third idea is in contrast to this. Others say the eye faculty can produce the six consciousnesses to understand the six sense objects; this idea is in contrast to this. This consciousness does not join with other faculties, nor does this faculty produce other consciousnesses. Still others say: speaking of mutual functioning, the eye faculty produces ear-consciousness to be able to smell fragrances and so forth. This also does not go beyond the two ideas above. From "the consciousness-aggregates are the same as consciousness..." onward, it concludes their differences. Regarding the commentary from "second, their functions are unequal..." onward, it first gives the doctrinal exposition and then presents two analogies, both clarifying that they are unequal. This is also Master Daosheng's meaning from the fourteen topics that good deeds do not incur retribution. Someone asked there: "Good and evil subvert each other, just as light and darkness do not coexist. Why is it said that the principle of the myriad goods is identical, while the differences of evil each have their limited domains?" Answer: "Although light and darkness subvert each other, in principle they are genuinely separated by heaven. Because light can eliminate darkness, there is no darkness that it does not extinguish; therefore a single torch of fire is identical with a vast marsh fire. Darkness cannot eliminate light, because its principle is exhausted in the substance of darkness." You can understand this by reflecting on it. The sixth bodhisattva. Regarding the commentary's phrase, "the two sections connect with each other, revealing that they are neither identical nor separate, and also mutually accomplish each other," the meaning of neither identical nor separate has already been clarified above. As for "mutually accomplishing each other," it is because they are not identical that they accomplish non-separation, and so forth. Therefore someone asks: "If one says they are not one, then apart from gold there should be a separate vessel substance. If there is a substance different from gold, then it should be non-different from gold, because sharing the substance of gold, there is no distinction." By "no distinction," it means having a single kind of substance. Answer: it is solely due to non-difference that non-oneness is attained. Why? If they were different, then the false would have its own substance and would not be established relying on the true. Because it would not rely on the true, the false could not exist. Now that the false exists, it is due to non-difference that non-oneness is accomplished, because the false has no self-substance, so the false is accomplished relying on the true. Because the false is accomplished, it is not one with the true. Just as waves rely on water, due to being non-different from water they come to form waves; because waves are formed, they are not one with wetness. The above is using non-difference to accomplish non-oneness. As for non-oneness accomplishing non-difference, it is just as in the preceding section. Because there are that which relies and that upon which it relies, they attain interpenetrating non-difference. Just as because there are waves, one says waves are wetness, and because there is wetness, one says water is waves, and so forth. Regarding the commentary's phrase, "yet the vehicle of analogy is not separate from all dharmas," as in saying sentient beings, non-sentient beings, and arising and ceasing in the three periods of time, these are all gathered within the "all dharmas" of the first line, completely without distinction, which is difficult to see. But if approached from the future being devoid of the characteristics of the past, then the principle of characteristiclessness is clearly and easily seen; hence it serves as an analogy for the difficulty of the characteristiclessness of form and mind.