大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔 42.2

42.2

The seventh bodhisattva. In the commentary, from "Second, the contemplation of arising through conditions without agency" downwards, the text has two parts: first, a general structural division, stating that the first half of the preceding verse concerns non-agency, while the second half concerns establishment through conditions, and the first half of the succeeding verse concerns establishment through conditions, while the second half concerns non-agency; second, from "Now, the first" downwards, the correct explanation of the first verse. Within this, it first explains the first half, which itself has four levels: first, refuting non-Buddhists; second, refuting the Hīnayāna; third, dispelling the characteristics of dharmas; and fourth, explaining according to the characteristic-less school. Now, the first: "not created by svabhāva and so forth" clarifies that it is not self-created. The flourishing of non-Buddhist sectarian tenets does not go beyond the Sāṃkhya and the Vaiśeṣika. The Sāṃkhya asserts that svabhāva is capable of agency—that svabhāva, namely the unmanifest principle (pradhāna), is capable of agency, whereas the self (ātman) is not an agent, but merely a knower. And when the commentary says "and so forth", it equates this to the self. That the self is the agent belongs to the Vaiśeṣika masters. Next, stating "nor is it created by an other such as Brahmā and so forth", it provisionally includes the World Egg (aṇḍa), Īśvara, and Brahmā. The World Egg is what the Aṇḍa theorists assert, which has already been clarified in the first fascicle of the commentary. Īśvara is what the ash-smearing non-Buddhists assert. Combining the above yields "joint creation"; separating from the above yields "creation without cause". Therefore, by merely citing "self-creation", the four alternatives are already complete. As for the commentary's "merely because it is false and lacks karmic retribution", this generally refutes the four alternatives, for the assertions of all four alternatives lack karmic retribution. Stating "extensively refuted as in the Three Treatises" means, not wishing to multiply words, he refers to extensive sources. Indeed, all Three Treatises refute them; the Śataśāstra extensively refutes the two schools. Now, to accord with refuting the creation of suffering by the four alternatives, we provisionally rely on the Dvādaśanikāya-śāstra. It explains: as for the single assertion of svabhāva, the first commentary and subcommentary have already extensively refuted it. The Vaiśeṣikas assert the self (ātman) as the self [in self-creation], which shall now be explained further. That is, the tenth verse of the chapter "Examination of the Agent" states: "Self-created and created by another, jointly created and created without a cause: such [modes] cannot be found, therefore there is no suffering." The prose exposition explains by way of the approach of causes and conditions, which then applies broadly to the Hīnayāna, Mahāyāna, and so forth. Next, it speaks in terms of refuting non-Buddhists, first giving a general summary. It states that as a sūtra says: there was a naked ascetic (acela) named Kassapa who asked the Buddha, "Is suffering self-created?" The Buddha remained silent and did not reply. "World-Honoured One! If it is so that suffering is not self-created, is it created by another?" The Buddha also did not reply. "World-Honoured One! If it is so, is suffering both self-created and created by another?" The Buddha also did not reply. "World-Honoured One! If it is so, is suffering created without cause and without conditions?" The Buddha also did not reply. Exegesis: The treatise below has two intentions in its refutation. First, in terms of intrinsic emptiness, it concludes: "To these four questions the Buddha did not reply at all. One should know that suffering is simply empty" (the first is spoken in terms of non-Buddhists). An objection asks: "When the Buddha spoke this sūtra, he did not say suffering is empty; he spoke this in accordance with sentient beings who could be liberated. This naked Kassapa held that a person is the cause of suffering. Those who hold a self say: good and bad are all created by the soul; the soul is ever pure and without suffering and distress. All that is known and understood is entirely created by the soul. Good, bad, suffering, and pleasure, in turn, undergo various bodies. Due to this wrong view, he asked the Buddha whether suffering is self-created. Therefore the Buddha did not reply. In truth, suffering is not created by the self. If the self were the cause of suffering, and suffering arose dependent on the self, the self would then be impermanent. Why is that? If a dharma is a cause, and whatever dharma arises from a cause, all are also impermanent. If the self were impermanent, then the retributions of sin and merit would all be cut off and extinguished, and the meritorious retribution of cultivating the pure life (brahmacarya) would also be empty. If the self were the cause of suffering, there would be no liberation. Why is that? If the self creates suffering and is free from suffering, there is no self capable of creating suffering, because there is no body. If without a body one could create suffering, one who attains liberation would also be subject to suffering; in that case, there would be no liberation. Yet in truth there is liberation; therefore, that suffering is self-created is not so." Exegesis: This refutes the self as the agent of self-creation. Hence the commentary says "svabhāva and so forth", equating it with the self. Next, refuting creation by another, the treatise states: "That suffering is created by another is also not so. Apart from suffering, what person is there who could create suffering and give it to another? Furthermore, if another created suffering, it would be created by Maheśvara. Because of asking with such a wrong view, the Buddha also did not reply. In truth, it is not created by Maheśvara. Why is that? Because their natures are contrary. Just as the offspring of a cow still gives birth to a cow, if all things were born from Maheśvara, they should all resemble Maheśvara, being his children. Furthermore, if Maheśvara created sentient beings, he should not give suffering to his children; therefore, one should not say it is created by Maheśvara." An objection asks: "Sentient beings are born from Maheśvara, and suffering and pleasure are also born from Maheśvara; because they do not recognize the cause of pleasure, he gives them suffering." The answer states: "If sentient beings were the children of Maheśvara, he should only ward off suffering with pleasure and should not give suffering; also, merely by making offerings to Maheśvara, one should extinguish suffering and attain pleasure. Yet in truth it is not so: one merely performs the causes and conditions of suffering and pleasure oneself and receives the retribution oneself; it is not created by Maheśvara. Furthermore, if he were sovereign (īśvara), he would have no further need. If he creates out of having a need, he is not called sovereign. If he has no need, why would he magically produce all things like a child's game? Furthermore, if Īśvara created sentient beings, who then created Īśvara? If Īśvara created himself, that is not so, just as a thing cannot create itself. If there were another creator, he would not be called sovereign." Below, it refutes this extensively, fully as in that treatise. It goes on to say: "If Īśvara created suffering, pleasure, and such matters, and he himself formed and destroyed worldly dharmas, and so forth... Moreover, if Īśvara were also created by another, there would be an infinite regress; and if there is an infinite regress, there is no cause; therefore, he is not sovereign." Next, refuting joint creation: it incurs the above two faults; and because it is a provisional conjunction of causes, it is not without cause. All four are wrong views; hence the Buddha did not reply. Refuting Brahmā and so forth follows the same paradigm as Īśvara: although differentiated by person, the meaning of creation by another is identical. However, the false assertions of this land [of China] are also traditions handed down from the Western Heavens (India). According to the Calendar of the Three Kings (Sanwang li): "Heaven and earth were in chaos, and Pangu was born within it. In one day he transformed nine times, divine in heaven and sagely on earth, lording over heaven and earth. Heaven grew one zhang higher each day, earth grew one zhang thicker each day, and Pangu also grew one zhang taller. After eighteen thousand years like this, heaven and earth were then opened up. Pangu had a dragon's body and a human head; his head reached the eastern extreme and his feet the western extreme; his left hand reached the southern extreme and his right hand the northern extreme. Opening his eyes made day, and closing his eyes made night. Exhaling made heat, and inhaling made cold. Blowing breath made wind and clouds, and his shouting voice made thunder and lightning. When Pangu died, his head became the first heavenly stem jia, his throat became yi, his shoulders bing, his heart ding, his gallbladder wu, his spleen ji, his ribs geng, his lungs xin, his kidneys ren, and his feet gui. His eyes became the sun and moon, his whiskers the stars and constellations, his eyebrows the Dipper's handle, his nine orifices the Nine Provinces, his breasts Mount Kunlun, his knees the Southern Peak, his thighs Mount Tai, his buttocks fishes and turtles, his hands flying birds, his claws turtles and dragons, his bones gold and silver, his hair grasses and trees, his body hairs ducks and drakes, his teeth jade and stone, his sweat rain and water, his large intestine the rivers and seas, his small intestine the Huai and Si rivers, his bladder the hundred streams, and the contour of his face Lake Dongting." Wei Zhao's Tongji states: "Popular tradition holds that Pangu underwent seventy transformations in a single day, overarching as heaven and lying prostrate as earth, dying only at eighty thousand years of age. Yet the deeds of Pangu are of recent fabrication; lacking historical records, they are difficult to rely upon. They are merely false traditions handed down from ancient times." Judgment: Truly it is as he says. It also vaguely resembles Brahmā, Viṣṇu, and others of the Western Regions. Now, since we are refuting heresy, recounting it carries no fault. As for the commentary's "Third, in terms of the mutual dependence of causes and conditions", the Ten Grounds are treated below. The Abhidharmasamuccaya states: "Because its own seed exists, it does not come from another; because it depends on multiple conditions, it is not self-created; because there is no active agent, they do not jointly produce; because it has efficacious capacity, it is not without cause." This takes the cause as self and the conditions as other. Utilizing the cause dispels conditions; utilizing conditions dispels the cause; utilizing lack of agency dispels joint [creation]; utilizing efficacious capacity dispels [creation] without cause. The Ten Grounds [section] is even more extensive. In the commentary, "Fourth, in terms of viewing the effect from the cause" is the initial heading, which speaks in terms of the characteristic-less school. From "The Madhyamakaśāstra states" downwards, the second part cites the treatise to explain correctly, namely the chapter "Examination of Suffering". First it cites one verse, which is the initial general statement, the verse clarifying that there is no creation through the four alternatives. In the third part, from "These words 'self' and 'other'" downwards, the commentary explains initially taking the effect as self. It cites the treatise: an effect dharma cannot create its own essence, which is Pin̄gala's explanation of the meaning of non-self-arising in the chapter "Examination of Conditions". Although taking the cause as self and conditions as other is the same as the Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā, the Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā involves the mutual mutual deprivation of causes and conditions, whereas here, within the phrase itself, it distinguishes arising through conditions without the effect in mutual dependence, correctly explaining the verse's "regarding the effect, it is not so". However, the commentary adopts the meaning to explain the first two lines. If discussed according to the verses, each verse refutes one: refuting the initial self-creation, it says: "If suffering were self-created, it would not arise from conditions. Because this skandha exists, that skandha arises." Exegesis: The first half provisionally concedes its self-creation apart from conditions; the second half shows its causes and conditions to clarify that it is not self-created. Next, refuting creation by another, it says: "If one holds these five skandhas to be different from those five skandhas, in that case one should say suffering is created from an other." Exegesis: This merely indirectly reveals non-creation by another. Because these present skandhas are certainly not different from the subsequent ones, they are not created by another. If one insists they are different, the cause would be different from the effect, and the cause would be the same as a non-cause. Since neither self-creation nor creation by another comes from conditions, how could an effect be attained in dependence upon a cause? Therefore, it is impossible. In the commentary, from "Since separation does not succeed" downwards, the commentary introduces the third and fourth lines. Afterward, it cites the treatise to explain correctly, explaining the line on non-joint [creation]. It merely follows the preceding to provisionally refute, adducing an analogy to explain the fourth line; hence the treatise above says: "When having a cause does not succeed, how could having no cause succeed?" In the commentary, "the two meanings of the second half" refers to the sūtra's "and its attaining establishment, and also attaining destruction." The former meaning is that the intrinsic emptiness of the first half does not obstruct the establishment through conditions of the second half, which is the principle of the non-obstruction of phenomenon and principle. The latter meaning is that through the intrinsic emptiness above, the second half is established—that is, "because there is the meaning of emptiness, all dharmas are able to be established"—which is the approach of the mutual establishment of phenomenon and principle. In the commentary, from "Furthermore, it does not only speak of suffering" downwards, this is the Madhyamakaśāstra's concluding statement by analogy. "The words 'establishment and destruction' show that it also includes the receptacle world": the Madhyamakaśāstra directly addresses direct retribution (sentient beings), whereas the present sūtra's intent is to encompass both. In the commentary, from "Hence Vimalakīrti states" downwards, it cites proof, namely Chapter Twelve, "The Dharma Door of Non-Duality": "Bodhisattva Nārāyaṇa said, 'The worldly and the supramundane are two. The intrinsic emptiness of the worldly is itself the supramundane; and within it there is neither entering nor exiting, neither overflowing nor dispersing—this is entering the dharma door of non-duality.'" Furthermore, Chapter One of the Viśeṣacintā states: "The five skandhas are the world, that upon which the world relies. Relying upon the five skandhas, one is not freed from the world. Bodhisattvas possess wisdom and know the real nature of the world: namely, the suchness of the five skandhas, undefiled by worldly dharmas." It also states: "The five skandhas lack intrinsic nature; this is itself the nature of the world. If a person does not know this, they constantly abide in the world. If one sees and knows that the five skandhas have neither birth nor death, this person moves in the world without relying upon the world. Ordinary beings do not understand dharmas, and stir up disputes in the world over what is real and what is unreal; this is merely within the two characteristics. I never stir up disputes with the world, because the real mark of the world has already been fully comprehended." This is largely identical to this. As for the commentary's "It then reveals that the former is not phenomenal cessation": cessation is of two kinds, namely principle and phenomenon; hence the supramundane above is also of two kinds: first, departing in terms of phenomena, meaning that prior to the stages (bhūmis) is the worldly, while ascending the stages is the supramundane. This is in terms of phenomenal cessation; since the verse merely says "its cessation is not worldly", it admits of both interpretations, and this text is cited to prove that it is not phenomenal cessation. Second, in terms of characteristics it is called worldly, while in terms of nature it is the supramundane. The meaning of the present text is cessation in terms of principle, in accord with sūtras such as the Vimalakīrti and the Viśeṣacintā. As for the commentary's "Then one knows that originally it is unproduced" and so forth: having stated that because it is empty it cannot be ceased, which is the meaning of non-cessation, it concludes that this is the meaning of non-arising, because there being nothing to cease, it is originally unproduced. This is what Bodhisattva Dharmavibhāvana said: "Arising and cessation are two. Dharmas are originally unproduced; now they are without cessation. Attaining this anutpattikadharmakṣānti is entering the dharma door of non-duality." In the commentary, "Furthermore, realizing the principle of lack of intrinsic nature": previously it discussed lack of intrinsic nature in terms of the response body (nirmāṇakāya), whereas here it discusses lack of intrinsic nature in terms of the true body (dharmakāya).