大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔 42

English (machine translation) 42

Language: English

42.1

Authored by Śramaṇa Chengguan of the Great Huayan Monastery at Qingliangshan under the Tang

The seventh bodhisattva. In the commentary, from "Second, the contemplation of arising through conditions without agency" downwards, the text has two parts: first, a general structural division, stating that the first half of the preceding verse concerns non-agency, while the second half concerns establishment through conditions, and the first half of the succeeding verse concerns establishment through conditions, while the second half concerns non-agency; second, from "Now, the first" downwards, the correct explanation of the first verse. Within this, it first explains the first half, which itself has four levels: first, refuting non-Buddhists; second, refuting the Hīnayāna; third, dispelling the characteristics of dharmas; and fourth, explaining according to the characteristic-less school. Now, the first: "not created by svabhāva and so forth" clarifies that it is not self-created. The flourishing of non-Buddhist sectarian tenets does not go beyond the Sāṃkhya and the Vaiśeṣika. The Sāṃkhya asserts that svabhāva is capable of agency—that svabhāva, namely the unmanifest principle (pradhāna), is capable of agency, whereas the self (ātman) is not an agent, but merely a knower. And when the commentary says "and so forth", it equates this to the self. That the self is the agent belongs to the Vaiśeṣika masters. Next, stating "nor is it created by an other such as Brahmā and so forth", it provisionally includes the World Egg (aṇḍa), Īśvara, and Brahmā. The World Egg is what the Aṇḍa theorists assert, which has already been clarified in the first fascicle of the commentary. Īśvara is what the ash-smearing non-Buddhists assert. Combining the above yields "joint creation"; separating from the above yields "creation without cause". Therefore, by merely citing "self-creation", the four alternatives are already complete. As for the commentary's "merely because it is false and lacks karmic retribution", this generally refutes the four alternatives, for the assertions of all four alternatives lack karmic retribution. Stating "extensively refuted as in the Three Treatises" means, not wishing to multiply words, he refers to extensive sources. Indeed, all Three Treatises refute them; the Śataśāstra extensively refutes the two schools. Now, to accord with refuting the creation of suffering by the four alternatives, we provisionally rely on the Dvādaśanikāya-śāstra. It explains: as for the single assertion of svabhāva, the first commentary and subcommentary have already extensively refuted it. The Vaiśeṣikas assert the self (ātman) as the self [in self-creation], which shall now be explained further. That is, the tenth verse of the chapter "Examination of the Agent" states: "Self-created and created by another, jointly created and created without a cause: such [modes] cannot be found, therefore there is no suffering." The prose exposition explains by way of the approach of causes and conditions, which then applies broadly to the Hīnayāna, Mahāyāna, and so forth. Next, it speaks in terms of refuting non-Buddhists, first giving a general summary. It states that as a sūtra says: there was a naked ascetic (acela) named Kassapa who asked the Buddha, "Is suffering self-created?" The Buddha remained silent and did not reply. "World-Honoured One! If it is so that suffering is not self-created, is it created by another?" The Buddha also did not reply. "World-Honoured One! If it is so, is suffering both self-created and created by another?" The Buddha also did not reply. "World-Honoured One! If it is so, is suffering created without cause and without conditions?" The Buddha also did not reply. Exegesis: The treatise below has two intentions in its refutation. First, in terms of intrinsic emptiness, it concludes: "To these four questions the Buddha did not reply at all. One should know that suffering is simply empty" (the first is spoken in terms of non-Buddhists). An objection asks: "When the Buddha spoke this sūtra, he did not say suffering is empty; he spoke this in accordance with sentient beings who could be liberated. This naked Kassapa held that a person is the cause of suffering. Those who hold a self say: good and bad are all created by the soul; the soul is ever pure and without suffering and distress. All that is known and understood is entirely created by the soul. Good, bad, suffering, and pleasure, in turn, undergo various bodies. Due to this wrong view, he asked the Buddha whether suffering is self-created. Therefore the Buddha did not reply. In truth, suffering is not created by the self. If the self were the cause of suffering, and suffering arose dependent on the self, the self would then be impermanent. Why is that? If a dharma is a cause, and whatever dharma arises from a cause, all are also impermanent. If the self were impermanent, then the retributions of sin and merit would all be cut off and extinguished, and the meritorious retribution of cultivating the pure life (brahmacarya) would also be empty. If the self were the cause of suffering, there would be no liberation. Why is that? If the self creates suffering and is free from suffering, there is no self capable of creating suffering, because there is no body. If without a body one could create suffering, one who attains liberation would also be subject to suffering; in that case, there would be no liberation. Yet in truth there is liberation; therefore, that suffering is self-created is not so." Exegesis: This refutes the self as the agent of self-creation. Hence the commentary says "svabhāva and so forth", equating it with the self. Next, refuting creation by another, the treatise states: "That suffering is created by another is also not so. Apart from suffering, what person is there who could create suffering and give it to another? Furthermore, if another created suffering, it would be created by Maheśvara. Because of asking with such a wrong view, the Buddha also did not reply. In truth, it is not created by Maheśvara. Why is that? Because their natures are contrary. Just as the offspring of a cow still gives birth to a cow, if all things were born from Maheśvara, they should all resemble Maheśvara, being his children. Furthermore, if Maheśvara created sentient beings, he should not give suffering to his children; therefore, one should not say it is created by Maheśvara." An objection asks: "Sentient beings are born from Maheśvara, and suffering and pleasure are also born from Maheśvara; because they do not recognize the cause of pleasure, he gives them suffering." The answer states: "If sentient beings were the children of Maheśvara, he should only ward off suffering with pleasure and should not give suffering; also, merely by making offerings to Maheśvara, one should extinguish suffering and attain pleasure. Yet in truth it is not so: one merely performs the causes and conditions of suffering and pleasure oneself and receives the retribution oneself; it is not created by Maheśvara. Furthermore, if he were sovereign (īśvara), he would have no further need. If he creates out of having a need, he is not called sovereign. If he has no need, why would he magically produce all things like a child's game? Furthermore, if Īśvara created sentient beings, who then created Īśvara? If Īśvara created himself, that is not so, just as a thing cannot create itself. If there were another creator, he would not be called sovereign." Below, it refutes this extensively, fully as in that treatise. It goes on to say: "If Īśvara created suffering, pleasure, and such matters, and he himself formed and destroyed worldly dharmas, and so forth... Moreover, if Īśvara were also created by another, there would be an infinite regress; and if there is an infinite regress, there is no cause; therefore, he is not sovereign." Next, refuting joint creation: it incurs the above two faults; and because it is a provisional conjunction of causes, it is not without cause. All four are wrong views; hence the Buddha did not reply. Refuting Brahmā and so forth follows the same paradigm as Īśvara: although differentiated by person, the meaning of creation by another is identical. However, the false assertions of this land [of China] are also traditions handed down from the Western Heavens (India). According to the Calendar of the Three Kings (Sanwang li): "Heaven and earth were in chaos, and Pangu was born within it. In one day he transformed nine times, divine in heaven and sagely on earth, lording over heaven and earth. Heaven grew one zhang higher each day, earth grew one zhang thicker each day, and Pangu also grew one zhang taller. After eighteen thousand years like this, heaven and earth were then opened up. Pangu had a dragon's body and a human head; his head reached the eastern extreme and his feet the western extreme; his left hand reached the southern extreme and his right hand the northern extreme. Opening his eyes made day, and closing his eyes made night. Exhaling made heat, and inhaling made cold. Blowing breath made wind and clouds, and his shouting voice made thunder and lightning. When Pangu died, his head became the first heavenly stem jia, his throat became yi, his shoulders bing, his heart ding, his gallbladder wu, his spleen ji, his ribs geng, his lungs xin, his kidneys ren, and his feet gui. His eyes became the sun and moon, his whiskers the stars and constellations, his eyebrows the Dipper's handle, his nine orifices the Nine Provinces, his breasts Mount Kunlun, his knees the Southern Peak, his thighs Mount Tai, his buttocks fishes and turtles, his hands flying birds, his claws turtles and dragons, his bones gold and silver, his hair grasses and trees, his body hairs ducks and drakes, his teeth jade and stone, his sweat rain and water, his large intestine the rivers and seas, his small intestine the Huai and Si rivers, his bladder the hundred streams, and the contour of his face Lake Dongting." Wei Zhao's Tongji states: "Popular tradition holds that Pangu underwent seventy transformations in a single day, overarching as heaven and lying prostrate as earth, dying only at eighty thousand years of age. Yet the deeds of Pangu are of recent fabrication; lacking historical records, they are difficult to rely upon. They are merely false traditions handed down from ancient times." Judgment: Truly it is as he says. It also vaguely resembles Brahmā, Viṣṇu, and others of the Western Regions. Now, since we are refuting heresy, recounting it carries no fault. As for the commentary's "Third, in terms of the mutual dependence of causes and conditions", the Ten Grounds are treated below. The Abhidharmasamuccaya states: "Because its own seed exists, it does not come from another; because it depends on multiple conditions, it is not self-created; because there is no active agent, they do not jointly produce; because it has efficacious capacity, it is not without cause." This takes the cause as self and the conditions as other. Utilizing the cause dispels conditions; utilizing conditions dispels the cause; utilizing lack of agency dispels joint [creation]; utilizing efficacious capacity dispels [creation] without cause. The Ten Grounds [section] is even more extensive. In the commentary, "Fourth, in terms of viewing the effect from the cause" is the initial heading, which speaks in terms of the characteristic-less school. From "The Madhyamakaśāstra states" downwards, the second part cites the treatise to explain correctly, namely the chapter "Examination of Suffering". First it cites one verse, which is the initial general statement, the verse clarifying that there is no creation through the four alternatives. In the third part, from "These words 'self' and 'other'" downwards, the commentary explains initially taking the effect as self. It cites the treatise: an effect dharma cannot create its own essence, which is Pin̄gala's explanation of the meaning of non-self-arising in the chapter "Examination of Conditions". Although taking the cause as self and conditions as other is the same as the Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā, the Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā involves the mutual mutual deprivation of causes and conditions, whereas here, within the phrase itself, it distinguishes arising through conditions without the effect in mutual dependence, correctly explaining the verse's "regarding the effect, it is not so". However, the commentary adopts the meaning to explain the first two lines. If discussed according to the verses, each verse refutes one: refuting the initial self-creation, it says: "If suffering were self-created, it would not arise from conditions. Because this skandha exists, that skandha arises." Exegesis: The first half provisionally concedes its self-creation apart from conditions; the second half shows its causes and conditions to clarify that it is not self-created. Next, refuting creation by another, it says: "If one holds these five skandhas to be different from those five skandhas, in that case one should say suffering is created from an other." Exegesis: This merely indirectly reveals non-creation by another. Because these present skandhas are certainly not different from the subsequent ones, they are not created by another. If one insists they are different, the cause would be different from the effect, and the cause would be the same as a non-cause. Since neither self-creation nor creation by another comes from conditions, how could an effect be attained in dependence upon a cause? Therefore, it is impossible. In the commentary, from "Since separation does not succeed" downwards, the commentary introduces the third and fourth lines. Afterward, it cites the treatise to explain correctly, explaining the line on non-joint [creation]. It merely follows the preceding to provisionally refute, adducing an analogy to explain the fourth line; hence the treatise above says: "When having a cause does not succeed, how could having no cause succeed?" In the commentary, "the two meanings of the second half" refers to the sūtra's "and its attaining establishment, and also attaining destruction." The former meaning is that the intrinsic emptiness of the first half does not obstruct the establishment through conditions of the second half, which is the principle of the non-obstruction of phenomenon and principle. The latter meaning is that through the intrinsic emptiness above, the second half is established—that is, "because there is the meaning of emptiness, all dharmas are able to be established"—which is the approach of the mutual establishment of phenomenon and principle. In the commentary, from "Furthermore, it does not only speak of suffering" downwards, this is the Madhyamakaśāstra's concluding statement by analogy. "The words 'establishment and destruction' show that it also includes the receptacle world": the Madhyamakaśāstra directly addresses direct retribution (sentient beings), whereas the present sūtra's intent is to encompass both. In the commentary, from "Hence Vimalakīrti states" downwards, it cites proof, namely Chapter Twelve, "The Dharma Door of Non-Duality": "Bodhisattva Nārāyaṇa said, 'The worldly and the supramundane are two. The intrinsic emptiness of the worldly is itself the supramundane; and within it there is neither entering nor exiting, neither overflowing nor dispersing—this is entering the dharma door of non-duality.'" Furthermore, Chapter One of the Viśeṣacintā states: "The five skandhas are the world, that upon which the world relies. Relying upon the five skandhas, one is not freed from the world. Bodhisattvas possess wisdom and know the real nature of the world: namely, the suchness of the five skandhas, undefiled by worldly dharmas." It also states: "The five skandhas lack intrinsic nature; this is itself the nature of the world. If a person does not know this, they constantly abide in the world. If one sees and knows that the five skandhas have neither birth nor death, this person moves in the world without relying upon the world. Ordinary beings do not understand dharmas, and stir up disputes in the world over what is real and what is unreal; this is merely within the two characteristics. I never stir up disputes with the world, because the real mark of the world has already been fully comprehended." This is largely identical to this. As for the commentary's "It then reveals that the former is not phenomenal cessation": cessation is of two kinds, namely principle and phenomenon; hence the supramundane above is also of two kinds: first, departing in terms of phenomena, meaning that prior to the stages (bhūmis) is the worldly, while ascending the stages is the supramundane. This is in terms of phenomenal cessation; since the verse merely says "its cessation is not worldly", it admits of both interpretations, and this text is cited to prove that it is not phenomenal cessation. Second, in terms of characteristics it is called worldly, while in terms of nature it is the supramundane. The meaning of the present text is cessation in terms of principle, in accord with sūtras such as the Vimalakīrti and the Viśeṣacintā. As for the commentary's "Then one knows that originally it is unproduced" and so forth: having stated that because it is empty it cannot be ceased, which is the meaning of non-cessation, it concludes that this is the meaning of non-arising, because there being nothing to cease, it is originally unproduced. This is what Bodhisattva Dharmavibhāvana said: "Arising and cessation are two. Dharmas are originally unproduced; now they are without cessation. Attaining this anutpattikadharmakṣānti is entering the dharma door of non-duality." In the commentary, "Furthermore, realizing the principle of lack of intrinsic nature": previously it discussed lack of intrinsic nature in terms of the response body (nirmāṇakāya), whereas here it discusses lack of intrinsic nature in terms of the true body (dharmakāya).

42.3

The eighth bodhisattva. The commentary states: "If one traces backward to its root, karma in turn has a cause, ultimately reaching the non-abiding." The preceding verse, [explaining that] because of karma there is birth, was a direct explanation. Now, explaining that birth relies upon karma, and karma also arises from conditions, therefore saying that it is empty of intrinsic nature is already tracing backward. The phrase "ultimately reaching the non-abiding" follows the meaning of the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa-sūtra. That text traces backward, saying: "'What is the root of the body?' Answer: 'Desire and craving are the root.' It further asks: 'What is the root of desire and craving?' Answer: 'False conceptual discrimination is the root.' It further asks: 'What is the root of false conceptual discrimination?' Answer: 'Inverted ideation is the root.' It further asks: 'What is the root of inverted ideation?' Answer: 'Non-abiding is the root. Mañjuśrī! From the non-abiding root, all phenomena are established.'" In the present sūtra, the three in the middle are all subsumed within karma; sentient beings are themselves the emptiness and quiescence of the body; and "without coming" is the non-abiding root. The commentary states: "If the body were the Buddha..." and so forth. "Body" means the body of physical marks; this is as the Diamond Sūtra states: "If one contemplates the Tathāgata by means of the thirty-two marks, a wheel-turning sage king would be the Tathāgata." The final two lines conclude and show [this]: the third is suchness, and the fourth is the cognition of suchness. The commentary states: "Because seeing the Buddha accords with the nature, one does not doubt the identical essence." The Three Jewels are of an identical essence: the Buddha is the Dharma, and the Dharma is the Saṅgha. Therefore, when the sūtra says "pure as the dharmadhātu," "as" has the sense of "according with." People believe in the dharmadhātu, but it is difficult [for them] to believe in the Dharma-Buddha; hence the word "as" is used. In reality, the Buddha's body is the dharmadhātu. The commentary states: "First, knowing detachment is called the Dharma." This is from the first fascicle of the Viśeṣacintibrahmaparipṛcchā, as already cited above. The fourth line states: "This is the bodhisattva's universal practice."

42.4

The ninth bodhisattva. The commentary states: "Complete-aspect Consciousness-only." This has already been explained above; it precisely takes the synthesis of the true and the false as constituting the complete aspect. The commentary states: "At first glance, this metaphor resembles what is produced in the preceding metaphor..." and so forth. This selects and refutes the Kanding. The Kanding says: "The first two metaphors use what is produced by the true and false mind to distinguish Consciousness-only; the next two metaphors use what can produce the true and false mind to distinguish Consciousness-only." Now, saying "resembles": the great elements being different from colors resembles what is produced by the painter, yet [colors] not being apart from the mind having the painting resembles what can produce. Thus, a coarse observation seems like that, but detailed investigation is not so. From "detailed investigation" onward directly reveals the correct meaning. The commentary states: "However, relying upon the eight consciousnesses of arising and ceasing..." and so forth. This distinguishes the reason for the two, revealing that the Dharma-character school only has the mutual support of mind and objects. "And yet is identical to the tathāgatagarbha..." and so forth. This distinguishes the reason for possessing both. Therein, it first generalizes; later, from "because integrating conditions into the real..." onward, it shows the two aspects separately, taking precisely the two gates of tathatā and arising and ceasing from the Awakening of Faith as the two meanings. "Preservation and destruction are non-dual, being solely a single conditioned arising" concludes by returning to the Avataṃsaka. Integrating conditions into the real is destruction. Because characteristics are not destroyed, it is preservation. The statement "The two gates are unobstructed, being solely the one mind" concludes by returning to the Awakening of Faith. Because based on the phenomenon of the one mind two gates are established, one must possess both meanings before it is called complete-aspect Consciousness-only. Question: The ninth fascicle of the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi also states that its locus of transformation has two kinds: first, the support that maintains seeds, meaning the eighth consciousness; second, the support of delusion and awakening, meaning tathatā. Why do you say that relying upon the eight consciousnesses of arising and ceasing only has the mutual support of mind and objects? Answer: Although that text speaks of the support of delusion and awakening, it is not the mutual support of mind and objects. Because tathatā is unchanging and does not transform into the myriad objects in concordance with the mind, it is merely that which is deluded about. Later, when returning to purity, because it does not integrate characteristics into being identical to tathatā, it is merely that which is awakened to. Here, however, the mutual support of mind and objects is precisely the true and the false, which do not have two separate essences; hence we speak of the one mind. In accordance with the differences in meaning, it is divided into two meanings and spoken of as the distinction between the two gates. Therefore the treatise says: "Yet these two gates each entirely subsume all phenomena, because these two gates are not separate from each other." This is explained extensively as in the "Inquiry and Illumination Chapter" and in the Profound Discourse. The commentary states: "The first line of the first verse generally illustrates the one mind through metaphor." It contains the true and contains the false; it has the active and the passive. The treatise says: "That which is called 'phenomenon' refers to the mind of sentient beings; this mind subsumes all mundane and supramundane phenomena. Therefore below it synthesizes: 'The mind is like a master painter.'" "The next line: conforming to conditions, perfuming transforms it into the dependent [nature]." The Awakening of Faith states: "The inherently pure mind, stirred by the wind of ignorance, comes to have defiled mind." The Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra states: "The ocean of the storehouse consciousness is permanently abiding; stirred by the winds of external objects, waves of various consciousnesses leap and arise in turn." This is also the non-arising and non-ceasing harmonizing with arising and ceasing, neither identical nor different, which is called the ālayavijñāna. "The next line: failing to understand the dependent [nature], it becomes the parikalpita [nature]." This is because the sūtra states: "Because falsely grasping different characteristics." Therefore the Awakening of Faith states: "All phenomena have distinctions solely based on false thoughts. If separated from mental thoughts, then there are no characteristics of any external objects." "The fourth line illustrates that when dependent characteristics are exhausted, the essence is precisely the pariniṣpanna [nature]." This is because it says that the great elements are without difference. The great elements illustrate tathatā, meaning that the mental essence free from thought is precisely the Tathāgata's universal dharmakāya; having no intrinsic nature as derived from conditions is precisely tathatā. Furthermore, lines one and two represent undefiled yet defiled; lines three and four represent defiled yet undefiled. Therefore, the subsequent verse uses metaphor for neither identical nor separate. The commentary states: "Within the great elements there is no color, because they are touched by the body." Solidity, wetness, warmth, and motion are all tangible objects. The statement "Within colors there are no great elements, because they are seen by the eye" is spoken with regard to manifest color: blue, yellow, red, and white are the objects of the eye. Directly in terms of the essential reality of phenomena, the great elements are tangibles, and colors are colors. In terms of sensory apprehension, they are the body and the eye. "Furthermore, that which can produce is without difference, while colors differ." Selecting what is predominant: where earth predominates it is yellow, where water predominates it is white, where fire predominates it is red, and where wind predominates it is blue. Yet solidity, wetness, warmth, and motion together produce blue, and also together produce yellow, red, and white. On the side of what can produce, it is the same solidity and so forth; arriving at the side of what is produced, there are blue and so forth. Therefore it says: "That which can produce is without difference, while painted colors differ." The commentary states: "Illustrating that the false relies on the true..." and so forth synthesizes [the metaphor]. First, it synthesizes the difference between what can produce and what is produced. It should also fully state: within the true there is no false, because it is the domain of noble cognition; within the false there is no true, because it is what ordinary people cognize. From "the nature is without difference" onward synthesizes the aforementioned point that what can produce is without difference, and so forth.

42.5

Regarding the commentary’s statement, “The nominal must depend upon the real, because they appear together in the same aggregate”: according to the correct doctrine of the various schools, solidity and the like are real, while color-form and the like are nominal. Only in the Tattvasiddhi school are color, fragrance, taste, and touch considered real, while earth, water, fire, and wind are considered nominal. This is because [Harivarman] was a disciple of the Sāṃkhya who subsequently entered the Buddha-Dharma and still followed his original teacher. Hence the *Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa* says, “It possesses subtle craftsmanship in abundance, yet falls short in clarifying reality.”

Regarding the commentary’s statement, “However, the great elements must be capable of producing color-form,” and so forth: this resolves an objection. The objection states: In the preceding discussion of non-identity, it was said that there is no color-form within the great elements, and no great elements within color-form. Now, in discussing non-separation, why does it not say that the great elements are not separate from color-form, and color-form is not separate from the great elements? The meaning of the answer is clear. The preceding explanation of the mutual reliance of the true and the false merely took the single approach of tathatā within the mind to contrast with defiled delusion.

Regarding the commentary’s statement, “The first [verse] also clarifies that mind and objects are neither identical nor separate”: because this is contrasted with the true and the false above, it says “also.” Moreover, the latter three verses also resemble the two verses: this verse resembles the previous second verse, and because it is convenient to follow the theme of non-identity and non-separation, it is explained first. The latter two verses resemble the previous first verse, which will be understood below. Now, regarding the first:

When speaking of the distinction between the objective aspect (*nimittabhāga*) and the subjective aspect (*darśanabhāga*) within non-identity and non-separation, this follows the preceding metaphor of having cognition and lacking cognition. Because the subjective aspect corresponds to the mind having the capacity for cognitive discernment, and the objective aspect corresponds to the painting lacking cognitive discernment, the vessel world is the objective aspect of the eighth consciousness.

Regarding the commentary’s statement, “This illustrates that apart from the mind there are no objective marks”: this is because all things in the three times are created by the one mind.

Regarding the commentary’s passage beginning, “It must be that the mind transforms into the object”: this resolves an objection. The objection is just as before, and the meaning of the answer is likewise.

Regarding the commentary’s statement, “The next verse illustrates the mental modes of that which transforms and that which is transformed”: this is largely identical to the preceding metaphor: “The mind is like a skilled painter, / Distributing the various colors,” and so forth. Within the explanation of the metaphor, it first explains the first three lines; from “What is painted is not the mind” onward, it explains the doctrinal application of the fourth line.

Regarding the phrase “the mind as the union of the true and the false”: this distinguishes it from the mind of the Dharma-character school; that is, as the *Awakening of Faith* says, “The non-arising and non-ceasing combined with arising and ceasing is called the ālayavijñāna.”

“The word ‘constant’ negates annihilation,” and so forth: this refers to the ninth aspect—the metaphor of cause and effect—within the first transformative consciousness (the eighth consciousness) in the *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*. The full line reads: “Constantly turning like a torrent.” The treatise first asks: Is the ālayavijñāna annihilated or eternal? The reply states: It is neither annihilated nor eternal, because it constantly turns. That is, from beginningless time, this consciousness has continued in a uniform, uninterrupted stream; because it is the fundamental entity designated as the realms, destinies, and forms of birth, its nature firmly maintains the seeds without letting them be lost. “Turning” means that from beginningless time, this consciousness arises and ceases moment by moment, shifting and altering from earlier to later, with the cause ceasing and the effect arising; because it is not eternal or unitary, it can serve as a ground for the evolving consciousnesses to perfume into seeds. Hence, the word “constant” negates annihilation, while “turning” indicates impermanence. It is like a torrent: the nature of cause and effect is just like rushing water, neither annihilated nor eternal, continuing over a long duration, in which beings are swept along and drowned. This consciousness is likewise: from beginningless time, arising and ceasing in unbroken succession, neither eternal nor annihilated, it sweeps along sentient beings so that they cannot escape.

Regarding the commentary’s statement, “Containing all seeds”: this is the third aspect—the causal characteristic. Hence that verse says, “The characteristic of all seeds is exceedingly profound and subtle,” which subsumes two aspects. That verse says, “Incomprehensible in its grasping, dwelling place, and cognition.” The single word “cognition” (*vijñapti*) is the fifth aspect—the mental mode (*ākāra*). “Dwelling place” (*sthāna*) is the fourth aspect—the objective support (*ālambana*) and mental mode. “Incomprehensible” refers to the differentiated nature within the cognitive mode and the object cognized. The treatise first asks: What are the mental mode and objective support of this consciousness? (This is a combined question.) It states: Incomprehensible in its grasping, dwelling place, and cognition. “Cognition” means discernment, serving as the mental mode. “Dwelling place” means the location, which is the vessel world, because it is the place relied upon by sentient beings. “Grasping” is twofold: the various seeds and the physical body endowed with sense faculties. Next, the treatise says: “Incomprehensible” means that because this mental mode is exceedingly subtle, it is difficult to discern (this clarifies the subjective aspect). Or, it is called incomprehensible because this internal grasped object of support is also subtle, and the external vessel world is difficult to measure. Therefore, the sūtra verse says, “The ādānavijñāna is exceedingly profound and subtle; / All seeds are like a rushing torrent. / I do not reveal it to the foolish, / Fearing they would conceptually grasp it as a self.”

Regarding the commentary’s statement, “The next line suddenly manifests the myriad objects”: this is also the aspect of its fruitional characteristic, termed “maturation” (*vipāka*). The treatise says: “Because this is the matured fruit of wholesome and unwholesome karma that leads to the various realms, destinies, and births,” this comprehensively clarifies the meaning of this consciousness as a transformative agent; this is the first transformative consciousness suddenly manifesting the myriad objects. The *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra* states, “Just as a clear mirror suddenly manifests myriad images, / So too does the manifestation consciousness manifest its domain.”

Regarding the commentary’s statement, “The lower line illustrates that the transformed objects have no substance apart from the mind”: because they lack substance, they cannot cognize one another. Therefore, the “Clarifying Questions” chapter says, “All dharmas have no activity, / Nor do they possess an intrinsic nature; / Therefore, all of them / Do not know one another.”

From “Furthermore, constantly not abiding” onward: above, in terms of the Dharma-character school, “constantly not abiding” means arising and ceasing from moment to moment. Now, explaining that it is not, this carries the meaning of “non-existence.” “Constantly not abiding” means constantly non-abiding. “Non-abiding” is an alternate name for the true mark (*dharmatā*); hence all dharmas are established from the non-abiding root. This is the Dharma-nature school: because the true mind conforms with conditions to form the myriad existents, it is profound, vast, and inconceivable. The preceding sūtra verse also corroborates this.

Regarding the commentary’s statement, “The mind that is able to paint arises and ceases from moment to moment, and does not itself know [the painting]”: although the mind has cognitive discernment, here it takes its arising, ceasing, and non-abiding, and thus it cannot know. Because the preceding thought has already ceased and the subsequent thought has not yet arisen: that which has not yet arisen has no substance to cognize the preceding thought; and the preceding thought having already ceased, there is nothing left to be cognized. The preceding thought also does not know the subsequent thought: the preceding thought having ceased, there is no cognizer; the subsequent thought having not yet arisen, there is also no object of cognition. Since the cognizing mind does not even know itself, how could it know that which is cognized?

From the commentary’s statement, “Illustrating both mind and objects together” onward: this matches the text, as can be understood. However, in explaining this verse, there are four general intentions: First, to clarify emptiness of nature: because nature is empty, it cannot know its own mind; because nature is empty, it cannot know the painting, which arises through the mind. Second, from “Furthermore, although it does not know” onward: this clarifies that although nature is empty, it does not obstruct dependent origination. Third, from “Furthermore, because it is unable” onward: this clarifies that by being deluded about the true, the apparent arises; if one awakens to one’s own mind, one does not create false objects. Fourth, from “Furthermore, precisely because” onward: that is, because there is the meaning of emptiness, all dharmas can be accomplished. “Therefore it says that the nature of all dharmas is like this”: this wraps up and concludes the four intentions. Thus ends the explanation of the metaphor.

Now, the first transformative consciousness in the *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi* consists of two and a half verses, which encompass ten aspects. These have already been distinguished above as applied; now they shall be set forth in full. The verses state: “First, the ālayavijñāna (1. intrinsic nature aspect), / Maturation (2. fruitional aspect), possessing all seeds (3. causal aspect), / Incomprehensible in its grasping, dwelling place (4. objective support aspect), and cognition (5. mental mode aspect), / Constantly associated with contact, attention, feeling, conceptualization, and volition (6. associated mental factors aspect), / Accompanied only by equanimity feeling (7. five feelings aspect), / It is unobstructed and indeterminate (8. three natures aspect). / Contact and the rest are likewise (same as above). / Constantly turning like a torrent (9. cause and effect metaphor aspect), / Abandoned at the stage of the arhat (10. abandonment and suppression stage aspect).” These ten aspects above are already in the commentary and may be known as correlated. Preceding and succeeding passages of this kind should be understood by analogy.

Regarding the commentary’s passage beginning, “The second set of five verses matches [the metaphor]”: The commentary says: “‘Mind’ refers to the mind of general characteristics,” as has already been explained in the preceding metaphor. However, regarding “The second line, ‘the various worlds,’ refers to the various colors”: this line has two aspects: First, from the standpoint of being able to paint, it belongs to the cause above; second, from the words “the various worlds,” it belongs to the fruit. Thus, the first half belongs to the causal transformation, and the second half belongs to the fruitional transformation. Hence the *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi* states: “There are two kinds of transformative consciousness: First, causal transformation, which refers to the seeds and latencies of niṣyanda and maturation in the eighth consciousness (the aspect of seeds and active dharmas). Both of these latencies are called causal transformation.” This is the general explanation. The treatise says: “Niṣyanda latencies are perfumed and increased by the wholesome, unwholesome, and indeterminate [states] among the seven consciousnesses (each producing its own active manifestation from among the three kinds of seeds, excluding the eighth consciousness because it cannot perfume). Maturation latencies are perfumed and increased by the defiled wholesome and unwholesome [states] among the six consciousnesses (excluding the seventh consciousness and indeterminate states, because they are not causes of maturation; hence the former is the direct cause (*hetupratyaya*), while this is the predominant condition (*adhipatipratyaya*)). Second, fruitional transformation refers to the arising of the eighth consciousness through the power of the preceding two kinds of latencies, manifesting various aspects (these are the active fruits produced by the preceding two causes; conditioned dharmas that can transform and manifest are called fruitional transformation. ‘Various aspects’ refers to the associated mental factors, the subjective aspect, and so on of the eighth consciousness). Because niṣyanda latencies act as the direct cause, the eight consciousnesses arise distinct in their essences and characteristics, which is called the niṣyanda fruit, because the fruit resembles the cause (the seeds of the three natures of the active eight consciousnesses each producing their own active manifestation is called the niṣyanda fruit, because the fruit produced is of the same nature as the producing seeds). Maturation latencies act as the predominant condition, inducing the eighth consciousness to recompense the power of leading karma; because it continues constantly, it is called maturation. Inducing the first six consciousnesses to recompense completing karma, arising from maturation, is called ‘born of maturation’ and is not called ‘maturation,’ because it is intermittent. The preceding maturation and that which is born of maturation are called the matured fruit, because the fruit differs from the cause.” The explanation states: Because there is no dharma that the five aggregates do not create, all are maturation.

Regarding the commentary’s statement, “As in the order of the metaphor,” and so forth: black corresponds to the hells, due to the retribution of dark-black karma. Yellow corresponds to the central direction, asura being neither god nor human. Humans are white, because they have much wholesome karma. Gods are white-white, because both cause and effect are wholesome. This will be explained in detail in the discussion of the nine stages.

Regarding the commentary’s statement, “Then the five aggregates of the ten dharmadhātus”: this refers to the six destinies and the four noble ones. Among the four noble ones, the Buddha is in the subsequent verse, while the two vehicles and the bodhisattvas are subsumed within the “various kinds.” Since it states that there is no dharma it does not create, it does not exclude the two vehicles and the bodhisattvas either. Furthermore, stating “dharmas and so forth” indicates that because in this sūtra there is no dharma that is not created, the three categories and myriad types are all created by the mind.

Regarding the commentary’s passage beginning, “The first verse adduces an analogy to match”: the commentary text has two parts: first, a horizontal discussion; second, a vertical explanation. Within the former, there are five points: 1. Directly explaining the sūtra text; 2. Harmonizing with the older translation; 3. Separately establishing the principle; 4. Opening up the conceptual perspectives; 5. Synthesizing and integrating them. Now, regarding the first: it generally explains the meaning of the sūtra.

Next, from “However, mind is the general characteristic” onward: this sets forth the distinct characteristics of the three—mind, Buddha, and sentient beings. “Mind is the general characteristic” means that the myriad types and myriad dharmas, defiled and pure, of the dharmadhātu do not go beyond the one mind; this mind subsumes all mundane and supramundane dharmas, hence it is named the general characteristic. The remaining two conditions, defiled and pure, each belong to two categories. Generally speaking, within the ten dharmadhātus, the six destinies are defiled, and the four noble ones are pure.

Regarding the commentary’s passage beginning, “However, the Buddha-fruit tallies with the mind”: this explains the second half. Above, there are three dharmas, yet it only speaks of the two dharmas—mind and Buddha—as inexhaustible, without mentioning sentient beings, because sentient beings have an end. Mind is the universal mind, having the true as its essence, and is originally inexhaustible. The Buddha-fruit tallies with the mind, the initial and the original being non-dual and sharing a single complete enlightenment, hence it is also inexhaustible. Delusion regarding the true gives rise to the false; this has a beginningless [origin] but an end, so it is not spoken of as inexhaustible. However, since the Buddha-fruit tallies with the mind, the Buddha is also mind-created; that is, bodhi with its four wisdoms is created by the purified eight consciousnesses. If we take the fundamental, it is the purified eighth consciousness. If we rely on Tripiṭaka Master Paramārtha, this purified consciousness of the Buddha is designated as the ninth, named the amala-consciousness. The Tang Tripiṭaka Master [Xuanzang] said: “This translates as ‘immaculate’; it is the eighth, matured consciousness. That is, at the time of Buddhahood, the eighth is transformed into the immaculate consciousness, with no separate ninth.” If we rely on the *Ghanavyūha-sūtra*, the text explains it fully; the sūtra says, “The mind has eight consciousnesses, or again it has nine.” Furthermore, the lower fascicle says, “The Tathāgata’s pure garbha is also named immaculate cognition.” This is identical to what was established by Paramārtha: because the ninth has emerged from obstacles, it differs from maturation, serving as the source of the nine realms of existence. Furthermore, in the *Chapter on the Nine Consciousnesses* of the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* translated by Paramārtha, it mentions the “ninth amala-consciousness.” The Tripiṭaka Master explained: “The amala-consciousness has two aspects: First, the objective support, which is tathatā. Second, original enlightenment, which is the cognition of tathatā. The cognizing subject is the non-empty garbha, and the objective support is the empty tathāgatagarbha. In general terms, both take tathatā as their essence.”

The explanation states: These two are simply the two gates of the one mind in the *Awakening of Faith*. Original enlightenment resides in the gate of arising and ceasing, while the one mind is tathatā. Hence the treatise says: “It is only the one mind, therefore it is called tathatā.” Regardless of whether eight or nine, both are distinct from the consciousness of ordinary beings; that is, the four wisdoms, the three bodies, and so forth created by the purified consciousness.

Regarding the commentary’s passage beginning, “If we rely on the older [translation]”: second, harmonizing with the Jin translation, in which all three are inexhaustible, whereas the two sūtras mutually lack [an element]: the Tang translation lacks sentient beings, and the Jin translation lacks inexhaustibility. Therefore, there is the third part, which separately establishes another principle.

Regarding the commentary’s passage beginning, “It should say”: this is the third point. If one takes what is complete and perfect, it should be translated in this manner; then the three matters would all possess the characteristic of being without distinction, and this would again be made clear.

From “Because the substance of the false” onward: this sets forth the reason why the false is inexhaustible.

From “Therefore, the Tathāgata” onward: this adduces an analogy to verify it, which reflects the intention of the *Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra*. Tiantai adopted this, holding that the two dharmas of good and evil both take tathatā as their nature; if one were to sever the nature of goodness, one would sever tathatā. Since the true cannot be severed, it is said that nature-goodness cannot be severed. Buddha-nature is precisely the nature of reality, and the nature of reality is ultimate emptiness—how could it be severed? Nature-evil is not severed, meaning that false dharmas are fundamentally true, and therefore they are inexhaustible.

Regarding the commentary’s passage beginning, “Furthermore, the above three”: fourth, separately opening up conceptual perspectives, which then incorporates the Jin sūtra as exhausting the principle. That is, the Tang sūtra’s inexhaustibility obtains only two dharmas and only treats purity; the subsequent statement that all three are inexhaustible again omits the meaning of having an end. Now, stating that they are without distinction means that both the exhaustible and the inexhaustible are without distinction, and it also reveals that defilement and purity are fundamentally without distinction. Regarding the statement, “The mind subsumes two meanings: first, defilement; second, purity”: purity is self-nature purity, and defilement is original defilement; defilement and purity being non-dual constitutes the one mind. Regarding the statement, “Each using its initial meaning establishes non-distinction in conforming to the flow”: sentient beings originally have defilement, hence they follow the flow and turn their backs on the Buddha. When the Buddha conforms with their defilement, how could they conflict? Opposing the flow is analogous to this.

Regarding the commentary’s passage beginning, “Furthermore, the two meanings within the three”: fifth, the mutual integration of defilement and purity, which can be understood.

Regarding the commentary’s passage beginning, “Above, it was discussed horizontally”: second, the vertical explanation. Within a single person, these three dharmas are present; those who practice contemplation should utilize this approach.

Regarding the commentary’s passage beginning, “The single verse has two meanings”: regarding the statement, “The first half combines the first halves of the preceding second and third verses”: the mind not abiding in the body is precisely that there are no great elements within color-form; the body also not abiding in the mind is that there is no color-form within the great elements. This combines with the first half of the second verse. If combining with the first half of the third verse: the mind not abiding in the body means there is no mind within the painting; the body also not abiding in the mind means there is no painting within the mind.

Regarding the commentary’s statement, “The mind is that which can transform”: this is the mind within the mutual reliance of mind and objects. “And the substance of the mind”: this is the true within the mutual reliance of the true and the false. Regarding the statement, “The body is that which is transformed”: this is the object above. “And the characteristic of the nature”: this is the false mentioned earlier.

Regarding the commentary’s statement, “The second half combines the meaning of non-separation from the second halves of the preceding two verses”: this refers to color-form being attainable without being separate from the great elements, which is performing Buddha-work. It is also that, as before, a painting is attainable without being separate from the mind, which is performing Buddha-work. “Manifesting objects based on the mind” combines with the second half of the preceding third verse; “arising function based on substance” combines with the second half of the preceding second verse, “performing various Buddha-works”; this combines both of the above.

From “Substance and function do not obstruct each other” onward: this explains the fourth line.

Regarding the commentary’s statement, “In order to include this meaning, it does not speak in terms of mutual non-existence but speaks of non-abiding—a marvel of translation!”: this praises this sūtra. If it did not combine the fourth verse, but only combined the second and third verses, it should say that there is no body within the mind and no mind within the body—which are words of mutual non-existence—and would not reveal the meaning that the mind is constantly non-abiding. However, “not mutually abiding” and “constantly non-abiding” differ slightly in meaning, yet the text encompasses both. If one equates this non-abiding with the preceding non-abiding: because the mind arises and ceases moment by moment, it cannot abide in the body; because the body arises and ceases moment by moment, how could it abide in the mind? Contemplating this, it will become evident.

Regarding the commentary’s passage beginning, “The final verse,” and so forth: within this, there are three parts: 1. Briefly explaining the meaning of the sūtra; 2. From “However, there are two” onward: opening up the meanings for distinct explanation. Within this there are two explanations: one is concluding by returning to mind-only, and two, from “Contemplation of dharmas” onward, is concluding by returning to the two gates. 3. From “Furthermore, one is the contemplation of the reality of tathatā” onward: concluding with the essentials of contemplation.

Regarding the statement, “Therefore, temporarily upholding it can destroy the hells”: this refers to the *Zuanlingji*, which states: “In the first year of the Wenming era, a man from the capital Luoyang named Wang Minggan, who had neither moral discipline nor had ever cultivated goodness, fell ill and died. He saw two men lead him to the hells. In front of the gates of hell, he saw a monk who claimed to be Kṣitigarbha Bodhisattva. The monk taught Wang to recite a one-line verse. Its text said: ‘If a person wishes to fully know / All Buddhas of the three times, / They should contemplate thus: / The mind creates all Tathāgatas.’ Having bestowed the sūtra verse, the bodhisattva told him: ‘Reciting this verse can dispel the sufferings of the hells.’ After Wang recited it, he entered to see King Yama. The king asked him, ‘What merit do you possess?’ He replied, ‘I only uphold one four-line verse,’ just as described above. The king then released him. When he recited the verse, wherever the sound reached, those undergoing suffering were all liberated. Wang revived after three days. Remembering and upholding this verse, he spoke of it to Master Ding of Kongguan Monastery. Comparing and verifying the verse’s text, they realized it was a verse from the twelfth fascicle of the old *Avataṃsaka Sūtra*, corresponding to the nineteenth fascicle, the ‘Chapter on the Cloud-Assembly of Countless Bodhisattvas in the Yama Deva Palace Preaching the Dharma,’ of the new sūtra. Wang personally related this to Dharma Master Ding of Kongguan Monastery.”

First 5 of 25 passages. Read on

Linked texts (1)

大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔 — Classical Chinese