大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔 52.74

52.74

疏「五證入」者，從「言平等」下，即疏釋論。此入是道，正證真如，故《唯識論》通達位頌云「若時於所緣，智都無所得，爾時住唯識，離二取相故。」釋論曰「若時菩薩於所緣境，無分別智都無所得者，不取種種戲論相故，爾時乃名實住唯識真勝義性，即證真如智。與真如平等平等，俱離能取所取相故。能取所取俱是分別有所得心戲論相故。」解曰：此即總釋偈意。言俱離能取所取相者，謂能證智及所證如俱無二取。又上言不取者，離於能取。種種相者，離於所取。餘可思準。一次論云「有義：此智二分俱無所取能取相故。二有義：此智相見俱有，帶彼相起，名緣彼故。若無彼相名緣彼者，應色等智名聲等智。若無見分應不能緣，寧可說為緣真如智？勿真如性亦是能緣，故應許此定有見分。」釋曰：即破前師之義。先破無相，謂如智之上無真如之相而能緣，如色等智上無聲等相應緣聲等。後破無見中，言勿真如性亦是能緣者，同無見分而能緣故。三次彼論云「有義：此智見有相無，說無相取，不取相故。雖有見分而無分別，說非無取，非取全無。」釋曰：說無相取下，即《瑜伽》七十三文「既無相分，何名緣彼？」彼論次答云「雖無相分，而可說此帶如相起，不離如故。如自證分緣見分時，不變而緣。此亦應爾，變而緣者便非親證。如後得智應有分別，故應許此見有相無。」釋曰：謂此緣真如智，挾帶真如之體相起，故名所緣，非帶相分影像而起，名緣於如不離如故。釋曰：上之三師，彼論以後義為正。依今經宗，應雙取前二，有即俱有，能所宛然；無即俱無，能所斯寂。此二無礙，方名證如。然今疏文先釋平等。從「二我」下，釋善清淨。釋平等中，但觀上來所引《唯識》，居然易了。若細委配，言平等者，即無分別智。將論就經，論中平等即是經中無分別義。從「無分別智正證真如」下，釋無分別稱平等所以，即《唯識》中平等平等。疏「二我分別隨眠不生名善清淨」者，釋論善清淨言，論意正明見道時中清淨。今疏先釋清淨，後重解見道得名。言二我者，即人我、法我，二我為本而起二障。今言二我，意取二障耳。故《唯識》云「煩惱障者，謂執遍計所執實我薩迦耶見而為上首，一百二十八根本煩惱，及彼等流諸煩惱隨煩惱，此皆擾亂有情身心，能障涅槃名煩惱障。」釋曰：欲界四諦各有十惑為四十，上二界各除瞋有七十二，為百一十二，並是見道根本之惑。然疑及三見唯是見斷，修道之中欲界唯六，上二界除瞋各五為十，故修有十六。見修合辯有一百二十八。論曰「所知障者，謂執遍計所執實法薩迦耶見而為上首。見疑無明愛恚慢等，覆所知境無顛倒性，能障菩提名所知障。」釋曰：見疑已下，辯出頭數與煩惱障同。煩惱障麁有多品類，二乘所斷唯是不善有覆性故，以數未顯。今所知障細無品類，唯菩薩斷，亦是異熟無記所攝，故不顯數。又顯法執無明唯一住地煩惱，即是四住地攝，故不顯數。言慢等者，亦等隨惑。言所知境者，有為無為。言無顛倒性者，謂真如理。由處此境，令智不生。前則煩惱即障，今所知之障。然二障別，義本在我法兩字，故二我言即二障。言分別隨眠者，分別揀於俱生，謂依邪師邪教邪思惟生。言隨眠，揀於現行，即是種子。由上二不生，故名清淨。故《唯識》云「如是二障分別起者，見所斷攝。任運起者，修所斷攝。二乘但能斷煩惱障，菩薩俱斷永斷二種。唯是聖道，能伏二現行，通有漏道。」釋曰：今是大乘，復是斷道，異於地前伏及與二乘，名善清淨。疏「最初照理立見道名」者，此釋上論見道時中。故《唯識》云「加行無間此智生時，體會真如名通達位。初照理故，亦名見道。」釋曰：此是彼論釋位名也。此智者即無分別智，體者通也，會者達也。照理名見，見即是道。而言初者，此應有難：若照理名見，二地已上豈不照理？故今釋云：此最初故，以此受名。餘隨別義。此言時中，即真見道中，故《唯識》云「真見道者，謂即所說無分別智，實證二空所顯真理，實斷分別二障隨眠。」釋曰：既真見實斷，明是真見道中。二見道義，次下當說。

In the commentary, as for 'fifth, entry through realization,' from 'the word "equal"' onward, it is the commentary explaining the treatise. This entry is the path, directly realizing tathatā; therefore, the verse on the stage of thorough penetration in the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi-śāstra states: 'When toward the cognitive object, / cognition obtains nothing whatsoever, / at that time one abides in representation-only, / because of being free from the characteristics of the two graspers.' The commentary on the treatise states: 'When the bodhisattva, toward the objective realm that is the cognitive object, with non-conceptual cognition obtains nothing whatsoever—because of not grasping the various characteristics of prapañca—at that time one is called truly abiding in the true ultimate nature of representation-only, which is the cognition directly realizing tathatā. Being equally equal with tathatā, it is entirely free from the characteristics of that which can grasp and that which is grasped, because both that which can grasp and that which is grasped are conceptualizing, grasping minds that are characteristics of prapañca.' Explanation: This generally explains the meaning of the verse. To say that 'it is entirely free from the characteristics of that which can grasp and that which is grasped' means that both the cognition that can realize and the tathatā that is realized are free from the two graspings. Furthermore, the statement above 'not grasping' means being free from that which can grasp; 'various characteristics' means being free from that which is grasped. The rest may be inferred accordingly. Next, the treatise says: 'There is an opinion: this cognition has neither of the two divisions, because it is free from the characteristics of that which is grasped and that which can grasp. Second, there is an opinion: this cognition possesses both the aspect of the object and the aspect of seeing; it arises bearing its aspect, and is thus called cognizing it. If it were called cognizing it without having its aspect, then cognition of form and so forth should be called cognition of sound and so forth. If it had no aspect of seeing, it should be incapable of cognizing; how could it be said to be the cognition cognizing tathatā? Do not let the nature of tathatā also be that which can cognize; therefore one must admit that this definitely has the aspect of seeing.' Explanation: This refutes the doctrine of the former master. First, refuting the lack of the aspect of the object: it means that if without having the aspect of tathatā upon the cognition it could still cognize, then just as cognition of form and so forth has no aspect of sound and so forth upon it, it should cognize sound and so forth. Later, in refuting the lack of the aspect of seeing, the statement 'do not let the nature of tathatā also be that which can cognize' means that both would equally lack the aspect of seeing and yet be able to cognize. Third, that treatise next says: 'There is an opinion: this cognition has the aspect of seeing but lacks the aspect of the object; it is said to grasp without an aspect because it does not grasp an aspect. Although it has the aspect of seeing, it is without conceptualization; it is said not to be without grasping, for it is not that grasping is entirely absent.' Explanation: From 'said to grasp without an aspect' onward, this is the text of the Yogācārabhūmi, fascicle seventy-three: 'Since it lacks the aspect of the object, how is it called cognizing it?' That treatise next answers: 'Although it lacks the aspect of the object, it can be said that this arises bearing the aspect of tathatā, because it is not separate from tathatā. Just as when the self-verifying aspect cognizes the aspect of seeing, it cognizes without transformation. This should also be likewise: if it cognized through transformation, it would not be direct realization. Like subsequent cognition, it would possess conceptualization; therefore one must admit that this has the aspect of seeing but lacks the aspect of the object.' Explanation: This means that this cognition cognizing tathatā arises carrying along the essential characteristic of tathatā, and is therefore called the cognitive object; it does not arise bearing the mental image of an objective aspect, and is called cognizing tathatā because it is not separate from tathatā. Explanation: Among the three masters above, that treatise takes the latter opinion as correct. According to the tenet of the present sūtra, one should adopt both of the first two: if they exist, both exist, and that which can and that which is [grasped] are distinct; if they do not exist, both do not exist, and that which can and that which is are quiescent. Only when these two are unobstructed is it called realizing tathatā. However, the present commentary first explains 'equal.' From 'the two selves' onward, it explains 'wholesome purification.' In explaining 'equal,' one need only observe what was cited above from the Vijñaptimātratā, and it will be readily understood. If analyzed in detail, the word 'equal' refers to non-conceptual cognition. Bringing the treatise in line with the sūtra, 'equal' in the treatise is precisely the meaning of 'non-conceptual' in the sūtra. From 'non-conceptual cognition directly realizing tathatā' onward, it explains the reason why non-conceptual is called 'equal,' which is 'equally equal' in the Vijñaptimātratā. As for the commentary's statement 'when the conceptualizing latencies of the two selves do not arise, it is called wholesome purification,' this explains the words 'wholesome purification' in the treatise; the intention of the treatise directly clarifies purification during the path of seeing. Now the commentary first explains purification, and afterward re-explains the path of seeing receiving its name. The 'two selves' refers to the self of persons and the self of dharmas; with the two selves as the root, the two hindrances arise. In mentioning the two selves now, the intention is simply to refer to the two hindrances. Therefore the Vijñaptimātratā states: 'The affliction hindrance: it takes the satkāyadṛṣṭi that grasps the imputed, real self as foremost, along with the one hundred and twenty-eight fundamental afflictions and their niṣyanda afflictions and secondary afflictions; all these disturb the body and mind of sentient beings and can hinder nirvāṇa, and are called the affliction hindrance.' Explanation: In the desire realm, the four truths each have ten afflictions, making forty; in the two higher realms, each lacks anger, leaving seventy-two; this makes one hundred and twelve, all of which are fundamental afflictions to be abandoned by seeing. However, doubt and the three views are abandoned only by seeing; in the path of cultivation, the desire realm has only six, and the two higher realms, each lacking anger, have five each, making ten; thus cultivation has sixteen. Delineated together, seeing and cultivation have one hundred and twenty-eight. The treatise states: 'The cognitive hindrance: it takes the satkāyadṛṣṭi that grasps imputed real dharmas as foremost. Views, doubt, avidyā, desire, anger, conceit, and so forth obscure the undistorted nature of the objective realm of the knowable, and can hinder bodhi; it is called the cognitive hindrance.' Explanation: From 'views, doubt' onward, the number of varieties delineated is the same as the affliction hindrance. The affliction hindrance is coarse and has many grades; what is abandoned by the two vehicles is solely of an unwholesome and obstructed nature, so its number has not been explicitly shown. Now the cognitive hindrance is subtle and without grades; it is abandoned solely by bodhisattvas, and is also subsumed under maturational indeterminate nature, so its number is not shown. Furthermore, it reveals that the avidyā of grasping dharmas is only a single ground-level affliction, which is subsumed under the four grounds, so its number is not shown. The words 'conceit and so forth' also include the secondary afflictions. As for 'the objective realm of the knowable,' it refers to the conditioned and the unconditioned. As for 'the undistorted nature,' it refers to the principle of tathatā. Due to abiding in this objective realm, it causes cognition not to arise. Previously, affliction was itself the hindrance; now, it is the hindrance to what is knowable. However, the distinction between the two hindrances fundamentally lies in the two words 'self' and 'dharma'; hence the words 'two selves' are precisely the two hindrances. As for 'conceptualizing latencies,' 'conceptualizing' is distinguished from innate; that is, they arise relying on false teachers, false teachings, and false reflection. The word 'latency' is distinguished from active manifestation; that is, they are seeds. Because these two do not arise, it is called 'purification.' Therefore the Vijñaptimātratā states: 'The conceptualized arising of these two hindrances is subsumed under what is abandoned by seeing. The spontaneous arising is subsumed under what is abandoned by cultivation. The two vehicles are only capable of abandoning the affliction hindrance; bodhisattvas permanently abandon both kinds. Only the noble path can suppress the two active manifestations, which extends to the path with defilements.' Explanation: This is now the Mahāyāna, and is moreover the path of abandonment, differing from suppression prior to the bhūmis and from the two vehicles; it is called wholesome purification. As for the commentary's statement 'first illuminating principle, the name "path of seeing" is established,' this explains 'during the path of seeing' in the treatise above. Therefore the Vijñaptimātratā states: 'Immediately following the preparatory practices, when this cognition arises, experiencing tathatā is called the stage of thorough penetration. Because it first illuminates principle, it is also called the path of seeing.' Explanation: This is that treatise's explanation of the name of the stage. 'This cognition' is non-conceptual cognition; 'experiencing' (tǐhuì) means penetrating (tōng) and reaching (dá). Illuminating principle is called 'seeing,' and seeing is itself the 'path.' As for stating 'first,' here an objection may be raised: if illuminating principle is called seeing, from the second bhūmi onward, does one not illuminate principle? Therefore it is now explained: because this is the very first, it receives the name on this basis. The others follow specific meanings. Stating 'during the time' refers to during the true path of seeing; therefore the Vijñaptimātratā states: 'The true path of seeing: that is, the stated non-conceptual cognition, truly realizing the true principle revealed by the two emptinesses, and truly abandoning the conceptualizing latencies of the two hindrances.' Explanation: Since it truly sees and truly abandons, it is clear that this is within the true path of seeing. The meaning of the two paths of seeing will be explained next below.