大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔 41.12

41.12

疏「二無生真性」下，即兼修勝義無性義也。疏「後偈遣能觀」者，然此疏中二義，亦通前依圓。前義依他圓成俱無所了，後義依圓皆無能了，皆由即性即無性故，故疏結云「能所雙亡」，即正結上二義也，亦通結上二偈能所。疏「不了國等依他謂為現見」者，而言等者，國即共業緣生，以後偈總結云「世間國土性」，世間之言通有情世間，故致「等」言。言謂為現見者，以《中論》內小乘被破，皆悉救云：世間現見故。意云不合與世間相違。又佛言：「世智說有，我亦說有；世智說無，我亦說無。」今現見有國等諸法，豈得言無？故引晉經云「當知由所生，所生即現，故見國等。」第四菩薩，可知。第五菩薩。疏「後偈顯智從生」下，疏文有三：一案經釋、二會實義、三「若準晉」下會晉經。今初，有二意。前意中云：猶搴芙蓉於深水，即顯所應。而於木末，非所應也。即《楚詞》意。彼云「搴芙蓉於木末」，此明不應也。疏「二者成後，智從自種熏習而生」者，於中有二：先正釋、後釋難會通。前中謂由本有無漏種子，與多聞熏習和合，而生無漏智故。依《唯識論》，本有新熏，三師異說。第一護月等師，唯立本有，故論云「有義：一切種子皆悉性有，不從熏生，由熏習力但可增長。」第二難陀，唯立新熏，故論云「有義：種子皆熏故生，所熏能熏俱無始有，故諸種子無始成就。」第三護法正義，論云「有義：種子各有二類，一者本有、二者始起。」乃至云「由此應信有諸有情無始時來有無漏種，不由熏習，法爾成就。」又云「其聞熏習非唯有漏，聞正法時亦熏本有無漏種子令漸增盛，展轉乃至生出世心。」釋曰：出世心者：即是見道。其第三義：正同《瑜伽》三十五〈種性品〉。論云「云何種性？謂略有二種：一本性住種性、二習所成性。住種性者，謂諸菩薩六處殊勝有如是相。從無始世展轉傳來法爾所得，名本性住種性。」今疏云熏習即是新熏自種而生者，熏但熏舊，無別新成。疏「若爾何以經言」下，第二釋難會通。有兩重難：初即引《淨名》第二〈佛道品〉難因。淨名問文殊言：「何等為如來種？」文殊師利言：「有身為種，無明有愛為種，四顛倒為種，五蓋為種，六入為種，七識處為種，八邪法為種，九惱處為種，十不善道為種。以要言之，六十二見及一切煩惱皆是佛種。」「何謂也？」答曰：「若見無為入正位者，不能復發阿耨多羅三藐三菩提心。譬如高原陸地不生蓮華，卑濕淤泥乃生是華。如是見無為入正位者，終不復能生於佛法，煩惱泥中乃有眾生起佛法耳。」今疏引此以為難耳。又《入大乘論》第一引龍樹偈云「不從虛空有，亦非地種生，但從煩惱中，而證成菩提。」皆此義也。疏「此說在纏」下，疏答。然約彼經文，見無為入正位者不生佛法，則已入見道便不能發。若約迦葉領解云：「如是聲聞諸結斷者，於佛法中無所復益。」則諸凡夫地前菩薩，有諸煩惱增修對治，成諸度門得為佛種。若已斷結，不可得為一切智因，故諸菩薩留惑潤生以至惑盡。故《攝論》云「煩惱伏不起，如毒呪所害。留惑至惑盡，證佛一切智。」此是經之顯意，今疏所明乃是經之密意，而是《勝鬘》、《楞伽》等義，故云「在纏如來藏」。煩惱如泥，覆於二藏。然大智自從所藏不空，大智光明遍照法界義生，故二相亦異。疏「若爾，煩惱即菩提，復云何通」，即第二重難。既言即者，則不得云二事別也。謂迷真起妄說為煩惱，妄體即真元是佛種。《無行經》云「婬欲即是道，恚癡亦復然」等。疏「約體性故」下，疏答上難有其二意：一約體性者，煩惱性即菩提，非約相也。故《淨名》云「煩惱是道場，知如實故。」《無行經》云「貪欲及瞋恚，無有能得者。是法皆如空，知是即成佛。」故知煩惱實性即菩提耳。亦就相明二事不一。二云約所迷故者，即第二義也。謂迷真起妄，離真則無能迷妄心，故云即菩提耳。真即性淨菩提，如波與濕雙喻上二，濕是波性、波是濕相，動濕成波，是波所依。能所不同，故非一也。疏「然實義者」下，第二會實義，通會兩章方顯中道。正通煩惱即菩提難，是顯真妄交徹之義。雖說三門，義含四句，謂初「二門峙立」，依理成事，則唯妄非真；事能顯理，即唯真非妄，故各峙立。從「若說一者」下，明此二章正為破病。若據菩薩，二皆會中。又此章則二門峙立，後章則二相寂然，故合此二非即非離。言「若說一者則離之令異」者，謂有問言：萬法即真，一如無異。故妄即真，有何過耶？答：略有三過。一能依即是所依，謂依真有妄，如依水有波。今妄即是真，便無能依，以無能依亦失所依，則生滅真如二俱不立。二者二既不異，亦失真妄。以妄即真故無妄，無妄對何說真？三者亦失真假二門，若別則三義俱成，如金與嚴具、波之與水。動濕體相二俱不同，能依所依各有三義，皆不雜亂。疏「若云異者合之令同」者，下章云「如金與金色，其性無差別」等。疏「諸識身」下，釋。此有四意：一眼唯見色、耳唯聞聲等。二「緣會不同」者，眼以色等而為緣故，耳用聲等而為緣故。三「眼無耳用」者，對於果位互用而說。初意顯自，此意遮他。四「又此眼識不合餘根」者，亦對六根互用義說。以互用義，或言眼根發於眼識而了六境，餘根亦爾，即第三意對之。二或言眼根能發六識以了六境，此意對之。此識不合餘根，此根亦不發餘識。更有說言：言互用者，眼根發耳識而能嗅於香等。亦不出上之二意。從「識身同識」下，結其不同。疏「二功能不等」下，先法說、後舉二喻，皆明不等。此亦生公十四科善不受報義。彼問云：「善惡相傾，其猶明闇不並。云何言萬善理同，惡異各有限域耶？」答：「明闇雖相傾，而理實天絕。明能滅闇故，無闇而不滅，所以一爝之火與巨澤火同。闇不能滅明，以其理盡闇質故也。」思之可知。第六菩薩。疏「二章相接顯非即離亦互相成」者，非即離義，已如上明。言互相成者，由非即故方成不離等。故有問言：若言不一者，即應離於金別有器體。若異金有體者，即應與金不異，以同金有體，無差別故。言無差別者，一種有體故。答：只由不異，方得不一。何者？若異，即妄自有體，不依真立。不依真故，即不得有妄。今有妄者，由不異故得成不一，以妄無自體，故妄依真成。以妄成故，與真不一。如波依水，由不異水遂得成波，以波成故，與濕不一。此上即以不異成不一也。言不一成不異者，即如上章。由有能依所依，故得交徹不異。如有波故說波即濕，由有濕故說水即波等。疏「然其能喻不離諸法」者，如云眾生非眾生三世生滅，皆是初句諸法中收，並無差別，斯則難見。若就未來無過去相，則無相理照然易見，故喻色心無相之難。

Regarding the commentary's phrase, "the second, the true nature of non-arising," etc., this concurrently cultivates the meaning of ultimate naturelessness (niḥsvabhāvatā). Regarding the commentary's phrase, "the latter verse eliminates the subject that contemplates," these two meanings within this commentary also apply to the preceding other-dependent (paratantra) and perfected (pariniṣpanna) [natures]. According to the former meaning, both the other-dependent and perfected are without anything understood; according to the latter meaning, both the other-dependent and perfected lack that which can understand. Both result from the fact that being identical with nature is being identical with naturelessness. Therefore, the commentary concludes by stating, "both subject and object perish," which directly summarizes the two meanings above, and also generally concludes the subjects and objects of the two preceding verses. Regarding the commentary's phrase, "failing to understand that lands and so forth are other-dependent, one takes them as directly perceived," as for the word "and so forth," lands are born through the conditions of shared karma, and because the subsequent verse generally concludes with "the nature of worldly lands," the term "worldly" applies to the realm of sentient beings as well; hence the word "and so forth" is used. As for "taking them as directly perceived," when the Hīnayāna is refuted in the Madhyamakaśāstra, they all rescue [their position] by saying: "Because it is directly perceived in the world." The intent is that it is unfitting to contradict the world. Furthermore, the Buddha said: "What worldly wisdom says exists, I also say exists; what worldly wisdom says does not exist, I also say does not exist." Now we directly see the existence of lands and other dharmas; how could one say they do not exist? Thus, quoting the Jin [dynasty] sūtra: "One should know that due to that which is produced, that which is produced becomes manifest; hence one sees lands and so forth." The fourth bodhisattva is understandable. As for the fifth bodhisattva: regarding the commentary from "the latter verse reveals that cognition arises from..." onward, the commentary has three parts: first, explaining based on the sūtra; second, reconciling with the true meaning; third, from "if based on the Jin..." onward, reconciling with the Jin sūtra. Now in the first, there are two ideas. In the former idea, it says: it is like plucking a lotus from deep water, which reveals what is appropriate; but doing so at the tips of trees is not appropriate. This is the intent of the Chuci (Songs of Chu), which says, "plucking a lotus at the tips of trees"—this clarifies that it is inappropriate. Regarding the commentary's phrase, "the second is that after attainment, cognition arises from the perfuming of its own seeds," within this there are two parts: first, directly explaining; second, resolving objections and reconciling. In the former part, it means that by the concurrence of the fundamentally existent uncontaminated seeds with the perfuming of extensive listening, uncontaminated cognition arises. According to the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi-śāstra, concerning fundamentally existent and newly perfumed [seeds], there are differing theories of three masters. The first master, Candragupta and others, posited only fundamentally existent [seeds]; thus the treatise states: "There is an opinion: all seeds are innately existent in their nature, not born from perfuming; through the power of perfuming they can merely increase." The second master, Nanda, posited only newly perfumed [seeds]; thus the treatise states: "There is an opinion: seeds are all born due to perfuming; both the perfumed and the perfumer have existed from beginningless time, and therefore all seeds are accomplished from beginningless time." The third is the correct opinion of Dharmapāla; the treatise states: "There is an opinion: seeds are each of two kinds: first, fundamentally existent; second, newly arisen." It further says, up to: "From this, one should believe that all sentient beings have possessed uncontaminated seeds from beginningless time, which are established by the nature of things without depending on perfuming." It also says: "Its perfuming by listening is not only contaminated; when hearing the true Dharma, it also perfumes the fundamentally existent uncontaminated seeds, causing them gradually to increase and flourish, developing progressively until producing the supramundane mind." In explanation: the "supramundane mind" is the path of seeing. This third meaning is precisely identical with the thirty-fifth fascicle of the Yogācārabhūmi, the "Chapter on Gotra." The treatise states: "What is gotra? There are, in brief, two kinds: first, the gotra abiding in its original nature; second, the nature accomplished through practice. The gotra abiding in nature means that the six bases of the bodhisattvas possess such characteristics of superiority; received by the nature of things as handed down progressively from beginningless eons, it is called the gotra abiding in its original nature." Now when the commentary says that perfuming is arising from newly perfuming one's own seeds, perfuming merely perfumes what was former; there is no distinct newly completed [seed]. Regarding the commentary from "if so, why does the sūtra say..." onward, this is the second part, resolving objections and reconciling. There are two levels of objections: the first cites the second fascicle of the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa, the "Chapter on the Buddha Path," to raise an objection about the cause. Vimalakīrti asked Mañjuśrī: "What is the seed of the Tathāgata?" Mañjuśrī said: "The view of having a body is the seed; ignorance and craving for existence are the seed; the four inversions are the seed; the five hindrances are the seed; the six sense bases are the seed; the seven stations of consciousness are the seed; the eight wrong dharmas are the seed; the nine grounds of annoyance are the seed; the ten non-virtuous courses of action are the seed. To state the essence, the sixty-two views and all afflictions are all seeds of buddhahood." "What does this mean?" He answered: "If one sees the unconditioned and enters the correct determination, one can no longer generate the mind of anuttarasamyaksaṃbodhi. Just as lotus flowers do not grow on high plateaus or dry land, but these flowers grow in low, damp mud and mire, likewise, those who see the unconditioned and enter the correct determination will ultimately never be able to produce the Buddha's dharmas; only within the mud of afflictions do sentient beings raise the Buddha's dharmas." Now the commentary cites this to frame an objection. Furthermore, the first fascicle of the Mahāyānāvatāra-śāstra cites Nāgārjuna's verse: "Not existing from empty space, nor born from earthly seeds, but only from within afflictions is bodhi realized and perfected." These are all this meaning. Regarding the commentary from "this refers to the enmeshed..." onward, the commentary answers. However, according to that sūtra's text, those who see the unconditioned and enter the correct determination do not produce the Buddha's dharmas, meaning that once one has entered the path of seeing, one can no longer generate it. If interpreted according to Kāśyapa's comprehension: "Such śrāvakas whose fetters are severed have no further benefit in the Buddha's dharmas," then all ordinary persons and bodhisattvas before the bhūmis, who possess afflictions, increase the cultivation of antidotes and complete the gates of the pāramitās, so that [afflictions] can serve as the seeds of buddhahood. If the fetters are already severed, they cannot serve as the cause of omniscience; therefore bodhisattvas retain delusions to moisten rebirth until delusions are exhausted. Hence the Mahāyānasaṃgraha says: "Afflictions are subdued and do not arise, as if stricken by a poisonous spell; retaining delusions until delusions are exhausted, one realizes the Buddha's omniscience." This is the explicit meaning of the sūtra. What the present commentary clarifies is the implicit meaning of the sūtra, which is the meaning of the Śrīmālādevī, the Laṅkāvatāra, and so forth; hence it says "the tathāgatagarbha enmeshed [in defilements]." Afflictions are like mud covering the two garbhas. Yet great cognition naturally arises from the meaning that what is contained is not empty, and that the radiance of great cognition universally illuminates the dharmadhātu; thus the two characteristics are also distinct. Regarding the commentary's phrase, "if so, how does one reconcile that afflictions are themselves bodhi?", this is the second level of objection. Since it says "are themselves," one cannot say that the two matters are distinct. That is, deludedly straying from the true to give rise to the false is called affliction; the essence of the false is itself the true, which originally is the seed of buddhahood. The *Apratiṣṭhita-cārya-sūtra* states: "Lust is itself the Path; anger and delusion are also likewise," and so on. Regarding the commentary from "because it is in terms of the essence..." onward, the commentary answers the objection above with two meanings: first, in terms of the essence, the nature of affliction is itself bodhi, not in terms of the characteristics. Thus the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa states: "Afflictions are the bodhimanda, because one knows them as they truly are." The *Apratiṣṭhita-cārya-sūtra* states: "Greed and anger—no one can grasp them; these dharmas are all like space; knowing this is itself becoming a Buddha." Thus we know that the real nature of afflictions is itself bodhi. It also clarifies according to characteristics that the two matters are not one. Second, regarding the statement "in terms of that which is strayed from," this is the second meaning. That is, deludedly straying from the true gives rise to the false; apart from the true, there is no deluded mind that can stray, hence it is said to be "itself bodhi." The true is nature-pure bodhi. Just as waves and wetness serve as a twofold analogy for the two above, wetness is the nature of waves and waves are the characteristics of wetness; stirring wetness forms waves, so [wetness] is that upon which waves rely. The subject and object of reliance being different, they are therefore not one. Regarding the commentary from "however, as for the real meaning..." onward, the second reconciles with the real meaning, comprehensively reconciling both sections to reveal the Middle Way. Directly reconciling the objection that afflictions are themselves bodhi reveals the meaning of the mutual interpenetration of the true and the false. Although three gates are spoken of, the meaning encompasses four propositions; that is, first, "the two gates stand opposed": relying on principle to accomplish phenomena, there is only the false and not the true; phenomena being able to reveal principle, there is only the true and not the false; therefore each stands opposed. From "if one speaks of them as one..." onward, it clarifies that these two sections are precisely meant to shatter errors. According to the bodhisattva, both converge in the Middle. Moreover, this section has the two gates standing opposed, while the subsequent section has the two characteristics tranquil; therefore, combining these two, they are neither identical nor separate. Regarding "if one speaks of them as one, one separates them to make them different," suppose someone asks: "The myriad dharmas are identical with the true, identical with the one tathatā without difference. Therefore, what fault is there if the false is identical with the true?" Answer: there are, in brief, three faults. First, that which relies would be identical with that upon which it relies; that is, relying on the true there is the false, just as relying on water there are waves. If the false were now identical with the true, there would be no that which relies, and because there is no that which relies, that upon which it relies would also be lost, so that neither arising-and-ceasing nor tathatā would be established. Second, since the two would not be different, both the true and the false would also be lost. Because the false would be identical with the true, there would be no false; with no false, in contrast to what could the true be spoken of? Third, one would also lose the two gates of the true and the provisional. If they are distinguished, then the three meanings are all established, like gold and ornaments, or waves and water. Moving and wetness, essence and characteristics, are both different; that which relies and that upon which it relies each have three meanings, and none are confused. Regarding the commentary's phrase, "if one says they are different, one unites them to make them identical," the subsequent section says: "Like gold and the color of gold, their nature has no distinction," and so forth. Regarding the commentary from "the aggregates of consciousnesses..." onward, this is the explanation. There are four ideas here: first, the eye only sees visible forms, the ear only hears sounds, and so forth. Second, "the meeting of conditions is different" means that the eye takes visible forms and so forth as conditions, and the ear uses sounds and so forth as conditions. Third, "the eye does not have the function of the ear" is spoken in contrast to the mutual functioning at the stage of fruition. The first idea reveals oneself; this idea excludes the other. Fourth, "moreover, this eye-consciousness does not join with the other sense faculties" is also spoken in contrast to the meaning of the mutual functioning of the six faculties. Regarding the meaning of mutual functioning, some say the eye faculty produces the eye-consciousness to understand the six sense objects, and the other faculties are also like this; the third idea is in contrast to this. Others say the eye faculty can produce the six consciousnesses to understand the six sense objects; this idea is in contrast to this. This consciousness does not join with other faculties, nor does this faculty produce other consciousnesses. Still others say: speaking of mutual functioning, the eye faculty produces ear-consciousness to be able to smell fragrances and so forth. This also does not go beyond the two ideas above. From "the consciousness-aggregates are the same as consciousness..." onward, it concludes their differences. Regarding the commentary from "second, their functions are unequal..." onward, it first gives the doctrinal exposition and then presents two analogies, both clarifying that they are unequal. This is also Master Daosheng's meaning from the fourteen topics that good deeds do not incur retribution. Someone asked there: "Good and evil subvert each other, just as light and darkness do not coexist. Why is it said that the principle of the myriad goods is identical, while the differences of evil each have their limited domains?" Answer: "Although light and darkness subvert each other, in principle they are genuinely separated by heaven. Because light can eliminate darkness, there is no darkness that it does not extinguish; therefore a single torch of fire is identical with a vast marsh fire. Darkness cannot eliminate light, because its principle is exhausted in the substance of darkness." You can understand this by reflecting on it. The sixth bodhisattva. Regarding the commentary's phrase, "the two sections connect with each other, revealing that they are neither identical nor separate, and also mutually accomplish each other," the meaning of neither identical nor separate has already been clarified above. As for "mutually accomplishing each other," it is because they are not identical that they accomplish non-separation, and so forth. Therefore someone asks: "If one says they are not one, then apart from gold there should be a separate vessel substance. If there is a substance different from gold, then it should be non-different from gold, because sharing the substance of gold, there is no distinction." By "no distinction," it means having a single kind of substance. Answer: it is solely due to non-difference that non-oneness is attained. Why? If they were different, then the false would have its own substance and would not be established relying on the true. Because it would not rely on the true, the false could not exist. Now that the false exists, it is due to non-difference that non-oneness is accomplished, because the false has no self-substance, so the false is accomplished relying on the true. Because the false is accomplished, it is not one with the true. Just as waves rely on water, due to being non-different from water they come to form waves; because waves are formed, they are not one with wetness. The above is using non-difference to accomplish non-oneness. As for non-oneness accomplishing non-difference, it is just as in the preceding section. Because there are that which relies and that upon which it relies, they attain interpenetrating non-difference. Just as because there are waves, one says waves are wetness, and because there is wetness, one says water is waves, and so forth. Regarding the commentary's phrase, "yet the vehicle of analogy is not separate from all dharmas," as in saying sentient beings, non-sentient beings, and arising and ceasing in the three periods of time, these are all gathered within the "all dharmas" of the first line, completely without distinction, which is difficult to see. But if approached from the future being devoid of the characteristics of the past, then the principle of characteristiclessness is clearly and easily seen; hence it serves as an analogy for the difficulty of the characteristiclessness of form and mind.