大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔 53.4

53.4

In the Commentary, from "As for the six characteristics..." downward, is the fourth [section], which lists the names and briefly explains them. First, one must generally recognize their characteristics: 1. The "universal characteristic" (sāmānya-lakṣaṇa): because one encompasses manifold virtues. 2. The "particular characteristic" (viśeṣa-lakṣaṇa): because manifold virtues are not identical. 3. The "identical characteristic" (samāna-lakṣaṇa): because manifold meanings do not contradict one another. 4. The "differentiating characteristic" (vilakṣaṇa): because manifold meanings are not similar to one another. 5. The "integrating characteristic" (saṃsiddha-lakṣaṇa): because dependent origination is accomplished by means of these meanings. 6. The "disintegrating characteristic" (vyavasthāna-lakṣaṇa): because the various conditions each abide in their own nature and do not shift. Listing their names is entirely drawn from the treatise's text. From "This indicates..." downward, the commentary integrates and explains them. To distinguish host and guest, the treatise is first cited as a single whole. The treatise states: "The universal is the fundamental entry; the particular consists of the other nine entries. The particular relies upon the root and fulfills that root. The identical characteristic is due to entry. The differentiating characteristic is due to the increasing characteristics. The integrating characteristic is due to brief exposition. The disintegrating characteristic is due to extensive exposition. Just as the worlds form and disintegrate. All other tenfold statements should be understood by analogy according to their meaning." The subcommentary explains: In this, the commentary's meaning can be comprehended mentally. In the commentary, "the nine characteristics gradually increase" is the commentary's explanation. For instance, the entry of comprehension is the wisdom born of hearing, and the entry of contemplating the meaning is the wisdom born of thinking. Each subsequent one surpasses the preceding; therefore, gradual increase constitutes non-similarity. The statement "gathering nine conditions to form one" means forming a single entry. The statement "dividing one to make nine" means that the nine meanings differ, and the universal entry conforms to them, so there is no separate "one." However, according to Master Huiyuan, the two gates of integration and disintegration exist because of the above differentiating characteristic. Stating that integration is brief means that because, within differentiation, hearing, thinking, cultivating, and so forth are not inherently identical in substance, a single entry is newly formed in accordance with those nine entries; hence it is termed brief. Disintegration is extensive because, within differentiation, the nine meanings such as hearing differ; the universal entry conforms to them and is divided into nine; hence it is called extensive. Alternatively: the universal gathers particulars to achieve formation; the particular divides the universal into particulars. Identity means that each particular embodies the universal; differentiation means that the particulars mutually diverge. Integration requires gathering both: only through identity and differentiation is it accomplished. If there were no differentiating characteristic, the universal would not be formed—just as rafters and beams of a house, if entirely identical, would never form a house. Disintegration pertains solely to the particulars, because each abides in its own nature. These three pairs are distinctly different. In the commentary, from "It also says: like the world..." downward, the treatise uses a metaphor for integration and disintegration. From "Just as..." downward, the commentary explains the treatise: the three wheels, four great elements, and so forth are the dependent origination of forming a world-system (kṣetra), which, when gathered, form the Sahā world—hence it is called integration. Divided into ten billion four-continents, there is no separate Sahā world—this is termed disintegration; it does not refer to a world forming over twenty kalpas and disintegrating over twenty kalpas. In the commentary, from "It is also like beams..." downward, the fifth [section] generally explains through a metaphor, reflecting Xianshou's thought. In the commentary, from "All other tenfold statements..." downward, the sixth [section] provides examples for comprehensive explanation, which is the text of the treatise. In the commentary, "broadly revealed in a separate chapter" is the seventh [section], directing the reader to a broader treatment elsewhere, namely Xianshou's *Treatise on the Division of the Doctrines*. There, there are only three gates: 1. The arising and significance of the doctrine; 2. Listing the names and briefly explaining them; 3. Questions, answers, and analytical selections. The first two gates have already been fully detailed above; now we merely explain the questions and answers by examining them in reference to a single house, from which the six characteristics may be inferred for other phenomena. Question: Which is the universal characteristic? Answer: The house is the universal characteristic. Question: These are merely rafters and such; which one is the house? Answer: The rafters and the rest are precisely the house, because they alone can make the house, and apart from them it is not formed. [Objection:] If so, before there are tiles and such, [the rafters] should already be the house. [Answer:] If there are not yet tiles, they are not rafters, because in the absence of tiles and such, in contrast to what would they be called rafters? If the various conditions each contributed a small amount of force to act together, rather than acting entirely, there would be the errors of annihilationism and eternalism. Merely several small forces cannot form a single complete house; thus the house would be annihilated. Grasping it as existing when unformed would be causeless eternalism. Now, if one rafter is removed, it is no longer a complete house, which clarifies that the rafter completely forms the house—the rafter is the house. Because of this complete formation, this rafter is precisely the tiles, ridgepoles, and so forth; for if the rafter is removed, the house is immediately destroyed, and the tiles, ridgepoles, and so forth are also all destroyed. Therefore, all these conditions are precisely the rafter, and only then is the house successfully formed. Since one condition is so, the other conditions are likewise. Hence, with phenomena of dependent origination: if they are not formed, that is that; but if formed, they are perfectly interfused. Second, the particular characteristic: the conditions such as the rafters are distinct from the universal. If they were not distinct, the meaning of the universal would not be established, for when there are no particulars, there is no universal. Therefore, the universal itself serves as the particulars. Question: If the universal is precisely the particulars, it should fail to be the universal. Answer: Precisely because it is identical with the particulars, it can become the universal. Just as the rafter is the house, it is called the universal characteristic; the house is the rafter, so it is called the particular characteristic. If the particular were not identical with the house, it would not be a rafter; if the house were not identical with the rafter, it would not be a house. If they were not mutually identical: if the universal were outside the particular, it would not be universal; if the particular were outside the universal, it would not be particular. Question: If they were not particular, what further fault would there be? Answer: There would be the faults of annihilationism and eternalism. That is, if there were no particulars, there would be no rafters and such, and the house would not be formed. To grasp it as existing when non-existent would be causeless eternalism. The following four characteristics each have [their corresponding faults of] annihilationism and eternalism, which may be understood by extension. Third, the identical characteristic: the conditions such as rafters cooperate to form a house without conflicting; they are all called conditions of the house, not making other things. If they were not identical, the various conditions would oppose one another and not be identical, and making the house would not succeed. How does it differ from the universal? Answer: The universal characteristic looks solely to the single house; identity looks to the various conditions mutually, whose potency and function are equal. Fourth, the differentiating characteristic: the conditions such as rafters are differentiated from one another according to their own shapes and categories. Question: If differentiating, they should not be identical. Answer: Precisely because their characteristics each differ and lengths vary, they can serve as conditions for the house and with combined strength form the house. How does this differ from the particular? In the particular characteristic, the various conditions are distinct in relation to the single house; in differentiation, the various conditions are distinct in relation to each other. Fifth, the integrating characteristic: by means of these conditions, the meaning of the house can be achieved. Because the house is formed, rafters and the rest are termed conditions. Otherwise, neither would be established. Question: One sees directly that the various conditions each abide in their own nature; through what cause is it integrated? Answer: Through not acting as a house, the house can be achieved. For if they acted as a house, they would lose their original conditionhood, and the house could not be formed. Now, through not acting, the various conditions remain present, and thus the house can be formed. Furthermore, if they did not form the house, the rafters would not be called conditions. Since they are now called conditions, it is clear that they make the house. Sixth, the disintegrating characteristic: the conditions such as rafters each abide in their own phenomenon and fundamentally do not act. If they were to act as the house, they would lose their original phenomenon, and the house would not be formed. Because they do not act, the house can be formed. Furthermore, the universal is the single house; the particular is the manifold conditions; identity is mutual non-conflict; differentiation is the distinctness of each condition; integration is the conditions accomplishing the result; disintegration is each abiding in its own phenomenon. Thus the verse says: / One being many is the universal characteristic; / Many being not one is the particular characteristic. / Manifold types, being inherently identical, accomplish differentiation; / Individual substances, being differentiated, reveal identity. / Dependent origination of one and many is subtly accomplished in principle; / Disintegration abides in its own phenomenon, ever non-acting. / It is an object of cognition alone, not of sense consciousness; / Through this expedient means, one accords with the One Vehicle. / The meaning of the six characteristics has now been briefly concluded.