大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔 52.74

52.74

In the commentary, as for 'fifth, entry through realization,' from 'the word "equal"' onward, it is the commentary explaining the treatise. This entry is the path, directly realizing tathatā; therefore, the verse on the stage of thorough penetration in the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi-śāstra states: 'When toward the cognitive object, / cognition obtains nothing whatsoever, / at that time one abides in representation-only, / because of being free from the characteristics of the two graspers.' The commentary on the treatise states: 'When the bodhisattva, toward the objective realm that is the cognitive object, with non-conceptual cognition obtains nothing whatsoever—because of not grasping the various characteristics of prapañca—at that time one is called truly abiding in the true ultimate nature of representation-only, which is the cognition directly realizing tathatā. Being equally equal with tathatā, it is entirely free from the characteristics of that which can grasp and that which is grasped, because both that which can grasp and that which is grasped are conceptualizing, grasping minds that are characteristics of prapañca.' Explanation: This generally explains the meaning of the verse. To say that 'it is entirely free from the characteristics of that which can grasp and that which is grasped' means that both the cognition that can realize and the tathatā that is realized are free from the two graspings. Furthermore, the statement above 'not grasping' means being free from that which can grasp; 'various characteristics' means being free from that which is grasped. The rest may be inferred accordingly. Next, the treatise says: 'There is an opinion: this cognition has neither of the two divisions, because it is free from the characteristics of that which is grasped and that which can grasp. Second, there is an opinion: this cognition possesses both the aspect of the object and the aspect of seeing; it arises bearing its aspect, and is thus called cognizing it. If it were called cognizing it without having its aspect, then cognition of form and so forth should be called cognition of sound and so forth. If it had no aspect of seeing, it should be incapable of cognizing; how could it be said to be the cognition cognizing tathatā? Do not let the nature of tathatā also be that which can cognize; therefore one must admit that this definitely has the aspect of seeing.' Explanation: This refutes the doctrine of the former master. First, refuting the lack of the aspect of the object: it means that if without having the aspect of tathatā upon the cognition it could still cognize, then just as cognition of form and so forth has no aspect of sound and so forth upon it, it should cognize sound and so forth. Later, in refuting the lack of the aspect of seeing, the statement 'do not let the nature of tathatā also be that which can cognize' means that both would equally lack the aspect of seeing and yet be able to cognize. Third, that treatise next says: 'There is an opinion: this cognition has the aspect of seeing but lacks the aspect of the object; it is said to grasp without an aspect because it does not grasp an aspect. Although it has the aspect of seeing, it is without conceptualization; it is said not to be without grasping, for it is not that grasping is entirely absent.' Explanation: From 'said to grasp without an aspect' onward, this is the text of the Yogācārabhūmi, fascicle seventy-three: 'Since it lacks the aspect of the object, how is it called cognizing it?' That treatise next answers: 'Although it lacks the aspect of the object, it can be said that this arises bearing the aspect of tathatā, because it is not separate from tathatā. Just as when the self-verifying aspect cognizes the aspect of seeing, it cognizes without transformation. This should also be likewise: if it cognized through transformation, it would not be direct realization. Like subsequent cognition, it would possess conceptualization; therefore one must admit that this has the aspect of seeing but lacks the aspect of the object.' Explanation: This means that this cognition cognizing tathatā arises carrying along the essential characteristic of tathatā, and is therefore called the cognitive object; it does not arise bearing the mental image of an objective aspect, and is called cognizing tathatā because it is not separate from tathatā. Explanation: Among the three masters above, that treatise takes the latter opinion as correct. According to the tenet of the present sūtra, one should adopt both of the first two: if they exist, both exist, and that which can and that which is [grasped] are distinct; if they do not exist, both do not exist, and that which can and that which is are quiescent. Only when these two are unobstructed is it called realizing tathatā. However, the present commentary first explains 'equal.' From 'the two selves' onward, it explains 'wholesome purification.' In explaining 'equal,' one need only observe what was cited above from the Vijñaptimātratā, and it will be readily understood. If analyzed in detail, the word 'equal' refers to non-conceptual cognition. Bringing the treatise in line with the sūtra, 'equal' in the treatise is precisely the meaning of 'non-conceptual' in the sūtra. From 'non-conceptual cognition directly realizing tathatā' onward, it explains the reason why non-conceptual is called 'equal,' which is 'equally equal' in the Vijñaptimātratā. As for the commentary's statement 'when the conceptualizing latencies of the two selves do not arise, it is called wholesome purification,' this explains the words 'wholesome purification' in the treatise; the intention of the treatise directly clarifies purification during the path of seeing. Now the commentary first explains purification, and afterward re-explains the path of seeing receiving its name. The 'two selves' refers to the self of persons and the self of dharmas; with the two selves as the root, the two hindrances arise. In mentioning the two selves now, the intention is simply to refer to the two hindrances. Therefore the Vijñaptimātratā states: 'The affliction hindrance: it takes the satkāyadṛṣṭi that grasps the imputed, real self as foremost, along with the one hundred and twenty-eight fundamental afflictions and their niṣyanda afflictions and secondary afflictions; all these disturb the body and mind of sentient beings and can hinder nirvāṇa, and are called the affliction hindrance.' Explanation: In the desire realm, the four truths each have ten afflictions, making forty; in the two higher realms, each lacks anger, leaving seventy-two; this makes one hundred and twelve, all of which are fundamental afflictions to be abandoned by seeing. However, doubt and the three views are abandoned only by seeing; in the path of cultivation, the desire realm has only six, and the two higher realms, each lacking anger, have five each, making ten; thus cultivation has sixteen. Delineated together, seeing and cultivation have one hundred and twenty-eight. The treatise states: 'The cognitive hindrance: it takes the satkāyadṛṣṭi that grasps imputed real dharmas as foremost. Views, doubt, avidyā, desire, anger, conceit, and so forth obscure the undistorted nature of the objective realm of the knowable, and can hinder bodhi; it is called the cognitive hindrance.' Explanation: From 'views, doubt' onward, the number of varieties delineated is the same as the affliction hindrance. The affliction hindrance is coarse and has many grades; what is abandoned by the two vehicles is solely of an unwholesome and obstructed nature, so its number has not been explicitly shown. Now the cognitive hindrance is subtle and without grades; it is abandoned solely by bodhisattvas, and is also subsumed under maturational indeterminate nature, so its number is not shown. Furthermore, it reveals that the avidyā of grasping dharmas is only a single ground-level affliction, which is subsumed under the four grounds, so its number is not shown. The words 'conceit and so forth' also include the secondary afflictions. As for 'the objective realm of the knowable,' it refers to the conditioned and the unconditioned. As for 'the undistorted nature,' it refers to the principle of tathatā. Due to abiding in this objective realm, it causes cognition not to arise. Previously, affliction was itself the hindrance; now, it is the hindrance to what is knowable. However, the distinction between the two hindrances fundamentally lies in the two words 'self' and 'dharma'; hence the words 'two selves' are precisely the two hindrances. As for 'conceptualizing latencies,' 'conceptualizing' is distinguished from innate; that is, they arise relying on false teachers, false teachings, and false reflection. The word 'latency' is distinguished from active manifestation; that is, they are seeds. Because these two do not arise, it is called 'purification.' Therefore the Vijñaptimātratā states: 'The conceptualized arising of these two hindrances is subsumed under what is abandoned by seeing. The spontaneous arising is subsumed under what is abandoned by cultivation. The two vehicles are only capable of abandoning the affliction hindrance; bodhisattvas permanently abandon both kinds. Only the noble path can suppress the two active manifestations, which extends to the path with defilements.' Explanation: This is now the Mahāyāna, and is moreover the path of abandonment, differing from suppression prior to the bhūmis and from the two vehicles; it is called wholesome purification. As for the commentary's statement 'first illuminating principle, the name "path of seeing" is established,' this explains 'during the path of seeing' in the treatise above. Therefore the Vijñaptimātratā states: 'Immediately following the preparatory practices, when this cognition arises, experiencing tathatā is called the stage of thorough penetration. Because it first illuminates principle, it is also called the path of seeing.' Explanation: This is that treatise's explanation of the name of the stage. 'This cognition' is non-conceptual cognition; 'experiencing' (tǐhuì) means penetrating (tōng) and reaching (dá). Illuminating principle is called 'seeing,' and seeing is itself the 'path.' As for stating 'first,' here an objection may be raised: if illuminating principle is called seeing, from the second bhūmi onward, does one not illuminate principle? Therefore it is now explained: because this is the very first, it receives the name on this basis. The others follow specific meanings. Stating 'during the time' refers to during the true path of seeing; therefore the Vijñaptimātratā states: 'The true path of seeing: that is, the stated non-conceptual cognition, truly realizing the true principle revealed by the two emptinesses, and truly abandoning the conceptualizing latencies of the two hindrances.' Explanation: Since it truly sees and truly abandons, it is clear that this is within the true path of seeing. The meaning of the two paths of seeing will be explained next below.